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Abstract 
This thesis has sought to investigate the development of Chinese elite sport policy 
after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games through examining the evolution of the 
Chinese Olympic discourses and elite sport policy discourses with emphasis on the 
power and interests reflected and constructed within and by these discourses. This 
study adopts a Critical Discourse Analysis approach, (founded on Critical Realist 
premises). The discourse analysis protocol employed is modified from Fairclough’s 
(2005, 2009) framework, also known as Dialectical-Relational Approach, to examine the 
constitution and implementation of power at the meso and micro levels of 
relationships within Chinese elite sport. 
The analysis is based on archival material and semi-structured interviews. Rather 
than providing a detailed chronology of the Chinese Olympic movement and of 
Chinese elite sport, the analysis, divided into two main parts, starts with identifying 
critical periods as the start line of the analysis and points of division that separate 
these periods. The analysis of the pre-2008 era starts with the year 1993, in which the 
first Olympic bid by China failed and the second significant reforming policy of 
Chinese elite sport was published. This section of the thesis consists of an analytic 
description of the development of Chinese elite sport policy and the analysis of 
Chinese Olympic discourse and elite sport discourse before the 2008 Olympics. The 
post-2008 section contains the analysis of these two discourses after the Beijing 
Games, and develops case studies of three sports, baseball, diving and table tennis, 
attempting to unveil the development of Chinese elite sport policy in the post-2008 
era. 
From 1993 to 2012, a consistent feature was the concurrent requirement of both 
reform and of satisfactory elite sport performance, was maintained in Chinese elite 
sport policy discourse. The power of discourses in relation to these dual goals has 
varied across the period, has been influenced by a number of factors, and has been 
maintained by the dominant group within Chinese society and within Chinese elite 
sport exercising their power over discourse. The thesis argues that the 
characterisation of Chinese elite sport and of its development has varied with the 
change in the power relationship between the two sets of goals, which has 
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significantly influenced the key developments and change in Chinese elite sport 
policy and its governance system.  
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Glossary of Terms 
Even though some would argue that discourse is language-specific and therefore is 
untranslatable in the literal sense, throughout history and with our daily life 
experience, we can clearly demonstrate that linguistic systems are not 
‘hermeneutically sealed’ systems, since cross-language communication and 
translation would not otherwise be feasible. On the other hand, it is also clear that a 
translated term, which may be translated based on the literal ‘denotation’ of its 
source language, may not have the same ‘connotation’ that it has in the original 
linguistic system. Take a scenario of the English word “Chair”. It is translated as 
‘Yizi’ in Chinese, following its denotation of a seat for one person, typically with a 
back and four legs. However, its connotation (in English) of the post of a professor or 
the person in charge of a meeting or of an organization is not a connotation of ‘Yizi’ 
(Paperback Oxford English Dictionary 2006; Oxford·FLTRP English - Chinese 2010; 
The Contemporary Chinese Dictionary 2012). 
Thus, a study using cross-language discourse analysis may be challenging and 
subject to subtle interpretation, especially in some terminologies with subtle 
connotations, nevertheless is still a potentially fruitful academic area which is built 
upon academic analysis and explicitly justified understandings (Henry, Al-Tauqi, et 
al. 2007).  
In order to make connotations and subtle meanings more explicit (and to signify that 
the Chinese word’s connotations are significant in our argument), for three Chinese 
terms, Juguo Tizhi, Tiyu and Zhuanye Sport, we employ the Pinyin form instead of 
translating them into English. Detailed explanation in terms of the meaning of these 
three terms is provided in this part of Glossary of terms. 
1 Juguo Tizhi 
Juguo Tizhi, often used as a byword for the system of Chinese elite sport, is normally 
translated and elaborated as “whole-country support for the elite sport system” (Fan, 
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Wu, & Xiong, 2005, p. 215; Tan & Houlihan, 2012; Wei et al., 2010). However, we 
would argue that Juguo Tizhi should also be understood as a framework that 
administers and operates Chinese sport affairs as a whole. It is Zhuanye sport that 
should be recognised as the sport system supported by the whole country, and is 
operated and governed by the government within the Juguo Tizhi framework.  
For more information and the discussion in terms of the relationship between 
Zhuanye sport, professional sport and Juguo Tizhi, see the discussion of Zhuanye 
Sport below. 
2 Tiyu 
Tiyu, is one of the Chinese phrases for sport, which, however, embraces a number of 
further meanings, such as physical activities, and physical education (The 
Contemporary Chinese Dictionary 2012; Oxford·FLTRP English - Chinese 2010). 
Another translation for sport is Yundong, which has extra connotations including 
mobility, movement, physical activity and political movement. (The Contemporary 
Chinese Dictionary 2012; Oxford·FLTRP English - Chinese 2010). In the thesis, ‘Tiyu’ 
is used when the term embraces other meanings such as physical activities, physical 
education in the Chinese context. 
3 Zhuanye Sport 
‘Zhuanye sport’ is employed as the term for the elite sport system that is supported, 
operated and governed by the government with administrative methods. ‘Zhuanye 
sport’ is the dominant form of Chinese elite sport.  
Bao (2009, p.14) identifies two defining features that differentiate it from  
‘professional sport’ that a) Zhuanye athletes receive payment or subsidies from 
government while professional athletes are mainly paid by their employer (normally 
professional clubs) or sponsors; b) Zhuanye athletes normally do not have full 
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ownership of their own human-capital, which means they are a kind of ‘sporting 
civil servant.’ More detailed analysis of the Zhuanye system and its operating 
framework is provided in the body of the thesis. 
It is important to clarify these meanings, as firstly in the limited amount of research 
literature on Chinese elite sport in western academic society, Zhuanye sport is 
normally translated as ‘professional sport’, ignoring the differences that are pointed 
out by Bao; secondly, the professionalisation of some Chinese elite sports that were 
dominated by Zhuanye sport is regarded as an important part of the 
market-oriented reform of Chinese elite sport, and it is therefore crucial to specify 
the difference when analysing the development of Chinese elite sport; thirdly, by 
using Zhuanye Sport as a particular term, we are able to make our analysis more 
precise and will enhance clarity, for example indicating why the term ‘professional 
sport’ was ignored in the 1985 reform policy, in which ‘Zhuanye sport’ and its 
reform provided the major focus. If we were to use the incomplete or inaccurate 
translation ‘professional sport’, then it would become very difficult for us to argue 
for the significance of the appearance of ‘professional sport’ in the 1993 reform 
policy.   
This understanding of the nature of Zhuanye Sport and Juguo Tizhi would lead to a 
better and fuller comprehension of Chinese elite sport, which has been lost in 
translation or even, consciously or unconsciously, omitted in the Chinese context. In 
the Research on the further perfection of Juguo Tizhi of Elite Sport of China, Li et al. 
(2003,p.2) provide a detailed elaboration of Juguo Tizhi indicating that: 
Juguo Tizhi is the system of the organisation and administration of [Chinese] elite 
sport, which aims to achieve outstanding results in Olympic Games and other 
important international events; [it] is government-led; [its] main component is the 
[elite] sport system. [Through utilising] the methods of optimising the allocation of 
[elite] sport resources, it promotes and organises the involvement of civil society [in 
Chinese elite sport]. [The system] has a single goal at national level, is rationally 
structured, is well managed, prioritises efficiency and gives attention to different 
interests.  
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Li et al, 2003 p.2 
In Li et al.’s definition, Juguo Tizhi is identified as “the system of the organisation 
and administration of [Chinese] elite sport”. This emphasis on its methodological 
and operational significance for Chinese elite sport clarifies an often-implicit nature 
of Juguo Tizhi. Concurring with Li et al.’s perspective, we recognise Juguo Tizhi as a 
framework that administrates and operates the sport affairs in China as a unit, 
especially Zhuanye sport.  
We would argue the reason for this confusing understanding of the nature of Juguo 
Tizhi, in terms of rhetoric, lies in the relation between “Juguo” which explicitly 
means “whole country”, and “Tizhi” that could be literally translated as “system”. 
The term of Juguo Tizhi thus could be interpreted not only as “the elite sport system 
supported by the whole country”, but also as “the whole-country directed by a 
system to support elite sport”. This is to say that “Tizhi”, the ‘system’, could be both 
interpreted as ‘the elite sport system’ and ‘the organisation and administration 
system of [Chinese] elite sport’, the second of which is advocated by Li et al. 
This confusion in the recognition of the nature of Juguo Tizhi, as the elite sport 
system per se (including both Zhuanye and professional sport) and the system 
administrating and operating the elite sport system is also evidenced in the Chinese 
literature. The statement in Hao’s (2004) in-depth study of Juguo Tizhi provides a 
good example, in which he argues that: 
Sport system is the administration system and the [whole] system [and institutions] 
of sport. 
Juguo Tizhi is a special sport administration system and operation mechanism in the 
second half of the 20th century in China.  
Hao, 2004, p.7 
Juguo Tizhi is a sport system that is led-by-government; it governs sport affairs with 
administration and distributes sporting resource with [methods based on] plan 
[economy].  
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Hao, 2004, p.9 
Following Hao’s interpretation, Juguo Tizhi could both be regarded as a “sport 
system” and “a sport administration system and operation mechanism”. Given that 
he also indicates in the same article that the “sport system is the administration 
system and the [whole] system [and institutions] of sport” (2005, p.7). The statement 
“Juguo Tizhi is a sport system” then becomes confusing, as it could be re-written as 
“JUGUO TIZHI (a sport system) is Juguo Tizhi (a special sport administration 
system) and the [whole] system [and institutions] of Chinese sport”. 
Even though, it is difficult to completely isolate an administration system from a 
sport system, we would argue that such ambiguous conceptualisation of the nature 
of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport influences the interpretation and implementation 
of Chinese elite sport policy. This is to say that implicit understanding makes the 
meaning of the goal of elite sport reform ‘insist and refine Juguo Tizhi’, become 
two-folded. On the one hand, it could be interpreted as the reform of JUGUO TIZHI 
(the Chinese elite sport system in general). This is consistent with the statement of 
the 1993 Policy and other pro-reform policies, parts of which had been implemented 
prior to the Beijing Games, such as the restructure of the training and competition 
system and the professionalisation of certain sports. On the other hand, it could also 
be interpreted as the reform to the system that administrates and operates Chinese 
elite sport, relating to the reform of the administrative governance system, a reform 
which had hardly achieved any significant progress.  
According to our analysis of the pre-2008 development of Chinese elite sport, we 
would argue this vague understanding of the nature of Juguo Tizhi is in line with 
the GAS’s interests. This is because it, on the one hand, protects the core of Juguo 
Tizhi (the administrative governance system) in the reform. On the other hand, it 
releases pressure for reform by employing reforming rhetoric in promoting moves in 
non-administration aspects of Zhuanye sport. Furthermore, some of these moves, 
such as restructuring of the national competition system, further reinforce the 
priority of the Olympic task, and thus the power of Zhuanye sport, and are in line 
with the interests of Sport Administration Departments. 
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Thus, this dual-interpretation of the nature of Juguo Tizhi effectively directed the 
reform to other (superficial and operational) parts of Chinese elite sport. In other 
words we could say that the superficial and operational reforms have been framed 
as a reform of the essential features of Chinese elite sport. Thus, Juguo Tizhi has 
remained the dominant approach in Chinese elite sport, enabling the GAS to 
concentrate resources for the preparation of the Olympics in “[a] closed [system] 
which to a degree protects against and rejects [the influence of] external … 
stakeholders” (Interviewee General 3) 
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Chapter One  Introduction 
In spite of the controversies built up around the Beijing Games, China managed to 
stage what the International Olympic Committee (hereafter the IOC) President was 
able to describe as “a truly exceptional Games” in 2008 (Rogge, 2008). In elite sport 
terms, China not only achieved its best performance in Olympic history, but also 
maintained this momentum in subsequent international events, such as the 2010 
Asian Games and the 2012 London Olympics. In the meantime, Chinese elite sport, 
has also confronted a variety of criticisms from the media (L. Li & Wang, 2011; Wang 
& Yang, 2011; Yang, 2010), and, more importantly, comments from figures at the 
head of the PRC (Zheng & Gong 2010; Liu 2014; Wang 2014) concerning its limited 
efforts in relation to reform.  
It has been nearly 30 years since the first proposal for Chinese elite sport reform was 
documented in the SPCSC1’s Decision on the Reform of Sport System (Draft) (SPCSC 
1986b), while China has been transferring from “an orthodox Leninist society to a 
neo-liberal socialist society with a Chinese character” (Wei et al. 2010, p.2380). Even 
though there have been some achievements accomplished in relation to reform, the 
                                                 
1 The SPCSC refers to the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission (hereafter, the SPCSC). It 
was established ion 15 November 1952 for the administration and development of sport affairs in the 
PRC (Wu, 1999). It was restructured in the General Administration of Sport (hereafter, the GAS) in 
1998. 
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traditional elite sport system (Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi) has maintained its 
dominance (Li et al. 2003; Zhang 2009; Xiong et al. 2008; Wu 1999). Especially during 
the preparation for the Beijing Games, the traditional system, i.e. Zhuanye sport2, 
and its administration framework, Juguo Tizhi 3 , had been to a large degree 
reinforced, while by contrast, voice of reform had been (voluntarily or involuntarily) 
muted (Interviewee General 2, Interviewee General 3, Interviewee Table Tennis 24, 
Zhang, 2009). In the post-2008 era, the maintenance of this planned-economy based 
elite sport system has continuously been identified as the mainstream of Chinese 
elite sport in the Sport Minister’s speeches in the annual All States Sports Minister 
                                                 
2 Zhuanye sport refers to the traditional USSR-fashion elite sport system, which is based on planned 
economy and is administered and fully funded by the government. For more information and the 
discussion in terms of the relationship between Zhuanye sport, professional sport and Juguo Tizhi, 
please refer to the part of Glossary of terms.  
3 Juguo Tizhi, often used as a byword for the system of Chinese elite sport, is normally translated and 
elaborated as “whole-country support for the elite sport system” (Fan, Wu, & Xiong, 2005, p. 215; Tan 
& Houlihan, 2012; Wei et al., 2010). However, we would argue that in essence, Juguo Tizhi should be 
understood as an administration and operation framework of Chinese elite sport, operates the 
nation-wide elite sport affairs as a whole. For more information and the discussion in terms of the 
relationship between Zhuanye sport, professional sport and Juguo Tizhi, please refer to the part of 
Glossary of terms. 
4 We category the interviewees in this research following the cases to which they relate, then name 
them in sequence, for example Interviewee Baseball 1, Interviewee Table tennis 3, and Interviewee 
Diving 5. Those academic and officials who do not relate to any specific sport are categorised as 
‘General’ and thus named as, for example, Interviewee General 1, Interviewee General 2. 
  3 
Conference (P. Liu 2009b; Liu 2010; Liu 2012). It is claimed that the consolidation of 
the three components of Chinese sport, elite sport, the sport industry and mass sport 
will be maintained in the post-2008 era (Wei et al. 2010; Yi 2010).  
Given the reforming context of Chinese society and the limited tangible evidence of 
change in Chinese elite sport after the Beijing Games, we are interested in 
scrutinising the power structure that has stabilised this system that has confronted 
increasing criticism, and in unveiling the intangible changes (if there is any) in it 
after the Beijing Games. In other words, in this research we aim to explore the power 
structure and relationship within Chinese sport, especially in the post-2008 era, 
through employing Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter, the CDA) as the primary 
research tool.  
A policy-as-discourse approach, which has been applied in sport policy analysis by a 
small number of scholars (Bacchi 2000; Chatziefstathiou & Henry 2009; Piggin 2014; 
Henry et al. 2005; Amara & Henry 2007), is employed in this thesis. From a 
Foucaultian perspective, discourse is seen to be able to not only reflect knowledge, 
but also deliver and transport knowledge, as it “sets limits upon what can be said” 
(Bacchi 2000, p.48). It also produces realities and relations of power, and “legitimates 
social actions and relations between those who shape the normative conventions and 
whose life experiences may be shaped by such conventions” (Chatziefstathiou & 
Henry 2012, p.12). In other words, discourse has the capability to not only reflect or 
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shape, but also enable (social) reality and this is how/why discourses generate 
power. Thus, “through studying the speaker or writer’s employment of various 
rhetorical devices and themes … we can understand relations of power in public 
policy.” (Piggin et al. 2009, p.465).  
This is to say that power, which circulates within social sectors (Foucault 1986, p.234), 
can be investigated through an analysis on discourse that is able to transfer and 
deliver knowledge and construct realities. Thus, the power structure and 
relationship of Chinese sport is investigated, in our research, through analysing the 
discourses of Chinese sport “based on the study of the techniques and tactics of 
domination” (Foucault, 1986, p. 237). This is to say, we examine the way in which 
sport policies and related narratives have been “established, consolidated (and) 
implemented” in the time span we choose for unveiling the development (and 
change) of power within Chinese elite sport. In Jäger & Maier’s (2009, p. 36) words, 
we employ CDA as the research apparatus “to chart what is said and can be said in a 
given society at a given time …, and to uncover the techniques through which 
discursive limits are extended or narrowed down” (Jäger & Maier 2009, p.36). 
The implementation of CDA, in this research, is based on a Critical Realist position. 
This combination is not only seen as logical and sensible (Fairclough 2003), but also 
argued to be more productive (Sims-Schouten et al. 2007). It enables us to 
distinguish the reality and the knowledge of reality during our investigation of the 
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way in which discourse generates and shapes power of a given society, and 
constructs its structure. In other words, following Bhaskar’s (2008) lead, it stops us 
from reducing the question of ontology to a question of epistemology.  
This is to say that, on the one hand, the constructed social structure exists 
independently from individuals’ knowledge, which means the social world is 
pre-constructed for us. On the other hand, individuals’ actions are also able to 
modify social structures, and may serve the interests of some groups at the expense 
of others (Henry 2007). In sport terms, Dewar (1991, p.20) put this into a concise 
statement that sport activities are “historically produced, socially constructed and 
culturally defined to serve the needs and interests of powerful groups in society”. 
However, it is worth noting that the constructive effects of discourse in Critical 
Realism are different from what they are in constructivist terms, as they are 
controlled and formed by materiality and are restrained by limited knowledge of the 
social world (Sims-Schouten et al. 2007). In other words, the ontological difference 
between Critical Realism and Constructivism is not in terms of ‘construction’, but is 
the acknowledgement of the restraints on construction activities. The restraints 
originate from the material conditions, social structure and availability of discourses 
in a certain society, and they limit people’s knowledge both on social activities and 
realities as well as of themselves.   
Therefore, analysis of causal power of changes from a critical realist view considers 
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the causal powers for social changes in both social structure and human agency. This 
is to say that it requires, on the one hand, investigating how social agencies interpret 
the meaning of social structure and shape it with discourses; on the other hand, it 
also requires exploring the (constructed) social restraints (or promotion) on 
interpreting activities. Such a dialectical relationship, which focuses attention both 
on the process of ‘meaning construction’ and the social limits on human activities 
from social structure, differentiates Critical Realist based CDA from those 
approaches which only emphasise one element of the relationship.  
In line with Foucault’s argument in Truth and Power (1980d, p.117)  that  “one has 
to … arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject with a 
historical framework… [,which is] a form of history which can account for the 
constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects, etc.”, a study on the 
history of Chinese sport and Olympic movement in China are necessary to 
understand the historical and thus structural context of the Beijing Olympics and to 
understand the political changes and behaviour of Chinese sport authority. 
However, rather than providing a detailed chronicle of the Olympic movement in 
China, the research starts with identifying the stages within which Chinese sport 
authorities confronted dilemma in terms of pursuing Olympic success and 
implementing reform. This dilemma resulted conflicts in Chinese elite sport policy. 
This important period spans three key events from 1993 to 2008:  
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a) The fail of China’s first bid to host the Olympic Games and the 
publication of the second significant reforming policy in 1993;  
b) The development and staging of the successful bid for the 2008 Games 
and the publication of the first Olympic strategy to cover a decade 
(which, though, is the second edition) in 2001; and 
c) The preparation, staging and aftermath of the 2008 Games themselves.  
For this reason we have chosen these three critical incidents as the start point of the 
analysis and points of division that separate the period we focus in this study. In 
particular, we focus on the policy changes (and continuities), which accompany 
these stages, seeking to address our first and second research question, which are as 
follows: 
I. Across the three periods in contemporary Chinese Olympic history, 1993-2001, 
2001-2008 and post 2008, to what extent have Chinese elite sport policy and discursive 
accounts of it changed?  
II. To what extent are the changes in Chinese elite sport regarded as a consequence 
of the experience of preparing for and staging the Beijing Olympics? 
It is claimed that though the study involves a significant period of time, from 1993 to 
the post-2008 era, and incorporates a number of changes in elite sport policies, 
thanks to the stability in Chinese politics, there has been a political mainstream 
reflecting communist ideology running through the period (Wei et al. 2010). And it 
is such apparent stability in Chinese elite sport policy that leads us to pose a third 
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research question:  
III.  In what ways are policies and their interpretation of the aftermath of the Beijing 
Games related to explanations of the socialist features of the regime?   
Thus we attempt to assess how communist beliefs, representing a feature of the 
political mainstream, have been consistently maintained, and/or differently 
interpreted and implemented, in the sport policy context. Furthermore, we attempt 
to explore the relationship between differences in the interpretation and 
implementation of such belief within different periods and the changes in the 
internal and external circumstances of China. 
Besides looking into policy documents and interpretation of policies in the pre-2008 
and post-2008 eras, three case studies respectively focusing on Chinese diving, 
baseball and table tennis are carried out, in order to illuminate the interpretation, 
and implementation, of policy. The use of case studies in policy or programme 
evaluation has long been suggested by scholars (Campbell 1975; Yin 2003), not only 
because of its ability to provide insights into the nature of the phenomena, but also 
because of their compatibility with explanations of ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, 
which can subsequently contribute to a critical realist understanding of the causal 
mechanisms that generate phenomena (Easton 2000).   
Through selecting our three sports, we attempt to explore Chinese elite sport not 
only from an orthodox Juguo Tizhi perspective, but also to address the reform of 
  9 
Chinese elite sport from different aspects, i.e. the civil-society-based development of 
sport in the non-state sector, the professionalisation of (some) sports, and the 
relationship between elite sport and the HE sector. 
In summary, we investigate policy changes through analysing changes in policy 
discourses (including statements and narrative of policy, and interpretation of 
policy), since these discourses reflect both the exercise of power and material 
changes in sport. Such changes are the outcome of both social structure and social 
practices. Following Fairclough (2005a; 2009; 2003), we argue that CDA is compatible 
with Critical Realism, as well as with our research strategy of case studies. Moreover, 
CDA should be carried out by reference to both synchronic and diachronic 
dimensions, in order to give a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon under 
consideration. However, it is important to note that changes in discourses do not 
inevitably lead to (though they may sometimes hint at or suggest) changes in social 
practice and social structure. Correspondingly, a maintained phenomenon in social 
structure can also be interpreted and implemented differently in discourses.  
In order to explore (construct) the context of our research in both synchronic and 
diachronic dimensions, we divide the following Literature Review chapter into three 
parts. The role of nation states and the role of sport in the era of globalisation are 
briefly reviewed in the first part, which is followed by an investigation of the 
contingent national policies concerning the increasing elite sport arm races in 
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international competitions. Then we start our introduction of Chinese sport, 
covering both the traditional view of sport in the Chinese context and the 
significance of Western, Modern, sport in Chinese society after it was introduced to 
China as a concept of modernity and a medium for national restoration. 
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Chapter Two  Literature Review 
Sport in the era of globalisation has extended its geographic reach (Klein 1991; 
Maguire 1994; Mangan 1996; Wagner 1990), economic effects (Close et al. 2007; Price 
& Dayan 2008; Zhang 2009; Zhao 2010), political function (Bairner 2001; Brownell 
2008; Cha 2009; Dong & Mangan 2008)  and cultural conception (Bale 1994; Donelly 
1996; Featherstone et al. 1991; Tomlinson 1991). It has developed into a universal 
term, providing opportunities to transcend the broader of nations, race and cultures 
by offering what has been referred to as a ‘global language’ (Maguire 1994; 
Milton-Smith 2002).  
Not only the economy and culture, but the governance of sport has also ‘escaped’, to 
a degree, from the hands of national and international bodies, and gradually become 
an outcome achieved “through the interaction between such bodies and other major 
stakeholders” (Henry 2007, p.7). However, the elite sport systems, which have been 
developed and which aim to win in competition against each other (Heinilä 1982), 
differ between nations, “due to the culture differences and the uniqueness of each 
sport system” (De Bosscher et al. 2007). 
In order to provide a full picture of contextual information and related studies our 
literature review is divided into three sections: the first discusses briefly the nature 
and significance of globalisation and the role of nation states and of sport in the era; 
the second section explores literature which relates to the elite sport system; and the 
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final section focuses on the historical development of Chinese sport.  
2.1 Globalisation, Sport and the role of Nation 
2.1.1 Globalisation and the role of Nation 
As the major feature of the contemporary world, globalisation has been studied and 
explained by different schools in their own area respectively (Dicken 1998; Omae 
1990; Omae 1995; Robertson 1992; Hay 2000; Hay 2004). Globalisation, especially in 
cultural terms, has been accompanied by a trend of homogenisation, which is merely 
“challenged only periodically by pockets of resistance” (Bairner, 2001, p.9). However, 
the danger of overstating homogeneity and integration has also been highlighted by 
many academics (Featherstone 1990; Pieterse 1995; Waters 1995; Bairner 2001). For 
example, it is stated by Robertson (1992, p.18) that globalisation is “the form in terms 
of which the world becomes ‘united’ but by no means integrated”. Appaduarai (1990, 
p.125) also argues that “the central problem of today’s globalisation is the tension 
between cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation”. Maguire (1999, 
p.93) also sees globalisation, especially in cultural terms, as a two-way 
communication, which can be understood not only “in terms of attempts by which 
established groups seek to control and regulate the access to global flows, [but] also 
in terms of how indigenous people both resist these processes and recycle their own 
cultural products.”  
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The influence of this trend on the roles of Nation States has been viewed from 
different perspectives. Some writers argue for the notion of a ‘border-less world’ and 
‘the end of geography’ the end of the nation state (Omae 1990; Omae 1995; O’Brien 
1992). However, others maintains that the role of Nation States remains significant 
and argue for an increase of government control and for local government’s ability 
to mediate the impact of globalisation (Hirst & Thompson 1998; Rodrik 1997; 
Robertson 1992; Dicken 1998; Appadurai 1990; Weiss 2003; Garrett 1998; Hay 2004). 
The interaction between local and global society has been characterised as 
‘glocalisation’, i.e. “the particularization of universalism and the universalization of 
particularism” (Robertson 1992, p.135) and a reduction in the contrasts among 
societies in a process with increasing varieties (Maguire 1999).  
In line with the advocacy of the significance of the role of Nation State, the 
importance of local stakeholders’ interpretation of globalisation in relation to 
national sport policy change has been argued and examined (Henry, Amara, et al. 
2007; Amara & Henry 2007; Houlihan 2009; Hay 2004). For example, in their study of 
the development of professional football in Algeria, i.e. a modern phenomenon in an 
ex-colonial context, Amara & Henry (2007) examine the influence of different local 
interpretations of globalisation on decision-making at various levels, such as 
national policy, and professional league and club management. From this 
perspective, our research of the development of Chinese elite sport after hosting the 
Beijing Games could also be regarded as a study of the influence of the interaction 
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between the interpretation of the Beijing Games, representing a global phenomenon, 
and local ideology on Chinese elite sport. This is to say that, on the one hand, during 
its bidding and staging the 2008 Olympic, China, to a degree, accepted and complied 
with global norms and practices related to this international phenomenon (Hu 2008b; 
Brownell 2008; Liu 2007). On the other hand, China not only maintained its 
characteristics in the close interaction with the global community during its bidding 
and preparation of the Beijing Games, but also attempted to establish and convey its 
image through this global event, which is interpreted in Chinese context as both 
“opportunities and challenges” (P. Liu 2009a; Li 2009; Song 2009; Hu 2008c, p.1). 
2.1.2 Globalisation and the role of sport 
Considerable research has focused specifically on the role of sport in the 
globalisation era, to identify “ways in which … sport[s] … have been either, or both, 
a reflection of such [globalisation] tendencies or a reaction to globalising 
phenomena”(Henry, 2007, p. 6; Houlihan, 2009; Klein, 1991; Maguire, 1999; Miller, 
Lawrence, Mckay, & Rowe, 2001). We can see that sport works both as a medium, 
through which globalisation permeates into local societies, and an arena in which 
nation states establish their own identity and value in order to respond to (or resist) 
globalising trends and pressures. 
Elias and Dunning (1993) indicate that the establishment and diffusion of modern 
sport has been accompanied by the process of modernisation, which is influenced by 
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the structure of British life and its colonial past practices. However it is also 
recognised as a consequence, or a symbol, of the local acceptance of this typical, 
British, cultural flow (Elias & Dunning 1993; Huizinga 1970; Houlihan 1994). Such 
trends in sport have also been reinforced by globalisation, and have modified sport 
culture into a globalised phenomenon, which is closely intertwined with other 
globalisation processes (Wagner 1990; Jarvie & Maguire 1994)  
Meanwhile, sport, more precisely modern sport, also works as a medium in the 
process of globalisation. Wagner (1990, p.400) argues modern sport in the 
globalisation era leads to homogenisation as a long-term trend. He claims that it 
results in, for example, “a blending and a melding together of … American aspects, 
European approaches, and traditional sports among them”. Such globalising trends 
in relation to sport have been examined in a number of aspects, such as the 
manufacture of sport goods (Andreff & Andreff 2009; Jackson et al. 2008), the free 
movement of labour (KPC Exall 2007; Tainsky & Winfree 2010; Wallerstein 2004; 
Kidd 1981), and the growth of the international sport media network (Leonard 2009; 
Ruddock et al. 2010; H. Li 2007; Rowe & Gilmour 2010) and so forth.  
Sport, it is thus argued, has become one of the most powerful cultural transfer 
mechanisms carrying the sociocultural code of the sender (Galtung 1991). It, on the 
one hand, privileges the [sport] culture of the West (Galtung 1991); while on the 
other hand, it “marginalises or destroys indigenous movement cultures, and as 
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cultural imperialism swept the globe, sports played their part in westernising the 
landscapes of the colonies” (Bale 1994, p.8). Of course, this globalising trend also, 
sometimes, works in a reverse fashion, favouring the peripheral or semi-peripheral 
states that are in a disadvantaged position in the ‘Western-ruled’ system (Maguire 
1999). Examples can be drawn from the dominance of Jamaican sprinters, Chinese 
table tennis, as well as Japanese baseball. However, these ‘exceptions’ are still 
successes within a Western-dominated structure of the world sport system, which 
“entails a shift from ethnic or national cultures to ‘’supranational’ forms, based upon 
either the culture of a ‘superpower’ or of ‘cosmopolitan’ communication and 
migrant networks” (ibid, p.88).  
Nonetheless, the tendency of global homogenisation considerably decreases at local 
level, from the economic to the cultural and political domain (Bairner 2001). It is thus 
emphasised that the ability of ‘locals’ to reshape, resist, or simply ignore, the global 
trend through employing sport to “resist or, at the very least, to domesticate 
globalising impulses” must not be underestimated (Cvetkovich & Kellner 1997; 
Andrews 1997; Bairner 2001, p.164). This function of sport, especially of elite sport, 
has been associated with, and embodied within, the procedure of establishing 
national collective identity, in which members of the nation are united in highly 
emotional circumstances with different manifestation of nationalism (Hargreaves 
1986; Maguire 1999; Bairner 2001). Sport is thus seen as “the most popular form of 
nationalist behaviour” (Kellas 1991, p.1991), and “the imagined community or nation 
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[has] become more real on the terraces or sporting track”(Jarvie 1993, p.75). For 
example, a number of studies have examined the utilisation of sport by 
sub-nation-state entities for the establishment of national identities and for the 
expression of alternative visions of the nation (Cha, 2009; Hwang & Chiu, 2010; 
Merkel, 2008; Stevenson & Alaug, 2008). In other words, in the era of globalisation, 
elite sport provides a transnational platform, on which the sport per se is divergently 
interpreted and utilised by stakeholders, such as, nation states.  
From this perspective, our research target, the post-2008 development of Chinese 
elite sport, can be seen as an outcome of the local interpretation of a global 
phenomenon in terms of the power structure at local level. This local interpretation 
is empowered and constrained by the local institutional structure, cultural tradition 
and political ideology, which, at the same time, jointly respond to the global context 
(Xiong 2002; Ma 2005; Cha 2009). In the case of the interaction between China and 
the international Olympic movement, the local response from Chinese society is 
partial cooperation with the international Olympic movement. However China does 
not totally comply with the IOC (Kamm 2008; Bao 2008; Ma 2005; Xiong 2002). This 
is evidenced in, for example, the emphasis on the communist ideology and national 
interests during its interaction with the IOC (P. Liu2007; P. Liu 2008; Ma, 2005; Xiong, 
2002). From another perspective, it is also reflected in the criticisms from the global 
community of the communist regime before the 2008 Games (Kamm 2008; 
Richardson 2008; Kine 2008; Bao 2008).  
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2.2 The Convergent National Elite Sport Policy  
Given the recognition of its salience in economic, political and cultural domains, elite 
sport has been prioritised in the national sport governance agenda across different 
countries for similar motivations (Houlihan & Green 2008; Shibli et al. 2007; Wang & 
Yang 2011; Cha 2009; De Bosscher et al. 2007; McNeill et al. 2003; Whitson & 
Macintosh 1988). Such cross-national emphasis on elite sport development also leads 
to a consistent emphasis on the Olympic Games, since the Olympics are generally 
recognised by many countries as one of the most significant opportunities for 
achieving political objectives (De Bosscher et al. 2007; Cha 2009; Wang 2014; Hill 
1992; Hoberman 1986). 
Besides this similar prioritisation of elite sport, there is also a convergence in the elite 
sport policies and elite athletes development systems (De Bosscher et al. 2007; 
Houlihan & Green 2008; Oakley & Green 2001). Oakley and Green (2001, p. 91) 
suggest that there are “common approaches to the problem of enhancing elite sport 
rather than responses to the social, political and economic elements in each country”, 
which is “a growing trend towards a homogeneous model of elite sport 
development ”.  
The convergence in elite sport policy is closely associated with the aim to pursue 
excellence or regain glory in the international arena. For example, the PRC’s poor 
performance in the 1988 Seoul Olympics is recognised as the trigger for the deep 
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structural reform of the Chinese Sport system, symbolised by the publication of The 
SPCSC’s Opinion on Deepening the Reform of Sport System (SPCSC 1993d) in the year 
China lost its first bid for the Olympics (Wu 1999; Zhang 2009; Xiong et al. 2008; Xu 
2008; Lu 1994; Li et al. 2003). The establishment of Australia’s ‘gold medal factory’, 
the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS), in 1981 is also closely related to Australia’s 
poor performance at the 1976 Montreal Games (Magdalinski 2000). In addition, the 
opportunity of hosting international events, which normally leads to a growth in the 
need for excellent performance, also results in elite-sport-privileging policy changes 
and funding allocations, and leads to increasing pressure on elite sport to succeed. 
Researchers have focused on the examples of staging the 1988 Calgary Winter 
Olympics (Macintosh 1996), the Sydney Games (Green 2007) and the gigantic 
amount of money China invested in elite sport after winning the Olympic bid in 
2001 (Fan et al. 2005).  
This convergent trend of elite sport policies in different countries also leads to 
similar conflicts between elite sport and other issues, such as the relationship 
between elite sport and mass sport. On the one hand, there is an increase in the 
understanding of the importance of mass sport, which, for example, is driven by 
health issues, such as obesity (Wang & Theodoraki 2007; Hanson et al. 2001; Jackson 
et al. 2005), as well as by the social equity and integration issues (Henry, Amara, et al. 
2007; Henry et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2008). On the other hand, there is a considerable 
neglect of the imbalance between the support for elite sport to succeed in 
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international events, and provision for sport and recreation opportunities for the 
general population (Muller et al. 2008; Green 2007; Wu 1999; Xiong et al. 2008). 
Green (2007) indicates that this imbalance is the consequence of increasing emphasis 
on, and privileging of, elite sport, which normally leads to the neglect of mass sport.  
In the case of Chinese sport, Wu (1999, p.13) points out that the initial arguments 
against the priority given to elite sport were made from a Communist point of view 
at the very beginning of PRC. Elite sport was recognised as only for the elite athletes 
and thus represented ‘capitalist champion-ism’. The balance between mass 
participation and elite sport had been carefully maintained until 1979, when the 
requirement of “rapidly climbing to the summit of competitive sport” was promoted 
in the 1978 National Sport Working Conference (Gu 1997; Miao et al. 2012). While 
based on the welfare state ideology and pre-eminence of social democracy, the GB 
Sports Council’s Sport for All programme was started in 1972, which directed 
government funding at wider social objectives and subsequently became ‘sport for 
the disadvantaged’ and ‘sport for inner city youth’. It is noted that “there was little 
discernible tension between the interests of the elite and of the mass, as there was a 
consensus . . . that an increase in facilities was the first priority” (Green 2007, p.936). 
However, from the early 1980s, elite level sport became the focus of government 
funding. Later, with the publication of Sport: Raising the Game in 1995 and A Sporting 
Future for All in 2000, central government shifted its priority away from sport 
development (Green 2004). Thus, while elite sport gains most of the attention and 
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funding, mass sport has become marginalised in the domestic sport policies in most 
countries5 (Armstrong & Giulianotti 1997; Whitson & Macintosh 1988; Green 2007; 
Australian Sports Commission 2011).  
Other problems caused by this exclusive emphasis on elite sport has also been 
addressed by academics. These include, the impact on social belief systems, and the 
tension between the individual development needs of athletes and collective values 
of the country; the tension between professionalised rational-bureaucratic models of 
management and the voluntaristic and more sectional/political models of 
governance; and the tension between national objectives, regional interests and the 
requirements of the business sector (Green & Houlihan 2005; Green 2007; Yu & 
Zhang 2006; Stambulova et al. 2007; Kristiansen & Roberts 2009; Wylleman et al. 
2004; Tan & Bairner 2011). 
Elite sport development, for which similar approaches are employed in different 
                                                 
5 For example, according to the grant and funding report of Australian Sports Commission (2010/11), 
the total funding to High Performance sport was over A$52.6 million, while the amount to Sport 
Participation was A$6.0 million which is just over 11.4% of the funding to high performance. In 
athletics, the most funded Olympic sport in Australia, the ratio between high performance and 
participation is about 23.5:1 (A$ 4,024,000 for high performance and A$ 171,400 for participation). 
Within the area of High Performance sport, the top three Olympic sports (Athletics, Swimming and 
Rowing) receive A$12.1 million of funding, while the top three non-Olympic sports (Baseball, Softball 
and Netball) collect A$3.7 million from the ASC, which is still A$0.4 million more than the funding of 
A$ 3.3 million to Paralympics sports as a whole (Australian Sports Commission, 2011). 
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countries, remains the dominant feature of sport policy in many national contexts. 
This convergent trend of elite sport policy is generally influenced by the model that 
was initiated and proven to be effective in the USSR and Eastern bloc countries and 
subsequently adapted by Australia then more widely employed by other Western 
countries (Oakley & Green 2001; Green & Houlihan 2005; De Bosscher et al. 2007; 
Bosscher 2010) 
A number of studies have focused on the convergence or similarity of policies, 
which lead to success in international competition. In his review of sport policy in 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, Green (2007) identifies four themes in 
the changes of sport policy priorities towards elite athletes, which are a) an 
increasing central/federal government intervention in the sport policy sector, b) 
discursive construction of policy discourse around the language of rational/ 
technocratic processes, c) governments’ endurance of debates on the conflicts 
between mass participation and elite sport development, and d) “a growing 
realization by all three governments that, while grassroots participation rates remain 
persistently low, political aspirations to utilize sport… to achieve health benefits will 
remain problematic (ibid, p.941)”.  
There are also studies focusing on meso-level factors affecting the success rate for an 
elite sport development programme, which are arguably more readily controllable 
for Sport authorities. As shown in Table 2.1, Oakley and Green (2001) provide 10 
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factors which can enhance elite sport performance. Green and Houlihan (2005) 
identify four principal areas of elite sport development.  It is worth noting that a 
remarkable effort has been made by De Bosscher et al. (2007) to provide a meso-level 
framework of SPLISS (Sport Policy Factors leading to International Sporting Success) 
based on international comparison with 9 pillars as the benchmarks of elite sport 
policy factors, among which funding and coaching are regarded as key drivers of an 
effective system.  
However, it is still worth reminding ourselves of the danger of overstating the trend 
of homogeneity and integration. For example, even though different governments 
with various ideologies employ convergent elite sport policies, State-organised 
doping, for example by East Germany, still constitutes a key difference (Braun 2007; 
Kalinski 2003; Spitzer 2005). In their review of elite sport systems of nine countries, 
Houlihan and Green (2008) conclude that though there is an increase in the 
similarities among elite sport policies employed by eight nations, except the USA, 
variations in the rationalisation, implementation, and other common policy features 
are still significant. In our research on Chinese elite sport, which is influenced by the 
system of the USSR, the Chinese characters are not only reflected in the political 
narrative in, and the construction of, the system, but also the local interpretation of 
the Olympic Games, i.e. the political task of Chinese elite sport. From this aspect, our 
research aims to provided a perspective to understand the Chinese characteristic of 
this elite sport system per se that was exported from the USSR and was subsequently 
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modified throughout the development of the Chinese community under the 
communist regime, as well as the interpretation of and the less-tangible power 
structure of Chinese elite sport. 
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Table 2. 1 Factors contributing to elite success 
Factors Oakley and Green Green and Houlihan SPLISS 
CONTEXTUAL 
An excellent culture support  Support for ‘fulltime’ athlete Financial support 
Appropriate funding   Participation in sport 
  Scientific research 
PROCESSSUAL 
Clear understanding of the role of different 
agencies 
 Talent identification and 
development system 
Simplicity of administration   Athletic and post career support 
Effective system for monitoring athlete progress  Integrated approach to policy 
development 
Talent identification and targeting of resources  Coaching provision and coach 
development  
Comprehensive planning system for each sport   
Lifestyle support   
SPECIFIC 
Well structured competitive programmes A hierarchy of competition opportunities 
centred on preparation for international events 
International Competition 
Well developed specific facilities Elite facility development Training facilities 
 The Provision of coaching sports science and 
sports medicine support services  
 
Source: Oakley and Green (2001), Green and Houlihan (2005), De Bosscher (2007), Houlihan (2008) 
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2.3 Chinese sport before 1993  
The phrase ‘exceptional’ which Jacques Rogue, President of the IOC, stated at the 
closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics has been officially interpreted by Xinhua 
News Agency into the Chinese phrase of ‘Wuyu Lunbi’ (Xinhua News Agency 2008). 
However, if translated literally, the Chinese version of Rogue’s appraisal means 
incomparable or unparalleled. Obviously, there are differences between the 
denotation of exceptional and of incomparable, which could hardly be understood by 
those who have limited knowledge of English, for instance, a great number of 
Chinese people, understand ‘exceptional’ as embracing a neutral adjective meaning 
‘unusual; not typical’ besides its positive denotation of ‘unusually good; outstanding’ 
(Paperback Oxford English Dictionary 2006). The positive meaning is ‘automatically’ 
preferred and selected by the media. 
It would be inappropriate to have a full discussion on the connotation of the 
ignorance of ‘being different’ in the domestic propaganda of China. However, we 
would like to provide a brief history of Chinese sport as an exploration of the 
uniqueness of Chinese sport and an introduction to the extent to which the Olympic 
movement in China is unique.  
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2.3.1 Background information of Chinese society and sports 
2.3.1.1 ‘Tiyu’ and sport in Ancient China 
‘Tiyu6’, the Chinese word for sport, is made up by two separate characters. The first 
means ‘body’, while the second stands for ‘cultivation’ and 
‘education’(Oxford·FLTRP English - Chinese 2010). Even though, technically, it had 
existed in the premodern Chinese language system, traditional meanings were 
different from the modern denotation, which was imported from Japan in the 1880s 
and implied an emphasis on hygiene and health rather than physical exercise. Given 
this modern meaning was introduced in the ‘century of humiliation’ of China, the 
altered denotation of ‘Tiyu’ has introduced new connotations in the Chinese context, 
most of which are in nationalist and patriotic terms (Liu 2003; Wu 1999; Xu 2008).  
Physical fitness had been stressed by social elites and realized by common people in 
the era of Confucius and Mencius, whilst ancient forerunners of some modern sports 
had appeared for a period of time in Chinese history (for more examples see 
Brownell, 2008; X. Zhou & Xu, 1984). However, compared to the historical 
accentuation of the mental and intellectual superiority of Chinese culture, neither 
‘Tiyu’ had played an important part in Chinese culture and society nor been given 
                                                 
6 Tiyu, is one of the Chinese phrases for sport, which, however, embraces a number of further 
meanings, such as physical activities, physical education, etc. For further elaboration of this term, 
please refer to the Glossary of terms. 
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equal emphasis until the 1880s. For example, the statement by Mencius, “those who 
work with their brain rule; those who work with their brawn are ruled”7 (translated 
into English and cited by Brownell, 2008), has encouraged Chinese people to look 
down on physical education, even though the Mencius also stressed the significance 
of physical exercise. It is stated by Giles (1911, p.508, cited by Brownell, 2008, p.30) 
that “many sports were once common in China which have long since passed out of 
the national life, and exist only in the record of books.” These included horn butting, 
boxing, wrestling, football, and polo. 
Since the Song dynasty (960-1279), with its emphasis on neo-Confucianism and the 
institutionalization of civil service examination (Zhang 2006), Chinese intellectuals 
had devoted their lives to reading the works of Confucius and other leading 
intellectuals. The famous poem from Zhao Heng (968-1022), the third emperor of 
Song dynasty, represents a good example and has remained influential in Chinese 
society to this day. It is composed thus  
There is no need to worry about anything, as in books, there are wealth, fame, beauties, 
and other things; If you want wishes to come true, work hard in your study room.  
Cited by Zhang, 2006, translated by the researcher  
Accordingly, for the following 1000 years, physical activity was down played and 
                                                 
7 Laoxinzhe zhi ren, laolizhe zhiyu ren 
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was regarded as an “ungentlemanly” activity from which Chinese men, especially 
those who were preoccupied with exam preparations, should refrain. As a popular 
saying, which is still in use today, expresses it, “if you could have or do everything, 
there is nothing that can come before studying8”, or “a decent man should not join 
the army, quality steel should not be made into nails9”. For this 1000-year period, a 
pale face from living indoor in order to study had been a true complement of, and a 
perfect portrait for the ideal Chinese gentlemen (Liu 2003).   
A story has been told and cited in a number of western studies of Chinese sport, 
which indicates the mythical status of sport in Chinese society at the beginning of 
the 20th century is reproduced here: 
At the end of the Qing dynasty, in the English consulate in Tianjing, there was a 
consul who once invited the highest official in the Tianjin administration – the Daotai 
- to dinner. After the meal, the consul wanted to play tennis to show his guest. This 
Daotai had never in his life seen tennis, and he was very curious, responding with 
enthusiasm. It happened to be a time of scorching hot weather, and although the 
players were wearing shorts and singlets, they were still streaming with sweat. After 
the demonstration, the consul asked his guest: “How do you think I played?” This 
Daotai shook his thumb back and forth and said: “Good! Good! Good! It’s a pity that 
you worked so hard; you are so tired that your whole body is covered with sweat. It 
would be much better if you could hire a man to play in your place.” 
                                                 
8 Wanban jie xiapin, weiyou dushu gao 
9 Haonan bu dangbing, haotie bu dading 
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Z. Wang, 1987, p. 15, translated by Brownell, 2008 
Xu (2008) claims that not only the civil service examination systems, but also the 
moral rules in China have prevented the Chinese from considering a robust body as 
a necessary part of a cultured gentleman. He indicates that the long believed norm of 
“He Wei Gui” (harmony and peace are most precious), and the adage that “Junzi 
Dongshou Budong Kou” (the gentleman uses words, not fists, to settle disputes) 
both perfectly reflect the ideal social behaviour of Chinese.   
While Chinese men had concentrated on Confucian ideologies and classics, Chinese 
women had experienced the physical humiliation of foot-binding till the beginning 
of the 20th century, which had lasted even longer than the civil service examination 
(Ko 2005). Foot-binding also started in the Song dynasty (AD 960-1279). In the Qing 
dynasty (1644-1912), nearly all Han Chinese female had their feet bound, and 
consequently their feet bones were broken from the age of 4 or 5 years. Ko (2005) 
states that most adult women had bound feet shorter than 10 cm, and were therefore 
physical disabled. It is believed that one of the reasons for feet-binding was to create 
physical disability by limiting their walk speed and range. As Xu (2008) states the 
feminized Chinese male elites indirectly forced or preferred Chinese women to 
become ‘hyper-feminine’. 
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2.3.1.2 Social Darwinism, Nationalism and sport in China before 1949 
When introducing Western sport into China at the turning point of the 20th century, 
more precisely 1895, [as Xu (2008) argues], China was at one of the most crucial 
moments in its history, traumatised by its loss in the first Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1985). With the humiliation of the Treaty of Maguan (also known in Japanese 
as the Shimonoseki Treaty) most Chinese elites finally understood that, only by 
converting the traditional ‘empire’ into a modern state, and joining the 
Western-dominated world order would China have any chance of survival and of 
rebuilding its former glory (Cui et al. 2008). 
Liang Qichao (1873-1929), one of the leaders of the Constitutional Reform Movement 
of 1898, dismissed traditional sport and urged the cultivating of solidarity, moral 
strength, and a warlike spirit in the Chinese people. He claims “to be civilized, 
citizens need a warlike spirit that serves as the essence of a nation. Without this 
warlike spirit, a nation cannot stand”(Liang 1936, p.706). To differ Western sport 
from the traditional physical activities, terms, such as ‘Xin Tiyu’ (new sport) and 
‘Yang’ or ‘Xiyang Tiyu’ (foreign sport), were employed, which emphasised the 
connotation of breaking away from the imperial and humiliating past (Brownell, 
2008). 
The term, “Dongya Bingfu” (the sick man of East Asian), was firstly used by Yan Fu 
(1854-1921) and subsequently applied by Japan and the West (Brownell, 2008; Xu, 
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2008) to portray Chinese people. The term was taken to heart by the Chinese, as a 
label of humiliation throughout the 20th century. Yan Fu wrote that: 
A nation is similar to a body. It is well known that restful life makes the body feeble, 
while exercise makes it strong. However, if one wants instantaneously to renovate the 
sick body into a healthy one, a man is bound to overdo it, which will lead him to his 
death. Does present China look like a sick man?  
Yan, 1895, cited by S. Wang, 1986, p. 13 
Social Darwinism was thus introduced into China and adopted by numbers of 
Chinese elites to transfer the old empire into a modern nation-state (Brownell, 2008). 
Brownell (2008) concludes two links between Social Darwinism and the 
development of Western sport in China: first it forced the Chinese to reject their 
absence of competitiveness, seeing this a cause of national weakness; secondly, 
thanks to a translation by Yan Fu, the Chinese started to accept Herbert Spencer’s 
three types of energy necessary for social survival: physical, intellectual, and moral. 
As a supporter of social Darwinism, Yan Fu was anxious to cultivate “people’s 
physical strength”, not just for individuals, but also for the nation. He and other 
leaders of the Constitutional Reform Movement of 1898 advocated PE for women, 
advocating healthy women would produce strong children. He opposed foot 
binding and early marriage, believing that sexual excess at a young age weakened 
the seed and led to the degeneration of descendant (Pusey 1983; Zhang & Qu 2008).  
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The transformation of body culture had a close relationship with the salvation of 
China. It was believed by many that Physical education was the only solution to the 
crisis of the country. In his famous work, Quan Xue Pian [Encourage to learning], 
Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), the former grand councillor of state (1907-1909), argued 
that the renaissance of China must rely on “Wugong”, i.e. Western-style exercise and 
military training (Zhang 1898, p.150).  Though coming from a different political 
perspective, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the founding father of the Republic of China, 
claimed that “today we advocate physical exercise because it is crucial for us to 
strengthen our race and protect our nation … if we want to make our country strong, 
we must first make sure our people have strong bodies” (Gu 1997, p.204). In 
addition, Cai Yuanpei, the first Minister of Education in the Republic of China, 
argued more explicitly “national strength is based on citizens. The people’s strength 
is decided by their physical strength. The physical strength comes from their warlike 
sprite” (Yuan 2011, p.57). 
In his first published article, Tiyu Zhi Yanjiu (The Study on Tiyu), Mao Zedong (1917, 
p.7) clearly demonstrates his view on sport that “It is absolutely right to say that one 
must build a strong body if s/he wants to cultivate inner strength….physical 
education or exercise … should be the number one priority.” He also criticised the 
lack of exercise in the education system as the scholars had no personal experience 
of exercise, felt no need for it, and therefore had no interest in it.  
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Brownell (2008) indicates that sport also worked as a social leveller in the Chinese 
society in the early 20th century, managing to reduce the differences not only 
between social classes but also between genders. Eugene Barnett, director of the 
Hangzhou YMCA, wrote in his diary that “the spectacle of mandarins, department 
chiefs, and clerks, tearing in scanty attire after a basket or volley ball over the 
yamen10 law[sic], persuades me that Old China is passing away” (Barnett & Lutz 
1990, p.89, cited by Brownell, 2008, p.58). Furthermore, with some records of the 
competition between female athletes in the sixth National Games, Barnett also 
portrays some new physical activities in Chinese women’s life, who did not bind 
their feet anymore (ibid). 
With the permeation of new body culture and emphasis on physical education, the 
first National Games took place in Nanjing in 1910, in which the Nationalist 
government stated that “China is living under multiple threats from abroad; it will 
have trouble surviving as a nation if most of its citizens don’t have war-like spirit” 
(Wang 1987, p.20). Four years later, spectators were invited to the second National 
Games, which were held in the Temple of Heaven in Beijing. This two-day event 
successfully attracted over 20,000 spectators, who observed the progress the country 
had made in sports and “shown their appreciation and admiration for the war-like 
                                                 
10 Yamen is the name of any local bureaucrat's, or mandarin's, office and residence during the period 
of the Chinese Empire. The term has been widely used in China for centuries, but appeared in English 
during the Qing Dynasty 
  35 
spirit [of competitors]”(idib, p.140).  
Furthermore, this war-like spirit was also portrayed in media coverage of 
international events. It is noted in a report of the 1921 Far Eastern Championship 
Games (also known as Far Eastern Games) that “the spirit of struggle in athletics is 
the same as in war. If one is defeated in war, territory is lost. If one is defeated in 
athletics, reputation is lost. And of territory and reputation, no one yet knows which 
is more important… We need to be able to perform in athletics before we can talk of 
war. A nation needs to be able to fight before it can talk of peace. Would peace begin 
with athletics” (Morris, 2004, p. 96). 
The YMCA made a remarkable contribution to the introduction of modern sport into 
China. From 1899 till 1922, forty branches of YMCA were operating across China, 
promoting western sport to its Chinese members (Xu, 2008). The 1910 National 
Games was under the YMCA’s leadership. When the far Eastern games took place in 
Japan in 1923, J.H. Gray, the director of the YMCA’s PE department, was the leader 
of China’s team and gave a speech at the games on behalf of China.  
As stated above, since the original point at which modern sport was introduced to 
China, this Western phenomenon has been given more political significance and 
connotation than amusement and play in Chinese context. It was embraced in the 
debates about the nature of the Chinese nation and nationalism, and was portrayed 
as a crucial element closely associated with the future and the international status of 
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the nation.   
2.3.1.3 The Olympics and Old China  
Like its common pattern at the beginning of the 20th century, the YMCA 
systematically introduced the modern Olympics to its Chinese audience. On 24 
October 1907, Zhang Boling, as the first Chinese national who seriously promoted 
the Olympic movement in the country, expressed the hope of taking part in the 
Olympics in his speech on the Olympics and China as well as the imminent London 
Games (Wu, 1999). One year later, an article was published in Tiantsing Young men 
bringing up three questions, which have become the cornerstone of the Chinese 
Olympic Dream. These questions, which take more than a century to be fully 
answered, were a) When could China be able to send a winning athlete to the 
Olympic Games? b) When could China be able to send a winning team to the 
Olympic Games? c) When could China be able to host an Olympic Game? (Xu 2008; 
Yi 2008). 
Xu (2008) points out that though China was prepared to take part in the 1916 Berlin 
Games, its Olympics debut was delayed until the 1932 Los Angles Games. In order 
to defeat Japan’s conspiracy to legitimise the status of its Chinese colony as an 
independent state through sending two athletes to the 1932 Games, China‘s official 
sport body decided to send the two athletes to the Games in China’s name. However, 
only Liu managed to take his ship from Shanghai, as the other athlete, Yu, was 
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arrested by the Japanese to prevent him from representing China in the Games (Yi, 
2008). Accompanied by his Coach, Liu Changchun, “the lone representative of four 
hundred million people” (LAOOC, 1932, cited by Xu, 2008, p.42) left for Los Angeles 
on 8 July with some sponsorship and a national flag. He arrived on 29 July, which 
was just one day before the opening ceremony. Despite winning nothing in his races, 
Liu completed his historical mission, the most important aspect of which was to 
signal the beginning of a new era of Chinese and Olympic history (Xu 2008; Yuan 
2008). 
Four years later, the Nationalist government successfully utilised the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics to enhance its international engagement through sport. Chiang Kai-shek’s 
government not only funded the entire cost of the Chinese delegation, in which there 
were 65 athletes, but also sent a 42-member study group to study sports in Europe. 
Even though the Chinese team failed to win any medals and was harshly criticised 
for losing to Japan in basketball, it is   remarked by Shen Siliang that “the 
achievement of international recognition alone is worth millions to us … I believe 
[the athletes] have accomplished more for China than several ambassadors could 
have achieved in years” (Morris, 2004, p. 176).  
Before the significant regime change in 1949, the Nationalist government sent its 
third, also the last, delegation to the 1948 London Games (Hua 1993). Though 
winning no medals in these three Olympics, Chinese athletes had completed, to a 
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certain extent, the original mission of Western sport in the China context, “as an 
avenue to national renewal … and a means to achieve their desire to be recognized 
as a respected power”(Xu, 2008,p.27). Brownell (2008, p.62) concludes that: 
Sports, like the nation-state, arrived in China with the appearance of being an “empty 
form” governed by (seemingly) universal principles like democracy and science. 
Chinese people embraced modern sports, as they did the form of the nation, because of 
their desire to take their place on the global stage of modernity.     
2.3.2 Tiyu, the Olympics and the People’s Republic of China before the Policy of 
‘Opening-up’ 
2.3.2.1 The new China and the political connotation of elite sport  
The political connotation of Western sport in Chinese society changed little after the 
People’s Republic of China (hereafter, the PRC) was formally established on 1st 
October 1949 (Wu, 1999). Wu (1999, p.11) notes that “though there have been great 
endeavours by the democratic revolutionists, the requirements of improving the 
national physique, rebuilding our image as well as national dignity are far from 
complete. It is the social legacy, as well as the historical mission of the PRC”.  
With its communist ideology and neo-democratic theory, the PRC government 
claimed to establish a ‘neo-democratic sport’. Feng11, the then-Secretary of the 
                                                 
11 Feng Wenbin, then-Secretary of the Chinese New Democracy Youth League, was nominated as the 
chief of the preparatory committee of the All-China Sports Federation. 
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Chinese New Democracy Youth League and the chief of the preparatory committee 
of All-China Sports Federation, employed a number of terms that were consistent to 
the political climate in the new-born communist regime in his specification of the 
characteristic of the ‘neo-democratic sport’. He stated this ‘neo-democratic sport’ is 
“united with progressive sports of other countries, as a part of new sport of the 
world,” and is “combined with political learning. … Generally, (we should) make it 
gradually belong to all the people, permeate it among all the people” (Feng 1950, p.8, 
cited by Wu, 1999, p.3).  
Consistent with the ‘war-like spirit’ that was linked with Western sport by the 
reformists, the PRC government also accentuated the militarist spirit and ‘protection 
of the country’. This emphasis is evidenced in institutional terms, as in the 
establishment of the Central National Defence Sports Club on 4 May 1954; as well as 
in discursive terms, such as the policy statement that Tiyu should “serve production 
and national defence”(The Central Committee of the CPC 1958). Sports with military 
usefulness, such as swimming, shooting, radios, and mountain climbing, were also 
officially promoted, for example, in this document published in 1958.  
It is worth noting that education, more precisely physical education, has been a 
significant element of Tiyu. The Interim Regulation and Standard of the Sport System 
“Preparing for Labour and Defence of the Country” (SPCSC, 1954) published by the State 
Physical Cultural and Sport Commission (hereafter, the SPCSC) was regarded as 
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“the basement of the education system of the PRC”. In 1956, after consulting the 
USSR guidelines for a 10-year physical education curriculum, the Ministry of 
Education published the first Guidelines for PE for Primary Schools, as well as one 
for middle schools. In the higher education sector, China also learnt from the USSR 
establishing a number of specialised sport institutions12, with theories of Marxism 
and Leninism, as well as other the modules of political education as compulsory in 
these sport institutions. 
Tiyu in the education system had been emphasised till the Culture Revolution13. And 
during this ‘ten years of chaos’, physical education in schools and universities was 
replaced by military training, academic staff of the sport institutions were sent to 
rural areas. Though there were some recoveries in the beginning of 1970s, with the 
political struggle of ‘Fighting Back against the Rightist’s Verdict-Reversal 
Movement’14, Tiyu in the education system went back to an anarchic situation. The 
                                                 
12 The first sport institution, East China Sport Institution, was founded on 8 November, 1952. By the 
end of 1956, there were six major specialised sport institutions in PRC. (Wu, 1999) 
13 The cultural revolution started in 1966, and ended in 1976. Please see Roerick MacFarquhar & 
Michael Schoenhals, 2006, Mao's Last Revolution. 
14 ‘Fighting Back against the Rightist’s Verdict-Reversal Movement’, also known as ‘Attacking Deng, 
Fighting Back against the Rightist’s Verdict-Reversal Movement’ is a political campaign starting in 
1975 in the Cultural Revolution, which was used by the ‘Gang of Four’ to attack Deng Xiaoping. In 
January 1975, Deng was re-nominated as the ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ by Mao Zedong, as the 
  41 
chaos in Tiyu and physical education in the education system ended in 1978 when 
the development of the physical condition of youth was affirmed again as a goal 
during the National Sport Working Conference (Gu 1997). 
Another essential phenomenon which related to sport during the early stage of the 
PRC was hygiene. It was officially stated, in the report of The Party Group of the 
Tiyu Yundong 15  (sports) Committee’s of the People’s Central Government on 
reinforcing the sporting life of people(Party Group of the PCSC of the Central 
Government of People 1954 cited by Wu 1999, p.502), that “the health condition of 
                                                                                                                                                       
then-Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had terminal bladder cancer and was in hospital at that time and 
Mao tried to use Deng to balance the power of the ‘Gang of Four’. However, some policies of Deng, 
such as prioritising economic development and investigating problems of the Cultural Revolution, 
dissatisfied Mao, who regarded the Cultural Revolution as an exploit in his later years. Meanwhile, 
the ‘Gang of Four’ kept persuading Mao that Deng was trying to reverse verdicts in the Cultural 
Revolution. Mao was subsequently convinced. At the meeting on 20th November, 1975, Mao asked 
Deng to make a public decision of affirming and supporting the Cultural Revolution, which was 
refused by Deng who was immediately deprived of the responsibility for domestic affairs. On 26th 
November 1975, Mao defined Deng’s behaviour as a ‘Verdict-Reversal Movement’. From 25th 
February, 1976, all of Deng’s policies were negated subsequently abolished, and the political attacks 
and public criticism of Deng started. However, though the attack was initiated by the ‘Gang of Four’, 
Deng was still an object of attack after the arrest of the ‘Gang of Four’ until his return to power in 
1977. (For more detail, please see Ye Yonglie, 2009, the Rise and Fall of the Gang of Four; and Roerick 
MacFarquhar & Michael Schoenhals, 2006, Mao's Last Revolution. 
15 ‘Yundong’ is another Chinese word that has a more specific (athletic) meaning of sport. Meanwhile, 
it also often indicates movement, especially political movement. 
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people is not able to meet the demands of work. In order to improve the situation … 
sport is one of the most positive and effective methods.” Mao Zedong further 
pointed out that “Tiyu is a crucial issue which is linked to the hygiene of 6 million 
people”(Liao et al. 2011). 
In contrast with the contemporary dominance of elite sport in Chinese sport, there 
had been little special emphasis on, and significant activity in, elite sport in the PRC 
until 1979, the year in which the PRC re-joined the IOC. Argued from a communist 
point of view, elite sport was blamed as serving only minor elite athletes and thus 
representing ‘capitalist champion-ism’ (Wu, 1999, p.13).  
However, the period from 1952, when the communist regime sent its first Olympic 
delegation to the Helsinki Games, to 1958, when China officially withdrew its place 
in the IOC because of the ‘two Chinas’ issue, provided an exception, in which elite 
sport had been highly emphasised by the PRC government. 
The 1952 Helsinki Games is regarded as a boost to elite sport in China, changing the 
national sport policy from ‘popularisation and routinisation’ to ‘popularisation with 
improvement’ and putting “the matter of efficient and rapid improvement of athletic 
level on the agenda” (Wu, 1999, p. 13).  On 25th November 1951, the All China 
Sport Federation (hereafter, the ACSF) organised a ‘central sport training course’, 
which later became the National Sports Training Centre of the General 
Administration of Sport (hereafter, the GAS). The objective of the ‘training course’ 
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was to develop elite athletes, and to rapidly increase their skill, in order to win glory 
for the country in international events. The first 58 members on the course were 
selected from the national basketball and volleyball championships, and 
subsequently became the members of the national team. In 1956, ACSF successfully 
organised national teams in 7 different sports16 (Lu et al. 2007; Yan 2009). 
Though there was fierce debate about the ‘improvement’ of elite sport, focusing on 
its ‘capitalist tendency’, at the beginning of 1956, the year of the Melbourne Games, 
the SPCSC urged the development of elite sport and emphasised the objective of 
catching up with the international level. However, on 6 November 1956, ACSF 
announced that the PRC would withdraw from the Melbourne Games because a 
delegation from the ROC in Taiwan was also allowed to participate to the Games. 
Two years later, on 19 August 1958, because of the same ‘two Chinas’ issue, ACSF 
(also the Chinese Olympic Committee) officially announced its withdrawal from the 
IOC17. The withdrawal was less than half year from the proposal of ‘The Outline of 
China’s 10-year Development of Sport’, in which the SPCSC proposed a leap mainly in 
                                                 
16 They were the national teams for basketball and volleyball (1951); athletics (1953); table tennis, 
swimming, badminton (1954); gymnastic (1955). 
17 For the same reason, ACSF also withdrew from FINA (Fédération Internationale de Natation), 
IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations), FIBA (International Basketball Federation), 
IWF (International Weightlifting Federation), ISSF (International Shooting Sport Federation), UCI 
(Union Cycliste Internationale), and ATTU (Asia Table Tennis Union). 
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elite sport terms (Xu, 2008). 
For the next two decades, from 1959 till 1979, the PRC，which had experienced a 
number of political campaigns and crises, such as the Great Leap Forward and the 
Great Famine, and the Cultural Revolution etc., had remained outside of the 
Olympic movement. Even though elite sport had suffered during this period, some 
progresses were made in the gaps, for example, from 1963 till 1966. The fundamental 
training system of ‘Juguo Tizhi’, three-level training network, which is composed of 
amateurs sport schools, sport schools (also known as the sport technical school) and 
elite athletic teams, and the hierarchy of athletic standards was initially established 
and improved in the 1960s18. The training theory of ‘three requirements and heavy 
load’19; ‘three fearless and five masteries (mostly at the psychological level)’20 were 
founded in the same decade. Furthermore, the national competition model of 
“Practising domestically, fighting consistently with the externals” and development 
model of “shrinking the battleline, ensuring development points” were also initiated 
                                                 
18 The initial national hierarchical standard of athletes, coach and referees in China were all officially 
documented in 1963 (Gu, 1997). 
19 The three requirements and heavy load training theorem was developed in 1960s, it stands for the 
requirement of hard, strict and practical training, involving heavy load training. 
20  ‘Three fearless’ stands for no fear of harshness, no fear of exhaustion and no fear of difficulty. 
‘Five mastery’ stands for the mastering of mind, physique, skill, training and competition. 
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(Cui et al. 2008; Gu 1997; Liu 2003). The 2nd National Games was held in 1965, in 
which 9 world records were broken21 (Gu, 1997). 
Chaos broke out in elite sport in 1967. Training and competitions were replaced by 
political struggles, the whole governing system was abolished, and the training and 
competition scheme collapsed. Sadly, a number of world champions, among them 
those who returned from foreign countries, committed suicide because of false 
charges, public criticism and personal abuse. In general, Chinese elite sport was in 
‘paralysis’ till 1971 (Wu, 1999). Though there was slight recovery from 1971, such as 
the famous ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’ in 1971 and the 3rd national games in 1975, the 
social atmosphere of political struggle was still the dominant feature of the elite 
sport system. During that period, there were only three events of athletics in which 
Chinese athletes achieved the Olympic Standard A requirement, and none of them 
ranked in the world top 10 (Gu, 1997).  
After the National Sport Working Conference in 1978, elite sport went back to the 
track. The role of “carrying out national sports events” and the requirement of 
“rapidly climbing to the summit of competitive sport” were promoted at the 
conference. Elite sport soon became the most significant part of Tiyu in the PRC. It is 
officially noted in the Summary of National Sport Working Conference in 1978 that 
                                                 
21 There were 2 new world records in weightlifting, 2 in archery, 3 in shooting, 2 in parachuting. 
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the PRC aims to “become one of the most developed sport nations in 20th century” 
and “in 1979 and 1980, the national and provincial PCSCs should place extra 
emphasis on elite sport”(Wu 1999, p.268). It was officially required that all the sports, 
disciplines and rules of national events had to duplicate what they were in the 
international events at that time, in order to be successful in the world sport (Gu 
1997).  
In addition, thanks to the severe political environment beginning in the 1960s, the 
emphasis on ideological and political education of athletes began to be made explicit 
and to be highlighted in government documents. Gu (1997) notes that the 
strengthening of ideological and political education became one of the keynotes 
emphasised in the 1960 national training conference held by the SPCSC. In practical 
terms, for example, it was compulsory for athletes and coaches to study the works of 
Chairman Mao22, and they were required to undertake manual labour in farms 
factories and military camps for a half to one month every year. There were also 
personnel who were specially designated for political studies (Cui et al. 2008). 
Collective values were overwhelmingly emphasised. Wu (1999, p, 152-153) 
demonstrates that there were “positive effects” in the political work of athletes; 
“they were able to prioritise national and collective value, to make individual values 
                                                 
22 There were 10 works of Chairman Mao that was compulsory for athletes and coaches, and more 
were required for senior officials. 
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subordinate to collective values, to make partial values subordinate to the unified 
values, and to ignore their own individual interests.” Other significant elements 
which were stressed in elite level sport included “calling for collaborative progress ”, 
“fighting against champion-ism and gamesmanship”, as well as “being a good 
winner and a good loser”, etc. Even after the Cultural Revolution, the political 
consciousness of communist ideology was still stressed in the elite sport system. 
Being “‘red and professional’ (both socialist-minded and professionally competent)” 
was not only a requirement for athletes, but also for all Tiyu personnel (SPCSC 1978). 
2.3.2.2 The Institutional Transformation in the PRC 
In the early days of PRC, Tiyu had been combined with a number of social issues, 
and had been consequently governed by different institutions. Before the official 
establishment of ACSF, it was the Chinese New Democracy Youth League23 that 
was in charge of Tiyu issues24. It was approved at the first sport (Tiyu more precisely) 
meeting of the PRC on 26 October 1949 that the former Chinese Olympic Committee 
(hereafter, the COC) and the China National Amateur Athletic Federation, both of 
which were formed by the Nationalist government, were to be unified and reformed 
into the ACSF. The ACSF was subsequently founded in June 1952. Ma Xulun, 
                                                 
23 It changed its name into ‘The Communist Youth League of China’. 
24 Feng Wenbin, then-Secretary of the Chinese New Democracy Youth League, was nominated as the 
chief of the preparatory committee of All-China Sports Federation. 
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then-Minister of Education, became the first chairman of the ACSF. Like other NGOs, 
there were a number of important sports figures who lived in the KMT regime area 
becoming members of the ACSF. For example, Dong Shouyi, the only IOC member 
who was in Mainland China, was accepted into the ACSF by the then-Premier 
Minister Zhou Enlai (Hua 1993).  
On the 15 November 1952, the Sports Committee of the People’s Central 
Government was established. He Long, a Military leader, was nominated as the 
Chief Director. The Committee was responsible for the administration of both the 
ACSF, which was planned to be under the Ministry of Education, and the Central 
National Defence Sports Club25. Two years later, the Committee changed its name 
into the SPCSC, and was identified as “the department of the People’s Central 
Government, which was chiefly in charge of Tiyu, and was also responsible for 
leading, coordinating and governing the national Tiyu issues.”(Wu, 1999, p. 50) 
It is claimed by many that the establishment of the SPCSC symbolised the 
institutionalisation of the tri-partite sport governance system (Wu 1999; Gu 1997; 
                                                 
25 The Central National Defence Sports Club was formed by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Youth League of China in 1952. The organisation was similar to the Voluntary Society for 
Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet of USSR, which was a mass voluntary military education 
and training organisation. Huang Zhong, the then-Minister of Military Affairs and Tiyu of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Youth League of China was nominated as the chief director of the club. 
It then changed its name to the People’s Defence Sports Association of China in 1956 (Wu, 1999). 
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Xiong et al. 2008). In parallel with the SPCSC, the elite sport issues in the military 
system were separately governed by the General Political Department of the Central 
Military Commission, while the People’s Defence Sports Association of China 
became the organisation of mass defence and sport. The third part of the sport 
governance system is the social sport system, which was made up of the ASCF, 
social organisations (such as All China Federation of Trade Unions, The Communist 
Youth League of China, etc.), and other mass sport organisations (Gu, 1997).  
This system was seriously damaged during the Cultural Revolution which started in 
1966. Even though the national sport administration system generally went back to 
work in the aftermath of the nomination of Wang Meng on 8 July, 1971, who was a 
General of the PRC, as the Chief of the Revolutionary Commission of the SPCSC, 
there were still fierce political struggles in the system, especially since the ‘Gang of 
Four’26 started ‘criticising Lin Biao and Confucius’ in Tiyu in 1974. 
The re-establishment of the sport administration system was prioritised by the PRC 
                                                 
26 ‘Gang of Four’ included Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife; Zhang Chunqiao; Yao Wenyuan; and Wang 
Honwen. It was a controversial political group in the history of Cultural Revolution. It has been 
usually portrayed as an anti-revolution group in the official media of China, and the arrest of the 
Gang of Four in 1976 is regarded as the symbol of the end of the Cultural Revolution. However, some 
scholars argue that Mao used them as his ideological praetorian guard, to defend the ideals of the 
Cultural Revolution. See Ye Yonglie, 2009, The Rise and Fall of the Gang of Four; and Roderick 
MacFarquhar & Michael Schoenhals, 2006, Mao's Last Revolution. 
  50 
government as the precondition of the restoration of Tiyu from the rubble of the 
Cultural Revolution. The replacement of Zhuang Zedong27 by Wang Meng, as the 
secretary and director of the SPCSC in 1977, was regarded as signalling the recovery 
of the Tiyu system (Wu, 1999). After the National Sport Working Conference in 1978, 
it was understood that “All of the Tiyu issues must follow the leadership of the CPC; 
all of the Tiyu regulations and institutional system must be realistically rebuilt; all of 
the personnel of Tiyu must be ‘red and professional’ (both socialist-minded and 
professionally competent)”(SPCSC 1978). Subsequently, a number of Tiyu 
regulations and institutions were amended and redrawn. By 1979, the sport 
governance system had fully reinstated.   
2.3.2.3 The Olympics and the ‘Two China’ dilemma 
Political significance and usefulness has been as inherent element in Chinese elite 
sport discourse. For instance, Tiyu is recognised as “an important element of 
Chinese diplomatic patterns, which has particular effectiveness and advantages” 
(Song 2009, p.160). It has thus been well implemented in the diplomacy of China to 
enhance the domestic development of sport, as well as to serve the diplomatic affairs 
of the CPC and the country (ibid, p.160).  
                                                 
27 Zhuang Zedong (born 1942) was a Chinese table tennis player, as well as a well-known political 
personality during the Cultural Revolution. He became a favourite of Jiang Qing, wife of Mao Zedong 
and leader of the Cultural Revolution in 1973, and was subsequently named as the secretary and 
director of the SPCSC. After the downfall of the Gang of Four, Zhuang was jailed in October, 1976. 
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As noted previously, the PRC was enthusiastic about becoming involved in the 
Olympic movement in its early days. Less than a month after its official 
announcement of the sovereignty of the country, the communist regime put the 
reform of the COC on the political agenda. This is because the ‘Taiwan issue’28 was 
the main problem with which the PRC government was concerned in terms of 
seeking to retrieve its place in international organisations (Wu, 1999). And, it was 
evidently particularly important for the newly in power PRC to replace the ROC on 
the IOC as the legitimate representative of China, in order to declare its sovereignty 
to the world 
The PRC threw its first strike in the bidding for the international legitimacy of its 
membership of the IOC and of the international Olympic movement on 5th February, 
1952. The ACSF mailed the IOC expressing its willingness to take part in the 15th 
Olympic in Helsinki. More importantly for the PRC government, it was a declaration 
of its right as the only representative of China, though there was only one of the 
                                                 
28 "Taiwan Issue" refers to the controversy regarding the political status of Taiwan that whether 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu should become unified with the territories now governed by the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), or should remain as the territory of the Republic of China (ROC) 
that went to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949 and has maintained its regime there since that date, or 
whether it should formally declare independence and become the Republic of Taiwan. This is bound 
up with the question of ,whether its existence and status as a state ("country") is legitimate and 
recognized by the international community (see, Sheng Lijun, 2001, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan 
Issue). 
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three Chinese Olympic committee members who remained in the Mainland29. When 
the IOC was trying to solve the dilemma, the PRC government wasted no time in 
replacing its political competitor in international sports federations. During the 
period of waiting for the IOC’s decision, newly formed sport associations in the PRC 
succeeded in joining a number of international federations, such as the IAAF, FIFA, 
and FIVB etc. However, the IOC had vacillated in deciding between the ‘two Chinas’, 
and was not able to resolve the political standoff until only a few days before the 
1952 Games30. Its final decision was to invite athletes from both the PRC and the 
ROC, the latter being the then-recognised member of IOC (Wu 1999; The Chinese 
Olympic Committee 2008; Xu 2008; Song 2009).  
It was clearly that neither of the two would send their athletes to any Olympic 
Games if the other regime was also invited. Hence, though the PRC’s top leaders 
gave their agreement to participating in the Games, the PRC delegation was kept in 
Beijing until they learned that Taiwan had withdrawn from the Games on 24 July, 
1952, which was the 6th day of the Helsinki Games. It took the delegation four days 
                                                 
29 The other two, Wang Zhengting and Kong Xiangxi, chose to leave mainland China, when the PRC 
was founded. Kong lived in the United States after 1949, and Wang spent the rest of his life in Hong 
Kong. (Xu, 2008) 
30 It is recorded in the offical webpage of the Chinese Olympic committee that it was on 17 July, 1952 
(http://en.olympic.cn/china_oly/china_olympic/2008-11-04/1665784.html); however, Xu (2008) 
states that it was on 18 July, 1952. 
  53 
to arrived at Helsinki on 29th July, just one day before the closing ceremony. Even 
though there was only one swimmer who took part in a preliminary competition 
and he was unable to go further than the first round, it was still regarded as a victory 
by the PRC government. Zhou Enlai, the then-PM, told the delegation before they 
left Beijing that ‘it is a victory for China, even if we could do nothing but just fly our 
flag in the Olympic village.’ (Wu, 1999, p.220) Of course, the flag of the ROC was not 
there in 1952. 
The PRC government’s progress did not slow down following this initial victory in 
the Olympic movement. Rong Gaotang, vice president and secretary general of the 
ACSF, telegraphed the IOC as soon as the PRC delegation left Helsinki, expressing 
his anger that Taiwan was also invited and urging the IOC to admit the legitimacy of 
the ACSF as well as to expel the representative from Taiwan (Xu, 2008). Nevertheless, 
the second round of the Olympics Game did not favour the communist side. Though 
the ACSF was successfully accepted as a member of the Olympic family in 1954, they 
found out to their surprise that their competitor was also welcomed by the new 
president, the American Avery Brundage (Wu, 1999). 
Though Taiwan chose to withdraw from the 1952 Helsinki Games in order to protest 
the “unlawful” decision of the IOC, it did not work as hard as the people from 
Beijing in the ‘Chinese civil war’ within the Olympic Family. Kong Xiangxi, who was 
one of the two IOC members who left mainland China, resigned from the IOC in 
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1955, and the other one, Wang Zhenting sent his resignation three years later (Xu, 
2008). The fading out of the voice of Taiwan in the IOC did not provide the PRC any 
benefits. On the contrary, Beijing’s efforts to keep Taiwan away from the Games had 
been ignored, if not rejected, by Brundage. Hence, when the PRC delegation arrived 
in Melbourne and found that the Nationalist flag was hanging in the Olympic 
Village, Beijing decided to emulate what Taiwan had done four years previously in 
Helsinki (Song, 2009). For the next two years, the PRC gradually obtained a better 
understanding of the power of the IOC in international sport, as more and more 
international federations followed Brundage’s tactic and recognised its competitor in 
their organisation. One year after Wang Zhenting’s resignation, Dong Shouyi sent a 
letter to Brundage expressing “indignation” at some “unfriendly and distorting 
remarks” by the President of the IOC which were seen as “insulting” (Xu, 2008, p.85). 
The resignation of Dong from the IOC was demanded by Brundage, which he 
subsequently submitted sending a letter to the American accusing him of adopting 
an imperialist attitude and anti-Beijing position. On the same day, the PRC 
terminated its relationship with the IOC, and this was not reinstated until the 
Nagoya session in 1979. Though Beijing was attempting to express its anger to the 
IOC, it lost the second round of its Olympics Game, however, to the Cold War 
international relationship rather than to the ROC (the Chinese Olympic Committee, 
2008; Xu,2008; Song, 2009). 
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2.3.3 Emergence of sports reform 1979-1993 
Wu (1999) points out that before 1979, Chinese Tiyu was administered and operated 
via administrative orders. However, with the introduction of economic reform in 
China in the late 1970s, the maladies of this development approach gradually 
unfolded to the public and politicians. 
After restoration from the impact of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Tiyu started its 
reform in the mid-1980s with a principle of “prioritising elite sport, then leading 
subsequent general development” (Wu, 1999). The first policy concerning Chinese 
sport reform, The SPCSC’s Decision on the Reform of Sport System (Draft) (SPCSC 
1986b), was published in 1986. Even though it was named as a policy for sport in 
general, nine out of ten parts of the document were closely related to elite sport. 
However, the reinforcement of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport system is regarded as 
the most significant achievement in the implementation of the 1986 policy (Xiong et 
al. 2008; Yang et al. 2002; Zhang 2009).  
Further reform, which focused not just on patching the existing Juguo Tizhi, but also 
on fundamental restructuring of its framework, was thus announced (Wu, 1999). The 
second reforming policy in Chinese elite sport in macro terms, The SPCSC’s opinion 
on deepening the reform of the sport system (SPCSC 1993d), was published in 1993, 
which is recognised as the start point of our pre-2008 analysis and is investigated 
later in Chapter 4. 
  56 
2.3.3.1 Elite Sport and Institutional reform 
Elite sport successes, which have been accentuated in the Chinese context, 
immediately became the dominant voice in Chinese sport when the sport 
administration system had fully recovered from the Cultural Revolution which 
ended in 1976 (Liu 2003). At the 1978 National Sport Working Conference, “rapidly 
climbing to the summit of elite sport” was exclusively emphasised and prioritised by 
the SPCSC, as the under-developed elite sport was regarded as the weak point of the 
Chinese Tiyu (Wu, 1999). A resolution was subsequently passed at the 1980 
Conference that “(we) attempt to join the top 10 in the 1980 Olympics medal list, and 
top 6 in the 1984 Games…(and seek) to completely change the under-development 
of (Chinese) elite sport in the 1980s” (SPCSC 1981, p.1). 
Wu (1999) states that developing elite sport was the mainstream activity of the 
Chinese Tiyu in the 1980s, because firstly, the government was not able to supply an 
overall development of Tiyu; secondly, elite sport became a crucial method for the 
country to establish national identity, after it re-joined the international community. 
A number of moves were carried out in the 1980s (Guo, 2009). For example, the 
SPCSC listed 13 sports as the main targets for development, the national teams for 
which were trained together throughout the whole year, and special funding, 
facilities and supplements were also provided. The national three-level training 
network was also correspondingly refined. The modification of the National Games, 
matching the National Games sports with the Olympic sports, provides another 
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good example, though this had a significant negative effect on non-Olympic sports 
(Gu, 1997).  
The reform in the 1980s is interpreted as a move with unclear direction and methods, 
and is thus viewed in essence as a reinforcement of Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi 
(Xiong et al. 2008; Yang et al. 2002; Zhang 2009). However, this superficial reform 
was recognised as an effective one in the immediate period after its introduction, 
given the 15 gold medals China won at the 1984 LA Olympics. The accentuation of 
elite sport was thus approved by the Party whose leadership argued that “we need 
to concentrate our resources and power on the sports in which we are good, and 
focus on those (sports) in which we will be able to catch up with the advanced world 
level”(The Central Committee of the CPC 1984). The financial support to elite sport 
and investment of infrastructure for its development were also officially required to 
be included in the national economy and social development plan of all level of 
governments (The Central Committee of the CPC 1984).  
The division of Tiyu was consequently emphasised by the SPCSC, which, to a degree, 
enable it to release the responsibility for developing mass sport. However, the 
PCSCs at every level still maintained administrative power, since “the operation of 
all kinds of mass sport groups have to be under the leadership of Sport 
Administration Departments or competent authorities” (SPCSC, 1986, p.1). These 
reforms of the functions and responsibility of PCSCs enabled the institutions to 
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concentrate on elite sport without ceding their governing power (Guo, 2009). As Wu 
(1999, p. 295) states “the reform … institutionally supports the development of the 
national strategy of Tiyu development that is ‘focusing on youth sport in mass sport 
terms, and prioritising the Olympic Games in elite sport terms’.”   
The reformed competition system was argued to be a reflection of the ‘refinement of 
the traditional governance system’ (Zhang, 2009). The national level events, which 
were segmented into 3 categories, were all recognised as ‘practices and rehearsal’ for 
the elite athletes, enabling them to “win more medals in international events, 
consequently completing its mission for the Party and people ”(Wu, 1999, p. 292). 
The SPCSC was responsible for the National Games and Youth Games, which were 
all ‘Olympicised’. National Federations were responsible for the national 
championships and leagues of particular sports, while the national events within 
particular social sectors, such as the Students Games, were organised by the 
governing bodies in the social sectors.  
However, there were still some suggestions and arguments relating to the reform 
and the system raised by scholars and politicians. Zhao Yu (2011) argues that most 
of the problems of Chinese Tiyu, such as the conflicts between patriotism and 
frenzied nationalism, the less-educated athletes who had a miserable life after 
retirement, and the unscientific training methods, were rooted in the 
elite-sport-prioritising policy which was the polar opposite of mass sport. He 
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advocated a complete reform of Chinese Tiyu, and argued that over-emphasis on 
gold medals had corrupted athletes, the sport governing system, and sport per se.  
Zhao received harsh criticisms, which, however, were silenced by the poor 
performance in the 1988 Seoul Olympic (Yi, 2008). This sporting disaster is regarded 
as a turning point from which the Chinese started to rethink the structural problems 
and consider further reform (Zhang, 2009). in comparison with the overall reform in 
China, Wu (1995, p.357) points out, the Tiyu reform in the 1980s was superficial, 
ignoring some deep conflicts, especially the “conflicts between the Tiyu 
administration and operation system rooted in the planned-economy and the 
demand of era”.  
After Deng Xiaoping’s second visit to south China in 1992, another round reform of 
the Tiyu system was carried out, which aimed to transmute the traditional structure 
and system (Wu 1999; Xiong et al. 2008; Yang et al. 2002). It is from this second wave 
of reform, symbolised by the publication of The SPCSC’s opinion on deepening the 
reform of sport system (SPCSC 1993d), that we start our analysis in chapters which 
follow. 
2.3.3.2 The PRC and the Olympic Movement 1979-1991 
The PRC re-joined the IOC in 1979, 2 years after the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
following considerable diplomatic effort (The Chinese Olympic Committee 2004; 
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Liang 2005; Liu 2003; Cha 2009).  
In 1973, one year after being recognised by the UN, the PRC was accepted by the 
Asian Games Federation31 as its member, and then took part in the 1974 Asia Games 
in Iran (Gu, 1997, Wu, 1999). On 9 April, 1975, the ACSF handed in its application for 
the membership representing China to the IOC. This was obviously unacceptable to 
Taiwan, the National Olympic Committee of which was recognised as representative 
of China at that time. The ‘two China’ dilemma was once again put on the table in 
Lausanne. 
Before the IOC made any decision, it was Canada who ‘invented’ the initial form of 
the resolution that the IOC was to adopt three years later in 1979 (Xu, 2008). The 
formal diplomatic relationship between Canada and the PRC was established in 1970. 
Following its acceptance of the one China policy by the PRC government, the 
Canadian government declared that it would not allow Taiwan’s team to compete in 
the 1976 Montreal Games if the delegation sought to use its officially designated 
name, flag, or anthem, all of which referred to the ‘Republic of China’ (Wu, 1999, Xu, 
2008).  
Needless to say, Beijing was pleased by the action taken by its new friend in North 
America. However, predictably, neither the IOC nor the US government (who 
                                                 
31 It transformed into the Olympic Council of Asia in 1982. 
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nonetheless duplicated this policy in the 1980 Winter Games) were pleased with it. 
However, the IOC, which worried about the potential ‘political pollution’ of the 
Games, did not sanction a cancellation of the Games to punish the Canadian 
government (Xu, 2008). This was a consequence of the concern of the financial 
impact of cancelling the Olympics and of the IOC’s understanding of the 
inevitability of solving the ‘two China’ quandary. Meanwhile, the United States, 
which was working on rebuilding its diplomatic relationship with the PRC, also did 
not want to offend Beijing and thus did not go any further than expressing criticism 
to Canada (Wu, 1999).  
The Canadian government made some concessions right before the Games, on 15th 
July, which was just two days before the opening ceremony, proposing that it would 
follow the IOC’s Rome formula, which meant the flag and anthem were available to 
use by the Taiwan delegation, but not its official name (Xu, 2008). The IOC accepted 
this compromise, which also satisfied the White House, but the Nationalist 
government in Taiwan chose to withdraw from the Games on 16th July (Brownell, 
2008). After the Games, the IOC President Lord Killanin and Vice-President J. A. 
Samaranch visited China in September 1977 and April 1978 respectively(The 
Chinese Olympic Committee 2004).  
Both the domestic and international political environment considerably changed for 
the PRC in 1979. On 1st January, 1979, the PRC and the US government normalised 
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their relations. The US government transferred diplomatic recognition of China from 
Taipei to Beijing. The news  of diplomatic ‘ice-breaking’ shocked the world as well 
as the IOC (Zhang 1996, p.132). On the same day, the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress promulgated the "Letter to Compatriots in Taiwan," 
promoting reunification, which in terms of rhetoric was a more peaceful phrase than 
its former discourse of ‘liberating Taiwan’. Subsequently, the COC representatives 
who were invited to attend the 81st IOC session in Montevideo in April 1979 
brought up the new ‘Olympic Model’ for resolving the ‘two China’ dilemma that: 
There is only one China in the world, and that is the People's Republic of China. 
Taiwan is part of Chinese territory. Based on this principle, the IOC should recognize 
only one NOC for China, and that is the Chinese Olympic Committee with its 
headquarters in Beijing and representing the amateur athletes of the whole country.  
The Chinese Olympic Committee agreed that the sports organization in Taiwan 
might stay in the IOC, on condition that it would not attach "Republic of China" to 
its name, nor use the appellation of "Taiwan" independently. Nor would it be allowed 
to use its "national flag" and "national anthem" and anything symbolic of the 
"Republic of China."  
The Chinese Olympic Committee, 2004, p. 1 
In mid-October 1979, the PRC was re-admitted by FIFA, and the football 
organisation in which Taiwan maintained its place by changing the name into the 
‘Chinese Taipei’, as well as its logo, flag and anthem (Song, 2009). 
On 25th October, 1979, the IOC Executive Board passed the resolution of the ‘two 
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Chinas’ dilemma at a meeting held in Nagoya. The COC was officially admitted as 
the NOC representing the Olympic Movement in the whole of China using the 
national flag and national anthem of the PRC, while the Olympic committee in 
Taiwan, as one of China's local organisations, could only use the name "Chinese 
Taipei Olympic Committee" with its flag, anthem and emblem different from the 
original ones pending the IOC's approval (The Chinese Olympic Committee, 2004). 
The resolution was subsequently passed after a postal vote by all the IOC members, 
and was announced on 26 November, 1979. Two years later, He Zhenliang was 
co-opted as the first IOC member in the PRC (Liang 2005). The PRC was finally 
reinstated in the IOC at the beginning of the 1980s (Brownell, 2008; The Chinese 
Olympic Committee, 2008). 
During the procedure of returning to the IOC, the PRC governments and sport 
authorities had made a number of domestic institutional and theoretical changes in 
addition to their diplomatic endeavours. In 1979, the COC became an independent 
institution from the ACSF (the relationship among the SPCSC, COC and ACSF is 
analysed in Chapters 4-6), and was then recognised by the IOC as the NOC of China 
(Yi, 2008). A number of national federations of different sports were also established, 
which were regarded as another part of the institutional foundation of the Olympic 
movement in China (Wu, 1999). In addition, some regulations, facilities and 
timetables were altered mapping onto the Olympic schedule as well. 
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The Olympic Games, as Cha (2009) argues, have always had political significance for 
China and Chinese people. For example, the first Olympics in which the PRC 
competed after its return to the IOC, the 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid, USA 
was the Olympic Games hosted in the territory of the arch “evil imperialist”, which, 
nonetheless, had just announced its recognition of the PRC and its establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the sole legitimate government of China. By contrast, the 
first, and only, Summer Games which the PRC boycotted after 1979 was the 1980 
Moscow Games hosted by its former big brother (Wu, 1999; Brownell, 2008). 4 years 
later, Xu Haifeng won the first Olympic gold medal in Chinese history in the Los 
Angeles Games, which was the first Summer Games China attended after its 
readmission, as well as the Games boycotted by the most of the socialist countries 
except China, Romania and Yugoslavia (Yi, 2008). Song (2009, p.173), the Director of 
the External Affairs Department of the GAS, notes that  
… though being under great pressure, because of the national fundamental interests, 
we decided to attend the 1984 Games. And it was subsequently proved that the 
decision not only, to a great extent, rescued the Olympic Movement, but also won a 
diplomatic reputation for the country.   
Even though suffering a poor performance in Seoul, China was hugely encouraged 
by the success of the 1990 Asian Games, which was not only “a victory of the reform 
and opening up policy”, but also “a diplomatic triumph that remitted the political 
pressure and convinced foreign countries that China was maintaining its route to 
reform”(ibid, p. 175). Subsequently, with the support from Deng Xiaoping and other 
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high profile politicians, the COC handed in its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games in 
the first year of the 1990s. Unfortunately, this bid was rejected in 1993, which is 
chosen as the start point of our analysis. 
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Chapter Three  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we aim to connect the theoretical concepts with methods employed 
in our research through providing an outline of the philosophical position, research 
method adopted in, and the process of empirical work of, this research. We start 
with discussion of our ontological and epistemological positions, which lay at the 
heart of a paradigm and affect other assumptions we have taken (Blaikie 2007; 
Sparkes 1992). The theory employed to answer our research questions and 
corresponding analytic framework are subsequently discussed in the third and 
fourth section. Following a demonstration of the rationale for the selection of the 
three sports addressed as cases and of interviewees, we finish this chapter with a 
short elaboration of the protocol of data analysis. 
3.2 Philosophical Considerations 
Prior to initiation of a research project, researchers must have a certain number of 
basic assumptions, as “we cannot, and do not, enter the research process as empty 
vessels or as blank slates that data imprints itself upon”(Sparkes, 1992, p.14). Blaikie 
(2007) elaborates the nature of, and relationship between, such set of assumptions 
through a flow chart, which is illustrated as Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3. 1 Research Choices 
 
Resources: Blaikie, 2007 p.27 
As shown in the chart, the interrelationships between the research problems, research 
questions, research strategies, ontology and epistemology are indicated with 
double-header arrows emphasising the dialectical nature of the relationship between 
elements. The contents linked with horizontal arrows exemplify decisions that need 
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to be made in each category. These are basic philosophical assumptions of a 
researcher, referring to the nature of reality, of truth, and of the social world, and are 
influential to the technical steps and aspects of research (Earls 1986).  
Critical realism (CR), adopted in our research, is located between the positivist and 
interpretivist position. On the one hand, CR, like positivism, claims the existence of a 
real social world, which includes not only observable events and entities, but also 
unobservable objects, structures and mechanisms (Bhaskar 1978; Bhaskar 1998; 
Collier 1994; Blaikie 2007). This distinction can be illustrated in the example of the 
difference between policy statements and the mechanism of, and power relationship 
within, the publication of such policy. For instance, the addition of the content in 
relation to the professionalisation of Chinese elite sport (in the statement of Chinese 
elite sport policy) is not only a consequence of the discussion of policy makers, but 
also an outcome enabled by the economic reform of Chinese society after 1979. On 
the other hand, in contrast with Positivism, CR places emphasis on the constructive 
role of social agency, which, at the same time is facilitated and constrained by social 
structure. In other words, social structure is regarded as the outcome of human 
agency’s construction (Bhaskar & Hartwig 2010). This is to say that, CR emphasises 
the dialectic relationship between structure and agency. For instance, policy makers 
in Chinese sport are not only restrained and enabled by the Chinese context, such as 
the institutional and ideological setting of Chinese sport, but also proactively 
(re)produce it through framing the nature of practice and the relationship between 
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different institutions. This dialectical relationship is evidenced, on the one hand, in 
the socialist narratives well employed in the policy statement; on the other hand, in 
the portrait of the consistency (and/or contradiction) between the socialist ideology 
and social phenomenon (example may be drawn from the construction of the nature 
of professional sport in the Chinese context, “as a product of capitalism “(Xiong et al. 
2008, p.83) or as a “accelerator of [Chinese] elite sport reform” (GAS, 2011, p.1)). 
Thus, both a] the structural restraint over constructive practices, and b] the 
constructive effects of social agencies’ framing of ‘reality’, need to be borne in mind. 
Marsh (1999, p.13) elaborates six major assumptions of the Critical Realism:  
1) The world exists independently of our knowledge of it;  
2) There are (deep) structures that cannot be directly observed;  
3) There is necessity in the world-objects/structures do have causal power, 
so it is possible to make causal statements;  
4) CR proposes that peoples’ discursive knowledge about ‘reality’ (which 
exists independently of their knowledge) will have an impact on the 
outcomes of social interrelations;  
5) Structures do not determine outcomes, rather they both constrain and 
facilitate actions and may be modified by the actions of agents; 
6) Social science, thus, involves the study of reflexive agents who are 
capable of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing social 
structures 
We thus claim that Chinese society and Chinese elite sport are a real, stratified and 
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only partially observable32, and are independent of social actors’ knowledge. This is 
to say, for instance, the events experienced post-2008 and the developments in 
Chinese elite sport, as well as policy changes are merely the observable part of social 
reality. These events and phenomena are real, and are ‘viewed’ or experienced from 
a superficial level. Underpinning these events and policy modifications are the 
unobservable structures and mechanisms that are not directly visible but have causal 
power in relation to these observable events (Bhaskar 2008). In order to reveal the 
stratified reality, and to improve the imperfect knowledge of it, an analysis of the 
tangibles and of the agencies’ interpretation of as well as of the historical 
development of the research target is required, since social structure is not only 
dependent on social agents’ activities but is also reliant on space-time (Bhaskar 1989, 
p.203). Thus, we address the first research question, “across the three periods, 
1993-2001, 2001-2008 and post 2008, to what extent have Chinese elite sport policy and 
discursive accounts of that policy changed?” aiming to identify sport policy change 
throughout the period we look at. 
We also explore the dialectic relationship between social actors and context. In doing 
                                                 
32 Also known as depth realist ontology, Critical Realist claims that social reality consists of three levels: 
the level of empirical, actual and real. The structures and mechanisms exist within real domain and in 
addition some events are located in the actual domain are unobservable to social actors. Please see, 
Bhaskar, 1978, 2008; Blaikie, 2007  
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so, we, on the one hand, consider the extent to which the discourse and the 
experience of staging the Beijing Games has influenced the patterns of policy change. 
On the other hand, we also investigate the extent to which the framing of and the 
impact of the 2008 Olympics has been manipulated and absorbed by Chinese society 
and the Chinese elite sport system.  
This is to say that the second question, “to what extent are the changes in Chinese elite 
sport argued to be a consequence of the experience of preparing for and staging the Beijing 
Olympics”, focuses on the relationship between changes in Chinese elite sport, as a 
structure, and agency’s activities which provoke changes in, and reproduces, the 
structure (Benton & Craib 2011). This is to say that, in essence, the second question is 
to look at the social actors’ activities, for example, the experiences of preparing for 
and staging the Beijing Olympics, and to assess the extent to which they reproduce 
and/or reinterpret the structure.  
However, as social agents operate within a structure, their capability to modify 
social structure is affected by the existing structural context (or their interpretation of 
it). Given our particular interest in the role of political factors in the Chinese context, 
such as that of communist ideology, our third question, i.e. “in what ways are the 
policies and their interpretation of the aftermath of the Beijing Games related to explanations 
of the socialist features of the regime”, gives emphasis to the effects of the political and 
ideological structures on policy interpretation, such as Chinese nationalism, 
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socialism, etc.  
3.3 Adequacy of Theory  
3.3.1 Policy as discourse and a Critical Realism based approach 
Classical definitions of policy include defining policy as what governments do or do 
not do (Goldsmith 1980; cited by Henry 2001), or as what governments say they do 
(Henry, 2001). Such focuses on the discursive side of policy, for instance policy 
statements, enable us to view policies as both the indication of intention and 
(implicit) statements of omission, which, though, may be intended or unintended 
(Henry, 2001). Piggin et al. (2009) argue the policy content is able to indicate the 
struggle over the production of meaning as well as the privilege and control in the 
dissemination of this meaning. From a Foucauldian perspective, they (Piggin et al. 
2009, p.465) claim, “through studying the speaker or writer’s employment of various 
rhetorical devices and themes … we can understand relations of power in public 
policy”. 
This relationship between policy discourse and power relations is in line with our 
interest in, and research aim of, exploring power and relationship changes in 
Chinese elite sport. We, consequently, employ a CR based approach to interrogate 
policy discourses, in order to bridge the less-tangible side of, i.e. the power structure 
of, Chinese elite sport.  
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It is worth noting that we not only look into discourse of policy, i.e. what government 
say they do, but also discourse about policy, for example, what they say about why 
they do, what others (including perhaps oppositional voices) say governments 
actually do. Embedded in this distinction and the discussions which relate to it are 
questions of the ‘power of discourse’ – how dominant is any one account related to 
policy; and ‘power over discourse’ – that is whose voice is (allowed to be) heard in 
discussions about policy, and whose voice is weak or absent. The CDA and its 
usefulness in investigating the relationship between discourse and power is 
discussed in the following part, Critical Discourse Analysis, a theoretical method. 
3.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis, a theoretical method 
As a theoretical method, Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter, CDA) theoretically 
constructs the object of research, i.e. ‘discourse’, which is seen as a manifold 
phenomenon. It exceeds the linguistic and semiotic term, further embraces and 
embodies a dialectical social process from three aspects: a way of acting, materializing 
and being (Fairclough 2009; Wodak & Meyer 2009). This is to say that the policy 
discourse per se is regarded, from a CDA perspective, as a manifestation and 
construction of social practice, social representation/construction and social identity 
(Fairclough, 2009). In other words, the framework of CDA enables us to explore the 
different facets of discourse, and subsequently highlight the dialectical relationships 
between semiosis (including language) and other elements of the society.  
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Recognising discourse as a multi-aspect phenomenon, Wodak & Meyer (2009, p.5-6) 
suggest that discourse analysis must focuses on “a dialect relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), 
which frame it”. This implies that CDA shares accordance with CR adopted in our 
research. It is also in line with our intention of highlighting the dialectical 
relationship between Chinese sport policy discourse and Chinese society, since 
discourse is a socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned phenomenon.  
Fairclough (2005, 2009) indicates that through investigating the manifestation of 
social structure, e.g. discourse, one is able to disclose the structural features of 
society, such as the constitution of power relationships between different groups. 
The relationship between power, as a systemic and constitutive element and 
characteristic of a society, and discourse has been investigated and discussed by 
many (Hall 2001; Foucault 1980a; Foucault 1980d; Fairclough 2005a). Given its 
concerns with power as a central condition in social life, CDA provides us with a 
useful instrument to discover the power relationship within Chinese elite sport, and 
to understand the social dynamics and control (of action, at both individual and 
collective level), through analysing discourse of, and about, policy (Foucault 1988; 
Foucault 1980a). In addition, our investigation does not stop at the level of the 
production of social domination, but also looks into the interpretation of social 
domination by the powerful (over the less powerful) groups, which is regarded as 
the main feature of CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). This is to say, through adopting 
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CDA, we explore not only the dominating discourse and power in Chinese elite 
sport, but also the way in which such dominance is legitimised and interpreted by 
the dominant and less-dominant groups, such as the diverse interpretation of why 
and in what way the Chinese sport authorities (are able to) do what they do. 
Ideology, another important phenomenon of this thesis, is recognised as “[a] 
representation of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and 
maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation through representing 
events, positioning people and constructing social structures” by Fairclough (2003, 
p.218; cited by Wodak & Meyer 2009, p.9). The phrasing of the definition implies the 
discursive feature of ideologies, which, on the one hand, is considerably affected by 
discursive practices; and, on the other hand, is also able to influence social power 
relationships. Moreover, it is worth noting that ideologies reflect the values that are 
promoted by certain groups based on their interests. And the mainstream ideologies 
of a given society usually manifest sets of interests of the group that sits at the 
summit of social power hierarchies. For instance, the ideological elements of Chinese 
elite sport discourse can be found in the promotion of collective value, for example 
of the Chinese table tennis and women’s volleyball teams (F. Liu 2009; P. Liu 2008); 
and in the criticism and regulation of commercial activities of Chinese elite athletes 
(GAS 2006a; Liu 2007; Gao 2005). Therefore, through analysing discourse, which is 
“an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique” (Fairclough, 2009, p.218), 
we are able to unveil the discursive construction and the influence of ideologies, not 
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only of the communist but also others (such as nationalist) philosophies, in Chinese 
elite sport discourse. 
To summarise, we employ CDA (which mainly focuses on the implementation and 
interpretation of power in a given society), as a theoretical research method. It is 
associated with a general method, arguing that the invisible power relationship and 
social structure can be investigated by analysing discourses; however, specific 
methods can be also used for a particular research based on the theoretical 
construction of its object (Fairclough, 2009). The analytic framework for this research 
is discussed in the part of Protocol, after the following part of the appropriateness of 
method and reliability of data and data collection. 
3.3.3 Power, Knowledge and Discourse 
In investigating the effectiveness of the operation of power within Chinese elite 
sport, we have been enlightened by Lukes’ (2005) informative concept of the three 
dimensions of power, for it not only incorporates the tangible practices of power 
(including the situation of decision making and non-decision making) but also, most 
importantly, invites us to consider the way in which obedience to the decisions of 
the power becomes habitual and thus less-noticeable.  
Following this concept, we define power via the effect when it is utilised and/or 
applied, and see it as a capacity obtained by different groups of actors in a society. 
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The effect of power and the power relationship within Chinese elite sport is thus 
investigated from three dimensions. For the first dimension, power is normally 
defined as “involving a successful attempt by A to get B to do something he would 
not otherwise do’”(Dahl 1957). Polsby accordingly suggests (1963, cited by Lukes, 
2005, p. 18) that the best way of examining power of different social groups is to 
investigate “who prevails in decision-making”. Following this one dimensional view, 
power is associated with the observable conflicts of interests and decision-making 
procedure. Such contending interests could be evidenced in policy preferences 
(Lukes, 2005). Examples in Chinese elite sport in relation to this dimension include 
the regulation, and sanction of, Chinese elite athletes participating in the commercial 
campaigns of organisations in private sectors. 
At the same time, Lukes (2005, p.20) also indicates that power is viewed by many as 
the capacity of “creat[ing] and reinforc[ing] barriers to the public airing of policy 
conflicts” (Bachrach, P. and Baratz 1970, p.8). This is acknowledge as the second 
dimension of power emphasising the effect of power in non-decision-making, which 
is “‘a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and 
privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept 
covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, 
failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of 
the policy process’ (Lukes, 2002, p. 44)”. Our quotation from Liu Peng’s (2007, p.1) 
speech (on page 239) provides a good example of the first instance Lukes exemplifies, 
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in which the Sport Minister openly admits the GAS’s neglect over “suggestions 
that … [might be] harmful to the interests of the majority of all institutions and 
organisations.” While the second ways in which the effects of power are manifest in 
this second dimension is evidenced in the establishment of, and the portrayal of the 
significance of, the Centres during the procedure of the independence of Sport 
Associations. In addition, it is important to emphasise that an observable conflict of 
interests is still seen as a compulsory condition for identifying power from this 
dimensional view (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). This is to say that there is one party 
that realises its interests, but their voice is ‘drowned out’ in the decision making 
procedure or policy agenda.  
The third dimension, or as Lukes (2005, p.27) terms “the supreme exercise”, of 
power enables the dominant to secure others’ “compliance by controlling their 
thoughts and desires”, preventing conflicts of interests from arising in the first place. 
In order to do so, the dominant group shapes others’ perceptions, cognitions and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things 
(Lukes, 2005). Tilly (p.1991, p.954) describes this continuous obedience as “a result of 
mystification, repression … [for] subordinates remain unaware of their true 
interests”. This is very close to the unconsciousness and the construction of 
knowledge from a Foucauldian (Foucault 1980a; Foucault 1980d; Foucault 1986; Hall 
2001) point of view, which is introduced subsequently. It also is related to the 
conceptual foundation of Chinese Olympic strategy and thus of Chinese elite sport, 
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and to an important account of Chinese Olympic discourse, i.e. the necessity of 
winning Olympic gold medal. 
The production of truth, to which social actors are subjected, is seen by Foucault as a 
necessary condition of the exercise of power in a given society, for “we cannot 
exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault 1986, p.230). Here, 
‘truth’ (in a given society), on the one hand, is recognised as a product of the 
construction of social actors via their discourse concerning ‘truth’, i.e. knowledge 
(Gary Gutting 2005). Thus, Foucault (1986, p.229) emphasises that power relations 
cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. On the other 
hand, ‘the truth’ is also viewed as a structural element constraining and facilitating 
the practices, or constructive activities, of social actors, as “it is truth that makes the 
laws, that produces the true discourse which, at least partially, decides, transmits 
and itself extends upon the effects of power” (Foucault, 1986, p.230). 
In terms of the relationship among the trio, i.e. discourse, knowledge and power, in 
a given society, Carabine (2001, p.275) argues in his Foucauldian study of unmarried 
mothers that “discourses are historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and 
truths, whereby knowledge is socially constructed by effects of power and spoken of 
in terms of ‘truths’. In other words, knowledge both constitutes and is constituted 
through discourse, while power constrains and produces ‘the truth’ through 
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manipulating the ‘discourse of truth’ (Foucault, 1986, 2002). This is to say that 
discourse, as stated by Bacchi (2000, p. 48), “sets limits upon what can be said… 
legitimates social actions and relations between those who shape the normative 
conventions and whose life experiences may be shaped by such conventions”. Our 
analysis of the changes in the portrayal of professional sports in Chinese elite sport 
discourse, which regulates the identity and function of professional sport among 
different eras, i.e. before and after the opening-up of Chinese society in 1979, during 
the preparation of the 2008 Games, and in the ‘Sport Power’-emphasised post-2008 
era, provides a good example of the relationship between power, knowledge and 
discourse in Chinese elite sport. 
It is worth noting that there are two types of power in the above discussion of the 
relationship between power and discourse. On the one hand, we have identified the 
power of discourse, which is the constructive effect of discourse constituting a 
particular view of society at a particular moment (Carabine, 2001). For example, 
different discourses concerning Chinese elite athletes respectively produce different 
‘truths’ in terms of their role, identity and thus ‘appropriate behaviour’. On the other 
hand, there is also power over discourse, i.e. which discourse is ‘selected’ or ‘heard’ in 
a given society. This is the structural constraint on the constructing activities, and is 
often a function of the social context and is not necessarily examined through 
discourse per se. An extreme example could be noticed in the extreme ‘left’ 
communist discourse in the Cultural Revolution, during which other accounts were 
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excluded, neglected and unconsidered in Chinese society. In other words, one 
dominant discourse of Chinese elite athletes, constructing ‘the truth’ of their role, 
position and thus appropriate behaviour, is made heard in Chinese elite sport, while 
other accounts concerning the same topic are, to a degree, repressed, silenced 
and/or invalidated. 
The power of discourse varies among different discourses, reflects and frames the 
point from which respective reality is produced. It manifests the effectiveness of a 
particular account, which frames reality, constructs truth and thus produces a 
particular knowledge constructing what counts as real. Considering the scenario of 
battles between policy groups at discursive level (for example in policy statements), 
it is not about what happened, but about what is said and how it relates to the 
portrayal of the situation and reasons which lead to what happened. It thus is in line 
with the interests of the group employing such an account.  
The power over discourse varies from one society to another, and regulates the point 
from which ‘the reality’ of the given society should be produced. It, for example, is 
evidenced in the availability of discourse in a given society, and suggests the 
influence of social context on the interpretation (in our research) of sport policy. It is 
thus in line with the interests of the group which is in the position of controlling the 
dominant discourse in a given society. In the case of battles between policy groups 
during the production of policy statements, power over discourse is concerned with 
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whose voice is (allowed to be) heard in discussions about policy, and whose voice is 
weak or absent.  
In sum, while discourses produces (a variety of) knowledge, the dominant discourse 
establishes the ‘truth’, in our study, of Chinese elite sport. This knowledge or ‘the 
truth’ generated in Chinese society produces “what is ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ whilst 
establishing the boundaries of what is acceptable and appropriate” (Carabine, 2001, 
p.279). However, it thus is also important to bear in mind, especially for those 
employing CDA, that “knowledge must itself be understood as a form of error” 
(Gary Gutting 2005, p.74), for its nature as a ‘product’ of construction. 
3.4 Appropriateness of method and reliability of data 
3.4.1 The Consistency of research framework 
The appropriateness of methods needs to be verified, in order to demonstrate the 
relevance of data collected, i.e. its consistency with the philosophical position and 
with the theory of the research. Based on the previous discussion, we aim to explore 
the way in which Chinese elite sport has changed in the post-2008 era through 
answering three questions, which are: 
a) Across the three periods in contemporary Chinese Olympic history, 
1993-2001, 2001-2008 and post 2008, to what extent have Chinese elite 
sport policy and discursive accounts of it changed? 
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b) To what extent are the changes in Chinese elite sport regarded as a 
consequence of the experience of preparing for and staging the Beijing 
Olympics? 
c) In what ways are policies and their interpretation of the aftermath of the 
Beijing Games related to explanations of the socialist features of the 
regime? 
Following our CR stance (Bhaskar 1978; Collier 1994), we argue for the existence of 
real but ‘invisible’ social structures, which, nevertheless, are (at least partial) 
products of social action. This invites us to consider, on the one hand, the production 
of social structures by social actors, and on the other hand, the effects of those 
structures on both enabling and constraining the constructive practices. Discourse, 
which we analyse in the research, can both help to shape social structures and also 
reflect their consequences. In other words it both (re)produces and reflects realities.  
Following our review of Lukes’ (2002) three dimension of power and our interests of 
power over/of discourse in the construction of knowledge and of reality in a given 
society. We see the effect of power in the non-decision making (second) dimension 
as a manifestation of the power over discourse, regulating the eligibility of certain 
types of account of entering the policy agenda of Chinese elite sport discourse. While 
the third dimensional view of power is associated with power of (the dominant) 
discourse to frame, transfer and produce knowledge, and thus to shape, manipulate 
and convert the obedient groups’ preference of and their understanding of interests. 
Thus, from a Foucauldian perspective, it could be argued that those who hold power 
over discourse linguistically frame what others want and what their interests are 
  84 
with the constructive power of their discourse. In other words, these interests and 
needs do not exist independently from the construction of them, while such 
construction is also constrained by the social context. Thus, by employing the 
Critical Realism based Critical Discourse Analysis, which dialectically considers the 
effect of discourse and of social structure, we are able to unveil of the power 
relations within Chinese elite sport through interrogating its discursive production, 
and subsequently understand the way in which the impact or the legacy of the 
Beijing Games is leveraged and Chinese elite sport has developed in the post-2008 
era. 
In practical terms, we collect empirical data from two main resources: a) archival 
documentary material in relation to Chinese elite sport, and b) interviews with 
stakeholders in three case studies, i.e. Chinese baseball, diving and table tennis. On 
the one hand, such a qualitative research strategy provides data for application in 
case studies (Yin, 2003), in both diachronic terms (such as the trends and 
characteristics of the development of Chinese elite sport since 1993) and synchronic 
terms (for instance, the emergence of new discourse in Chinese elite sports after the 
Beijing Games). On the other hand, firstly, consistent with CR, the case study 
approach provides insights into the nature of the phenomena and further 
investigation to the invisible structural mechanisms beyond specific cases (Easton 
2000; Easton 2009). Secondly, this problem-oriented approach is also 
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Figure 3. 2 Illustration of Methodology discussion 
 
recognised as a preferred method in CDA, which usually starts with identifying and 
describing a specific social problem and subsequently leads to a stepwise procedure 
  86 
to uncover the critical features of the social phenomenon under review (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009). 
Yin (2003) indicates that case studies are the preferred research strategy for the 
investigator who wants to cover the real-life context of contemporary phenomenon 
but has little control over it. In this study, for instance, though the researcher is able 
to investigate the development of three Chinese elite sports, he is not able to 
influence anything except the interview procedure. Yin (ibid, p.15) suggests that such 
research strategy is multi-functional, since it is able to “explain the presumed causal 
links in real-life interventions… describe an intervention and the real-life context … 
illustrate certain topics … explore those situation in which the intervention being 
evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes”.  
3.4.2 Reliability and Validity  
As a number of authors point out (Wood & Kroger 2000; Sarantakos 1998; Blaikie 
2007; Easton 2000; Kirk & Miller 1986), given the differences between natural and 
social science, it is difficult, if not totally inappropriate, to apply the classical 
concepts of ‘validity’, ‘reliability’ and ‘objectivity’ in the way that they are used in 
scientific research or in the application of quantitative methods in some social 
science research, in particular those employing qualitative methods such as CDA.  
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In terms of the reliability and validity of this discourse analysis approach, following 
Wood and Kroger (2000, p.164), we argue for using “alternative conceptions of 
reliability and validity”, i.e. warrantability. On the one hand, the concept of 
reliability, which is originally a concept from natural science, is questionable, if not 
inapplicable, in social science. This is to say that because meaning is contextually 
specified in the social world, the significance of identical movement may be 
interpreted differently from one context to another. A different movement may also 
be assigned the same meaning in different contexts, let alone the development or the 
changes in the constructed knowledge of what is ‘appropriate’ in one society, then 
repeatability of findings is less likely to be achieved, or the significance of 
repeatability across different contexts becomes questionable. 
On the other hand, in terms of validity, which concerns whether [the research] 
reflects the ‘truth’, or the true state of the world, given discourse is both constructing 
the world and is part of the world, we could argue that the analysis of discourse per 
se is an analysis of the social world and a medium constructing truth and realism of 
the society. This significance of validity is thus also remarkably devalued than it is 
for nature science. However, this is not to say that we deny “reality”, but question 
whether reality should be regarded as the primary criterion for evaluating research 
employing discourse analysis. In addition, in order to realise its emancipatory 
function, CDA brings to the fore voices and sets of interest which otherwise remain 
under- or un-considered or are labelled as ‘false’ and ‘inappropriate’. We would 
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argue that this makes the requirement of validity ‘reflecting the truth’ more 
questionable, for it suggests a position which opposes simply following the 
stereotype of ‘the truth’ constructed by the dominant voice. 
Blaikie (2007) suggests that the aim of social research is, thus, to improve this 
imperfect knowledge through progressively revealing stratified reality through 
investigating tangible facets, i.e. discourse in the context of this research. Even 
though analysis may only involve the study of a number of ‘cases’, it is still effective, 
as long as “the process involves thoughtful in depth research with the objective of 
understanding why things are as they are” (Easton, 2010, p. 119). 
Researchers, especially those who employ qualitative approaches, are recognised as 
research instruments (Blaikie 2009; Sarantakos 1998). For example, using 
semi-structured interview as one of the data collecting methods implies that the 
researcher, as the interviewer, actively involves with the data collection procedure as 
an insider rather than maintaining a position external to the research target, i.e. 
Chinese elite sport.  
Blaikie (2007) further argues that social researchers are not able to achieve a neutral 
or external ‘observer’ position in the social hierarchy of power and status, since they 
are subject to this structure. For instance, the researcher’s former working experience 
as a sport journalist in China, on the one hand, benefits him in approaching 
interviewees and in understanding certain assumptions and connotations in the 
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conversation. On the other hand, this background also affects his ethical standards, 
research interests and values, which he is unable to discard. At the same time, the 
researcher’s academic background in the UK has helped him to understand the 
western literature as well as introduce and translate the empirical data from Chinese, 
his mother tongue, into English, his academic ‘tongue’ (despite the obvious 
difficulties in translating the confusing and subtle meanings between corresponding 
words in the two languages). In contrast, the UK academic background of the 
researcher is also recognised by interviewees, who viewed the researcher as an 
‘outsider’ and thus as a potential ‘danger’ to Chinese sport society or to themselves.  
It is undeniable that both our research object and the researcher’s accessibility of 
data influence the selection of data resources, which, accompanied with the ‘insider’ 
position, could be criticised as against the requirements of objectivity. In addition, 
since the uniqueness of, and the rapid change of, the Chinese context and the limited 
possibility of repeating interviews, our data might be assessed as non-replicable. 
However, the issue is perhaps less one of replicability than warrantability of the 
claims made on the basis of the data, i.e., how convincing is the researcher’s account 
rather than would somebody else have obtained the same data and derived a similar 
account based on that data. 
Sarantakos (1998) argues that because obtaining the same data is not (always) 
achievable in social science, as long as validity is assured (especially in qualitative 
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research), research should be regarded as reliable and objective. It is also indicated 
by Wodak and Meyer (2009, p.8) that given the infeasibility ‘value free’ social 
research, researchers employing a critical discourse approach should” make their 
position, research interests and values, explicit and their criteria as transparent as 
possible”, rather than apologising “for the critical stance of their work”.  
The key concern of qualitative research, especially that involving interview data, 
should thus be the ‘transparency’ of the research, which is whether a) the elements 
of research process are overtly stated and open to judgement; b) interviews obtain 
frank and open responses; c) conclusions are sensible and seek to avoid bias 
(Sarantakos, 1998). Thus, instead of labelling the conflicting, but frankly responding, 
accounts as ‘false’ or ‘fake’, we crosscheck them with other relevant data, such as the 
identity of source, and social context in order to explore casual factors and less 
tangible structural elements that provoke such divergences. By doing so, we are able 
to unveil an inner coherence of respective voices conflicting against one another, and 
scrutinise consistently conflicting power and interests of different stakeholder 
groups. In addition, it is worth reminding that the emancipatory function of CDA 
brings to the fore voices and sets of interest which otherwise remain under- or 
un-considered as being labelled as ‘false’ and ‘inappropriate’. This makes the 
requirement of validity ‘reflecting the truth’ becomes more questionable. 
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3.4.3 Assessment of data 
It is important to assessing the quality of data, which significantly affects the quality 
of analysis and of the thesis. We employ Scott’s (1990, cited by Bryman 2004) four 
criteria for assessing the quality of documentary data (authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning) as the ‘standards’ for the quality control of the 
empirical data. 
Authenticity concerns the origin of the documents, especially the credibility of 
evidence of authorship. We use publicly available transcripts of government 
archives, speeches and statistical reports relating to Chinese sport. In relation to 
interviews, we are fully aware of the identity of the interviewees in relate to the 
sport he/she involves, and are also familiar with his/her background, which fulfil 
the requirement of authenticity. 
Credibility refers to whether the data is free of error or distortion. In our research, 
we employ two criteria for credibility assessment. The first is relatively ‘factual’ data, 
such as, the time and date of critical events, governmental personnel etc. 
Government documents and reports are used as benchmarks for these relative facts. 
It is worth noting that apart from these well known / widely held ‘less culturally 
mediated facts’, divergent accounts and the more culturally mediated ‘soft facts’ (for 
example, the extent of accomplishment of Chinese elite sport, and causal factors 
influencing the direction of Chinese elite sport development) are tolerated and 
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presented in the thesis. This is because we are concerned about why and how 
different parties represent the ‘facts’ differently, offering dissimilar portraits, 
experience and accounts of certain events or of sport policies would, thus, rather 
provide a more panoramic vision and interpretations rather than cause credibility 
concerns. A more tolerant standard is thus implemented in assessing the data. 
However, this is neither to say that credibility is disregarded, nor that everything 
from the media and interview sources are to be regarded as reliable data. Thus, the 
relationship between data and the identity of source is regarded as the second 
criterion for credibility assessment. This is to say that we evaluate whether and to 
what extent the interviewees speak sincerely and seriously through assessing the 
relationship between the data per se and the identity of the interviewee and the 
interests of the corresponding stakeholder group in Chinese elite sport. 
Representativeness refers to the extent to which the evidence is typical of its kind, or, 
if it is not, whether the extent of its uniqueness is known. In terms of the archival 
material, though we attempt to implement a full range review of government 
documents, some of documents may not be accessible due to confidentiality and 
other reasons. However, Scott (1990, p.7) also indicates that full representativeness is 
not always required, but “what is important is that the scientists should know how 
typical the available evidence is in order to be able to assign limits to the application 
of any conclusions that are drawn from it”. The representativeness of the sports (and 
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their federations) in respective case studies is discussed in following section on Data 
collection. 
The last criterion, ‘meaning’, which refers to what the text actually says, is a twofold 
phenomenon including literal meaning and the interpretative understanding. The 
data is analysed in Chinese, the crucial part of which is presented in the thesis in 
English. In order to fulfil the requirement of the consistent literal meaning, the 
Chinese version is read by a third-party proof-reader and the English version 
presented in the thesis is checked by an expert in the researcher’s area. To address 
the interpretative meaning issue, four interviews are fully translated and then 
thoroughly coded by both the researcher and supervisor in order to ensure the 
consistency and reasonableness of analysis. Consistency and reasonableness are in 
part reflected in the attempt to represent or at least acknowledge both denotative 
and connotative aspects of the meaning of the Chinese data in the English language 
script of this thesis. Examples may include the reforming connotation of 
‘civil-society-based development’ in Chinese elite sport and the political significance 
of ‘left’ and ‘right’ in different stages of the recent history of the communist regime, 
which are discussed in the analytic chapters. 
3.5 Data Collection: the selection of resources and cases 
Two types of empirical data are collected in the research: 1) archival material, such 
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as governmental documents, memoirs of significant sport figures and media 
coverage, 2) semi-structured interviews. The archival material covers the period 
from 1993 to 2012, and is separately analysed in the subsequent ‘pre-2008’ and 
‘post-2008’ chapters. There are two types of archival material collected for the 
research. The first is government documents, including documents published by 
Sport Administration Departments, for instance, the Law of the PRC on Physical 
Culture and Sport, the Strategic Plans for Winning Olympic Glory, Sport Minister’s reports 
at the All States Sports Minister Conference, etc. and those documents relating to, or 
which have impact on, sport issues from other government organs, for example the 
State Council, the Ministry of Education, etc. The second part of archival material 
contains 1) speeches and memoirs of important political or sport figures on Chinese 
elite sport, and 2) comments on the development of and the policies of Chinese elite 
sport by academics, media.  
A two-step procedure has been employed to ensure the  ‘quality’ of policy 
documents analysed in our study. Firstly, we logged in the database of the GAS and 
looked through all policy documents to which we had access. In order to provide a 
full picture of the development of Chinese elite sport, we focused on documents 
providing strategic guidelines for the overall development of Chinese elite sport at 
macro level, rather than on policies merely concerning concrete practices, unless we 
use those practical documents as supporting evidence. Examples would be 
documents relating to the ideological education of Chinese elite athletes and 
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regulation of their commercial activities. Secondly, we also reviewed both the 
comments within and outside Zhuanye system in terms of the significance and 
implication of those macro level policies, which we have selected in the first step. 
After finishing this ‘quality check’ of Chinese elite sport policies, we have selected 
five documents, which were respectively reviewed in the subsequent analysis 
chapters, as the main material accompanied by a number of documents concerning 
related ‘niche issues’ of Chinese elite sport.  
The second type of data is collected through semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders of the three elite sports, i.e. baseball, table tennis, and diving, which are 
selected as three cases studies respectively focusing on different perspective of 
Chinese elite sport development. 
Chinese baseball is a peripheral sport in the Zhuanye sport system, and has became 
further marginalised after the sport was excluded from the Olympic programme 
after the Beijing Games. In contrast to its gloomy future in Zhuanye sport system, 
organisations in the commercial and voluntary sectors have become increasingly 
active, and have organised different campaigns and promotions of the sport at 
non-elite level, after the loss of its Olympic identity. However, the increasing 
resources invested in, and the cumulative attention paid to, baseball from these 
sectors have limited relation to, and only slight interest in, Zhuanye baseball. For 
example, despite the growing campaign of baseball in Chinese cities and increasing 
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number of baseball teams in HEIs, the elite baseball league (CBL) was terminated in 
2012 due to insufficient sponsorship. We investigate such development of baseball to 
scrutinise the civil-society-based development of Chinese elite sport from the 
perspective of a weak, if not the weakest, link of the chain of Zhuanye sport, and to 
explore the change in the power balance between the Sport Administration 
Department and other stakeholders in Chinese baseball. 
Table tennis is recognised as the national sport and as one of the main symbols of 
Chinese elite sport. It also is the only professionalised Chinese Olympic sport in 
which Chinese athletes have been dominant. The introduction of professionalisation 
to table tennis began in 1995, which aimed to explore another source of income for 
elite table tennis players and thus to stop the draining of talent to foreign countries. 
However, after nearly 20 years, the Chinese professional table tennis league remains 
recognised as a “fake professional league” and as greatly influenced by the 
traditional planned-economy based sport system. In this case, we investigate the 
root of the dominance of the Zhuanye sport system and Juguo Tizhi in the 
professionalisation of Chinese table tennis, and the perceived impact of the Beijing 
Games and of a significant reforming move in 2012. 
Diving is the most ‘productive’ Olympic sport in China, which has provided the 
most Olympic medals for the communist regime. Zhuanye diving has been stable 
within its system, however, it had been challenged by another elite diver 
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development system outside Juguo Tizhi from the HE sector. This challenge is 
recognised as an example of ‘a combination of [elite] sport [development] and 
education’, which has been promoted as an approach that would lead to the 
“healthy, sustainable and rapid development” of Chinese elite sport (Yu & Zhang 
2006, p.79). A number of Chinese divers competing in the Beijing Games were from 
this new system, which, however, has been greatly hindered since a policy change in 
2001. In the case of Chinese diving, we inspect relationships between Zhuanye sport 
and the HE sector as well as the factors that influence the power between the two.     
The interviewees include not only policy makers and those who are influential in the 
policy making process, but also the relatively less powerful groups in policy making 
or those who are recipients of policy changes, such as athletes, coaches and 
journalists. This is consistent with the traditional definition of stakeholders as a 
group or individual “who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s 
objectives” (Freeman, 1984. p, 25).  
Freeman (1984) points out that the categories of stakeholders vary due to 1) their 
relative power (power over), and 2) their potential to cooperate or threaten (power 
to). It is suggested by Savage et al. (1991) that a stakeholder’s capacity to expand 
his/her dependence with the organisation positively correlates with the potential to 
cooperate, while his/her power of threat is determined by resource dependence, the 
stakeholder’s ability to form coalitions, and relevance of the threat to particular 
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issue.  
By selecting interviewees from different stakeholder groups with different levels of 
influence, we aim to explore the discursive construction from different perspectives 
about: a) what they do, b) how they perceive what they do, and c) why they do as 
who they are, in the post-2008 era, and the role of Beijing Games and political factors 
in these discursive construction.  
Figure 3. 3 Stakeholder categories and related strategies 
 
Modified from Freeman (1984) and Savage et al. (1991) 
The interviewees are hence categorized firstly according to their power over and of 
discourse relating to Chinese elite sport; secondly, from both the ‘cooperative 
potential’ part and the ‘competitive threats’ (as illustrated in Figure 3.3) of Chinese 
elite sport. In addition, it is suggested that when being applied in a sport or sport 
event, stakeholder theory must relate to the wider environment irrespective of 
whether or not the stakeholder is within the Zhuanye sport system (Andersson & 
Getz 2008). Thus the key criterion of stakeholder group identification is whether the 
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stakeholder is ‘affecting or being affected’ by the system rather than their ‘position 
within the system’. Therefore, interviewees from both in and outside of the Chinese 
elite sport are selected.  
From 11th March 2013 to 16th April 2013, 28 interviews were conducted with the 
following interviewees: 
Table 3. 1 The selection of interviewees 
Categories General Baseball Table Tennis Diving 
Academics 2    
Administrators 1 2 2 3 
Athletes  2 2 2 
Coaches  2 2 2 
Journalist  1 1 1 
Other  2 (Commercial) 1 (Senior advisor)  
In order to gain frank responses and explore further unexpected perceptions from 
these interviewees, the researcher informed them that their responses would remain 
confidential and anonymous. However, there were still a number of interviewees 
who appeared to remain suspicious of the real aim of the researcher and declined to 
have their interview recorded. 
The questions designed in the interviews were ‘open ended’ since it is recognised as 
desirable to give the interviewees the opportunity to reveal their perceptions of the 
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development of sport policy (for interview questions, please refer to Appendix). 
Indeed the open-ended questions allowed the interviewee take the interview in the 
direction they wished, selecting from his/her full repertoire of possible responses 
those which were most salient, and to use their own mode of expression, which 
disclosed their perspective and their manner of discursive construction. 
3.6 Protocol 
As indicated in Figure 3.4, we aim to explore the 
dialectical relationship between social structure and 
social agents’ constructive activities (the double black 
arrows) in terms of the post-2008 development of 
Chinese elite sport via exploring the discourse of and 
about Chinese elite sport policy after 2008.  
We start our analysis with inspecting the structural constraints on the constructing 
activities, namely power over discourse, which is often a function of the social context 
and is not necessarily examined through discourse per se. For instance, the 
availability of discourse in any given societies suggests the influence of social 
context on the interpretation (in this case) of sport policy. On the other side of coin, 
we also investigate the constructive effect of discourses, namely the power of discourse, 
for example, the (different) ways in which discourse defines the effect of the 
Figure 3. 4 The relationship 
between researcher and objects 
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experience of staging the Beijing Games on the development of Chinese elite sport. 
The power of discourse varies among different discourses, reflects and frames the 
point from which the reality is viewed.  
Although what is addressed in the thesis is the researcher’s interpretation on both 
discourse and context (the single black arrows in Figure 3.4), it is important to bear 
in mind that the two also synchronously influence the observer (the single hollow 
arrows). For example, as a Chinese citizen, and former sport journalist, there are 
certain contextual factors (such as the emphasis on dialectical materialism during his 
education in China) that the researcher has (consciously or unconsciously) been 
affected by. Meanwhile, his interpretation(s) also, to a certain extent, reframe the 
context, for example, in a language community.  
In order to investigate this dialectical relationship between context and discourse, 
we adopt and modify Fairclough’s (2005, 2009) CDA framework, also known as 
Dialectical-Relational Approach, with less focus on linguistic analysis. The main 
strength of this approach is its emphasis on the dialectical relationships between 
semiosis (including language) and other elements of social structure (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009). Because, from a CR perspective, analysis of causal power of changes 
requires, on the one hand, investigating how social agencies (re)construct social 
structure with discourses; while on the other hand, exploring the social restraints on 
these constructive activities, such as the material resources and available discourse 
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in a given society. This recognition of, and emphasis on, the dialectical relationship, 
between the process of ‘meaning construction’ and its structural constraints, 
differentiates this CR based CDA from approaches whose focus of analysis only 
emphasises a one-sided effort (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 2009; Wodak & Meyer 
2009).  
In order to examine the relationship between power and discourse, leading to 
organisational and social changes, Fairclough (2005a, p.916) peels ‘discourse’ from 
three facets of society (as shown in Figure 3.2): 
a) Linguistic and semiotic elements of social events,  
b) Linguistic and semiotic facets of social structures, and  
c) Linguistic and semiotic facets of social practices’.  
For the first of these facets, the term of linguistic and semiotic elements of social 
events refers to “language as well as other forms of semiosis such as visual images 
and ‘body language’, and texts” (ibid, p.916).  
The second of these facets refers to discourses which are well admitted in a given 
society, such as a certain ideology or policy. It is recognised as part of social 
structure, influencing actors’ behaviour.  
Thirdly, Fairclough points to the discourse of social practices relating to the 
phenomenon of order of discourse. The order of discourse, “can reflect structural 
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feature in a certain society” (Fairclough 2003, p.37; Fairclough 2005a; Fairclough 
2009), and is  “a relatively stabilised and durable configuration of discourses that is 
a facet of a relatively stabilised and durable network of social practices” (Fairclough, 
2005, p. 921). It is comprised of the particular ways of ‘acting’, ‘presenting’ and 
‘being’, which, in other words, are the three aspects of a dialectical process through  
Figure 3. 5 Discourse in Society 
 
Modified from Fairclough, 2005 
which discourse is operationalized or ‘put into practice’ (Fairclough, 2009). Fairclough 
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(2005, 2009) labels these three aspects as genre, discourse and style, and further 
elaborates this trio respectively as 
a) Actions in semiotic aspect, such as ‘to argue’ or ‘to explain’, or even the 
form of discourse, for example, interview or advertisement;  
b) Semiotic construal of the world from different perspectives, such as 
different interpretation and evaluation of the Beijing Games, and;  
c) Identities in the semiotic aspects, for example, the semiotic construct of 
‘a Chinese elite athlete’.  
This is to say that the changes in the dialectical relationship between social structure 
and discourse of social agents needs to be explored with concern given to shifts in 
the aspects of genre, discourse and style (Fairclough, 2009). It is acknowledged that 
this three-dimensional conception of discourse emphasising the relationship 
between structure and agency as “a helpful approach to bridge the polarities of 
Foucauldian sociopolitical analysis and more linguistic-oriented studies” (Van Dijk 
2001, p.263), even though both of them acknowledge the constructive effect of 
discourse (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 2003; Foucault 2002; Foucault 1980d). Even 
though, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p.32) acknowledge the acceptance of 
post-structuralist perspective of discourse analysis, they emphasise the degree of 
such adoption, which should avoid “either post-structuralist reductions of the whole 
of social life to discourse, or post-structuralist judgemental relativism.”  This 
acknowledgement of the effect of structure is also evidenced in Fairclough’s 
attempts to ‘put Foucault’s perspective to work’ (Fairclough, 1992: 38), leading to his 
retention of normativity, which is see as contradictory to “the non-normative 
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parameters and purposes of Foucault’s thought (O’Regan 2006, p.229; Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 1999). For instance, McKenna (2004) suggests that it is the aim of the 
Fairclough’s studies to investigate the way in which subordinates might be 
emancipated from the consistent modality. In contrast, Foucault (1982, p.777) aimed 
to “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings 
are made subjects”. 
As indicated in Table 3.2, our analysis is divided into two main parts according to 
chronological periods (pre- and post-2008). This is a product of our previous analysis of 
the significance of prior events which is a prior discursive analysis in its own right. 
Even though we aim to explore the constructivist aspect of discourse, there are 
transcendent terms (though some of which are also discursively constructed) which 
exist as both the object and context of construction. For instance, a date or an event 
becomes discursively constructed as soon as it is ‘picked’ and thus associated with a 
phenomenon (e.g. the year of 1066 in English history, and the notion of ‘18th 
September’ for Chinese). However, the key point is not whether the term is 
‘interpretation-free’, but is that it becomes a premise that is established from the 
prior construction which act as premises for subsequent analysis or studies.   
In the subsequent step, objects of discursive construction are analysed. Topics refer to 
the objects of discursive construction, including the Olympics (e.g. the Beijing Games 
and other Chinese Olympic discourse) and elite sport development (e.g. the 
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discourse related to Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport, and that concerning the reform 
of Chinese elite sport).  
Table 3. 2 Protocol of CDA 
Chronology Pre-2008 Post-2008 
Topic The Olympics 
Elite sport 
development 
The Olympics 
Elite sport 
development 
Genre as 
medium 
Documents & Archives Documents, Archives & Interviews 
Genre as 
action 
The action implied in discourse (relationship with, and attitudes 
towards, others; action over others) 
Discourse 
The perspective and presentation of topics (knowledge about event & 
structure; control over things) 
Style 
How the identity is constructed (Knowledge about, relations with self, 
e.g. Zhuanye system and reformists) 
Modified from Fairclough (2005,2009) 
Genre is recognised as “the specifically discoursal aspect of ways of acting and 
interacting in the course of social event,” and can be variously defined or categorised 
according to the different level of abstraction (Fairclough, 2003, p.66, 2005, 2009). For 
instance, it can be abstractly classified into categories that transcend particular 
networks of social practices, such as narrative, discussion, dispute and so forth. This 
is labelled as pre-genre by Fairclough (2003). It could also be more concretely 
grouped as disembedded genre (ibid), for example, interview, advertisement, report 
and so on, which could also be further categorised according to the social practices it 
is related to, for instance, news report in media, annual report by PhD researcher, 
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investigation report from a third party evaluator and so on. Genre, at micro level, 
relates to the activities conveyed or constructed discursively, such as making an 
argument (or to argue), promoting or rejecting certain kind of value or interests (to 
promote or to reject), and so forth. These micro genres directly relate to the inherent 
meaning, identified at the beginning of this paragraph.  
Fairclough (2003) suggests that an analysis of genre can provide a lens for 
investigating the social relationship. For instance, ‘to elaborate’ and ‘to discuss’ 
constructs two different relationships, particularly in terms of the knowledge of the 
topic of the discursive practices, between parties involved, such as information 
sender and receiver. In addition, it could be argue that policies and strategies, such 
as The Notice of Strengthening the Administration of Commercials and Other Business 
Activities of Elite Athletes in Service (SPCSC, 1996), have more compulsory and 
disciplinary influence on elite athletes’ behaviours than those of academic papers 
and documentary books. Thus, as shown in Table 3.2, we employ the disembedded 
genre, named as ‘genre as medium’, and genre at micro level, named as ‘genre as 
action’, aiming to unveil the relationship constructed and conveyed through framing 
‘actions over others’ (Fairclough, 2003) in Chinese elite sport discourse. 
In the column of discourse, we analyse not only representation of topics but also the 
perspectives of representation and interpretation, for example, the different ways in 
which a dominant discourse are construed by different social actors. In order to 
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clarify the confusion between the content of topic and discourse, as indicated in Table 
3.3, we elaborated the philosophical difference between the two through introducing 
another item, Pattern. 
Table 3. 3 The relationship between Topic, Discourse, and Pattern 
 Topic Discourse Pattern 
What it 
is 
• Real phenomena  
• Objects of discursive 
construction of 
social actors 
• Objects of meaning 
construction of the 
researcher (analysis) 
• Knowledge of social 
actors 
• Concrete content of 
discursive 
construction 
• Objects of meaning 
construction of the 
researcher (analysis) 
• Knowledge of the 
researcher 
• Meaning 
constructed to 
research data 
 
What it 
includes 
Two themes of 
research data: 
 
• The Olympics 
• Chinese elite 
sport 
development 
 
• Knowledge about: 
• Event 
• Social structure 
• Content and 
perspective of 
meaning construction 
• The content of change 
before and after 2008 
• Answers to 
research questions 
• The way Chinese 
elite sport is 
changing 
Topic is the object of discursive construction of social actors in research data, as the 
researcher advocates for the existence of social events and partially tangible social 
structure. There are a number of objects in research data, for instance, in media 
content there are objects such as competition (reports), sport celebrities (gossip) and 
so forth. However, only those data that focus on two topics, the Olympics and elite 
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sport development, are selected and subsequently categorized in the research. In 
addition, topic is also the object of meaning construction of the researcher by his 
analysis, as the researcher aims to investigate and explain the pattern of change. 
By contrast, the analysis of discourse provides the knowledge of social actors on the 
two topics, including representation and perspective of discursive construction. 
Representation and perspective are “two sides of the same coin”, though the second 
is more intangible than the first, representation, which is the content of meaning 
construction to the event and phenomenon. Although the topics of data can be 
variously constructed and interpreted in different terms, for example, economy, 
culture, social equity etc., this research emphases the effects of the Olympics and 
political phenomena in the Chinese context.  
Through identifying the diverse perspectives and representations from different 
resources on the two topics, we attempt to deliver a ‘panoramic view’ of Chinese 
Olympic discourse and of elite sport discourse, and then extract the structural 
elements, which facilitate or constrain the social actors knowledge of events (the 
Olympic Games, especially the 2008 Games) and of social structure (Chinese elite 
sport and political elements). Furthermore, in an approach similar to the discussion 
of topic, the analysis in the column of discourse also addresses the objects of meaning 
construction of the researcher, whose interpretation is subsequently demonstrated in 
Pattern. 
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Pattern is not a criterion of analysis, but is listed in the table to provide a better 
explanation of the way the analysis is developed. Pattern refers to ‘the pattern of 
changes in Chinese elite sport discourse’ or ‘the way in which elite sport discourse 
changes’, which embeds the answers to research questions. It is the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data through analysing it following the whole protocol. In other 
words, in a manner similar to the way the relationship between the two topics, the 
‘Olympics’ and ‘Chinese elite sport’ and the data is analysed in discourse, the 
relationship between research data and content in pattern relates to ‘objects and 
interpretation’, namely researchers’ knowledge.  
Practically, the analysis of the Olympic discourse examines the discursive construction 
of the Chinese Olympics discourse in general and the discourse concerning the 2008 
Games in both pre-2008 and post-2008 era. The interpretation of the elite sport policy is 
investigated from the perspective of “Juguo Tizhi” and of “Chinese elite sport 
reform”. The investigation of the pre-2008 data provides a general benchmark for 
our analysis of post-2008 data, the latter being effected through not only a study of 
the general trend of post-2008 development, but also three cases studies of particular 
sports in term of specific issues.  
Style refers to the discursive facet of identity, reflecting social actor’s knowledge, 
both in terms of self and other’s recognition, of its social identity. (Fairclough, 2003), 
in other word, how social actors view and discursively construct their social identity. 
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For example, being an administrator requires not only certain managing behaviours, 
but also certain discursive behaviour, such as speaking in the same manner as other 
administrators do. We, on the one hand, investigate the general style used to talk 
about the Olympics and Chinese elite sport, for instance, the identity of the 
Olympics and elite sport is constructed in the Chinese context. Subsequently, we 
explore the extent to which the style, for example of different stakeholders in Chinese 
elite sport, along the development of Chinese elite sport overarching the 2008 
Games.  
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter on methodology, we demonstrate the philosophical positions, specific 
research methods and the process of empirical work, in order to connect the 
theoretical concepts with the practical research methods employed. With the 
adoption of CR and CDA, we advocate the existence of a real but merely 
partially-‘tangible’ social structure and its construction through social actions, in 
particular, discourses. Thus our investigation of the relationship between the 
stratified social structures and social agency in Chinese elite sport is through 
analysing the ‘tangible’ elements, i.e. the discourse of and about Chinese elite sport.  
Discourse can be a reflection of deep structures, for example, growing use of 
dialogue about commercial activity in sport may be a reflection of changing values 
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in relation to entrepreneurial activity. In addition, discourses, particularly those of 
the dominant group, can also be constructive and thus reproduce (or reshape) the 
deep structure, for example, shaping the social value or ideology about whether, and 
in what ways, entrepreneurialism is good. Our interests in this relationship between 
discourse and power are in both ‘power over discourse’ – whose view predominates, 
and in how discourse shapes our view of reality (‘power of discourse’). CDA is thus 
employed to investigate of Chinese elite sport discourse before and after the Beijing 
Games in chapter five and six, after our analytic description of the development of 
Chinese elite sport in pre-2008 era in chapter four.  
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Chapter Four  
 
An Analytic Description of the Development of Chinese Elite Sport 
Policy in the Pre-2008 Era 
By characterising this element of our account as ‘analytic description’, we emphasise 
the analytic and critical features in this ‘historically descriptive’ account. Given our 
focus on Chinese elite sport discourse, it is crucial to bear in mind that the ‘history’ is 
a part of the discursive construction of what was done, why and how it was done etc. 
As previously demonstrated, even the choice of relatively ‘objective factors’, such as 
a specific date, could be regarded a construction of meaning.  
We would also argue that simply by regulating the accessibility or acceptability of 
certain type of documents or ‘voice’, a (type of) ‘history’ is constructed and a power 
relationship is structured; meanwhile, by selecting data to be described, a superficial 
analysis is also simultaneously made and communicated. Thus, if the analysis was to 
be done unreflexively by merely ‘repeating’ or ‘listing’ what was regulated or 
available, we would end up seeing the development and problems of Chinese elite 
sport as what the empirical material have been descripted, and thus failing to 
consider the reasons for such portrayal and the interests which are thus promoted. 
As a researcher employing CDA, one has to go further than simply describing 
discourse, and has to peel off the discursive skins and reveal intangible implications 
often bound up with understanding the connotations or implications of the 
  114 
discourses employed by particular groups of actors. The use of reflexive analytic 
description is thus central to the recounting of the ‘history’ of sport policy in China.   
4.1 The pre-1990s reform and the background of the 1993 reform 
Chinese elite sport started its reform in the mid-1980s, following the strategic 
guideline, “prioritising elite sport, then leading to general development [of sport]” 
(Wu, 1999). The first guideline for reform the SPCSC’s decision on the reform of the sport 
system (draft) (SPCSC, 1986a, hereafter, the 1986 Policy) is regarded as the principal 
symbol of the official recognition of the reform of Chinese sport (Xiong et al. 2008). 
Its updated version, the SPCSC’s opinion on deepening the reform of sport system (SPCSC 
1993d, hereafter the 1993 Policy), was published in 1993, the year in which China lost 
its first Olympic bid. Though 1986 predates the 1993 Olympic bid, which is 
recognised as the start line of our research, we would argue that reference to both 
documents permits us to demonstrate the continuities and discontinuities in the 
development of the state’s elite sport discourse33.  
                                                 
33 Even though the aim of the 1986 Policy was claimed as to ”promote the overall development of 
sport” (SPCSC 1986b, p.68), elite sport was consistently accentuated in both the 1986 and 1993 Policy. 
For instance, nine out of ten sections of the 1986 Policy partially or fully related to Chinese elite sport. 
This ratio was maintained in the 1993 Policy. In addition, four of the five ancillary documents in the 
1993 Policy directly or partially focused on elite sport. Thus, despite being portrayed as guidelines for 
Chinese sport reform in general, these two policies provide important material for analysing elite 
sport policies. 
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As indicated in the SPCSC’s (1986a, p.60) report to the National Council, the 
problems in elite sport with which the 1986 Policy aimed to deal were:  
…most [elite] sports are in the middle and lower tier at international level…a number 
of [elite] sports lack reserve athletes …ideological and political [education]… is 
relatively insufficient, there is no sign of improvement in the behaviour of in sport 
teams and in arenas [including sportsmanship];… the Physical Culture and Sport 
Commissions (hereafter, PCSCs) at county level or below are inadequate, PCSCs at 
all levels have played an insufficient role in leadership, coordination and supervision; 
the SPCSC is busy with numerous administration and competition affairs, only 
providing generalised working guidance; it lacks research and analysis, and is 
bureaucratic.  
The brief introduction conveys three perspectives, a) elite sport performance, b) 
ideological and disciplinary education, and c) the working performance of PCSCs. It 
could be argued that this self-critique narrative indirectly constructs the direction of 
the subsequent reform of the PCSCs’ system and the idealised role of the SPCSC, 
which is a greater role in “leadership, coordination and supervision” while assigning 
“administration and competition affairs” to relevant organisations, such as Sport 
Associations and the education sector.   
The main causal factors for these problems were subsequently identified in the 1986 
Policy, stating that:  
[Though] the current [PCSCs] system is basically effective…[it] has over 
concentrated on organising sport, has not mobilised society to organise [sport] … [has 
not] released [sport] to … [the] civil society; the role of PCSCs at all levels in 
leadership, coordination and supervision has not been fulfilled 
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 SPCSC, 1986b, p. 68 
The policy makers, are not only endorsing the current PCSCs system, but also 
indirectly constructing the PCSCs’ role as the ‘core leader, coordinator and 
supervisor’ in the projected ‘new’ Chinese sport system, in which civil society 
organisations are to be ‘mobilised’ to undertake operational responsibility. This is in 
line with goal of the 1986 Policy, which is interpreted as to “take the route 
of ’civil-society-based’ development [of sport] 34, with the reinforcement of the 
SPCSC’s unified leadership as the precondition” (Yang et al. 2002; Xiong et al. 2008, 
                                                 
34 ‘Civil-society-based’ is a translation we adopt in this thesis for the Chinese term 
‘Shehuihua’. ’Shehui’ stands for ‘society’. However, ‘hua’ used as a suffix has a number of derivatives, 
which are normally translated as ‘-en’,’-ze(-ise)’,’-fy’, ’ -lise’ or ‘-zation’, etc (Zeng, 2004). 
As the direct translation of ‘Shehuihua’ as ‘socialisation’ does not capture the meaning of ‘developing 
civil society based (organisation)’, we use different terms for the derivatives of the important Chinese 
phenomenon.  
Derivatives Noun Adjective Verb 
Translation ‘civil-society-based 
development’ 
’civil-society-based’ ’to-develop-civil-society-
based-organisation’ 
We make this choice because, firstly, it is a crucial phenomenon, i.e. one of the four themes of Chinese 
elite sport reform that is subsequently discussed. Secondly, it is widely used in policy statement in 
different derivatives so that we are not able to use one Pinyin word for all these derivatives, which 
may cause confusion. Thirdly, though ‘voluntary organisation’ was initially chosen, it was abandoned 
as the nature of the ‘voluntary’ or ‘non-governmental’ sport organisation in China being in effect a 
semi- or quasi-public institution. 
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p.44). 
In other words, we would argue that the goal of the 1986 reform was two-fold: a) 
reinforcing the unified leadership of the SPCSC; b) promoting the civil-society-based 
development, especially of Chinese elite sport. It is generally recognised that the first 
part35 of this goal was achieved, which strengthened the SPCSC’s administration 
and supervision over sport affairs at all levels and eventually reinforced its 
administrative power (Xiong et al., 2008). Even though, it would be radical to regard 
the new ‘circumstance’ as the consequence of the 1986 per se, we would argue that 
the changes in the portrayal of the circumstance in the 1993 Policy (SPCSC, 1993d, p. 
1) construct the difference and implies the new direction of reform: 
There are still a number of deeply rooted conflicts in sport, which have not been 
completely solved. There are problems of varying degrees, such as that sport funds are 
short, elite level talents are scarce, the motivation and inventiveness of society for 
participation in the organisation of sport is not fully stimulated; sport work is not 
effective and efficient, the development of sport is insufficient and the momentum is 
slow. The task of furthering sport reform is [thus] colossal. 
We would argue that this official account not only frames the problems, with which 
                                                 
35 The SPCSC reinforced its power in Chinese sport via the 1986 reform, for example, through 
restoring the county level PCSCs that had previously been cancelled, the power of the PCSC system 
was vertically extended to local level of the Chinese administrative division. Horizontally, though it is 
stated in the 1986 Policy that all industries and social sectors should have their own Sport 
Associations; it was also stated that the PCSCs at every level should reinforce their unified leadership 
of sport affairs for all of these industries and organisations. 
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the SPCSC planned to deal, but also indirectly reflects the result of the 1986 reform. 
On the one hand, compared with the portrait of the background of the 1986 Policy, 
the content concerning the ideological education and the role of PCSCs is replaced by an 
emphasis on the civil-society-based development of sport. This absence of the content 
emphasised in the 1986 Policy is in line with Xiong et al.’s (2008) statement 
acknowledging the achievement of the 1986 reform in reinforcing the unified 
leadership of the SPCSC.  
On the other hand, the addition of the civil-society-based development is consistent with 
the unsatisfactory achievement relating to promotion of ’civil-society-based 
development’, despite a number of “sensible and correct attempts36” proposed in the 
1986 Policy (Zhang, 2009). This limited achievement is ascribed as an outcome of the 
over-reinforcement of the PCSC system’s administrative power and of the 
ideological interpretation of the reform (Xiong et al. 2008, Yang et al. 2002, Zhang, 
2009). For example, Yang et al. (2002, p.3) state that: 
Because the social trend of socialist market-oriented economic reform was 
insufficiently understood, even partially influenced by the extreme ‘left’ ideology, the 
                                                 
36 A number of measures promoting civil-society-based development were promoted in the 1986 
policy, such as encouraging enterprises and factories to organise sport clubs and elite sport teams, for 
which PCSCs were required to provide policy and technical support; inviting tenders to bidding for 
hosting or funding some national or provincial events; and the ‘school-lisation36‘ attempts made by 
provincial teams were encouraged. 
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initial idea of the reform [of Chinese sport] strayed significantly into limited 
adjustment and amendment of the Zhuanye sport system that was formed as part of 
the planned economy system… All of these made the problems and conflicts of 
competition and training systems rooted in the planned economy impossible to solve. 
Internally [within the system) there was a lack of competition and dynamism, and it 
was difficult for civil-society bodies and enterprises to develop elite sport entities. 
A number of words with negative connotations were used in this critical account 
concerning conservatism in the 1986 reform. For example, “planned economy”, 
which is the target of economic reform, is associated with not only “the Zhuanye 
sport system” but also “problems and conflicts”. Thanks to the “extreme ‘left’ 
ideology” (hinting at the impact of the Cultural Revolution), the understanding of 
reform was “influenced”, the initial idea of reform had been “strayed”, and the 
reform thus became ‘impossible’. This is consistent with the then-Sport Minister’s 
(Wu 1995, p.45) interpretation of the 1986 reform that “compared with the reform [in 
Chinese society], the 1986 reform was peripheral. A number of deeply rooted 
problems were unsolved, especially the Juguo Tizhi system and its mode of 
operation that had been formed in the former planned economy”.  
We would thus argue that even though the SPCSC indicated in the 1986 Policy its 
willingness to reform, this first reforming document eventually reinforced the 
administrative power of the PCSCs system and Juguo Tizhi. Given the effectiveness 
of Juguo Tizhi in elite sport development, it could be argued that this consequence of 
the 1986 Policy is in line with the first part of the guidelines, “prioritising elite sport, 
then leading to general development [of sport]” (Wu, 1999), and with the vested 
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interest of Zhuanye sport system, which is realised through providing satisfactory 
elite sport performance.  
4.2 The 1993 Policy and the comparison with the 1986 version  
Compared with the Chinese society in 1986, the 1993 reform enjoyed a much easier 
social environment, particularly in ideological terms, as it was one year after Deng 
Xiaoping’s burden-lifting visit to south China, during which he stated ”the market 
economy is not equal to capitalism, … because socialism also has a market”(Deng 
1993, p.373). The 14th National Congress of the CPC also took place in 1993, during 
which the direction of the development of a socialist market economy was explicitly 
identified. Therefore, the 1993 Policy was published in a society which, as officially 
documented, was on its route to the new ‘socialist market economy’ system (Wu, 
1999). 
As with the 1986 Policy, the 1993 Policy also strongly highlighted elite sport. 
However, in terms of the policy statement per se, the 1993 Policy added another 5 
ancillary documents, and is, as we would argue, more strategy-like and detailed 
than the 1986 version. In order to systemically analyse this document, we have 
divided the contents relating to elite sport reform into four sections according to 
their respective foci: the reform of the administrative governance system, the reform 
of the sport market and industry (concerning the introduction of professional sport), 
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the reform of the training system, and the reform of the competition system. 
4.2.1 The reform of administrative governance system 
As with the 1986 Policy, the key point of the reform of the administrative 
governance system in the 1993 Policy (SPCSC 1993d, p.1) was stated as to  
… change the function [of the administrative governance system], adjust internal 
bodies, separate governance and practical affair, transfer a great number of practical 
tasks to public institutions and civil-society organisations, and firmly shift the focus 
to macro control. 
However, in contrast to the 1986 reform, which strengthened the system, the 1993 
policy identified the reframing of structures and departments as the means by which 
to accomplish the reform. This new policy narrative, on the one hand, signified the 
SPCSC’s new understanding of the ways of governing and promoting elite sport 
development; on the other hand, it constructed the function and a new identity of 
civil-society-based organisations in sport, which were virtual incarnations under 
Sport Administration Departments (hereafter, SADs). For example, the ASCF, COC 
and the GAS were recognised as “three titles shared by one group of people”, among 
which the GAS is predominant (Li et al. 2003). 
It is acknowledged in the 1993 Policy that new identity and function of civil-society 
based organisations in sport requires ”straightening out the relationship” among 
these identities (SPCSC 1993d, p.1). Even though this is consistent with the principle 
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of the separation of administration and operational power, it was, by contrast, also 
explicitly regulated by the State Council that ‘’the GAS, having another ‘banner’ as 
the ACSF, is the directly-affiliated institution in sport of the State Council”(The 
General Office of the State Council of the PRC 1998, p.1). This combined identities at 
the top level assign SADs dominant and substantial power among the other two 
(Bao 2003), and, on contrary, make sport associations (led by the ACSF at national 
level) continuously affiliated to corresponding SADs.  
It is stated in the 1993 Policy (SPCSC 1993c, p.1) that  
[The governance] of sport [should be transferred] from ‘directly governed by sport 
departments’ to ‘governed by the public-institutional association entities’ and 
‘governed by the authentic civil society associations37’; the key Olympic sports, the 
traditional sport in which we enjoy advantages and the sports based on public 
institutions38 should be transferred into the public-institutional associations. 
                                                 
37 The characteristics of the authentic civil society organisations are: 1. Their staff are not in the public 
institution system, 2. More autonomy for the organisations. The only three authentic civil society 
organisations are the China Triathlon Sport Association, Federation of Automobile Sport of PRC, 
China Dance Sport Federation. However, because of a number of problems, for example failure in 
financial reporting and auditing, the three authentic civil society organisations were then re-absorbed 
into the public institution system (D. Liu 2008). 
38 ‘Public institution’ is defined by the State Council as ‘the public service organizations that are 
established by the state organs or other organizations by using the state-owned assets’ (The State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China 1998, p.1). Thus this type of Sport Associations is closely 
associated with SADs. 
  123 
The significance of sport is indirectly acknowledged as the criteria distinguishing the 
two new types of Sport Associations. Olympic sports, the performance of which is 
closely related to the interests of the Zhuanye system, and which are to be governed 
by public-institutional associations, are heavily steered, if not wholly controlled, by 
the SADs. In contrast, those sports governed by the authentic civil society 
associations are simply ignored in the subsequent policy statement. We would thus 
argue that such a selective account indirectly constructs the hierarchy of the 
significance of different types of Sport Associations and the sports they respectively 
governed, which is in line with the interests of the Zhuanye Sport system.  
In addition, SADs’ control over Sport Associations was maintained through, 
indirectly regulating the structure of the lead agencies of Sport Associations39; and 
directly defining the relationship between SADs and Sport Associations, that: 
The affairs of a Sport Association are controlled by the competent authority, which is 
the SAD; [the SAD] mainly implements the following administrative functions: a) 
Assigning tasks to Sport Associations… ; b) allocating, supervising and auditing 
government funding to Sport Association; c) recommending candidates for the role of 
chairperson… and also examining their qualifications; d) examining and approving 
Sport Association’s documents published in the name of SAD. 
SPCSC, 1993d, p. 1 
                                                 
39 It is also regulated that representatives from government were top ranked in the list of the lead 
agencies of Sport Associations, and the head of the associations was the person solely responsible for 
the duties the organisation. 
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Though the policy statement is highly descriptive, it normalises the power 
relationship between the two through employing directive and hierarchical terms, 
such as “assigning tasks”, ”determining”, ”supervising”, “approving”, etc. Sport 
Associations were portrayed as being politically, financially, institutionally and 
administratively overseen by SADs. Even though the independence of Sport 
Associations experienced a rapid growth after the publication of the 1993 Policy40, 
since the start of the establishment of Administration Centres of sports41 in 1994, 
Sport Associations gradually and eventually became virtual incarnations of this new 
type of apparatus of sport governance42.  
                                                 
40 Before the socialist market economy was announced in 1992, though there had been some attempts 
at the independence of Sport Associations (for instance at one time three Sport Associations were 
even organised as civil society organisations, which were independent of state governance or control), 
the phenomenon of independent Sport Associations was merely a ‘concept’ attached to functional 
departments of the sport administration system (Li et al. 2010; D. Liu 2008). After the publication of 
the 1993 Policy, the reform experienced a rapid growth. Up to 1998, 63 Sport Associations were 
formed, only three of which authentic civil society organisations (Zang 1998). 
41 The Administration Centres work as the administration department’s puppet string connecting 
Sport Associations. It is indicated in the Interim Provisions of the Regulation of Sport Administration 
Centres of the State Physical Culture and Sport Committee (SPCSC, 1997, p. 1) that “[the Centres are] the 
directly affiliated public institutions under the SPCSC, [they are] responsible for the governance of 
sports, [and] are the standing body of the national association of the sport that it governed, …. 
responsible for all the kinds of sport it governed” 
42 The personnel of these Administration Centres were drawn from that of the previously existing, 
corresponding functional Departments of the SPCSC and/or from the Offices of Sport, which 
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On the one hand, the Centres are portrayed as key institutions for strengthening and 
implementing the Olympic strategy (Ma 2005; Zhang 2009). On the other hand, the 
Centres are also recognised as “‘state-owned enterprises’, which are operated by 
administrative power” (Xiong et al., 2008, p.63), and “hived off”, and “regrouped 
from the corresponding functional department of the SPCSC” (Zhang, 2009, p.45). 
These terms identify the Centres’ relationship with, and origins in, the GAS, which 
resulted in the equivocal nature of the Centres and of their ‘non-governmental’ 
identity, i.e. as Sport Associations. For example, it is pointed out by Liu (2008, p.24) 
that: 
The identity of Sport Associations in China is ambiguous, and their function is 
unclear. Administration Centres are the directly affiliated public institutions of the 
GAS, as well as the administrative offices of Sport Associations. They inherently 
combine three identities of administration, public institutions and civil organisations. 
                                                                                                                                                       
themselves were disbanded. For example, the Administration Centre for Athletics had been formed 
from staff from the Office of Athletics in the Department of Training and Competition Three, of the 
SPCSC. After the reform, the Administration Centre for Athletics, which is the standing body of the 
Chinese Athletic Association, became a directly affiliated public institution under the auspices of the 
SPCSC. 
At the time of writing, there were 22 Administration Centres governing all Olympic sports and most 
of the non-Olympic sports in China, and these act as the administrative bodies for more than 70 Sport 
Associations that make up the majority of sports in the ACSF (D. Liu, 2008). Many personnel are 
shared between Administration Centre and the Sport Association(s) they administer, especially top 
level officials, thus ensuring political consistency between the governmental side and the 
non-governmental side of Chinese elite sport (Tan & Houlihan 2012). 
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Because of the overlapping identities and lack of clarity of function, the 
Administration Centres are not able to clearly comprehend their working targets and 
missions, which directly influence the effectiveness and efficiency of its governance. 
Liu’s account is consistent with a common characteristic of the governance of 
Chinese elite sport, i.e. “three titles shared by one group” (Li et al., 2003). It is 
interesting to note that even Liu elides the object of the above quotation, changing 
from “the identity of Sport Associations” in the first sentence to “Administration 
Centres” for the rest of the quotation. It is argued that such ‘seamless’ changes reflect 
Liu’s internalised elision of the two identities.  
In summary, even though there were changes in the 1993 Policy in terms of the 
explanation of how policy would be implemented, as with the 1986 Policy, the 
achievement remained limited. Given the SADs’ legitimised control over Sport 
Associations (SPCSC, 1993d) and the governmental nature of “the standing body of 
Sport Associations” (SPCSC 1997, p.1), (i.e. the Centres), we would argue that the 
Sport Associations’ continuous dependence on SADs is an inevitable outcome of the 
guidance given in the 1993 policy statement, and other government documents. This 
is to say that although the goal of reform stated in the 1993 Policy statement was the 
rendering of Sport Associations into truly independent entities, a counterproductive 
outcome was caused by the measures promoted in the conflicting policy narrative. 
This limited achievement of the independence of Sport Associations not only 
maintained Sport Associations as the virtual incarnation of SADs, but also reflected 
the GAS’s power in protecting its interests through manipulating the policy 
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discourse. 
4.2.2 The reform of sport industry and market  
Among the different aspects covered in the section of the 1993 Policy on the reform 
of the sport industry and the sport market, the introduction of professionalisation 
directly related to Chinese elite sport (the focus of this research). Professionalisation 
was new to Chinese sport when it was proposed in the 1993 Policy, as it had always 
been regarded “as a product of capitalism … [which] it was not believed could 
emerge [naturally] in socialist sport “ until the reform of Chinese society (Xiong et al. 
2008, p.83). In other words, the shift from rejection to introduction of professional 
elements in Chinese elite sport, more precisely Zhuanye sport, could be regarded as 
a consequence of changes in the Chinese political environment. 
Consistent with the political backdrop, in the 1993 Policy, ‘professionalisation’ was 
mentioned 7 times, and was associated with a number of concepts promoted in the 
reform, such as “internationally accepted practices”, “international competition”, 
and “modern rule of development” (SPCSC, 1993a, p. 1, 1993c, p. 1, 1993e, p. 1). This 
narrative, on the one hand, clothed professional sport in a ‘socialist market economy’ 
rhetoric and endorsed such “a product of capitalism” with the ‘opening-up’ reform 
of the PRC. On the other hand, it also reinforced the significance of professional 
sport in political, rather than financial, terms.  
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We would argue that this political significance was in line with the nature of Chinese 
professional sport, which was a consequence of both external and internal pressure 
on the PCSCs system, and was reflected in the 1993 Policy. As a part of the State 
machinery, the SPCSC had to obey the external reforming theme of the PRC, which 
demanded market-oriented reform in Chinese sport. This was evidenced in the 
inclusion of the professional elements in the 1993 Policy, which indicated a 
willingness to follow the trend. On the other side of coin, the internal pressure refers 
to the ‘traditional’ political task of SPCSC, i.e. winning Olympic glory, in which its 
primary interest lay. In terms of policy discourse, this internal pressure resulted in 
the omission of a number of crucial issues related to professionalisation in the 1993 
Policy, such as the eligibility criteria for sports to be professionalised, the procedure 
of professionalisation, and the governance of professional sport.  
This broad rhetoric with implicit statements concerning practical issues reflects 
policy makers’ hesitation in introducing professional sport. This is because, on the 
one hand, the PCSCs system’s political task had been well fulfilled by Zhuanye sport 
and Juguo Tizhi, in which vested interests group had thus been long established. On 
the other hand, other than the external pressure that was partially defused through 
the ‘reformist’ statements in the 1993 Policy, the State funded PCSCs system faced 
hardly any pressure, especially in financial terms, to introduce professional elements 
in its system. The SPCSC hence had no reason to implement professionalisation in a 
radical sense since this might have a negative influence on Zhuanye sport and 
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subsequently affect its capability of winning Olympic glory. 
In practice, such an attitude of suspicion resulted in the careful selection of which 
sports should be professionalised. Up to 2005, eight elite sports 43  had been 
professionalised, none of which, except table tennis, was regarded as a key sport in 
terms of the Olympic task44. Thus, it could be argued that the professionalisation of 
these sports not only had limited impact on the Olympic task, but also enabled the 
PCSCs system to concentrate more resources on ‘key sports’.  
Taking the scenario of football, Wu Shaozu provided a five-point elaboration of the 
rationale for choosing football as the first sport to be professionalised: 
Firstly, football is a sport, which [Chinese] people love and [to which Chinese people] 
pay great attention. Comrade Li Tieying45 once commented in a document that 
                                                 
43 The eight elite sports had or has been professionalised are football, basketball, volleyball, table 
tennis, tennis, Go chess (Weiqi), baseball and Chinese chess. 
44 Football, basketball and volleyball have been called ‘the three big ball [sports]’ in Chinese society 
for their popularity and social influence. However, they have also been well known for their low 
efficiency in payback in terms of winning medals. Therefore, in spite of its social impact, a great 
number of provincial PCSCs excluded football from their work plans for the National Games, in 
order to concentrate resources on medal prospect sports (Xiong et al., 2008). 
45 Li Tieying, the former Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
of China. When giving the quoted speech, Li was a Member of the Political Bureau of CPC Central 
Committee, State Councillor and concurrently Minister in charge of State Education Commission and 
secretary of its Leading Party Members’ Group. 
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football must be improved, which is the expectation of all Chinese people…; 
Secondly, there is no mental burden [for us] in football so far, since the performance 
has been poor. It is impossible for me to experiment on table tennis and 
swimming46… 
Thirdly, the focus of the SPCSC in the 1990s, besides working on a bid for the 
Olympics and the acceleration of the PCSC system reform, also included some 
important sports, especially football.  
Fourthly, football encompasses a wide range [of issues] and is a good example of the 
reform… (We can) repeat it if it fails, which would be a partial loss (to Chinese elite 
sport)   
Fifthly, the external environment is good for football reform … advocacy for 
professionalisation and [professional] clubs used to be labelled as capitalism. There is 
no such problem now. 
Wang 2002, p.46 
The causal factors leading to the professionalisation of Chinese football are identified 
as, a loose political environment; considerable public and political attention paid to 
the sport; and relatively less influence on the Olympic task, and none of these relate 
to financial concerns. The first factor is in line with our previous argument 
concerning the importance of changes in political elements of Chinese society, while 
the other two suggest the dual political pressures confronted by the SPCSC. On the 
one hand, thanks to its great social influence, the reform of football was able to 
provide a “good example” that was to effectively ease the external pressure. On the 
                                                 
46 When Wu made this speech, Chinese swimmers just won four gold medals, five silver medals in 
the Barcelona Olympic Games. 
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other hand, its poor performance would ensure the limited impact on the Olympic 
performance of China, even if it failed, which reduced the “mental burden” of, or the 
pressure placed on, the SPCSC. In his speech in 1993 All States Sports Minister 
Conference, Wu (1996, p.80) emphasised the importance of poor performance from 
another perspective that “if we made mistakes in the reform … [and] negatively 
affected the performance [of key sports], our reform would be rejected”.  
In summary, we would argue that the introduction of professional sport was 
enabled by changes in political environment (i.e. economic reform), and was 
advocated because of its symbolic meaning in obeying the reforming trend, and was 
promised for its scarce influence on the political task of the SCPCS. It could be thus 
argued that it was such political concerns that framed the implicit 
professionalisation message in the 1993 Policy, which eased the external pressure for, 
and maintained the core of, the Zhuanye system. In return, the statement of, and the 
interpretation of, the 1993 Policy indirectly reflects the significance of political 
elements in Chinese elite sport, and accentuates political rhetoric in the development 
of the commercial elements in Zhuanye sport. 
4.2.3 The reform of training system 
Consistent with the principle of the 1986 reform, i.e. “reinforcing the unified 
leadership of the SPCSC”, responsibility for training for elite sports was assigned to 
the three Departments of Training and Competition of the SPCSC (Wu, 1999). 
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However, Wu (1999) points out that, because each Department of Training and 
Competition was in charge of a number of sports, it was difficult for it to provide 
sport-specific guidelines. 
In order to address this problem caused by the over-concentration of responsibility 
for training in one single department, different roles were assigned to different 
institutions in the 1993 Policy: 
Training institutions and sports entities’ functions include administrative 
governance, practical and professional guidance, and advising on competition;  … 
The SPCSC publishes guidelines, policies, orders and regulations, [a Sport 
Association] implementing its administrative governance function; … providing 
practical… guidance, and direct development via competition and economic 
leverage….  
Sport associations will generally become entities that have their own responsibility, 
power and interest, and will vertically govern the training system of their own sports 
from amateur level to elite level.  
SPCSC, 1993b, p. 1 
In line with the principle of the 1993 Policy, “the separation of administration and 
operational power”, the SPCSC was portrayed as a macro-controller making policies 
and administrative orders, and the Sport Associations were assigned responsibilities 
for practical issues in a vertical national training system. 
It was also indirectly implied in the second quotation that Sport Associations were 
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“entities that have their own responsibility, power and interest”, which is consistent 
to their identity as the virtual form of the SADs. It could be argued that though the 
1993 policy portrayed different roles of the SADs and Sport Associations in the 
training system, it was not Sport Associations, but the SADs then the Administration 
Centres that had consistently controlled the national training system. 
It is pointed out that the efficacy of this vertical governance system that was 
essentially implemented by the Centres was not very satisfying, because: 
In subsequent development, the Centres with a ‘semi-administrative character’ have 
replaced the function of Sport Associations [of vertically governing the development 
of sports]. However, these Centres that are affiliated to the GAS do not have proper 
institutional identities when dealing with Provincial Sport Departments47; 
additionally, [because of] the actual benchmark of Provincial Sport Departments, 
which [compete against other delegations in] the National Games, the vertical system 
does not work smoothly.  
Xiong, et al. 2008, p.58 
                                                 
47 Though using the term “Provincial Sport Departments” in the thesis, there are different types of 
sport governance entities embraced in the term besides the entities of Provinces, Municipalities, 
Autonomous Regions and Special Administrative Regions. For example, the ‘Physical Culture and 
Sports Team of the PLA’, also known as the August First Physical Culture and Sports Team, is the 
SAD of the military force of China, which sends delegation the National Games using the name of the 
‘PLA Delegation’(The Editing Committee of the Encyclopedia of China Sports 2001). Special 
indications are provided when the term of “Provincial Sport Departments” is specifically used for the 
entities of Provinces, Municipalities, Autonomous Regions and Special Administrative Regions in the 
thesis. 
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Firstly, we would argue that the word “replace” constructs the relationship between 
the Centres and Sport Associations, and shapes the impact of the establishing of the 
Centres on the reform of the training system. This relationship between these two 
types of sport organisations, more precisely between the ‘two banners of one group’, 
is consistent with our previous argument that it was the Centres, as  
‘semi-administration institutions’, which took over the “responsibility, power and 
interests” of Sport Associations and implemented the 1993 Policy. 
Secondly, through portraying the conflicts between the Centres, i.e. an apparatus of 
the SPCSC, and the Provincial Sport Departments, the authors indirectly suggest 
that the SADs at the national level were not the always source of the most powerful 
discourse in Chinese elite sport. The Centres’ identity and the interest of Provincial 
SADs are identified as two main factors that hinder the effectiveness of the vertical 
training system. The Centres were defined as public institutions that were only 
responsible for a given sport or sports (SPCSC, 1997). In contrast, a Provincial SADs 
is an institution of the provincial government. It thus was not the Centres but the 
provincial government, which provided resources to Provincial SADs and tasked 
Provincial SADs mainly with delivering the provincial teams performance at the 
National Games. Thus, the Centres’ ability to direct policy at the provincial end of 
the vertical training system was limited by virtue of the weakness of their 
semi-governmental identities, and by Provincial SADs’ principal concern to 
maximise performance in the national competition system. 
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In other words, the conflict between the Centres and the Provincial SADs reflects 
struggles between the interests at the National (represented by the Centres), and 
Provincial, levels of Zhuanye system. Olympic performance was prioritised as the 
top goal of Chinese sport by the SPCSC. By contrast, Provincial SADs emphasised 
respective provincial delegations’ performance in the National Games, which for 
them was even more important than Olympic performance, because good or poor 
performance related to the rewards or penalties for Provincial SADs and their staff 
(Yi, 2008). Provincial SADs thus strategically prioritised competition at national 
rather than international level. However, such inconsistency of interests at national 
and provincial level was addressed in another part of the 1993 Policy concerning the 
reform of competition system of Zhuanye sport. 
4.2.4 The reform of competition system  
The principal purpose of the National Games was explicitly defined as preparing for 
the Olympic Games in the 1986 and 1993 Policy. It was highlighted in the 1986 Policy 
that the guideline of the competition arrangements for the National Games was to 
“emphasise the Olympic sports, and [to] include common [sports]” (SPCSC 1986a, 
p.72). The emphasis on the Olympic sports was further accentuated in the 1993 
policy, through elaborating the problems of the National Games as: 
… having redundant sports, key sports thus cannot receive the support they should 
have had; the distribution of resources [to key sports] is inappropriate, [and 
consequently] affects the implementation of the Olympic strategy. [Therefore] the key 
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aspect of reform should be a focus on ‘shrinking the frontline [focusing on a reduced 
number of sports and], highlighting the key sports ’utilising regional advantages and 
improving the quality and efficiency of competition. 
SPCSC, 1993a, p. 1 
It is explicitly indicated that the reason for restructuring the National Games was to 
protect the implementation of the Olympic strategy and to promoting key sports, 
both of which had been hindered by the redundant sports in the National Games. In 
other words, this indirectly regulated the inclusion of certain ‘unneeded’ sports in 
the National Games as inappropriate for accomplishing the Olympic strategy. 
Consistent with this tone, was the notion of “common sports” (i.e. non-Olympic 
sports; non-Asian Games sports; and Asian Games sports for which there was no 
prospect of China winning gold medals), which was included in the statement of the 
1986 Policy but was absent in the 1993 edition. 
After the 1993 Policy was published, the sports incorporated in the National Games 
were reduced to merely Olympic sports and Wushu. Given the significance of 
National Games to Provincial SADs, it could be argued that this policy change not 
only reflected the accentuation of Olympic sports at the National level; but also 
manifested a purpose of unifying the working focus of SADs at national and 
provincial levels. This focus on provincial level is consistent with the indication of 
“utilising regional advantage”, which is identified as an approach to realise the 
ultimate goal of the reform of the competition system, i.e. reinforcing the Olympic 
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strategy. In other words, we would argue that through utilising its power over 
Chinese elite sport policy discourse, the SPCSC was able not only to preserve its 
power and interests at national level, but also to increase the prominence of Olympic 
performance discourse at provincial level through re-structuring the regulation of 
the competition system.  
A number of supportive measures were subsequently implemented to further ease 
the conflict between the National and Provincial SADs, such as, altering the year of 
National Games from one year before to one year after each Olympic Games, which 
helped to ensure that athletes were in peak condition for the Olympic Games. Since 
1997, athletes’ Olympic performance had been given ‘points’ which were to be 
added into the total points that a provincial delegation earns in the National Games. 
The ranking of the provinces in the National Games was a source not simply of 
kudos for the province and its sports leaders, but could also influence the political 
career of successful sports administrators (Shi et al. 2009; Wang & Yang 2011; Xiong 
et al. 2008). After 2005 the Olympic performance became double weighted while 
medals in world championships also started to be assessed and to contribute to 
provincial performance. Since this period, the significance of Olympic performance 
has increased markedly throughout the Chinese elite sport system. By contrast, 
non-Olympic sport has been significantly devalued in the overall Chinese elite sport 
system.   
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Even though the National Games was also recognised as “an important element 
to … attract public attention and strengthen government investment in sport” 
(SPCSC, 1986a, 1993a, p. 1), there was hardly any concrete content concerning this 
function. We would argue that such simple inclusion of content relating to civil 
society is in line with the superficial policy statement, which we previously analysed, 
concerning the introduction of professional elements into Chinese elite sport.   
In general, the 1993 Policy is regarded as “the strategic turning point, at which 
[Chinese sport] made its first attempt to fundamentally break from the [traditional] 
framework of the [elite sport] system, and to look for a breakthrough route to reform 
from outside the [PCSC] system” (Yang et al. 2002, p.4). However, the core interests 
of the SPCSC and its power over Chinese elite sport were essentially protected, 
which could be argued to be a reflection of certain parts of the 1993 Policy, such as 
the maintaining of administrative power that was subsequently assigned to the 
Centres; the accentuation of Olympic performance in Chinese elite sport, and the 
selective professionalisation of Zhuanye sports. In their review of the 1993 Policy, 
Xiong et al. (2008. p.53) point out that: 
In terms of the elite sport reform, the 1993 Policy did not have a firm stance [to carry 
out reform]. … An important [reason] was the high correlation between Olympic 
performance and the political kudos of Chinese sport officials. Under such 
circumstances, everything [in Chinese elite sport] had to be targeted at the Olympic 
Games. In the situation that elite sport had hardly been developed in a ‘civil-society’ 
context, it seemed that there was no other choice but to implement administrative 
methods in order to ensure that [Chinese] elite sport could achieve [satisfactory] 
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results in the Olympic Games. It is argued, perhaps a little radically, that those with 
vested interests in elite sport would rather sacrifice the development of elite sport per 
se than to cede their own interests and [political] future. Because it is a time-tested 
rule for individual [career] development in elite sport that ‘he who excels in training 
can gain access to an official career’, ’ he who excels in competition can gain access to 
an official career’. 
In the above evaluation of what the SPCSC did and why in the 1993 reform, the 
authors, on the one hand, question the starting point of the reform which was “not a 
firm stand” since civil-society-based development was not fully trusted by the 
SPCSC as a means for optimising Olympic performance; and, on the other hand, 
criticise the motivation of vested interest groups to promote the reform, since this 
was to protect “their own interests and [political] future”.  
There were three targets of the reform set in the 1993 policy statement, namely elite 
sport success; the efficiency of the sport system; and civil-society-based development 
of elite sport. Compared to the other two, there was less essential achievement in 
terms of the civil-society-based development of Chinese elite sport, despite of 
several attempted innovations, such as the independence of Sport Associations and 
the introduction of professionalisation. Thus, the dominant voices in Chinese elite 
sport were still those of Zhuanye, rather than professional, sport from the PCSC 
system, though this was not the case for the Sport Associations. The authors identify 
this limited achievement in the civil-society based development of sport as 
reinforcing the appropriateness of Juguo Tizhi, and maintaining the dominance of 
Zhuanye system in Chinese elite sport. We would further argue that it is also the 
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practices promoting the dominance and interests of Zhuanye sport that have 
hindered the development of civil-society elements in Chinese elite sport. In other 
words, the dominance of Zhuanye sport is both the reason for, and the outcome of, 
the limited civil-society-based development of Chinese elite sport. This is in line 
with the vested interest group in Zhuanye sport, and eventually limited the efficacy 
of reform in terms of civil-society-based development. As Xiong et al point out in the 
above quotation, the aspect of civil-society-based development was “sacrificed” in 
order to ensure “achiev(ing) [satisfactory] results in the Olympic Games” which 
were in line with the vested interests (benefits and status) of state administrators.  
Through regulating and restructuring the system of Chinese elite sport, the 1993 
reform strengthened the SPCSC’s overwhelming power over elite sport. The SPCSC 
did however attempt to introduce market economy/civil society based approaches 
into elite sport but greater effort was focused on sports that had not enjoyed 
Olympic success. Even though it brought more detailed operational content and 
market-oriented economic features into the policy narrative, the 1993 Policy shares 
with the 1986 Policy the goal of ‘winning Olympic glory’, which is consistent with 
the interests of state administrators operating within the PCSC system. 
4.3 The Strategic Plan for Winning Olympic Glory 1994-2000, 2001-2010  
The Strategic Plan for the Winning Olympic Glory (hereafter, the Plan) is a periodically 
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renewed Chinese elite sport policy. There have been three editions, respectively 
covering 1994-2000, 2001-2010, 2011-2020 (hereafter, the 1994 Plan, the 2001 Plan and 
the 2011 Plan)48. 
The nature of the Plan is well recognised as a policy concerning the ”general reform 
and development of elite sport; it is, in other words, a concentrated version of the 
general reform and development plan of (Chinese) elite sport” (Xiong et al. 2008, 
p.95). This is consistent with the then-portrait of the Olympic Games as a driving 
force for the general development and reform of Chinese sport. Lu (1994, p.1) states 
that:  
In the last seven or eight years of the 20th century, Chinese sport will seek its survival 
and development in two … contemporary trends, … the second is [the combination of] 
the global sport development and [Chinese sport’s] own restless trend of 
reform…especially [because of] its engagement with the Olympic movement, [which] 
predestines that the reform of Chinese sport has to follow this global trend.”  
                                                 
48 Each edition of the Plans consisted of two parts, the Summary of the Plan (hereafter the Summary) 
and the Implementation Plan. Though specifically named after the Olympics, the Plans, especially the 
Summaries, are regarded as essentially the most representative political guidelines for the 
development of Chinese elite sport after the 1993 policy (Hao & Ren 2003; Xiong et al. 2008). The 
Summary is described as “comprehensive and foundational, and is the principal document for the 
SPCSC to carry out macro control [over Chinese elite sport]” (SPCSC 1995b, p.1); and is “the strategic 
blueprint guiding Chinese elite sport for its steady development, [and] the programmatic document 
directing the development of Chinese elite sport and the implementation of Olympic strategy” (GAS 
2011b, p.1). Due to the confidentiality of the full version of the document, we focus on the Summaries 
as the main data source for this aspect of the research. 
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Straightforwardly, Chinese sport was constructed as a passive follower of the 
development of global sport, and its reform was “predestined” to “follow” the 
external global trend, represented by the Olympic movement. Additionally, given 
the significance of the Olympic Games to Chinese elite sport (which we discuss in 
the subsequent two discourse-focused chapters), it could be argued that this external 
pressure was also consistent with the inherent feature of Zhuanye sport. Thus, this 
Olympic ‘specified’ strategic plan was to be regarded as a working guideline for the 
Olympic-targeted SADs (Cheng 2011). 
Given this nature of the Plans and the Summaries, the goals of these Olympic-titled 
policies can be said to be two-fold, namely enhancing Olympic performance, which 
can be straightforwardly used as its benchmark; and the development and reform of 
Zhuanye sport. Given the steady increase in Chinese Olympic performance since the 
1992 Barcelona Games, the Plans can be straightforwardly regarded as successful 
and fruitful. However, the second target, which is relevant to the concerns of this 
research, is less tangible and more difficult to assess. We thus focus on those 
statements and interpretation of the Summaries, concerning reform and development 
in the Plans, and aim to unveil the interest and power relation through analysing the 
account relating to the intangible targets.  
Content-wise, the Summaries are generally composed of four major parts, the situation 
and task, the goal, the principle, and the measures. However, only the 2001 Plan 
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consisted of all four of these sections. In the 1994 Plan, there is an additional 
introduction section with the measures and steps for the implementation of the Plan. 
The 2010 Plan has a specific section on achievement that mainly focused on the 
Beijing Games. The analysis in this Chapter focuses on the first two editions, while 
the 2011 Summary is reviewed in the Post-2008 Chapter. 
4.3.1 The Situation and Task  
Even though both the 1994 and 2011 Summaries covered two Olympic Games in their 
respective time spans, thanks to the successful bid for the 2008 Games in 2001, the 
2008 Olympics was a crucial and major focus of the 2001 Summary. The Beijing 
Olympics was not only portrayed as a sporting event, but also interpreted from a 
number of perspectives, for instance, economic, political and diplomatic. For 
example: 
Winning the bid for the 2008 Games is another important opportunity for the 
development of sport in our country, which will have a significant impact on the 
development of economy and society, on the promotion of opening-up, as well as on 
the increase of the international status of our country. 
GAS, 2002, p. 1 
Consistent with the political significance of the Olympics and modern sport in the 
Chinese context, the significance of the Beijing Games was acknowledged in two 
ways. First, it was emphasised in terms of elite sport per se, which is consistent with 
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the statement of the 1994 Summary concerning the political task of Zhuanye sport, 
i.e. “writing the glorious Chinese Olympic chapter”(SPCSC 1995b, p.1). Secondly, 
the Beijing Games is also associated with a number of political terms, “the 
opening-up” and “the increase of international status”, which imply the initial 
purpose of introducing the Olympics into Chinese society and is consistent with the 
features of Chinese Olympic discourse that we subsequently discussed in the 
following two chapters. 
International competition was employed in both Summaries, constructing the 
external environment of Chinese elite sport. In contrast to the general description in 
the 1994 Summary (SPCSC 1995b, p.1), “because of the collapse of the USSR and the 
vanishing of East Germany…there are more competitors at our level in the Olympic 
Games”, a more detailed analysis of competitors was provided in the 2001 
Summary:   
Global elite sport has rapidly developed in the new century; all countries have paid 
more attention to the Olympic performance and ranking, have increased their 
investment in elite sport and have employed various kinds of methods to reinforce 
national administration and [national] support for elite sport… 
Competition has taken place between the two super powers, the USA and Russia; the 
differences among China, Germany, France and Australia have been decreasing… 
GAS, 2002, p. 1 
The increasing involvement of government within elite sport, represented by 
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“increased investment” and “reinforce[d] administration”, is acknowledged as a 
global trend in elite sport development. As the two “international practices” were in 
line with the character of the Juguo Tizhi, it could be argued that such a portrayal 
indirectly legitimised Juguo Tizhi and thus endorsed the requirement of 
concentrating resources and power. Moreover, the political significance of Olympic 
performance was also accentuated through relating the Olympic Games to 
international competition in the policy narrative.    
Besides this increasing and more explicit portrayal of international competition, the 
account concerning professional sport was remarkably different between the two 
Summaries. It was acknowledged in the 1994 Summary that “the introduction of 
commercialisation and professionalisation has stimulated the rapid development of 
elite sport performance”” (SPCSC 1995b, p.1). However, there was no mention about 
this function of professional sport in the subsequent edition. This change, on the one 
hand, is consistent with the characteristic of Chinese professional sport, most of 
which were ‘functionally’ worthless to the GAS in terms of fulfilling its Olympic task. 
On the other hand, such an account indirectly identified Zhuanye sport as the only 
means by which Olympic glory could be achieved, and thus endorsed the 
concentration of resource on it in preparation for the Beijing Games. 
In the subsequent part of the Situation and Task section in the 2001 Summary, 
discussion of ‘governance’ and of ‘sport science and technology’ replaced the 
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description of the domestic situation and the winter Olympic sports in the 1994 
Summary. The 2001 Summary (GAS 2002, p.1) stated: 
Relationships in sport administration, the competition management [system], the 
financial investment [system] and the social security [system] should be further 
clarified and reinforced… 
Traditional, experiential training is still dominant [in the training system of Chinese 
elite sport], the combination of training and science and technology is insufficient, 
and therefore the investments in science and technology as well as research teams 
urgently need to be intensified. 
It is pointed out by Xiong et al. (2008) that the addition of the first two issues in 
terms of governance, i.e. sport administration and competition management, aims to 
solve problems in professional sport and ease conflicts between professional and 
Zhuanye sport. We would argue that this purpose, on the one hand, is consistent 
with the genre employed in the statement, i.e. “clarifying and reinforcing”. On the 
other hand, it is also in line with the GAS’s attitude towards, and knowledge of, 
professional sport and the Olympic task, which led to the nearly complete 
exclusion49 of professional sport in the 2001 Summary. 
The addition of the other two issues, finance and social security reflected the GAS’s 
attempts to demand additional social resources for Zhuanye sport for the 
                                                 
49 Professional sport was only mentioned once in the 2001 Summary, “the professionalisation of elite 
sport is accelerated” (GAS 2002, p.1). 
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preparation of the Beijing Olympics. This demand was rationalised and legitimised 
by China’s continual improvement in Olympic performance, which evidenced the 
effectiveness and efficiency of Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi in elite sport 
development. There were a number of elements covered in the subsequent detailed 
breakdown of the requirement for resources, such as, human resources, ideological 
education, financial supports, etc., which reflected the GAS’s interpretation of the 
causal factors of its former success. 
The inclusion and emphasis of these issues [the refinement of sport administration, 
of the competition management system, of the financial investment system and of 
the social security system] in the policy statement also reflected the GAS’s awareness 
of the weaknesses of Juguo Tizhi. These requirements, which were eventually 
fulfilled during the preparation for the Beijing Games, essentially reinforced the 
power of, and resource invested in, Juguo Tizhi. Thus, as a number of interviewees 
noted, “an extreme Juguo Tizhi” was established before the Beijing Games.  
4.3.2 The Guiding Theory and Principle  
This section on Guiding Theory and Principle was ‘promoted’ from the third section of 
the 1994 Summary to the second of the 2001 Summary, which, we would argue, 
reflected the GAS’s growing attention to the effect of theoretical and strategic issues 
relating to Olympic performance. In terms of the policy statement, this section in 
each of the Summaries were consisted with four parts, which are respectively 
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discussed below. 
4.3.2.1 Guiding theory and the principle of Reform 
Consistent with the reforming trend of the Chinese society, reform is also 
emphasised in the 1994 Summary, that “the overall [development of Chinese elite 
sport] should be led through deepening the reform of Chinese sport” (SPCSC 1995a, 
p.1). However, like the term of ‘professionalisation’, this perspective was absent in 
the 2001 Summary. Given the nature of Chinese elite sport reform, which is to “refine 
Juguo Tizhi”(SPCSC 1993d; Liu 2007; P. Liu 2008; P. Liu 2009b), this absence 
indirectly reflected the GAS’s attempt to, at least, postpone ‘refining Juguo Tizhi’ for 
the preparation for the Beijing Games. This ‘sacrifice’ of reform is evidenced in the 
interview with Interviewee General 3, indicating that: 
Actually, there were all of these problems [in Chinese sport] before 2008… [However], 
everyone kept quiet at that time just for the 2008 Games, for the success of the 
Games… though everyone had some complaints or comments, we suppressed them,… 
to show our devotion and as a contribution to the nation…The reform of Chinese 
sport had basically halted from 2000. Everyone temporarily suppressed conflicts in 
order to guarantee [the success of] the Beijing Games. … 
Through suggesting the “silence” of “everyone” (both internal and external to 
Zhuanye sport), the Interviewee portrays a general understanding of Chinese society 
in terms of the necessity of sacrifice for the Beijing Games, which, consequently, 
enhanced the power of discourse in relation to Olympic performance and Juguo 
Tizhi discourse. We may also argued that this absence of a reforming account in the 
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statement of the 2001 Summary also reflected a significant power difference between 
the discourse of Olympic performance and of elite sport reform, which were 
implicitly constructed as incompatible in the policy narrative. This is evidenced in 
Zhang’s (2009, p.22, p.48) assessment on the impact of the Beijing Games on the 
reform of Chinese elite sport, stating: 
During the packed-schedule of the preparation for the [2008] Games,… the reform 
that might destabilise [Juguo Tizhi] and thus affected elite sport performance had to 
be postponed. The introduction of professional sport and the further refinement of 
Juguo Tizhi were therefore affected….  
Winning the bid in 2001, … offered an excuse for the continuity of conservatism in 
sport reform...  
Even though the Beijing Games was portrayed as the factor hindering the reform of 
Chinese elite sport in general, this ‘negative’ impact of the Beijing Games was 
explicitly associated with those reforms that were recognised as potentially 
“affect(ing) elite sport performance”. Given the relationship between Juguo Tizhi 
and elite sport performance, this is consistent with our previous argument 
concerning the limited achievement of certain parts of the 1993 reform, i.e. the 
aspects of the reform of the administrative governance system and the 
professionalisation of Chinese elite sport. In other words, this (voluntary or 
involuntary) ‘pre-2008 silence’ of reforming narrative in policy statement or external 
discourse reflected the impact of the Beijing Games on the power structure of 
Chinese sport in the reforming era.   
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4.3.2.2 The construction of the Olympics and of the Olympic strategy 
In line with its title, Olympic performance was emphasised in three editions of the 
Summary, although their accounts concerning the Olympics are different. In the 1994 
Summary (SPCSC 1995b, p.1), the Olympics was portrayed as the primary strategic 
goal of Chinese elite sport:   
[We should] implement the strategy for development, which prioritises the Olympic 
Games at top level. 
Given the historical emphasis on Olympic performance in Chinese elite sport 
discourse, this identification of the prime importance of the Olympics indirectly 
promoted the Olympic performance as the principal benchmark of the PCSCs 
system.  
In the 2001 Summary, though the performance in the Beijing Games was particularly 
accentuated, the 2008 Olympics was also portrayed as an opportunity for the general 
development of elite sport. It was stated that: 
(We should) consider the 2008 Olympics as an opportunity to improve the 
comprehensive strength and competitive level of Chinese elite sport by regarding the 
fulfilment of people’s increasing need in sport as the starting point, linking it closely 
to practices, and obeying the rule of elite sport development. 
GAS, 2002, p. 1 
In contrast to the concentrated emphasis on Olympic performance and thus the 
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absence of reforming content in this section, another outcome, the general 
development of Chinese sport, was introduced into the policy statement as one of 
the projected outcomes of hosting the 2008 Games. Compared with the other 
benchmark, that of Olympic performance, this new outcome was relatively more 
difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless it seems clear that the introduction of this 
less-tangible element and of “the increasing need of Chinese people” would protect 
the interest of the GAS. On the one hand, this inclusion of ‘the need of people’ 
endorses SADs’ subsequently move with a principle of the CPC, ‘serving the people’ 
(Mao, 1944). On the other hand, it also hedges the bets of the Zhuanye sport system, 
if it failed to clinch a top three place in the medal table of the Beijing Games, as 
stated in the 2001 Summary. 
Compared to the 1994 Summary, the mechanism of Chinese elite sport development 
was regulated in a more concise, practical and more clearly targeted fashion in the 
2001 edition, stating: 
[We should] strengthen the Olympic strategy… establish the hierarchy of sports [in 
terms of their importance], carry out adjustments in the structure [of Chinese sport], 
and refine the distribution of resources.[We should also] clarify the relationship 
between the Olympic Games, Asian Games, National Games and Inter-City Games, 
develop national sporting resources, utilise the advantage of Juguo Tizhi, and 
stimulate and make use of the enthusiasm of all social sectors...  
GAS, 2002, p. 1 
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Besides changing genre in relation to the Olympic strategy from “implementing” to 
“strengthen(ing)”, the above quotation also concretely identified the key procedures 
of Chinese elite sport development, which reflected the “advantage of Juguo Tizhi”. 
On the one hand, following the 1993 Policy, a hierarchy of the importance of sport 
events from international to domestic level was regularly emphasised. On the other 
hand, the utilisation of resources from the state and social sector was also 
normalised as a common practice for implementing the Olympic strategy. This 
account further endorses the GAS’s control over elite sport resources and over 
Chinese elite sport per se in preparing for the Beijing Games, which was at the very 
top of the hierarchy. 
4.3.2.3 Elite sport development 
In the 1994 Summary, there were 9 factors covered in this part, most of which were 
concrete operational measures and were subsequently repeated in the section on 
Main Measures [for implementing the Olympic strategy], which to a degree, reduce 
the value of this part of content in the section of Guiding theory. By contrast, only 
three factors, i.e. scientific and technological support, legal elements in sport and 
mass sport, were included in the corresponding section of the 2001 Summary. This 
content reflected the GAS’s ‘new’ knowledge about ways of strengthening Juguo 
Tizhi and of exploring new fields and methods for concentrating social resource. 
The first factor, the scientific and technological support, was combined with 
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education issues in the policy statement, and was more detailed than the 1994 
Summary. On the one hand, the increased amount of content and level of detail was 
consistent with the previous section in the 1994 Summary on the Situation and Task, 
which addresses the insufficient scientific and technological support to Chinese elite 
sport. On the other hand, the addition of the education sector matters identified it 
not only as a means of promoting ‘civil-society-based development’ but also as a 
measure for enhancing performance. However, there has been only limited progress 
in relation to the educational goals. This was interpreted as the consequence of the 
Zhuanye system’s monopolistic control over elite sport resources and its concerns 
about the potential challenges from the education sector for winning Olympic glory, 
which would threaten its vested interests (Xiong et al. 2008). 
Secondly, the maintenance of legal elements, i.e. claiming “ruling [elite] sport by 
law”, echoed the then-popular political statement, ‘ruling the country by law’, which 
was made by the Chinese President (Jiang 1997). This also reflected the GAS’s 
recognition of the function of legal elements in endorsing its monopolistic power in 
Chinese elite sport. For instance, the SADs’ intervention in elite sport, which became 
more important during the preparation for the Beijing Games, is legitimised in the 
Sport Law of China (the only substantive sport related law in China50). 
                                                 
50 Besides the Sport Law of China published by the State Council, there are some regulations relating 
to elite sport mainly published by the SPCSC and then the GAS, such as the notice on reinforcing 
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Thirdly, it is ‘acknowledged’ that elite sport had a number of positive impacts on it, 
such as “enhancing people’s consciousness of sport participation, increasing the 
weight of sport in people’s life” (GAS 2002, p.1). This is consistent with the advocacy 
of “the fulfilment of people’s increasing need in sport” and with the indication of 
general development as one of the intended outcomes of hosting the Games in this 
document. We would argue that this account reflected the GAS’s attempts to 
legitimise the necessity of prioritising elite sport from the perspective of mass sport.  
4.3.2.4 The expected outcomes 
As policies inherently focusing on elite sport development in general, the expected 
outcomes stated in both the 1994 and 2001 Summaries were not restricted to Olympic 
performance only. In the 1994 Summary, the expected outcome was indicated in a 
‘stratified’ manner: 
[We should] implement [a various of] … means … that are in line with these 
principles, consolidating and upgrading the sports in which we have had advantage; 
strengthening those sports in which we have potential to develop advantage; [striving 
for] breakthrough in weak points [of Chinese elite sport], and improving those 
less-developed regions. 
SPCSC, 1995b, p. 1 
                                                                                                                                                       
administrative management on sport market关于加强体育市场管理的通知 (published by the SPCSC); 
Methods of National Sport Competition (published by the GAS), etc.; the Summary of Nationwide 
Fitness Program 全民健身计划纲要 was published by the State Council for mass sport in 1995. 
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This emphasis on general elite sport is consistent with the statement in the section on 
the Situation and Task, indicating that the overall strength of Chinese elite sport 
“urgently needs to be improved” (SPCSC 1995b, p.1). However, like the 1993 Policy, 
the 1994 Summary confronted a similar dilemma in balancing reform and Juguo Tizhi. 
For instance, the reform of Juguo Tizhi was strongly promoted in the 1994 Summary 
and was portrayed as a primary factor leading the overall development of Chinese 
elite sport (SPCSC 1995a, p.1). This account, as we previously argued, reflected the 
clash of the internal and external pressures on Chinese elite sport. 
In the 2001 Summary, fulfilling people’s needs is framed as the ultimate outcome of 
the GAS’s practices. This is indicated in the following extract: 
…[We should] regard the 2008 Olympics as an opportunity for improving the overall 
strength and level of the elite sport of China by regarding the fulfilment of people’s 
increasing needs in sports as a starting point, by closely linking it to practices, and 
[by] obeying the rule of elite sport development. 
GAS, 2002 
In line with Mao Zedong’s (1944) words, “serving the people”, the improvement “of 
the overall strength and level of elite sport” was framed as the GAS’s approach to 
meeting the needs of Chinese people. This account clothes the GAS’s moves, which 
essentially realise its interests through providing satisfactory performance, in a 
socialist rhetoric and legitimises such a move with the dominant ideology in Chinese 
society.  
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In general, through comparing the statement of the 1994 and 2001 Summaries, it 
could be argued that the GAS was more experienced than the SPCSC in promoting 
elite sport development in a reforming era. For example, through utilising different 
concepts, such as mass sport and people’s needs, the GAS endorsed the necessity of 
prioritising elite sport as well as of maintaining its power over Chinese elite sport 
during the preparation for the Beijing Games. Additionally, the GAS was also 
empowered by the emphasis on the Beijing Games in the Chinese society (as we 
demonstrated in the part concerning the Chinese Olympic discourse in the following 
chapter), and consequently employed the concentrated political and public attention 
on the Games as a distraction allowing a drift in the focus of the Summary away from 
reform, and towards the reinforcement of Juguo Tizhi.  
In Xiong et al.’s (2008, p.97) analysis of the 2001 Summary, these ‘clever’ practices 
and consistent dominance are regarded as a key obstacle to sport reform, which is 
also the result of common understanding of Chinese elite sport: 
Including the authors of the Summaries, almost everyone in Chinese sport believes 
that the Olympic success of Chinese elite sport should be ascribed to Juguo Tizhi 
which has lasted since the planned economy era. However, Juguo Tizhi has also been 
the target of the two reforms of Chinese elite sport so far. Nonetheless, as evidenced by 
the current situation, a significant number of the missions of ‘the reform of the 
administrative governance system’ (for example, the independence of sports 
[associations], and the diversification of funding resources) have not yet been 
completed. 
Framing Juguo Tizhi and reform as two conflicting phenomena, the authors 
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indirectly identified the continuous dominance of Juguo Tizhi through 
acknowledging the limited achievement in Chinese elite sport reform. This 
dominance, as stated in the first line of the quotation, was supported by the belief 
held by almost everyone in Chinese sport in the effectiveness and significance of 
Juguo Tizhi. In other words, it indirectly normalises the ‘usefulness’ of Juguo Tizhi 
as a common knowledge of Chinese elite sport. Though we are not able to know 
exactly who “almost everyone” was, given the relatively fewer number professional 
sports in China, we may infer that most of those referred to are those who were 
involved in Zhuanye sport. Given that the vested interests within Zhuanye sport 
were in line with Chinese Olympic performance that had been attributed to Juguo 
Tizhi, we may argue that promoting Juguo Tizhi or demoting reform were also in 
line with the interests of most of this significant majority. Eventually,  
“the Beijing Games pushed Juguo Tizhi to the extreme, … [which] has concentred the 
nation’s scarce resources on a limited number of elite sports, and implemented all 
means to maximize (Olympic) performance”. 
Interviewee General 2 
4.3.3 The Objects of the Plan 
Straightforwardly, projected performance targets for each Olympic Games were 
clearly listed in the 1994 and 2001 Summaries. However, in contrast to the indication 
of the general position in the Olympics, the projected rank of the Chinese team in the 
Beijing Games was explicitly indicated in the 2001 Summaries.   
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‘The fundamental factors in the strength of the system’ and ‘the goal of the reform of 
the system and mechanism of Chinese elite sport’ were also employed in the 1994 
Summary as the other two objects. ‘The fundamental factors’ were relatively 
straightforward: including a number of basic indicators of elite sport development, 
such as the number of elite athletes and coaches, the percentage of Olympic level 
athletes in the Zhuanye sport system, the system of scientific and technological 
support, etc. 
The inclusion of ‘the object of the reform of system and mechanism‘ is consistent 
with the nature of the 1994 Summary as a series of implementations of the 1993 Policy 
(Xiong, et al. 2008). All of the eight aspects in part duplicated the requirement in the 
1993 Policy. Six of these aspects were associated with the verb “to establish”. we 
would argue that his genre the reflected a dissatisfaction with the implementation of 
the 1993 Policy in ‘establishing’ foundation in these six aspects, and an intention to 
reinforce the power of the SPCSC, which, as we previously argued, was the essential 
impact of the 1993 Policy. 
The title of the corresponding section in the 2001 Summary was changed to “The 
Objectives of Reform and Development”. This change in rhetorical terms was 
interpreted as a representation of GAS’s improved recognition of the importance of 
the reform of Chinese elite sport. Ironically, the reform narrative was remarkably 
reduced in the 2001 Summary in both quantitative and qualitative terms. For example, 
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similar to the exclusion of the topic of reform in the Guiding Theory and Principle, the 
objective of the reform of the system and operating mechanisms of Chinese elite sport was 
also deleted in the 2001 Summary. Although there was a new topic in the section on 
the Objectives of the Plan, i.e. the general object of elite sport development, there was only 
one sentence generally relating to the reform as follows: 
… establish[ing] the elite sport administrative system and operating mechanisms 
with Chinese characteristics [, which is] consistent with the socialist market economy 
[of China] 
GAS, 2002 
This contradictory narrative in the title and statement of this part in the 2001 
Summary reflected a similar dilemma between Juguo Tizhi and reform, which 
confronted the SPCSC when publishing the 1993 Policy. Juguo Tizhi had been well 
regarded and positively portrayed as an effective apparatus of elite sport 
development (Fan, Wu, & Xiong, 2005; Hao & Ren, 2003; Yu. Li et al., 2010; Wei et al., 
2010; Xu, 2008). However, it was also recognised as the obligation and the target of 
Chinese elite sport reform by external commentators and a number of internal 
‘reformists’. For example, Zhang (2009, p. 1) indicates that 
The socialist market economy of China has been established, nevertheless, there is still 
an element of the planned economic system left in Chinese sport, (namely) Juguo 
Tizhi in which typical features of the planned economy are still highly rewarded and 
respected… 
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Given the reforming trend in Chinese society, it could be argued that through 
identifying the planned-economy nature of Juguo Tizhi, Zhang indirectly portrays 
Juguo Tizhi as the target of the reform. Hence, the alternation of the title of this 
section on the Objects could be regarded as a consequence of the influence of the 
political power over discourse of Chinese society. In other words, it represented the 
GAS’s positive response to the increasing emphasis on reforming discourse in 
Chinese society.  
However, as previously indicated, this positive responds to the pressure for reform 
was limited in the title of this part. We would argue that this superficial support and 
essentially postpone of the reform, which substantially protected Juguo Tizhi at least 
during the imminence of the Beijing Games, was enabled and endorsed by the 
significance of the Beijing Games and the effectiveness of Juguo Tizhi, both of which 
were well recognised by Chinese society. Thus this knowledge empowers the GAS 
to not only eventually protect Juguo Tizhi in the reforming trend, but also, silence 
requirements for carrying out reform in the name of preparing the Beijing Games. 
Li Yuanwei et al. (2003, p.4) interpreted this dilemma between the requirement of 
reform and of the performance in the Beijing Games as a conflict between short term 
and long term objects of Chinese sport, stating that  : 
The reform procedure of refining Juguo Tizhi accidentally overlapped with the 29th 
Olympiad. Because the Olympic Strategy is directly implemented by the GAS [who 
recognise that] on the one hand, reform might bring some risks, on the other hand, 
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stopping reform will waste a good opportunity, and subsequently will affect long term 
development. [It could] neither use the task of the 29th Olympiad as an excuse to give 
up reform, nor hastily carry out [the reform] without considering the timing, [the 
GAS thus is] in a dilemma. Hence, controlling the timing and the process [of the 
reform] became one of the key factors influencing the big picture [of the development 
of Chinese elite sport].  
In contrast to other scholars, Li et al. suggested that the reform of Juguo Tizhi was 
not a consequence of external pressure on Chinese elite sport, for example, “the 
socialist market economy of China” (Zhang, 2009, p.1) or “the development of global 
sport” (Lu 1994, p.1), but a long-term target of it. Thus the GAS was identified as the 
sole policy maker proactively, rather than passively, balancing its significant 
short-term goal, namely performance in the 29th Olympiad, and the inescapable 
long-term objects.  
This interpretation not only reflected the GAS’s dominance in Chinese elite sport, 
but also, legitimised the GAS’s choice of promoting Juguo Tizhi before the Beijing 
Games. This was consistent with the fact that the main author was a holder of high 
rank in the SAD. This also suggests that the GAS, which was under great pressure to 
succeed in Olympic performance and to implement elite sport reform, still 
maintained its power over discourse not only in Juguo Tizhi but also in the reform. 
This is to say that though the reform was a significant long-term target, which 
should not be “given up”, the choice of prioritising Olympic strategy was eventually 
made after careful planning when the Beijing Games were imminent. However, it 
was emphasised by Interviewee General 3 that this essential emphasis of Olympic 
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performance (in the intrinsic and extrinsic discourse of Chinese elite sport) was “a 
double-edged sword for the GAS tying both the government and itself”. On the one 
hand, it brought tremendous pressure on Zhuanye sport for providing satisfactory 
Olympic performance for its benefit and status. On the other hand, it also 
rationalised the maintenance of Juguo Tizhi, and endorsed the GAS’s requirement 
for support from the government in terms of resources and further cooperation, in 
order to ensure delivering satisfactory Olympic performance.  
4.3.4 The Measures 
The policy statement in the section of the measures covers the practical factors and 
elements that are well regarded (by the policy makers) as essentials to elite sport 
development. In order to have a systemic view of these operational factors, we will 
begin the analysis by comparing these aspects covered in the 1994 and 2001 
Summaries, to De Bosscher et al.’s (2007; 2009; 2010) 9-pillar SPLISS model of elite 
sport development. 
As we can see from the Table 4.1 below, there were nine aspects elaborated in the 
practical section of the 1994 Summary and ten aspects in the 2001 Summary, 
covering all of the 9 pillars of the SPLISS model. However, the section of the measures 
in the 1994 Summary and 2001 Summary did not literally imitate the SPLISS model, 
as some aspects covered more than one pillar and some measures focused on 
different perspectives of one pillar.  
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In addition, as shown in Table 4.1, there are differences between the policy statement 
of the measures in the 1994 and 2001 Summaries, such as some additional aspects and 
modifications of the 1994 Summary in the 2001 edition. In this section, we mainly 
focus on the additional aspects in the 2001 edition, because, on the one hand, we 
would argue that, these additions represented the GAS’s ‘new’ knowledge of the 
weakness of Juguo Tizhi in terms of practical affairs; on the other hand, these two 
additional aspects concentrated on administrative issues while the other aspects 
were mainly concerned with operational matters. 
4.3.4.1 The restatement of Juguo Tizhi 
There are two new aspects included in this section of the 2001 Summary. The first is 
the restatement of Juguo Tizhi, which was titled as “insisting and refining Juguo Tizhi, 
deepening the reform of elite sport system” (GAS 2002, p.1) Juguo Tizhi was absent in the 
1994 Summary and then was reinstated as the leading measure for implementing the 
Olympic strategy. The well-targeted policy statement started with referring to the 
features of the communist regime and of the connotation of modern sport in the 
Chinese context. It was emphasised that: 
Utilising the superiority of the socialist system; fully developing all kinds of sporting 
resources; establishing the ideology of ‘practicing domestically, uniting against the 
foreign [athletes]; complementing each other with respective advantages, promoting 
mutual development’, which regards the whole country as one entity; paying 
attention to the combination of general and partial development; effective addressing 
the interests of different hierarchies. 
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GAS, 2002, p. 1 
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Table 4. 2 Modified Aspects the 1994 and 2001 Summary 1994 Summary SPLISS 2001 Summary Article 3, Developing scientific training, provoking performance improvement with [enhanced] governance and [use of] science and technology 
Pillar 6 Training Facilities Article 5, Insisting scientific training, enhancing scientific investment in sport, rising effectiveness in training Pillar 9 Scientific research Pillar 5 Athletic and post-athletic career support Article 4, Training and making a high level, tough style elite athlete and coaches team Article 4, Training and making a team of elite coaches  Pillar 7 Coaching provision and coach development Article 8, Expanding ‘opening-up’, increasing international exchange Pillar 8 International competition (only part of its contend focusing on international competition) Article 10, Increasing international exchange, popularising and promoting Olympism, enhancing the social impact of elite sport Article 9, Popularising and promoting Olympism, enhancing the social impact of elite sport Pillar 3 Participation in sport (a single line) 
 
Table 4. 1 Additional Aspects the 1994 and 2001 Summary 1994 Summary SPLISS 2001 Summary  Pillar 2 integrated policy (From a overall and strategic perspective) Article 1, Insisting and refining Juguo Tizhi, deepening the reform of elite sport system   Article 7, Establishing and improving laws and regulation, promoting sport ethical development 
  166 
 
Table 4. 3 Identical Aspects the 1994 and 2001 Summary 1994 Summary SPLISS 2001 Summary Article 5, Implementing 2000 talent project Pillar 4 Talent identification and development system Article 8, Implementing 2010 talent project 
 
 
 
Table 4. 4 Developed Aspects Between the 1994 and 2001 Summary 1994 Summary SPLISS 2001 Summary Article 1, Modifying the overall layout of the development of Olympic Sport Pillar 2 Integrated policy (focusing on the (horizontal) integrating development among regions and sports) Article 3, Refining structural layout of sports, expanding new gold-medal opportunities  Article 2, Establishing a intra-national team competition system, combining centralisation and de-centralisation (of training) 
Pillar 2 integrated policy (focusing on the formation and training of national team system) Article 2, Expanding [the number of sports in which China is highly competitive], while emphasising key sports, full engagement [of Chinese elite sport] in Olympic competition Pillar 4 Talent identification and development system Article 6, Establishing effectiveness of the financial investment system Pillar 1 funding Article 9, Refining the effectiveness of the financial investment system of elite sport Article 7, Fully utilising the leverage effect of competition Pillar 8 International competition (modifying domestic competition system mapping international ones) Article 4, Reform and refine competition system, Fully utilising the leverage effect of competition 
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Through linking Juguo Tizhi with “the superiority of the socialist system”, the 
authors endorsed the political correctness of Juguo Tizhi, which, however, 
was inconsistent with the reforming trend of Chinese society. The collective 
ideology was also indirectly conveyed in the statement through constructing, 
on the one hand, a “we” identity. This collective identity includes not only 
Chinese elite sport but the whole Chinese society through using terms such as 
“practicing domestically”, “uniting against the foreign”, and “the whole 
country as one entity”. We would argue that the statement, “practicing 
domestically, uniting against the foreign [athletes]; complementing each other 
with respective advantages, promoting mutual development”, on the one 
hand, defined Juguo Tizhi in a patriotic fashion from four aspects, namely the 
methods, target, internal relationship within, and outcome of, Juguo Tizhi. On 
the other hand, through constructing a ‘we’ identity, it also linked Juguo Tizhi 
to the initial purpose of introducing modern sport to China, which was to 
establish national identity and status and to resist the invasion of foreign 
countries. 
On the other hand, the collective ideology is also conveyed through 
producing  the hierarchy of Chinese elite sport, in which Juguo Tizhi and 
Zhuanye sport were granted prior status for promoting general development. 
It was explicitly indicated that there were divergent interests, which need to 
be “effectively addressed”, at different hierarchies. Some were newly 
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emerged in the reforming era, such as the interests of sponsors and clubs; 
while others were intrinsic to Zhuanye sport, such as those between the 
national and provincial SADs. Utilising the 2008 Olympics as an opportunity 
to promote Juguo Tizhi that was in line with the interest of Zhuanye sport, the 
policy makers identified collective ideology, represented by “the whole 
country as one entity”, as the principle to ease potential conflicts among these 
interests.  
Along with the restatement of Juguo Tizhi, a reforming feature, deepening the 
reform of elite sport system, was also included in the title of the first measures. It 
was accordingly indicated that: 
… Continuously pushing on and refining the reform of governance systems of 
sport, clarifying the Administration Centres’ relationship with provincial 
sport department and Sport Associations; all Centres should strengthen their 
own development, establish and refine scientific working mechanisms and 
reasonable rules and regulations, and continuing to explore the independence 
of Sport Associations.  
GAS, 2002, p. 1 
According to the previous analysis of the 1993 Policy, there are four aspects of 
the reform of Chinese sport that are related to elite sport. However, only the 
content concerning the reform of the administrative governance system was 
included here. We would argue that this is because, on the one hand, the 
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reform of the training system and the competition system were emphasised in 
other sections. On the other hand, the absence of professionalisation is also 
sensible, given the limited importance Chinese professional sports in the 
Olympic strategy. 
Moreover, the Centres were clearly identified as the principal institution in 
the above quotation. As we previously argued, the Centres, regarded as 
‘state-owned enterprises’ in essence, had significantly hindered the reform of 
the governance system (Zang 1998; Xiong et al. 2008). However, through 
employing “clarifying”, the authors conveyed the GAS’s attitude to the 
Centres as to refine, if not to reinforce, rather than to reform. It was also 
indicated that it was the Centres, but not any other institutions, that were to 
be in charge of “their own construction” and their prior duties, at least, in the 
era of 2001-2010. Thus, with the GAS’ power over the discourse of elite sport 
reform and the legitimisation of the Centres’ principal role in the reform, the 
power of Juguo Tizhi discourse, which were in line with the interests of 
Zhuanye Sport system, and the power of SADs’ over Chinese elite sport 
discourse were further enhanced. 
Xiong et al.’s (2008) ascribed this change in the statement of the 2001 
Summary, which significantly reinforced the power of the SADs, from three 
aspects: 
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a) it solidified the dominance of Juguo Tizhi and to ease problems 
provoked between Juguo Tizhi and professional sport; 
b) it realised the interests of SADs through providing satisfactory 
elite sport performance than developing mass sport; and, 
c) it ensured the realisation of the expectation of the government 
and Chinese society in terms of the performance in the Beijing 
Games. 
We would argue that this was essentially a consequence of the effectiveness of 
Juguo Tizhi in elite sport development and, more importantly, of the pressure 
for providing satisfactory performance at the Beijing Games. It was also 
explicitly acknowledged by the authors that  
Without Juguo Tizhi, there would be no-guarantee of [winning] gold medals, 
and the SAD would [thus] not be able to hand in a satisfactory ‘answer paper’ 
to its superior department and the general public… [This is important since] 
elite sport [, compared to mass sport,] can attain remarkable ‘political kudos’ 
in a short period of time through utilising the Olympics [as a showcase] 
Xiong et al., 2008, p.53 
Such pressure was recognised as an outcome of the Olympic expectation and 
of the interests of SADs, namely gaining political recognition via the Beijing 
Games. We would argue that these external and internal factors affected both 
GAS’s power over Chinese elite sport discourse and the power of the 
discourse concerning Olympic performance in 2008, which jointly led to and 
endorsed the restatement of Juguo Tizhi. This is to say that the GAS was able 
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to reemphasise Juguo Tizhi because of its power over discourse. Juguo 
discourse was not only emphasised by GAS but also was empowered by the 
knowledge of the significance of the Beijing Games by the Chinese society. 
The GAS’s power over discourse was consistent with its role as the leading 
authority of Chinese sport, and could be regarded as the consequence of the 
Juguo Tizhi system. With the increase of the power of Juguo Tizhi discourse, 
the GAS as its leading authority was further empowered to given additional 
stress and protection of Juguo Tizhi for the Beijing Games. This proactive 
accentuation is in line with both the consensus of Chines society before the 
Beijing Games and the interests of Zhuanye sport system. Therefore, thanks to 
this ‘active promotion’ of Juguo Tizhi by the government, which was 
represented by the GAS, and the ‘voluntary compliance’ of Chinese society, 
when the 2008 Games were imminent, all discourses were turned down in 
Chinese elite sport except those of Juguo Tizhi.  
4.3.4.2 The addition of a moral code 
The other additional element in the 2001 Summary focused on the moral code 
and legal elements of Chinese elite sport, which was entitled “establishing and 
improving laws and regulation, promote sport ethical development”. It was stated: 
[We should] enhance the comprehensive administration over sportsmanship 
and discipline in competitions, establish and refine related laws and 
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regulations, increase punishment in response to rule violation. [We should] 
Firmly resist misbehaviour, such as deception, disruption to competition 
regulations, disorder in the arenas etc., in order to protect fairness and justice 
in sport. … 
[We should] strengthen the administration and ideological education of 
referees, [we should] refine the regulation of registration, training, assessment, 
selection and rewards and sanctions [of referees], [we should] improve the 
professional quality and lecturing ability [of referees], [we should] promote 
professional ethics and dedication [on the part of referees], in order to ensure 
that they can literally make accurate, fair and justice decisions. 
GAS, 2002, p. 1 
The policy statement in this section was straightforward, and was consistent 
with the statement in the section on guiding theory and principles, in which 
legal aspects were one of the only three elements. It could be argued that 
legislation and ethical elements, such as the “punishment” for 
“misbehaviour”, would further complement the power of the SADs or other 
authorities for the preparation of the 2008 Games. 
Though the regulations for athletes indicated in the policy statement mainly 
focused on misbehaviour within competition, the addition of this section was 
interpreted as a move to ease conflicts between individual and collective 
interests that led to these incidents. It was stated by Xiong et al. (2008, p.99) 
that: 
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Firstly, since Olympic champions have been ‘worshiped’ by the society, there 
have been a small number of them ‘individually involved with commercial 
activities’, which negatively affected the stability of Olympic teams and the 
implementation of Olympic strategy; 
Secondly, there are redundant talents in those sports that China is leading, 
this situation results in some athletes not being able to deal in an appropriate 
manner with ‘the decision of the organisation’ concerning the Olympic 
qualification and [the decision as to who should win] Olympic gold medals, 
which negatively affected the public image of Chinese elite sport; 
Thirdly, Chinese elite sport has been lacking in preparation in terms of 
legislation and regulation, [resulting in] conflicts between sport departments 
and athletes about [interests or] the distribution of benefits, which have 
subsequently hindered the strategic deployment of related sport departments. 
Fourthly, there are serious issues about elite athletes’ unsatisfactory or even 
illegal behaviours in professional sports, which have had considerable negative 
impacts on Chinese elite sport, especially professional sport. 
The purpose of adding moral and legislative content to the 2001 Policy was 
largely to address the conflicts of interests between individuals and a number 
of collective elements. These collective elements include the “Olympic team”, 
“the decision of the organisation”, “the public image of Chinese elite sport”, 
etc. We would argue that this interpretation reflects a strong collectivist 
perspective, which, firstly, was conveyed through portraying institutional 
phenomena and collective values as the ‘victim’ of such conflicts, for instance, 
in “[interests or] the distribution of benefits”. Secondly, individual activities 
were associated with a number of terms with negative meanings employed, 
such as “hinder”, “negative effect” and “not able to have the appropriate 
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attitude”, which framed the promotion of interests of the individual as 
‘misbehaviour’. Additionally, the authors also marginalised these activities as 
behaviours of minorities at individual level, by “a small number of” athletes, 
and at the sport level through explicit links to professional sport, which was 
complementary to the Olympic strategy and was excluded from the 2001 
Summary. 
The authors associated most of the misbehaviours with their potential 
negative impact on the strategy of Chinese elite sport and on Olympic 
performance. However, only those within professional sports were not linked 
to the Olympic strategy. It could be argued that this, on the one hand, 
reflected the authors’ knowledge of the remote relation between professional 
sports and Olympic performance. On the other hand, the authors also 
suggested that the essential purpose of the addition of moral code and legal 
elements was to protect Olympic performance. This purpose coincided with 
the statement of the regulation of the commercial activities of elite athletes 
published in 2006. This stated that:   
Under the circumstances of the socialist market economy, the administration 
of athletes in the national teams is faced with a new environment, [there are] 
also some new problems in terms of the way in which the direction and 
management of athletes’ commercial activities is reinforced. If these problems 
cannot be resolved effectively and in time, it would affect the training and 
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[results in] competitions and greatly disturb the administration of national 
teams.  
GAS, 2006, p.1 
We would argue that via the addition of the moral code and legal elements in 
the 2001 Summary, the power of SADs was enhanced in elite sport 
administration, especially in relation to its fight against individualism. The 
collective values rooted in the socialist ideology, which have been emphasised 
in Chinese elite sports, were hence further accentuated in Chinese elite sport 
discourse and protected during the preparation for the Beijing Games. This is 
to say, taking the scenarios in the previous quotation from Xiong et al. (2008), 
that the “organisational decisions” which deal with redundant elite athletes 
would be accepted more readily by those who were identified as redundant; 
that the Olympic strategy, which is the political task of the SAD, would be 
well implemented; that the Olympic team, which would realise the Olympic 
strategy, would be more stable; in addition, that the illegal behaviour of 
professional athletes would be regulated.  
Additionally, the regulation over, and conservative attitude towards, 
individualism can also be noticed in the changes of other elements of the 
policy statement in the 2001 Summary. For instance, in the 1994 Summary, 
besides giving an indication of the routine incentive to elite athletes, 
contained a special statement about promoting the contribution and values of 
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the individual: 
While [we are] strictly administering and educating [athletes], [we] should 
popularise the value and contribution of sport stars, increasing [their] social 
awareness, those who performed outstandingly deserve big rewards from the 
country.  
This type of narrative was however abandoned in the 2001 Summary. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Through our analytic description of the historical development of Chinese 
elite sport discourse, including statements of policy, the narrative constructed 
through policy statements and related interpretation, we would argue that the 
interest of SADs has been promoted and privileged in Chinese elite sport 
policy while other interests were embraced during the introduction of other 
stakeholders (such as sponsors and others representing professional sport 
interests) into the Chinese elite sport system.  
While arguing for the increase of the power of Juguo Tizhi prior to the Beijing 
Games, it is important to remind ourselves of the function of the power over 
Chinese elite sport discourse and its impact on the development of Chinese 
elite sport. The power over discourse regulated not only the dominant topics 
that should be talked about in Chinese elite sport before the Beijing Games. 
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For instance, Olympic performance, national glory, etc.; but also the dominant 
way of talking, such as, the superiority of socialism, and collectivism; as well 
as, practically, the prioritised means of achieving these goals, namely Juguo 
Tizhi and Zhuanye sport. Meanwhile, these examples of power over 
discourse also included evidence of the influence of the general trend in 
Chinese society, namely of economic reform and opening-up. This ‘external’ 
theme was so powerful that related discursive elements had to be included 
within elite sport discourse, even though they were regarded as challenges to 
Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport. The Minister of Sport’s speech before the 
Beijing Games provides a good illustration of the power of such external 
discourse, in which there were direct indications of commercial and 
market-oriented elements, albeit superficial. In addition, the external political 
power over discourse not only ensured the inclusion of reformist elements in 
the policy statement or official discourse, but also legitimised social actors’ 
interpretation, more precisely disputation, over Chinese elite sport policy e.g. 
the criticisms within reform discourse of the structural defects of Juguo Tizhi. 
Thus, on the one hand, given the considerable reformist power, which was 
consistent with and endorsed by political actors in Chinese society, the GAS 
had to not only face challenging reform discourses, but also to include certain 
reformist features in the policy statement even when the Beijing Games was 
imminent. On the other hand, we would also argue that the power of reform 
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discourse in terms of Chinese elite sport was limited in the pre-2008 era due 
to the significance of the 2008 Games for Chinese elite sport and to the 
country as a whole. In other words, although other discourses, especially 
challenging ones, were included in the Chinese elite sport policy statement 
prior to the 2008 Games, Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport still dominated in 
Chinese elite sport, which, however, was the target of the reform. This 
dominance was not just safeguarded and privileged by the GAS, but was 
promoted by the Chinese government and Chinese society. This was due to 
the faith in, or knowledge of, Juguo Tizhi which was portrayed as the most 
effective means of elite sport development. It was indicated by Zhang (2009, 
p.43) that 
Before the Beijing Games, it is the maintenance and improvement of elite sport 
performance that is the most important task of the GAS. Since China has had 
glorious victories in elite sport in the last several Olympic Games, which was 
guaranteed by Juguo Tizhi, no one would dare to initiate reform of Juguo 
Tizhi during such a special period of time, only Kafkaesque articles that are 
about refining and improving Juguo Tizhi have been regularly published. Till 
now, the core issue of Chinese sport reform, the ‘monopolistic’ elite sport 
system that has been solely run by the state has not yet been shaken at all. 
In the above interpretation of the relationship among the Beijing Games, the 
Chinese sport reform and Chinese elite sport discourse, it was indicated that 
the GAS, as the leading department of the monopolistic state-run elite sport 
system, has maintained its dominant power within Chinese elite sport and 
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over Chinese elite sport discourse after all these years of reform. This 
dominance ensured that the “the most important task of the GAS” and its 
interests were prioritised in Chinese elite sport. Juguo Tizhi, as we previously 
argued, was thus protected and privileged, and discourse related to Juguo 
Tizhi was also promoted as the most dominant Chinese elite sport discourse.   
The identity of other stakeholders promoting elite sport reform was also 
indirectly indicated in the above quotation, none of whom, however, “dare[d] 
to promote [the initiation of] reforming Juguo Tizhi during this particular 
period of time”. We would argue that the silence of reform discourse, 
superficially, relates to the argument of the GAS’s power over discourse. This 
is to say that given there was no other stakeholder who had greater power 
over Chinese elite sport discourse, none could therefore have made reform 
discourse ‘speak’ louder during the preparation for the Beijing Games. 
Additionally, the author also indirectly portrays the overwhelming power of 
Juguo Tizhi and related discourse in this period before the Beijing Games, 
which was a product of the significance of the Beijing Games to Chinese 
society. This power was internalised by stakeholders in Chinese elite sport, 
especially the advocates of elite sport reform. It was the political and social 
significance of the Beijing Games which made the pre-2008 era “a special 
period of time” and the internalisation of such power ensured that “no one 
‘dared’ to” challenge the dominance of Juguo Tizhi. In addition, coinciding 
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with the ‘superficial’ statement of reform discourse in the 2001 Summary, it 
was also suggested by Zhang that the reforming trend of Chinese society still 
affected Chinese elite sport discourse. Nonetheless, this influence was 
affected by the social and political expectations for the Beijing Games and 
reform discourse was distorted through the prism of “Kafkaesque articles 
about refining and improving Juguo Tizhi”.  
Nevertheless, it is crucial to bear in mind that though power is normally 
viewed as constraining, it is also enabling or productive, which, as Foucault 
argues, “induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse”(Foucault 
1980b, p.119 cited by Hall, 2001, p.77). For instance, the power over discourse 
was utilised by the GAS and Chinese government to endorse the dominance 
of Juguo Tizhi in the Chinese elite sport discourse, which eventually 
contributed to the exceptional success of Chinese athletes in the Beijing 
Games. Additionally, in the scenario of elite sport reform, it was the influence 
of power external to elite sport that ensured that the reform discourse was 
still included in the 2001 Summary, albeit only in section titles in the pre-2008 
era, and gave Zhang (2009, p.47) the hope that “all kinds of reformist forces 
will converge in 2008, [and] the end of the Beijing Games will open the 
curtains for another round of the reform of Chinese sport”.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Chinese Olympic Discourse and Chinese Elite Sport 
Development in the Pre-2008 Era 
In the previous chapter, we investigated the development of Chinese elite 
sport policy from its first reforming policy (from 1986) to the periodic 
strategic guidelines for elite sport development covering the 2008 Beijing 
Games. We also examined different interpretations concerning the policy 
discourse and implementations. We therefore argued that different interests 
were promoted in the different discourse of/about policy, within which there 
were a number of conflicts. These conflicts within policy discourses reflected 
the clashes between different interests that emerged along with the reform of 
Chinese society and of Chinese elite sport. Nonetheless, the policy narrative 
of these Chinese elite sport policies not only constructed the fundamental 
logic underlying the ‘theory’ of Chinese elite sport development, but also 
reflected the dominant power of the GAS over Chinese elite sport discourse. 
Following this logic and the main theme of Chinese elite sport, namely Juguo 
Tizhi and ‘Olympic glory’, the projected outcome of the implementation of 
the Chinese elite sport policy (i.e. the dominance and reinforcement of Juguo 
Tizhi) was evidenced in the subsequent interpretation of policy as well as in 
the actual and exceptional performance of Chinese elite sport in the 2008 
Olympic Games.  
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The focus of this pre-2008 discourse analysis chapter is on relationships 
between the Chinese Olympic discourse and the development of Chinese elite 
sport in the pre-2008 era. We aim to further scrutinise the interaction between 
the Chinese portrayal of the Olympics and the pre-2008 development of 
Chinese elite sport, to inspect the way in which power relationships within 
Chinese elite sport were being constructed and influenced by the Chinese 
Olympic discourse and vice versa.  
In terms of Chinese Olympic discourse, we examine those elements which are 
related to the Olympic Games, as the major target of our investigation, and 
also address those concerning the Olympic movement. However, this is not to 
say that we are attempting to reduce the Chinese Olympic discourse merely 
to those elements concerning the Games per se. The reason for doing this is 
two-fold. Firstly, it is clear that the Olympic Games, and more precisely the 
performance in, and the competitions of, the Olympic Games, are 
overwhelmingly accentuated in Chinese Olympic discourse. In terms of social 
consensus, as D. Xiong (2002, p.10) describes it, “it is natural that Chinese 
people, even sport personnel and media… regard the Olympic [movement] 
merely as a sport competition, as winning gold medals, which is a superficial 
understanding”. 
Secondly, the focus of this research, i.e. Chinese elite sport, closely relates to 
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the elite sport system’s Olympic performance. For instance, in terms of elite 
sport policies, as we argued in the previous chapter, Olympic performances 
have been historically emphasised by the political leaders and in policy 
statement as the primary goal, portrayed as the political task of Chinese elite 
sport, and thus prioritised by the policy makers.  
Hence, the main part of the Chinese Olympic discourse that we review relates 
to the Chinese interpretation of the Olympic Games and Olympic 
performance, while the Chinese discourse on the Olympic movement is also 
embraced in the analysis but is given significantly less weight (as it is in the 
documents, speeches and commentaries concerning Chinese elite sport 
themselves).  
5.1 The Chinese Discourse on the Olympics  
5.1.1 The ‘extrinsic’ function of the Olympics  
As a phenomenon exogenous to Chinese society, not only the Olympic Games, 
but also modern sport has been portrayed as a multi-functional social 
phenomenon, and emphasised more often for its extrinsic social functions 
rather than for its own sake. For example, D. Xiong (2002, p.10) argues that: 
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The various functions of sport have been well known to sport academics…in 
fact the intrinsic functions of sport are educating, [promoting] well-being and 
entertaining, which is common to all types of sports. Other social functions, 
such as political, economic, cultural etc., which are normally discussed, shall 
be regarded as extrinsic functions. Hosting the Olympics in Beijing is a 
favourable circumstance to fully utilise these functions of sport, and is also a 
platform on which sport will show what it is capable of.  
As we previously demonstrated in the literature review, the “extrinsic 
functions” of modern sport, especially the political ones, have been 
accentuated since it was introduced to, and accepted by, Chinese society in 
the early 20th century. Chinese Olympic discourse has also embraced this 
feature of emphasising “extrinsic functions”, such as national revival that was 
well-known to Chinese society as the three Olympic questions asked in a 
Chinese newspaper article in 1908 (Xu 2008; Brownell 2008). In the history of 
the PRC, the political significance and function of the Olympic Games has 
also been recognised and stressed by PRC leaders since the then three-year 
old regime sent its first Olympic delegation to Helsinki in 1952 (Wu 1999). 
Thus, Xiong’s portrayal of the Beijing Games as an opportunity for “fully 
utilising these functions” indirectly emphasises the extrinsic functions of the 
Beijing Games to Chinese society.   
The political elements in the Chinese Olympic discourse are not only reflected 
in the portrayal of the political implications of participating in the Games, but 
are also manifested in the interpretation of the Chinese Olympic movement. 
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For instance, in D. Xiong’s (2002, p.10) statement concerning domestic 
Olympic education and the Olympic movement, national political interest is 
emphasised as the top concern in the Olympic movement in China. It is stated 
that:   
We experienced a 27-year conflict with the IOC fighting about the 
“two-Chinas” [issue], during which it was obviously impossible to promote 
the Olympic movement [in China], let alone to have Olympic education [in 
China], therefore it is natural that Chinese people, even sport personnel and 
media have not had abundant knowledge about the Olympic [movement] … 
Till now, most of them still regard the Olympic [movement] merely as a sport 
competition, for winning gold medals, which is a superficial understanding. 
D. Xiong, 2002, p. 10 
In the above quotation, the political conflict between the PRC and the IOC on 
the status of the PRC and Taiwan in the international Olympic movement is 
identified as the main factor, if not the sole factor, that caused a split between 
the PRC and the international Olympic movement but as a consequence also 
hindered the development of Olympic education in mainland China. Through 
elaborating the impact of the political conflicts, the author suggests that the 
guarantee of the national interests of China in the international Olympic 
movement was a condition of the PRC’s involvement with the international 
Olympic movement and thus also of the promotion of domestic Olympic 
education.  
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This prioritisation of the political interests is consistent with what Ma (2005, 
p.30) argues, “Chinese Olympic policy is an important part of the diplomatic 
policy of China. Diplomacy relates to core national interests, to which sport 
affairs [therefore] have to be subordinate and serve”. In both quotations from 
D. Xiong (2002) and Ma (2005), the Chinese government’s influence on the 
Chinese Olympic movement is embraced, or more precisely internalised, as 
the condition and premise of the Chinese Olympic movement. This political 
feature of the Chinese Olympic discourse is reflected, for example, in the 
political connotation of the ‘two China issue’ and in the notion of “Olympic 
policy as a diplomatic policy” 
The political implications of the Olympic movement and Olympic Games are 
often directly and positively stated in government documents, and portrayed 
as an essential motivation for China’s involvement with the international 
Olympic movement. For instance, the 1994 Summary states that  
With its unique attractiveness, the modern Olympic Movement attracts all 
countries around the world to participate; promoting the Olympic ideology 
and advocating the Olympic spirit [in China] are beneficial for stimulating the 
opening-up of our country and its international communication. 
SPCSC, 1995a, p. 1 
Similarly, the 2001 Summary comments 
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Winning the bid of the 2008 Games is another great opportunity of Chinese 
sport development, and will have significant impact on the economic and 
social development [of China] in the new century, on the establishment of an 
‘all-dimensional’, multi-tiered and wide-ranging ‘opening-up’ of our country, 
as well as on enhancing its international status. 
(GAS 2002, p.1) 
While the 2002 publication, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State 
Council's Guidelines for Further Strengthening and Improving Sporting Affairs in 
the New Era comments,    
Winning the bid of the 2008 Games fully reflects the great accomplishments 
that have been achieved through the reform and opening-up, and will have 
significant impact on the economic and social development [of China] in the 
new century, on the establishment of an all-dimensional, multi-tiered and 
wide-ranging opening-up, as well as on enhancing its international status.  
It is a mutual duty of all Party members, governments at various levels and 
Chinese people of all ethnicities to seize the opportunity and accept the 
challenge [of the Beijing Games], to try their best to make the 2008 Olympic 
Games the most outstanding Olympics in history… in order to promote the 
development of the socialist material progress, and cultural and ethical 
progress, of our country. 
The Central Committee of the CPC, 2002, p. 1 
The political implications of the Olympic movement are emphasised in all of 
these three quotations from key elite sport policy publications by the GAS 
and the core of the PRC regime. We would further argue that these official 
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discourses not only stress the political function of the Olympics, but also 
indirectly regulate the means for realising this function. In the three 
quotations, the term “Olympic movement” is only mentioned in the first, 
while the other two focus explicitly on the Beijing 2008 Games. This is not 
only evidenced in the quoted policy statement. The term “Olympic movement” 
is absent in the statement of the two documents from which the last three 
quotations are taken. In these two important documents, the term “Olympic” 
is only mentioned once without being linked with terms such as ‘Games’ or 
‘strategy’. It is in the 2001 Summary that it is stated “[we should] utilise the 
opportunity of the Beijing Games… to energetically promote the Olympic 
spirit, [in order to] make the whole society emphasise and support the 
Olympic strategy”. The choice of terms in the policy statement, as we see, 
indirectly identifies Olympic performance as the officially recognised means 
for realising the political implications of the Olympics, and also reflects the 
impact of winning the bid for the 2008 Games on Chinese Olympic discourse. 
In other words, due to the significance of the Beijing Games to the Chinese 
government, the focus and perspective of the discursive construction of the 
Olympics, at least in Chinese elite sport discourse, reflected the government’s 
power over discourse even when the Games was still 6 years away. 
It is worth emphasising that this suggests neither that the discourse of the 
2008 Games had replaced all other Olympic discourses in China after 2001, 
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nor that the political implications of the Olympic Games had been the sole 
motive on the part of the PRC government for hosting it. However, we would 
argue that the political features, and the focus, of the Chinese Olympic 
discourse do reflect the Chinese government’s emphasis on the political 
implications of the Olympic Games rather than on the general Olympic 
movement and matters such as Olympic values. At discourse level, the official 
emphasis reflects the government’s preference among the ‘extrinsic functions’ 
of the Games, and structures the way in which the key impact of the 2008 
Games should be constructed in Chinese elite sport discourse. At a practical 
level, it increased the significance of the Olympic Games per se and thus of 
Olympic performance, especially the performance of 2008 Games, as the 
premier political task for Chinese elite sport. 
Besides the optimistic and positive portrayal of the impact and political 
function of the Olympics in the policy statement, the negative side is normally 
stated immediately afterwards, reflecting a dialectical materialist style of 
discussion with roots in the Marxist origin of the PRC regime. To contrast 
with the explicit acknowledgement upholding the national interests and 
political features in the positive portrait, the negative influence is usually 
stated in vague terms at least publicly, for example, portraying the 2008 
Games as “a rare historical opportunity, as well as a new challenge” (The 
Central Committee of the CPC 2002, p.1). 
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In the Discussion on the Olympic Policy of China, Ma (2005, p.30) provides 
further details of both the potential positive and negative political impacts of 
the Beijing Games on China, stating that: 
Hosting the 2008 Games in Beijing … we will be able to have more 
communication with the IOC, IFs and NOCs… to make more friends… to 
strive for greater political, diplomatic and sporting achievements. The … 
challenges are that the increase of interaction between our country and other 
political and sport organisations may result in more problems and conflicts. 
Therefore, we have to hold the dialectical materialist and historical materialist 
stance, in order to understand, maintain and develop the Olympic policy of 
our country, [we have to] analyse and adjust relevant policies for the Beijing 
Olympiad as soon as possible.  
Ma, 2005, p. 30 
In terms of the challenging effect of the Games discussed in Ma’s statement, a 
protective attitude is constructed through employing a number of 
conservative terms, such as “have to hold”, “in order to … maintain”. The 
defensive perspective is consistent with the construction of the identities of 
different parties included in the statement. For example, international 
organisations are portrayed as those with whom China would have “more 
problems and conflicts” if more interactions between the two parties took 
place. By contrast, the mainstream political ideology of the PRC, represented 
by the terms “dialectical materialist and historical materialist”, is emphasised 
as the basic point that should be protected in these potential 
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‘problem-provoking’ interactions associated with the opportunity of hosting 
the 2008 Olympic Games. We may argue that the conservative tone and terms 
illustrate the nature of political movement that Ma suggests, i.e. “analyse and 
adjust relevant policies for the Beijing Olympiad”, which is to deal with the 
greater occurrence of “problems and conflicts”. In other words, from a 
negative perspective, Ma’s prediction of the potential challenges in the Beijing 
Games and the ‘defensive’ suggestions emphasises the political implication of 
the Beijing Games and ultimately promotes the political interests of the 
socialist regime. 
The Beijing Games are also portrayed as a diplomatic opportunity in the 
above quotation. The potential political and diplomatic achievements are 
identified as the objectives, for the achievement of which China should strive 
equally, if not primarily, as it should do for the objective of sporting 
performance. The Minister of Sport identifies this ‘diplomatic mission’ of 
Chinese elite sport as “the positive tradition”, stating that:  
International interaction has been increasing while the [Beijing] Olympics are 
approaching…. Following the positive tradition of [Chinese] sport 
diplomacy … [We should] make diplomatic affairs in sport a showcase of the 
image of China as a peaceful rising country, while creating a good 
international environment for the battle preparation [for the Beijing Games].  
P. Liu, 2008, p. 1 
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The imminence of the Beijing Games is identified as the backdrop for Liu’s 
stress of the diplomatic mission of Chinese elite sport to the high-profile sport 
officials, who were the audience for this speech in the 2008 All State Sports 
Minister Conference. Normalising the diplomatic function of Chinese elite 
sport as its “positive tradition”, which refers for example to China’s 
‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’, the Minister of Sport indirectly assigns this 
diplomatic function to the Beijing Games, as a Chinese elite sport event.  
To summarise, the accentuation of the political function of the Olympics, 
especially the 2008 edition, is consistent with extrinsic function that has been 
assigned to modern sport in China since its initial introduction in the country. 
This feature is not only reflected in the official Chinese Olympic discourse, 
but also manifested in the interpretation of Chinese elite sport by external 
commentators. The national interest is ultimately promoted in the Chinese 
Olympic discourse as a goal for realising its political function. The elements 
relating to the socialist character of the regime are also embraced in the 
promotion of the national interest and portrayal of the Olympics. 
It is worth noting that due to the importance of the socialist character of 
China, we choose to leave further investigation of its function in, and impacts 
on, Chinese Olympic discourse and elite sport discourse to section 1.3. We 
now turn to the other two major political features of the Chinese Olympic 
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discourse, namely nationalism and patriotism. 
5.1.2 Nationalism and Patriotism  
Nationalism and Patriotism51 are the other two major features of the Chinese 
Olympic discourse. Both are viewed as intrinsic features of the Chinese 
Olympic movement (Brownell 2008; Dong & Mangan 2008; Xu 2008).  
A typical Chinese Olympic discourse constructing the linkage between 
western Olympism and the Chinese nation is the notion of the “Olympic 
dream” of China. Since the notion of ‘the three Olympic questions’ was raised 
                                                 
51 In their encyclopaedia, Nations and Nationalism, Herb and Kaplan (2008, p.xi) view 
nationalism as “the process that defines, creates, and expresses the essential loyalty … 
holding people’s allegiance … to a nation”. Bairner (2008, p.998) indicates that the nationalist 
elements in sport, such as representing one’s nation in international event, are closely related 
to cultural nationalism. This is especially evident in relation to the political dispute between 
the Mainland China and Taiwan, ‘nationalism’ and ‘national identity’ could be more 
appropriate terms to be associated with Olympic discourse in the Chinese context than 
‘nationality’, to which the respective sides of the Taiwan Strait ascribe, even though these 
concepts, to a degree, overlap with one another. And Patriotism, which sometimes is 
relatively politically influenced, is also evidenced in the sport domain, for example, in the 
desire to express national identity. In their paper on Chinese nationalism, Lewis and Teets 
(2008) state that patriotism is consistently employed by the communist regime, due to a 
concern with the ethnic denotation of the concept of nationalism, which would have a 
negative impact on the minority ethnicities. The government also promotes the concept of 
“Chinese nationalism”, which is associated with the idea of unifying the various ethnicities in 
China with political criteria and vague cultural principles (Lewis and Teets, 2008). 
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in 1908, the Olympic Games has been constructed as a “dream” or a “wish” of 
all Chinese people, associated with the idea of national rejuvenation (Xu 2008; 
Yi 2008). Yuan Weimin’s (2001, p.1) speech celebrating the success of the 
Beijing Olympic bid provides a good example of not only the Olympic dream 
discourse but also the politicisation of ‘the dream’, in which he states that  
Hosting an Olympic Games in China is a dream of generations of Chinese 
people, and is also a common wish of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. As early 
as the 1950s, and 1960s, the leaders of the Party and the country had 
repeatedly stated that China would host an Olympic Games. The Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai52 argued in 1959 that China should host an Olympic 
Games in the future. …..  
Yuan also reminds the audience that this suggestion or aspiration was 
repeated by Deng Xiaoping in February 1972, and again in July 1990, and he 
went on to argue,  
 … Now, we are able to give consolation to the older generations of 
revolutionaries that under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee with 
Comrade Jiang Zemin at the core, thanks to the endeavours of Chinese people 
and BOBICO as well as the support and understanding of the IOC members 
and international community, Beijing was finally awarded the 2008 Olympic 
Games.  
                                                 
52 The first PM of the PRC, serving the country since it was established in October 1949 till his 
death in January 1976. 
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In the short quotation from the speech of the then Minister of Sport, hosting 
an Olympic Games is portrayed not only as a national dream which has lasted 
for generations, but also an expectation of the political leaders of the PRC. It 
could also be argued that due to the explicit indication of the date, i.e. 1950s, 
the relationship between those KMT politicians of the Republic of China (the 
Olympic delegation of which is officially known as Chinese Taipei) and the 
realisation of the national dream was ‘suppressed’. Through quoting 
statements of the top PRC leaders, Yuan emphasises the role of these political 
leaders in the ‘realisation of the Olympic dreams’, legitimising this goal, and 
subtly mixes their identity with ‘the Chinese people’ in terms of the Olympic 
dream. These politicians then represent, if not replace, the Chinese people as 
those who have finally been able to realise the Olympic dream, and thus the 
Olympic goals of the older generation of revolutionaries have finally been 
met. This transformation of the subjects of the Olympic dream, manifested a 
way in which a nationalist discourse, i.e. the realisation of Chinese Olympic 
dream, is seen as synonymous with the Party’s Olympic dream, and is 
therefore utilised as an endorsement of the regime. This is similar to the 
function of the statement that credited the 2008 Games to “the great 
accomplishment that has been achieved in the reform and opening-up of 
society” (The Central Committee of the CPC, 2002, p. 1), reflecting the 
political power over Olympic discourse exerted by the regime, regulating the 
way in which the Chinese Olympic dream should be interpreted and to 
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whom the achievement should be credited.  
In the same event, the speech made by He Zhenliang (2001), the honorary 
president of the Chinese Olympic Committee and an honorary member of the 
IOC, provides another example of the nationalist Chinese Olympic dreams 
discourse. He states that: 
When the IOC president Juan Samaranch announced that the 29th Olympic 
Games was awarded to Beijing, I felt that the wish had finally been fulfilled. 
Hosting an Olympic Games in the land of China is not only my personal wish, 
but also a long-time aspirtion of the Chinese people… 
When Wu Ching-kuo, the IOC member from Chinese Taipei, hugged me, tears 
were steaming down our faces. He said to me that “this is the first time for 
Chinese people to host the Olympic Games for more than 100 years, I am so 
exultant, I am so thrilled, our mutual wish is realised.” I believe there were 
more excited Chinese people than just the two of us, who had tears down their 
faces, including those from Taiwan, from Hong Kong and Macau, and from all 
around the world…. 
In the media conference after the result was announced … I felt that it was my 
duty to make the whole world be aware of my thoughts, [so that] I replied in 
English: “I am proud of my homeland, I am proud of my people”. 
He, 2001, p. 1 
Through comparing the construction of Olympic dream in He and Yuan’s 
account of the successful bid for the 2008 Games, we would argue that the 
quoted speech of He is made in a way that has less connection to the socialist 
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feature of the PRC than those of Yuan. For example, the concept of the 
“Chinese Olympic dream” indicated in He’s speech is extended not only 
beyond the history of the PRC, but also beyond the geographic territory of the 
regime. In spite of the disputed status of the ROC and Taiwan, the mutual 
Olympic dream of “Chinese people … all around the world” is described in 
terms of Chinese culture, ethnicity or nation, rather than the border of either 
of the regimes with ‘China’ in their name.   
It is worth noting that in terms of the cultural and ethnic definition of Chinese 
people in the above quotation, language is utilised as the criterion regulating 
the knowledge or defining the ‘Chinese nation’, and constructing a “we” 
identity. We may argue that this is done in two steps. Firstly, in the second 
part of the above quotation, with the direct quotation from Mr Wu and the 
indication of his identity as the IOC member from Chinese Taipei, it is 
naturally and wordlessly implied that the conversation was made in Chinese. 
Then, through generalising their emotion during the conversation as a mutual 
feeling of Chinese “all around the world” at that time, the language is 
naturally implied and constructed as a key reaction shared by Chinese “all 
around the world” and which thus provides a vehicle for all Chinese to 
express their exultant emotion. 
Secondly, in contrast to the definition of Chinese, the world, to which He 
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spoke, is explicitly linked to another language, i.e. English, in the third part of 
the above quotation. Through noting that “I replied in English”, the foreign 
language is portrayed as the vehicle for communicating with the rest of the 
world about the mutual emotion conveyed between Wu and He in Chinese 
language and shared by the Chinese people. This is to say that, on the one 
hand, the “Olympic dream” discourse reflects and reproduces the significance 
of the Olympic movement to Chinese people; on the other hand, especially in 
the pre-2008 era, the “Olympic dream” discourse was employed to a certain 
degree to construct the national identity of Chinese people. 
Besides the portrait of the Olympic Games as a national “Olympic dream”, it 
is also well recognised as a “part of the project to reinsert China into an 
international narrative of history and progress” (Morris 2004, p.3). As 
previously indicated, modern sport was introduced to China accompanied by 
the idea of national restoration, when China was at one of its most crucial and 
dangerous moments in its modern history (Brownell 2008). Compared to 
traditional Chinese physical culture, modern sport was regarded as a ‘new’ 
body culture related to warlike spirit and national survival at that time (Xu 
2008; Gu 1997). This characteristic of re-establishment of the Chinese national 
identity and national restoration is thus normally evidenced in Chinese 
Olympic discourse. For example, in He’s (2004, p.3) statement concerning the 
impact of the Beijing Games in China, he claims that:  
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The success of the Beijing Olympic Games will greatly revive national spirit 
and reinforce national cohesion, which will generate boundless energy for [the 
development of Chinese society]… 
Hosting an Olympic Games in China …will make the world gain better 
understanding of China, of the Chinese nation’s sprit of continuous 
self-improvement, and the Chinese nation’s obsessive pursuit of [being capable 
of] standing among other powerful nations… 
Straightforwardly, the term of “national spirit” is mentioned in both 
quotations, and is portrayed as the beneficiary of the Beijing Games in terms 
of domestic and international impact. Following the connotation of modern 
sport in national revival terms in China, there are a number of terms with 
progressing and developing meanings employed in these quotations. These 
terms, such as “generating boundless energy for [development]”, “continuous 
self-improvement”, and “pursuit of standing among other powerful nations”, 
reflect the connotation of the national revival of China embraced in the 
Chinese Olympic discourse.  
The effect of the Beijing Games in terms of the restoration of China is 
suggested from both domestic and international aspects in the above 
quotation. It could be argued that there is a slight difference between the two 
facets. In terms of the re-establishment of the international status of China, 
“hosting a Games in Beijing” per se is portrayed as the sufficient condition for, 
and the trigger of, a positive global impact for China. However, the domestic 
impact of the Beijing Games, especially in terms of its political significance of 
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national restoration, is explicitly linked to the “success” of the Games. 
Although the concept of “success” can be interpreted from a number of 
perspectives, it is argued that this subtle difference in He’s discourse suggests 
the importance of having a ‘successful’ Olympic Games to Chinese society.  
Following D. Xiong’s (2002) criticism of the ‘superficial understanding’ of the 
Olympics in Chinese society, it could be argued that the notion of ‘success’ 
closely associates to ‘success in the Olympic stadium’. The significance of 
‘winning Olympic glory’ is therefore emphasised in political terms as an 
important, if not the important, means for Chinese elite sport to promote the 
restoration of China. It is emphasised by Liu Peng, the Minister of Sport, that: 
[In order to] develop harmonious sport, [we] must further develop our skills 
and [must] achieve great result in the Beijing Games. Elite sport has unique 
or even irreplaceable effects in increasing national cohesion and centripetal 
forces and in inspiring the national spirit… 
 P. Liu, 2007, p. 1 
It is incumbent upon us to strive for outstanding results in the Beijing 
Games… the performance of Chinese elite athletes will be a showcase of the 
national image and Chinese sport. 
P. Liu, 2008, p.1 
In the above two quotations from Liu’s speech at the annual conference of all 
state ministers of sport, the Minister of Sport details the political significance 
  201 
of the Beijing Games and Olympic performance. It is worth noting that in 
contrast to the traditional expression of “Olympic performance”, the 
achievement of “great results” and then “outstanding results in the Beijing 
Games” is emphasised by Liu as the responsibility of Chinese elite sport, 
suggesting an increase from the standard of merely ‘satisfactory’ Beijing 
Olympic performance. It could be argued that through portraying it as 
“incumbent” and linking it to the then-fashionable political term, 
‘harmonious society’, that was brought up by the core of the CPC in 2004, Liu 
portrays this increased standard as a compelling requirement that is 
associated with the top-tier political requirement despite the growing 
pressure this would bring. This relationship between the Olympics and the 
development of Chinese elite sport and the cumulative pressure reflected in 
Chinese elite sport discourse will be further discussed in subsequent sections.  
From the above analysis, it is evident that the Olympic Games and Olympic 
performance, especially the ‘successful’ Olympic performance, are imbued 
with significant political meanings in terms of national restoration and the 
re-establishment of the national identity in the Chinese context. This 
nationalist connotation of the Chinese Olympic discourse is evidenced not 
only in the statement of sport officials, but also from external discourses, for 
example: 
  202 
The Olympic medal ceremonies are obviously politically symbolic, [the 
symbolic meaning of] which is expressed through the raising of the national 
flags and the playing of the national anthem…when our athletes are standing 
on the top of the podium…as long as having the blood of Huaxia in his/her 
body, he/she will be excited about, and proud of being the descendants of Yan 
and Huang. [The Olympic] Gold medallists are usually regarded as national 
heroes (need discussion of this translation). This is to say, one successful 
Olympic Games per se. is a great resource for national identity education for 
[Chinese] nationals, and is [also] a great opportunity for strengthening 
national cohesion. From this point, it is argued that the effect of a successful 
Olympic Games on the construction of national society is irreplaceable in this 
inevitably special period due to reform and the opening-up process, in which 
there are confusions in social values.  
Tang, 2007, p. 20 
It is important to point out the two historical concepts employed in Tang’s 
statement, which extend the nationalist implication of Olympic glory as an 
element of the development of Chinese history and beyond the borders of 
both the PRC and ROC. “Huaxia” is a historical term originally relating to a 
union of tribes that were the ancestors of the Han Chinese, who represent 
more than 90% of the Chinese population (The Central People’s Government 
of the PRC 2006). The other historical reference is to “the descendants of Yan 
and Huang”. “Yan” and “Huang” are the names of the leaders of two tribes of 
the “Huaxia” people who fought against a mutual enemy (Cioffi-Revilla & Lai 
1995). Given “Zhongguo”(‘China’ in Chinese) usually refers to Mainland 
China, both of these two terms, at present, are mutually used in the PRC and 
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ROC representing the Chinese nation. We would argue that through explicitly 
linking the political implication of Olympic medal ceremonies with “the 
blood of Huaxia” and portraying gold medallists as “national heroes”, Tang 
extends the significance of Olympic victories, i.e. the political task of Chinese 
elite sport, from the political dimension to the nationalist dimension that 
embraces all Chinese people around world.  
Even though Tang argues for the effects of “a successful Olympic 
Games“ rather than “successful Olympic performance”, it is the Olympic 
victories that are inherently stressed in his interpretation of the significance of 
the Olympic Games in nationalist terms. Firstly, this emphasis on Olympic 
performance is consistent with the portrayal of the nationalist implication of 
Olympic victories in the previous quotation, and is associated with a number 
of terms implying successful performance such as the podium, national flag 
and anthem. Secondly, the argument concerning the effect of the Olympic 
Games in terms of establishing national identity is extended beyond the 2008 
Games, at least, to those Olympic Games in the “inevitable special period due 
to reform and opening-up”. Compared to the opportunity of hosting the 2008 
Olympic Games, there are relatively fewer criteria through which to evaluate 
the success of China in the Olympics as a participant except that of providing 
satisfactory performance. In other words, it is suggested that it is the character 
of Chinese society in the opening-up era, i.e. the inevitable “confusions in 
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social values”, that endorses the political significance of Olympic success that, 
in most cases, would be largely evaluated via Olympic performance. Thus, 
the requirement of Olympic performance is recognised and legitimised as a 
quest for the Chinese society rather than for the Zhuanye sport system. 
The importance of Olympic performance in nationalist and patriotic terms is 
also stressed from an international perspective. It is stated by Xiong & Zheng 
that: 
Although the termination of the Cold War has reduced the political opposition 
in the Olympics, political functions of the Olympic Games such as inspiring 
national spirit and [establishing] national identity are still the main reasons 
that governments of all countries participate in the Olympic movement. This 
is evidenced in the increased the investment by western developed countries in 
participating in the Olympic Games. It is impossible for us, as a giant 
developing-country that is rising, to stay out of the Olympic Games. 
X. Xiong & Zheng, 2007, p. 13 
In the above quotation, the authors legitimise the Chinese government’s 
involvement in developing the nationalist function of the Olympic Games 
from a global perspective. Firstly, through employing terms implying the 
activities of national governments, such as “the Cold War” and “investment 
by … countries”, and indicating the activities of “developed western 
countries”, national governments are portrayed as proactive actors and 
participants in the Olympic movement. Secondly, the development of the 
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political function of the Olympics in the nationalist dimension is identified as 
a common international practice in the global sphere. Given China cannot 
“stay out of the Olympic Games”, it is implied that this common practice of 
“developed western countries” in the international Olympic community 
should also be followed by the Chinese government. 
The features of nationalism and patriotism, especially the latter, are normally 
employed in the discourse related to the Olympic performance and the 
ideological education of elite athletes. If we, for example, consider the 
scenario of the speeches of Liu Peng in the 2007 and 2008 All States Sport 
Minister Conferences, in which the Minister of Sport states that: 
It is pointed out by comrades in the leading core [of the CPC] that, spiritual 
character… of [how] the Chinese female volleyball team and Chinese table 
tennis team worked tenaciously to win glory for the country … is the 
foundation of the [Chinese] elite sport to prepare for the battle of the 2008 
Games … the victory of the Long March53 was achieved by the Red Army due 
to their recalcitrant spirit under the tough conditions; preparing the battle of 
Olympic Games also needs the same recalcitrant spirit. 
                                                 
53 The Long March (October 1933-October 1935) was a military retreat of 9,000 km by the Red 
Amy, the CPC military force which was being chased by the KMT army (Zhang & Vaughan 
2002). It has been constantly used as a theme of propaganda, delineating the fighting spirit 
and spirit of stubborn determination under tough conditions of the Chinese people, a spirit 
accredited to the leadership of the CPC. 
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Winning glory for the country is the eternal topic of the ideological and 
political work of elite sport teams. Facing the Beijing Games, [we] have to 
make our athletes realise that winning glory for the State is not only a slogan, 
but also a heavy responsibility and an honourable mission. 
P. Liu, 2007, p. 1 
The construction of the ideology and the sportsmanship [and positive 
behaviour] of elite sport teams is as important as training… in the 
battle-preparation [for the 2008 Games]. All Centres … have to regard the 
education of patriotism…the honing of [an appopriate] mentality as important 
elements in the battle- preparation [for the 2008 Games].  
P. Liu, 2008, p.1 
In Liu’s statement, patriotism, as an element of the ideological education of 
Chinese athletes, is portrayed as a factor crucial to the preparation of the 2008 
Beijing Games. Thanks to the traditional ideological education and political 
portrait of Chinese elite sport, ‘winning glory for the country’ has been 
recognised as an innate and essential duty of Chinese elite sport. Chinese elite 
sport and athletes had thus been utilised and internalised as a metaphor of 
patriotism, such as in the case of the Chinese female volleyball team and 
Chinese table tennis team in the above quotation.  
The typical patriotic phrase, i.e. “winning glory for the country”, is not only 
linked with Chinese elite athletes, but also associated with political metaphors, 
such as the revolutionary spirit of the Red Army. Besides the notion of the 
Red Army, other revolutionary-spiritual concepts, such as “recalcitrant spirit” 
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and “working tenaciously to win glory for the country”, are also portrayed as 
essential content of the ideological education of Chinese elite athletes for 
winning Olympic success.  
This linkage between Chinese Olympic discourse and the feature of the 
socialist regime is also illustrated in our previous quotation from the speech 
of the then Minister of Sport, Yuan Weimin, in celebrating the success of the 
Beijing Olympic bid. Before jumping to the investigation of these elements, 
which are related to and reflect the socialist character of the PRC, in the 
following section, we would like to provide a brief conclusion of our analysis 
of the features of nationalism and patriotism in Chinese Olympic discourse. 
As original features which have accompanied the Chinese Olympic 
movement since its beginning, features of nationalism and patriotism reflect 
the purpose of constructing the identity of a ‘new’ Chinese nation that is to be 
re-established from its bitter experiences in the 20th century. Even though this 
‘new’ national identity is differently interpreted in political or cultural terms, 
the features of nationalism and patriotism, such as the aim of national 
restoration, reinforce the significance of Olympic victories not only to Chinese 
elite sport, but also to the Chinese nation. In the pursuit of Olympic victories, 
Chinese elite athletes become both the objects of patriotic education and a 
symbol of what ‘constitutes’ Chinese elite athletes themselves. 
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5.1.3 The Superiority of Socialism  
It is worth noting at the beginning of this section, the analysis contained in 
this section specifically focuses on the socialist element in Chinese elite sport, 
which is different from Section 1.1, investigating the ‘extrinsic’ (political) 
function assigned to the Olympics in general in the Chinese context. 
As one of not many countries that remain labelled (by themselves or others) 
as a socialist country, China embraces and utilises this political feature in its 
Olympic discourse, on the one hand, to interpret its achievement related to 
the Olympics; and on the other, to support its response to the international 
community as a ideological foundation. 
Illustrated in a number of previous quotations, the socialist character of the 
PRC is associated with Chinese Olympic victories, either in the Olympic 
stadia or in the successful bid of the 2008 Games, such as the statement of the 
Central Committee of the CPC (2002, p.1), “Winning the bid of the 2008 
Games fully reflects the great accomplishments that have been achieved 
through the reform and opening-up…” Even though there is not direct 
reference to socialism, given the strong political connotation of “the reform 
and opening-up”, as the symbol of ‘the socialism with Chinese characteristics’, 
we would maintain that the successful bid of the 2008 is portrayed as an 
endorsement of the correctness of the socialist regime and its development 
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route. He Zhenliang’s speech in the celebration ceremony for the successful 
2008 bid provides a more obvious example of this association. It is stated that: 
This [winning the 2008 bid] is the recognition [by the IOC] of our 
achievement in the reform and opening-up, the support of our government and 
Chinese people [to the bid]… Genuinely speaking, I would ascribe [the 
successful bid] to the leadership of the Party, to our achievement in the reform 
and open-up, to the People’s support. 
He, 2002, p. 1 
In the above quotation, the successful bid is not only identified as a result of 
the reform and opening-up of China, in other words of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, as it is in the quoted CPC document; but also 
portrayed as a symbol of the international recognition of this development 
route. Following the typical and implicit account of achievement in relation to 
reform, He does not acknowledge the difference between the enormous 
accomplishment in the economy and the relatively less significant 
achievement in other areas, such as the political domain. Though it would be 
difficult to argue that the successful bid was only an outcome of the economic 
achievement of the reform, we would suggest that this ambiguous expression, 
to a degree, generalises the nature of the international recognition and thus 
endorses the political theme of the PRC. It is also worth noting that in the 
second part of the above quotation, He also acknowledges the domestic 
factors relating to the success of the bid. In contrast to his interpretation of the 
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international perspective, the Party’s leadership is explicitly included as the 
leading factor in the success of the bid, while the other two factors mentioned 
(“the support of people and the achievement of the reform and opening up”) 
are also consistently mentioned throughout the document.  
In terms of the success China has enjoyed in the Olympic Games, the socialist 
character of the country is normally portrayed as the fundamental source of 
Olympic victories, reflecting the superiority of socialism. For instance, it is 
stated by the Central Committee of the CPC that 
Drafting the Plan for Winning Olympic Glory in the new era…, [we should] 
further utilise the superiority of socialism, [we should] insist and refine Juguo 
Tizhi,… better integrate sport resources from the whole country.  
The Central Committee of the CPC, 2002, p. 1 
The former President of China, Hu Jintao, (2008b, p.3) also stated that the 
“superiority of socialism” is reflected in “the concentration of all national 
resources for a major task”. This is consistent with the main feature of Juguo 
Tizhi, the support of whole nation for the elite sport system, and with the 
notion of “integrat[ing] sport resources from the whole country” in the above 
quotation. Given the close relationship between the socialist character of 
Chinese society and Juguo Tizhi, we would argue this promotion of the 
socialist features of Chinese elite sport in Chinese Olympic discourse 
ultimately reinforces and endorses the status of Juguo Tizhi. However, we 
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will have further discussion on the discursive construction of the relationship 
between the Olympic success, Juguo Tizhi and its socialist character in 
subsequent sections.  
Socialist elements are also employed in the portrait of the challenges 
associated with the Olympics. In terms of those challenges within the 
Olympic competition, i.e. the challenges for fulfilling the Olympic strategy, 
the superiority of socialism is normally accentuated as it is in explaining 
Olympic success. Due to its close relationship with Juguo Tizhi, it will be 
investigated in the following section entitled, “Olympic glory, Juguo Tizhi and 
Zhuanye sport”. 
In responding to the potential challenges related to the Olympics, especially 
in political terms, socialist elements are often employed as the ideological 
foundation for the PRC to respond to these external pressures and challenges. 
The previous quotation from Ma (2005) provides a good example of this 
implication of socialist elements. Ma emphasises the importance of 
maintaining the “dialectical materialist and historical materialist” stance in 
dealing with “problems” caused by the increased interaction with 
international organisations for the staging of the Beijing Games. 
Domestically, discourses related with socialist ideology and values are 
associated with the ideological education of elite athletes in their preparation 
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for the Olympic Games. This is indicated in a GAS document that is 
specifically published for the ideological education of elite athletes: 
Further strengthening the ideological education of the national teams is an 
urgent need in the preparation for the Olympics, and is an important means to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the preparation of the 2008 Games. 
Something which needs to be specifically addressed is that some athletes…have 
even behaved in libertarian, hedonistic, ways exhibiting extreme individualism 
and materialism [money-worship] … [because] they have abundant 
opportunities for competing overseas, they are susceptible to Western ideology, 
values, cultural products and unhealthy practices … [We thus] need to 
further strengthen and improve ideological education … to ensure all athletes 
give everything in the battle preparation for the Olympics. 
All of the new members of the national teams have to be given [ideological 
education] tutorials … [We] must educate [athletes] about the history of the 
[Communist] Party…the ‘Socialist concept of honour and disgrace’…[which 
should be] reflected in their love of the country and the organisations [to 
which they belong]… in order to let them clearly understand the essential task 
of, and the significance of, the preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games.  
GAS, 2006, p. 1 
In the quoted statement of the Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving 
the Ideological Education of National Teams, the ideological education of the elite 
athletes is identified as compulsory and a necessary condition of the Olympic 
task for Chinese elite sport, especially for 2008. In other words, socialist 
ideological education is legitimated by the significance of the Olympic 
performance in Chinese society. As exemplified in the above quotation, such 
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ideological education is consistent with the patriotic character of Chinese 
Olympic discourse, “love of the country and the organisations”; and with the 
political theme, i.e. socialism of the PRC, education in “the history of the 
[Communist] Party…the ‘Socialist concept of honour and disgrace’”. The 
‘misbehaviour’ of elite athletes that is influenced by other, i.e. Western, 
ideologies is portrayed as the target of the programme of ideological 
education, which should ‘correct’ these negative tendencies. Given the close 
relationship with the term ‘Western’ and capitalism, in a Chinese context, 
indirectly through criticising capitalist and Western values the socialist 
features of this ideological education are subtly promoted. 
For the recipients of education, i.e. Chinese elite athletes (especially those 
preparing for the Olympics), given the overwhelming proportion and 
tremendous significance of Zhuanye athletes to the achievement of the goal of 
Olympic glory for China, it is Zhuanye athletes instead of professional 
athletes who are portrayed as the target of this ideological education.  
As we previously demonstrated, providing satisfactory Olympic performance 
is recognised as one of the major ways for Zhuanye athletes, who rely on 
government funds, to realise their benefits and to promote their status. Thus 
we would argue that the ideological education is, to a degree, consistent with 
the individual interests of elite athletes, given that it is designed to promote 
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Olympic performance. In other words, even though it is the collective and 
national interests that are ultimately promoted in the socialist discourse 
advocating ideological education for Chinese Olympians, it does not 
necessarily lead to a full rejection of the interests of the individual. To a 
certain extent, the collective and individual interests are consistent with each 
other in the ideological education, to which Chinese elite athletes are 
subjected. Thus through fulfilling the collective and national interests, certain 
individual interests have been satisfied and vested interest groups have 
subsequently been formed. Such groups proactively promote the national 
interest and their own interests, which are to be realised through providing 
satisfactory Olympic performance, and thus reject the pursuit of ‘extreme’ 
individual interests threatening the preparation for the Olympics. 
Even though the conflicts between some ‘Western ideology’ and socialist 
philosophy are well recognised, the socialist development of the country 
remains portrayed as a beneficiary of the western-origin Olympics, especially 
through the 2008 Beijing Games. As indicated in the previous quotation from 
the documents of the Central Committee of the CPC (2002, p.1), the Beijing 
Games is portrayed as an opportunity “to promote the development of the 
socialist material progress, and cultural and ethical progress, of our country”.  
In terms of the development of Chinese elite sport, it is also projected by 
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Zhang (2009, p.13) that the Beijing Games would “provoke dynamism in the 
Chinese socialist-market-economic sport system that is in the process of 
transformation”. Given the reforming connotation of the ‘socialist market 
economy’ in contemporary Chinese society, it could be argued that the term 
“socialist-market-economic sport system” also implies a reformist tone and 
the prediction of the positive impact of the Beijing Games on the development 
of Chinese elite sport reform. However, such a projection is in contrast to the 
‘extreme accentuation’ of the planned-economy-based Juguo Tizhi and ‘the 
superficial-emphasis’ on market-oriented Chinese elite sport reform in the 
development of pre-2008 Chinese elite sport policy, which is argued in the 
previous chapter. In the next two sections, we will investigate this 
relationship between the Olympic task, Juguo Tizhi and Chinese elite sport 
reform in detail. 
In general, Olympic victories are framed as a symbol of the socialist 
development of the country endorsing the correctness of the communist 
regime and of Juguo Tizhi. In the name of protecting national interests, the 
collectivist discourse, as a feature of the socialist regime, is employed to 
safeguard the vested interests that have been realised through providing 
satisfactory Olympic performance. Elite athletes are thus educated with such 
collectivist values which embrace the ‘proper’ ways of pursuing individual 
interests while competing in the Olympics. Both Juguo Tizhi and the 
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socialist-market-economic reform of Chinese elite sport are portrayed as 
beneficiaries of the 2008 Olympic Games. However, there were considerable 
differences between the pre-2008 developments of the two, which was also in 
line with the vested interests of Zhuanye sport. In general, we would argue 
that the socialist features of the Chinese Olympic discourse are closely 
associated with Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport, as the two are deeply rooted 
in the socialist structural characteristics of the Chinese elite sport system. The 
relationship between these three is subsequently investigated in the following 
section. 
5.2 Juguo Tizhi, Zhuanye Sport and the Olympic performance oriented 
policies  
In this and the subsequent section, we focus on the relationship between the 
pre-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse and the development of Chinese elite 
sport. For this section, the major concern is the interaction between Chinese 
Olympic discourse and the discursive construction of Juguo Tizhi, and the 
influence on different interests within the Zhuanye sport system.  
5.2.1 The nature of Juguo Tizhi  
As demonstrated in the part of Glossary of terms, we would argue that Juguo 
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Tizhi should also be understood as a framework that administers and 
operates Chinese sport affairs as a whole. It is Zhuanye sport that should be 
recognised as the sport system supported by the whole country, and is 
operated and governed by the government with the Juguo Tizhi framework.  
The Olympic task are recognised as innate characteristics of the 
administrative framework, i.e. Juguo Tizhi, which was initially established in 
the 1950s for “concentrating all resources on highly challenging tasks” (Hao 
2004; Hao & Ren 2003; Li 2009, p.229) and was then articulated as an approach 
in Chinese elite sport discourse in the 1980s (Li et al. 2003; Hao 2004). The 
then-President of China, Jiang Zemin’s statement popularised the term, 
stating in a public address that “…the [Olympic] success of Chinese [elite] 
sport relies on Juguo Tizhi” (Li 2002, p.1). According to our literature review, 
these two dates are associated with the two initiations of the Olympic 
movement in the PRC. During the ‘Olympic vacuum’ between these dates, 
Juguo Tizhi was seldom mentioned in Chinese elite sport discourse.  
In Li et al.’s interpretation of the origin and significance of Juguo Tizhi, both 
the nature of, and the notion of, Juguo Tizhi is associated with the Olympic 
strategy. It is indicated that:  
The notion of ‘Juguo Tizhi’ was brought up after the 1984 LA Olympics. 
When the SPCSC started formulating the ‘Olympic strategy’, it was indicated 
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by some comrades who were analysing the factors that lead to the rapid 
development of the sport that we were leading, … This method of organisation 
and administration [of elite sport] that highly integrates resources within the 
sport system is similar to the model of [the PRC, by which] “two bombs and 
one satellite54” [were developed], and is therefore entitled as ‘Juguo Tizhi’. 
 
Y. Li et al., 2003, p.2  
In the above quotation, the notion of Juguo Tizhi is portrayed as a ‘by-product’ 
of the formulation of the Olympic strategy, suggesting that Juguo Tizhi was 
developed for achieving the goal of Olympic strategy, i.e. winning Olympic 
glory, which should be the prime policy concern. A number of terms that 
imply victories in the Chinese context are accordingly included by the authors, 
such as “the 1984 LA Olympic Games”55, “the rapid development of the sport 
                                                 
54 The idiom, “Two bombs and one satellite”, stands for China’s nuclear bombs, missiles and 
man-made satellites, most of which were developed during the Cultural Revolution. “Two 
bombs and one satellite” are not only regarded as referring to the scientific achievement of 
the PRC but also in political terms are portrayed as the foundation of the international status 
of the PRC as a powerful country. Given the poor economic conditions prevailing in China at 
that time, it was also interpreted in ideological terms as a icon of the spirit and the progress of 
socialist self-development relating to patriotism, collectivism, socialist spirit and scientism 
(CCTV 2007; Jiang 1999). 
55 The 1984 Olympic Games is recognised as “breakthrough from 0” of Chinese elite sport, in 
which China won its first Olympic gold medal by shooter Xu Haifeng and finished fourth in 
the medal table with 15 gold medals (Miao et al. 2012; Wu 1999; Liu 2003) 
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that we were leading” and “two bombs and one satellite”, portraying Juguo 
Tizhi as an effective apparatus for Chinese elite sport to achieve satisfactory 
(Olympic) performance. Such emphasis on the Olympic victories is consistent 
with statement of Jiang linking Juguo Tizhi to “the success of” Chinese elite 
sport. 
It is worth noting the association between Juguo Tizhi and the highly political 
idiom, “two bombs and one satellite”. This linkage not only implies the 
political significance of elite sport performance; but also associates ‘the 
ideology of “the two bombs and one satellite”’, i.e. “patriotism, collectivism, 
socialist spirit and Scientism”(Jiang 1999, p.4) with Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye 
sport, an association which coincides with the political features in the Chinese 
Olympic discourse. In addition, in line with our previous quotation from Li 
(2009, p.229), the authors also identify the integration of resources as the 
defining character of Juguo Tizhi, the initial goal of which was focused on 
economic terms (Hao & Ren 2003; Hao 2004; Li et al. 2010; Hu 2008b). 
Not only being identified as consistent with the structure and ideology of the 
communist regime, Juguo Tizhi is also associated with other political phrases 
in the PRC, such as the political status quo of China, and recognised as 
“necessary [for Chinese elite sport] especially in the primary stage of 
socialism”(Ma 2005, p.29). Juguo Tizhi’s features of planned-economy and 
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government-control, which are closely associated with communism, are also 
often emphasised. Li et al. state that: 
The sport system of China is consistent with the planned economy, in which 
the government directly operates [practical affairs of] sport. Its basic 
characters are that government distributes sport resource with plans 
[formulated by central authorities] and governs sport by administrative means. 
The government is the one that both administers and operates [Chinese] 
sport… it is the support of this system that makes Juguo Tizhi significantly 
effective.   
Y. Li et al., 2003, p. 1 
The government’s control and the planned-economy features are portrayed as 
the two inherent elements of the character of Chinese elite sport and Juguo 
Tizhi. Even though such ‘orthodox’ socialist features of Juguo Tizhi are 
inconsistent with the reforming trend of Chinese society, they are promoted 
in Chinese elite sport as the necessary condition for fulfilling the Olympic 
strategy. Given the strong involvement of the government in the planned 
economy, these two features complement each other and jointly promote the 
government’s power in Chinese elite sport. In return, this promotion of the 
planned-economy features of the Chinese elite sport system restrains the 
involvement and influence of other stakeholders, especially those from 
civil-society and the market economy. This coincides with the way in which 
interviewee G3 characterises the nature of Juguo Tizhi, indicating that it “is 
not a system supported by the whole country, but by the sport system. It is [a] 
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closed [system] which to a degree is closed to, and rejects, external resources 
and stakeholders.” Hence, this dominant role of the GAS was, on the one 
hand, ensured by the reliance of Zhuanye sport on government resources, i.e. 
the planned-economy character of Chinese elite sport; while on the other 
hand, it was also safeguarded via the emphasis on Olympic performance that 
led to the ultimate promotion of the Juguo Tizhi system, which was 
dominated by the GAS.  
In general, we would argue that Juguo Tizhi is the government-controlled 
framework by which the Chinese government administers and operates elite 
sport (including Zhuanye sport) with administrative methods, and distributes 
resources with the means provided by the planned economy. Similar 
ideological features, which are consistent with the socialist feature of the 
regime, are shared between the Chinese Olympic discourse and the 
interpretation of Juguo Tizhi, emphasising the success in the Olympics and 
associated political implication of these excel performance. The major 
benchmark for this framework is to achieve satisfactory Olympic 
performance.  
5.2.2 Juguo Tizhi and its political task: elite sport performance  
The significance of satisfactory performance, recognised as the ‘political task’ 
of Chinese elite sport, for Juguo Tizhi has mainly been constructed from two 
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perspectives. On the one hand, it is recognised as the necessary condition for 
realising the social function of elite sport, which is accentuated in the Chinese 
context. On the other had, it is also understood, especially by the SADs, that 
failure to accomplish this core task would threaten the value of the existence 
of Juguo Tizhi, as providing satisfactory performance is the main role of 
Chinese elite sport, the main form of which is Zhuanye sport. 
The political significance assigned to Chinese elite sport has varied along the 
history of the PRC. In the period immediately prior to the Beijing Games, the 
satisfactory performance in the 2008 Olympics was associated with political 
phrases, such as ‘a moderately prosperous society’ (Deng 1993) and “the 
socialist harmonious-society” (The Central Committee of the CPC 2006), for 
example, in the deputy Sport Minister’s speech (Duan 2007, p.1). 
It could be argued these timely changes reflect the requirement on Chinese 
elite sport of being “consistent with the macro policy of the Party and the 
country” (Ma, 2005, p.29), for instance the ‘opening-up and reform’. This 
emphasis on coherence between Chinese elite sport and the political theme of 
Chinese society is consistent with the political origin of Chinese elite sport 
and SADs.  
However, along with the changes in political climate, providing excellent elite 
sport performance has steadily been stressed as the means to realise such 
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extrinsic functions (promoting nationalism and socialism for example), and 
thus as the main political task of Chinese elite sport at both collective and 
individual level. Xiong et al. (2008) portray this reliance on outstanding 
performance as a defining characteristic of Zhuanye sport. It is indicated that:  
The only way for …the former [model of] elite sport that “developed with a 
closed door”… [to exert] social influence is [through competing in] important 
international events; the positive influence would only be induced with 
outstanding performance. … Realising… other social [functions] through 
striving for outstanding performance is the origin of all practices of [Chinese] 
elite sport, is the ultimate goal of [Chinese] elite sport development, and is an 
important standard for restructuring the model of the development of Chinese 
elite sport.  
Xiong, et al, 2008, p.87, p.177 
Through a longitudinal description overarching the origin, the present and 
the future of Chinese elite sport, the authors portray the social function and 
the political implication of elite sport performance as an inherent feature and 
ultimate goal of Chinese elite sport. It is worth noting that “outstanding” is 
repeatedly employed in the above quotation, qualifying the necessary 
condition for realising the social functions of Chinese elite sport. This constant 
pursuit of ‘excellence’ is not only linked to “elite sport that ‘developed with a 
closed door’”, but also acknowledged as “standard for restructuring the 
model of the development of Chinese elite sport”. We would argue that this 
account, on the one hand, constructs a consistent relationship between the 
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elite sport performance and the social effect of Chinese elite sport, and thus 
regulates the acceptability of certain types of elite sport performance. On the 
other hand, it also normalises the political functions that are undertaken by 
Chinese elite sport. Through portraying this consistency of the requirement of 
realising its social task, the authors acknowledge that outstanding 
performance would be continuously recognised as the standard for Chinese 
elite sport. Indirectly, this also implies that the political value of those elite 
sports with ‘less-outstanding’ performance, for example Chinese baseball, is 
thus decreased in the Chinese context. 
At the level of the individual, this character of Chinese elite sport is 
emphasised by the deputy Minister of Sport in the construction of the identity 
of sport personnel as an essential duty. It is stated that:  
 ‘Winning glory for the country’ is the duty of those who work in sport, like 
[the duty of] farmers [to] provide more food, [or the duty of] workers [to] have 
more production, [or the duty of] soldiers [to] protect the country, which 
would never merely be a slogan. Either Olympic or non-Olympic sports, 
either professional or amateur athletes, as long as one participated in an 
international event in the name of China, it would be incumbent to ‘win glory 
for the country’, which is [a] non-negotiable [task]. 
Duan, 2007, p. 1 
In the speech of Duan, the responsibility of “winning glory for the country” is 
expanded to non-Olympic sports and amateur athletes. However, given the 
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significance of Olympic performance and ‘officially-designated’ association 
between Zhuanye sport and the Olympic strategy, it could be argued that it is 
Zhuanye athletes that mainly, if not solely, undertake this task at individual 
level. 
The identity of Chinese elite athletes is constructed as undertaking the role of 
full-time employee of the state through comparison with other occupations, 
especially soldiers, stressing the non-negotiability of athletes’ duty to “win 
glory for the country”. This also indirectly suggests the corresponding 
relationship between elite athletes and its employer (in the case of Zhuanye 
sport, SADs). Given the SADs’ interests associated with elite sport 
performance, it could be argued that Chinese elite athletes, who have such 
responsibilities imposed upon them, are also indirectly framed as a medium 
for the GAS to realise its own interest through “winning glory for the 
country”.  
From an alternative perspective, i.e. promoting the necessity of Chinese elite 
sport reform, Xiong et al. argue that unsatisfactory performance will be the 
driving force provoking change in the system, and providing a challenge to 
Juguo Tizhi:  
There was a huge gap between the performance [of Chinese athletes] in the 
1988 Seoul Games and the expectation of Chinese people, which caused great 
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pain, since Chinese [elite] sport had been fabulous in the first half of the 
1980s. … Especially, after the failure of the Chinese Olympic football team in 
pursuing qualification for the Barcelona Olympic Games, there was great 
reaction [and discussion] throughout the country, Chinese football and 
Chinese [elite] sport [hence] had to confront the greatest pressure that it had 
ever experienced from the public for [the initiation] of reform.  
Xiong et al, 2008. p.28 
Even though the emphasis in Chinese society on successful Olympic 
performance is criticised by D. Xiong (2002) as a superficial understanding of 
Olympism, the above quotation suggests that this superficial expectation was 
so powerful that it left Chinese elite sport with “great pain” and “the greatest 
pressure that it had ever had” after China’s Olympic “failure” in the 1988 
Games. In other words, the Olympic performance is portrayed as the key 
influential factor of the public expectation, or as Ma (2005) terms it “the 
people’s needs”.  
Following Chairman Mao’s (1944, p.1) famous line “serve the people”, the 
argument that “people need gold medals” has long been utilised as a 
rationale by governments for ‘buying’ gold medals from sport departments 
(Lu 1994, p.1). It could be argued that the value of Juguo Tizhi to the 
government is greatly affected by its effectiveness in fulfilling the “people’s 
need”, or the need of the ‘investor’. This threat to the value of Juguo Tizhi is 
conveyed from an opposite perspective in the above quotation, portraying the 
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unsuccessful performance as the trigger of the increase in the pressure for 
elite sport reform. Xiong et al. circuitously suggest that the success of, or the 
acceptability of, the Olympic performance essentially affects the pressure on 
Chinese SADs to actually implement the reform. In other words, the power of 
SADs, especially the GAS, to maintain the dominance of Juguo Tizhi relies on 
its capability of obtaining Olympic victories. It could be argued that as long as 
Olympic success could be guaranteed, Chinese elite sport is capable of, to a 
degree, resisting the requirement for essential reform, even though reform has 
been a mainstream political and economic theme in Chinese society. Such a 
situation coincides with our previous analysis of the 1993 Policy, which 
eventually reinforced Juguo Tizhi in its role of fulfilling the Olympic task of 
Chinese elite sport while the SPCSC was under great external pressure for 
reform.   
As a brief summary of this section, we would argue that the political 
implication of elite sport has been highly accentuated in Chinese elite sport 
discourse, which is constrained in the Chinese context. Consistent with the 
traditional emphasis on success and political significance assigned to elite 
sport, victorious performance has thus been emphasised and prioritised as the 
political task of Chinese elite sport. Given the importance of the Olympics in 
Chinese society and in the global sport world, Olympic performance has been 
the most prominently stressed element in policy statement and external 
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comments, especially in those statements relating to Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye 
sport. 
Such emphasis on Olympic performance, on the one hand, is regulated and 
accepted as the dominant discourse of Chinese elite sport, as it is in line with 
Chinese society’s need in relation to elite sport, i.e. the need for success. On 
the other hand, Olympic performance is accentuated in Chinese elite sport 
because of its consistency with the vested interests of the Chinese elite sport 
system. This accentuation further strengthens the dominance of Juguo Tizhi, 
which is employed for achieving elite sport excellence; and enables SADs to 
resist changes that may threaten the stability of the Zhuanye sport system, 
through regulating the truth, or the priority, of Chinese elite sport. It also 
considerably devalues those non-key-sports, which ‘grab’ scarce resources 
from the key sports; and even inherently de-emphasises the reforming 
discourse in Chinese elite sport. Such ‘promotional’ effects of Chinese 
Olympic discourse on Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport are analysed in the 
following section. 
5.2.3 Promoting Juguo Tizhi, in the name of the Olympics 
Even though the refinement of Juguo Tizhi, especially ‘separating the 
administration and operational issues’, has long been identified as the core 
target of the Chinese elite sport reform; in the period immediately prior to the 
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Beijing Games, Juguo Tizhi was reshaped to reflect an “extreme form” 
(Interviewee General 2), namely “a system that was literally supported by the 
whole country rather than the [elite sport] system” (Interviewee General 3). In 
the interpretation of such a development, which ran somewhat counter to the 
so-called reform, the Beijing Games is a crucial factor rationalising the 
prioritisation of elite sport performance and thus of Juguo Tizhi. For instance, 
it is indicated by Li et al. that: 
Refining Juguo Tizhi, to a great extent, focuses on the sustainable 
development of Chinese elite sport, which is concretely symbolized by the new 
breakthrough that Chinese elite sport is going to accomplish in the 29th 
Olympiad, and the capability of Chinese elite sport of maintaining this 
powerful momentum after 2008. 
(Li et al. 2003, p.3) 
In the above quotation, Li et al. portray two divergent directions of Chinese 
elite sport development through employing a term with strong reforming 
connotation, “the sustainable development of Chinese elite sport”56 while 
emphasising Olympic performance (as the benchmark for Juguo Tizhi). 
                                                 
56 The sustainable development is a crucial element of the political theory “scientific outlook 
on development” that was initiated by the President of China, Hu Jintao, and heavily 
promoted by the Central Committee of the CPC in 2003 (The Central Committee of the CPC 
2003). It was further stressed as the basic requirement of the “scientific outlook on 
development” in Hu’s speech as the 17th National Congress of the CPC (Hu 2007). 
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However, there are subtle differences, which the authors indirectly indicate, 
between the importance of the two crucial tasks. This is to say that through 
identifying “the new breakthrough” in the Beijing Games as the benchmark, 
or “concrete symbol”, of the refinement of Juguo Tizhi, the imminent task of 
Juguo Tizhi is imposed on the long-term development of Chinese elite sport. 
The reinforcement of Juguo Tizhi is hence eventually accentuated. In addition, 
“sustainable development”, the reforming concept, is also interpreted from a 
perspective stressing the continuous excellence of elite sport, i.e. “the 
capability of … maintaining this powerful momentum after 2008”. We would 
argue that this interpretation clothing the consistent reinforcement of Juguo 
Tizhi in a reforming rhetoric is in line with the vested interests of SADs. This 
subtle discourse, which ultimately promotes Juguo Tizhi, coincides with 
Xiong et al.’s (2008, p.59) interpretation stating that “inherently, the Olympic 
strategy has been the core of all of the reform of Chinese elite sport”.  
We would thus argue that even though the dilemma between Juguo Tizhi and 
the reform has led to a conflicting feature in Chinese elite sport discourse in 
the reforming era, Juguo Tizhi has been normalised as the ‘standard’ priority 
via the accentuation of the importance of the Olympic performance, at least, 
by SADs themselves. This also coincides with our previous argument that the 
fulfilment of the Olympic expectation is literally the key factor determining 
the pressure on, and necessity of, SADs to implement essential reform.  
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Thanks to the association between Juguo Tizhi and satisfactory Olympic 
performance, political significance assigned to Olympic performance is also 
directly employed in Chinese elite sport discourse as an endorsement to the 
prioritisation of Juguo Tizhi. For instance, Juguo Tizhi is associated with 
socialism in the policy published by the headquarters of the CPC and State 
Council, emphasising “[Chinese elite sport should] target achieving 
outstanding results in the Olympic Games … [should thus] further utilise the 
superiority of socialism, insist and refine Juguo Tizhi,… [and] better integrate 
sport resources from all over the country (The Central Committee of the CPC 
2002, p.1)”. We would argue that this account not only portrays Juguo Tizhi 
as intrinsic to the socialism, but also legitimises its planned-economy 
characteristics, such as the GAS’s control of sporting resource, which had 
been publicly stressed by a number of Chinese politicians, including the 
then-President of China before the Beijing Games (Sun & Zou 2006; Xinhua 
News Agency 2007; Hu 2008a; P. Liu 2008). 
The ‘extrinsic function’ of elite sport performance, especially Olympic 
performance, is also an important feature of Chinese elite sport discourse that 
is often employed to legitimise the implementation of Juguo Tizhi. It is stated 
by Hao and Ren that: 
The establishment of Juguo Tizhi had direct relation with the participation [of 
China] in the Olympic Games… Though there are many problems with Juguo 
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Tizhi, it is still an effective system for … achieving outstanding results in 
international events. ... In other words, as long as the Chinese government 
and Chinese people have collective emotional needs for outstanding results in 
international events, any proposal suggesting abandoning the system is 
unrealistic.  
Hao & Ren, 2003, pp. 3, 4 
Hao and Ren interpret the necessity of implementing Juguo Tizhi from a 
domestic perspective in terms of its effectiveness in fulfilling the Olympic 
expectation in Chinese society. On the one hand, the authors directly 
acknowledge Juguo Tizhi’s role as the GAS’s prime apparatus to “achieving 
outstanding results in international events”, while acknowledging its 
problems. On the other hand, through associating the infeasibility of “any 
proposal suggesting abandoning the system” with “collective emotional 
needs” in Chinese society, the authors indirectly identify collective interests 
as the element which legitimises the overwhelming importance of the 
Olympic strategy and the dominance of the Juguo Tizhi system. This is to say 
that the promotion of Juguo Tizhi, technically, is closely linked to its 
effectiveness in achieving elite sport success, especially Olympic success, 
which is highly emphasised as reflecting “collective emotional needs” in the 
Chinese context. Essentially, the implementation of Juguo Tizhi relates to the 
vested interests of both the Zhuanye sport system and of SADs, which also 
emphasise the priority of “collective interests” in Chinese elite sport while 
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proactively protecting Juguo Tizhi during the reforming era.  
Though from a radical perspective, Tang’s (2007) portrayal of the differences 
in the realisation of different stakeholders’ interests within Juguo Tizhi and 
Zhuanye sport provides a good example of the content of ‘the collective 
interests’ promoted in the Olympic strategy. It is stated that: 
The development of Chinese elite sport has been focusing on gold medals… 
The Olympic strategy has gradually transformed into a ‘gold-medal strategy’. 
Throughout this transforming procedure, the number of gold medals has 
increased, sport departments have received political [recognition for its] 
achievement, gold-medallists and coaches have received [financial] benefits 
and status, taxpayers have received their bills, a huge number of ‘obsolete’ 
athletes have ‘received’ unemployment.  
(Tang 2007, p.20) 
With the realisation of collective interests as the foundation for realising 
interests of other sub-groups, which is symbolised by the notion of increased 
gold medals, the author lists the (different) “benefits” gained by different 
stakeholders. We would argue that Tang’s account associates the extent to 
which different stakeholders’ interests are realised with the internal and 
external identities of these “beneficiaries”. This is to say that the author 
associates the interests of internal stakeholders with benefits gained from 
achieving the ‘gold-medal strategy’; while links those externals, including the 
athletes who are ‘obsolete’ (i.e. who fail to reach or retain a place at the elite 
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level), with the cost of winning gold medals. In other words, Tang indirectly 
conveys that the benefits of winning gold medals are focused within the 
Zhuanye sport system, which is consistent with the monopolistic position and 
power of Juguo Tizhi in Chinese elite sport.   
In addition, it is worth noting the use of ‘receive’ in the above quotation. We 
would argue that this term, on the one hand, implies the passive role of 
stakeholders, either those who would be benefitted, or be negatively affected, 
in the Chinese elite sport system. On the other hand, more importantly, 
through ignoring the capability of actors, the author overlooks the influence 
of the intention, for example of those who are in powerful positions, of 
maintaining the system that promotes the interests of internal stakeholders. It 
is thus indirectly suggested that the inhibition of the interests of external 
stakeholders is a structural defect of, or a feature of, Zhuanye sport, which 
should be accepted by ‘receivers’ as long as the Olympic strategy is accepted. 
We would thus argue that in spite of its negative effects which are identified 
as the target of the reform, Juguo Tizhi would be continuously promoted, or 
accepted unless, a) there were any challenging systems that could accomplish 
the Olympic strategy with relatively less negative impact, or; b) Juguo Tizhi 
was no longer effective in fulfilling its Olympic task, or; c) the Olympic fever 
of the Chinese society decreased, which would reduce the value of the 
Olympic strategy for the vested interests group in Chinese elite sport, 
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especially the Zhuanye sport system.  
This is consistent with the statement of Interviewee General 3 that, “though 
having complaints or comments, everyone temporarily suppressed conflicts 
in order to guarantee [the success of] the Beijing Games ... The reform of 
Chinese sport had basically been halted from 2000, which is just to protect 
Olympic [performance] ”. We would argue that this account reflects a) the 
priority of Olympic performance in Chinese elite sport; b) the reliability of 
Juguo Tizhi in accomplishing the Olympic strategy, for which the reform had 
been halted; c) the proposition that the reformed system was not as effective 
as Juguo Tizhi in providing satisfactory Olympic performance, and is thus 
less powerful in the Olympic-accentuated Chinese context. This relationship 
between Chinese Olympic discourse and the Chinese elite sport reform in the 
pre-2008 era is investigated in the following section. 
5.3 The Chinese Olympic Discourse and the Pre-2008 Reform  
In this section, we will investigate the relationship between Chinese Olympic 
discourse and Chinese elite sport reform and examine the influence of 
Chinese Olympic discourse on the portrayal and implementation of the 
reform. It is worth noting that the reforming concepts investigated in this 
section mainly relate to the reform that is recognised as challenging Juguo 
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Tizhi and Zhuanye sport, for example, the reform of the administrative 
governance system of Chinese elite sport and the introduction of 
professionalisation. We would argue that Chinese Olympic discourse also had 
a two-fold effect on the reform of Chinese elite sport, which was regarded 
mainly as a refinement of Juguo Tizhi.  
5.3.1 The Olympics and the postponement of reform  
As argued in the previous chapter, the goal of the reform is to refine Juguo 
Tizhi and to ultimately promote the sustainable development of Chinese elite 
sport. Nonetheless, limited achievement had been accomplished in the core 
parts of the reform. Juguo Tizhi, as the main target of reform, has maintained 
its dominance in providing satisfactory Olympic performance of Chinese elite 
sport. The effect of postponing progress on the reform of sport reached a high 
point during the preparation for the Beijing Games, in which a temporary 
silence was gradually implemented on, and eventually accepted by, the 
Chinese elite sport reformers. There was thus a gradual marginalisation of 
reforming content in elite sport policies as China was approaching to the 2008 
Games (Policies Laws and Regulations Department of the GAS 2000; The 
Central Committee of the CPC 2002). 
It could be argued that this pattern of policy discourse reflects awareness on 
the part of policy makers of the tension between the emphasis on Olympic 
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performance and the advocacy of, at least certain elements of, elite sport 
reform. Even in the policy statement in which content from the two sides 
co-exists, it was Juguo Tizhi and Olympic performance that were ultimately 
prioritised (Policies Laws and Regulations Department of the GAS, 200057; 
SPCSC, 1995b58; The Central Committee of the CPC, 2002).  
The Chinese Minister of Sport links this decrease in the importance of elite 
sport reform to the preparation for the Beijing Games in his speech in the 2007 
All States Sports Minister Conference, indicating that:  
… There have been a number of battle-preparation policies that aim to refine 
Juguo Tizhi… The basic principle of these policy modifications at this time 
was to obey and to serve the needs of the battle-preparation for the 2008 
                                                 
57 Gradually refine the sport administration system. Clarifying the relationship between different 
types of sport organisations, in order to fully utilise their respective functions…Establishing a sport 
service system that will serve the general public, and [establishing] an elite sport system that will 
benefit [the target of] “winning Olympic glory”(Policies Laws and Regulations Department of the 
GAS, 2000, p.1) 
58 (Article six) Greatly develop commercial sport competitions. ….. [The development of commercial 
sport competitions] should be incorporated with the implementation of Olympic Plan. [We should] 
regard the reform of the competition system and of the operational mode [of competitions] as 
fundamental issues [in the promotion of commercial competitions], [we should] actively direct and 
regulate the commercial activities of all kinds of sport competitions, encourage all social sectors to bid 
and to organise international elite sport events, in order to lead the development of sport competition 
towards industrialised, civil-society-based and law-based [development]. (SPCSC, 1995B, P.1) 
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Beijing Games, to highlight the national interest…and to motivate the 
enthusiasm of the majority of all institutions and organisations. [We have] not 
adopted those suggestions that …might cause new problems and be harmful to 
the interests of the majority of all institutions and organisations. 
Liu, 2007, p.1 
Given the emphasis on “the battle-preparation for the 2008 Beijing Games” in 
the context, Liu’s account of “refining Juguo Tizhi” focuses on its 
effectiveness in the imminent Beijing Games rather than a long-term 
sustainable development of Chinese elite sport. However, although this is a 
reforming term, the underlying reality is one of protecting the conservative 
direction of the GAS, covering this with a layer of apparent reform. 
In the quoted speech, the Sport Minister promotes Juguo Tizhi from two 
perspectives. From a pro-Juguo Tizhi side, Liu emphasises the importance of 
national and provincial interests during the policy modification of Chinese 
elite sport. Given the consistency between political interests and the success of 
elite sport, Liu’s statement indirectly frames Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport 
as the key elements that should be promoted for their effectiveness in elite 
sport development. In return, the Sport Minister also officially but indirectly 
rejects the reforming voice, because these “potential problem-making” 
proposals would ultimately challenge Juguo Tizhi, and “be harmful to the 
interests of the majority of all institutions and organisations”, which are to be 
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fulfilled via elite sport success. 
It could be argued that the Olympic discourse, especially the emphasis on the 
2008 performance, changed the previous balance between the discourse of 
Juguo Tizhi and of reform in Chinese elite sport. It had devalued any other 
Chinese elite sport discourse except that of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport, 
and reproduced the knowledge of the importance of the Beijing Games, of 
Juguo Tizhi, and of the incompatibility between Juguo Tizhi and reform. In 
practical terms, the increased accentuation of Juguo Tizhi, to a degree, led to 
the inhibition of the reform of Chinese elite sport. This (temporary) rejection 
of reform was promoted both in an indirect, or unintentional, manner, such as 
the promotion of its counter part, Juguo Tizhi; and also directly or 
intentionally, like the Sport Minister’s official rejection of ‘problem-making 
proposals’ and commercial activities. More importantly, it was supported by 
other stakeholders, especially those whose interests related to the reform, as a 
result of, as we would argue, the internalisation of the significance of the 2008 
Olympics, of the priority of the Olympic performance in 2008 and thus of 
Juguo Tizhi. 
This compliance to the promotion of Juguo Tizhi, and the tolerance and 
sacrifice of the postponement of the reform, at least before the Beijing Games, 
had been portrayed and recognised as an appropriate move at the ‘right time’. 
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It is elaborated by Li et al. (2003) and Zhang (2009) as follows: 
The reform procedure of refining Juguo Tizhi accidentally overlapped with the 
29th Olympiad… on the one hand, [because] reform might bring some 
risks…[we] can’t hastily carry out [the reform] without considering the 
timing, [the GAS therefore is] in a dilemma. Hence, controlling the timing 
and the process [of the reform] became one of the key factors influencing the 
big picture [of the development of Chinese elite sport].  
Y. Li, et al. 2003, p.4 
Winning the bid in 2001… provided an excuse for conservatism in sport 
reform, [because] successfully hosting the 2008 Games becomes the most 
important task at present. … there are a great number of people who openly 
and profoundly advocate Juguo Tizhi, and those who criticise Juguo Tizhi 
become “those defying the universal consensus”.  
Zhang, 2009 p. 42, p63  
Li et al. acknowledge “the potential risk of the reform” as the reason that 
makes the pre-2008 era an inappropriate time for Chinese elite sport reform. 
Though the authors do not indicate what the ‘risks’ would be, given the 
indication of the Beijing Games, there is a clear implication that it refers to a 
potential decline in Chinese Olympic performance. It could thus be argued 
that Li et al.’s account of the GAS’s dilemma elaborates the inconsistency 
between Juguo Tizhi, or elite sport performance, and the reform. This brief 
statement, whose source is Li, who had a high-profile identity within the GAS, 
reflected the attitude of the GAS established towards the dilemma of reform 
in the pre-2008 era. It endorses the postponement of the reform before the 
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2008 Games, as a case of bad timing while still maintaining the possibility of, 
and in fact also the necessity of, furthering reform after the Beijing Olympics. 
The second quotation directly indicates the impact of winning the bid for the 
2008 Games on elite sport reform and on the power relationship within 
Chinese elite sport discourse regulating the balance between, and the 
acceptability of, different types of discourse in the pre-2008 era. It is worth 
noting that there is no indication of the identity of those who represent the 
opposing side to Juguo Tizhi, except labelling them as “those defying the 
‘universal’ opinion”. Employing ‘the universal opinion’ (even though literally 
it clearly was not ‘universal’), Zhang generalises and suggests that such 
power was promoted and legitimated by the public consensus of the 
usefulness and significance of Juguo Tizhi before the Beijing Games. Luke 
(2005, p. 11) indicates in his elaboration of the “third dimension of power’, 
that such power shapes “cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things”.  
Given the reproduced knowledge of, and the new balance of, the power 
relationship within Chinese elite sport, not only the general public but also 
the reformists, to a degree, accepted this significance of the 2008 Olympics. 
The ‘temporary’ promotion of Juguo Tizhi was thus recognised as an 
acceptable, or even appropriate, move before the Beijing Games. By contrast, 
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due to the new balance between the significance of the Beijing Games, the 
importance of Juguo Tizhi and the ‘sacrifices’ required, objectors to the Juguo 
Tizhi approach are portrayed as “those defying the universal consensus”. 
We would argue that the change in the social context of Chinese elite sport, i.e. 
winning the bid, increases the significance of the Olympic performance in 
2008. While, the knowledge of the relation between Juguo Tizhi and Olympic 
performance, which regulated the “right way” of going about this, alternated 
the existing balance between the “reformist” and “conservative” discourse of 
Chinese elite sport. Nonetheless, although the expected very high level of 
performance in the Beijing Games is strongly emphasised, endorsing the 
promotion of Juguo Tizhi; its counter part, i.e. the reform of Chinese elite 
sport, is still maintained in the Olympic discourse. It is further implied that 
the post-2008 era offers the “right time” for progressing reform. 
5.3.2 The Olympics and the promotion of reform  
Even though the pre-2008 deceleration of the elite sport reform was 
rationalised by the Chinese Olympic discourse and accepted by different 
stakeholders, this is not to say that the reforming discourse was totally 
silenced by the SADs and ignored in Chinese society. On the contrary, there 
were also Olympic discourses positively portraying the relationship between 
the Olympic Games and elite sport reform and predicting a potential impact 
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of the Beijing Games on elite sport reform. In line with the Foucauldian notion 
of the productive effect of power, the repressive effects of which is often 
accentuated in research, we would argue that Chinese Olympic discourse also 
provides a positive portrayal of, and positive impact on, elite sport reform, 
even though it mainly focuses on elite sport performance and Juguo Tizhi. 
Typologically, we would categorise the Chinese Olympic discourse that 
positively constructs the relation between the Olympics and elite sport reform 
into three types. For the first type, the Olympic Games, especially the 2008 
edition is portrayed as a watershed, or turning point, for Chinese elite sport 
policy moving towards reform or marketization. The SADs are normally 
portrayed as proactive initiators and operators of the reform. Their promotion 
of Juguo Tizhi is normally portrayed as a reforming move through ‘stretching’ 
the connotation of reform to the overall development of Chinese sport in this 
era of change.  
For example, it is stated by Li, et al. that:   
The benchmarks for assessing the reform are … the 29th Olympics … and 
[whether] the sustainable development of sport… . Though the direct 
motivation for the new round of reform is … [the] great pressure to … achieve 
outstanding results in the 29th Olympics, … the 29th Olympics… should be 
utilised as an opportunity to focus on institutional innovation; to maximally 
integrate all kinds of domestic and international resources for sport … 
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Y. Li et al., 2003, p. 3 
Given the necessity of, the urgency of and the complicatedness of the reform of 
the elite sport system, it is unrealistic to try to complete [the reform] at one 
go. … We would suggest that the reform shall be divided into three stages: … 
The Stage of the Complete Reform (post-2008): fully implementing the 
institutional reform of the GAS, realising the independence of the COC. … 
[ensuring that] all Centres complete their transitional mission [as an interim 
institution from government-administration to associational-governance], 
completing the mission of reform of current Zhuanye sport teams, establishing 
a new Juguo Tizhi. 
ibid, p. 5 
In the first quotation, the performance in the 2008 Beijing Games is explicitly 
framed as an important context and focus of Chinese elite sport reform, as 
well as the watershed for a new round of reform. In contrast to the 
‘pro-reform’ discourse that eventually emphasises Olympic performance, Li et 
al explicitly advocate a form of elite sport reform, which, however, is assigned 
a different connotation according to the period in which this term is used. The 
‘complete or essential reform’, as we term, mainly concerns the reform of the 
governance system, which is associated with “the stage of the complete 
reform” in the second quotation. By contrast, the ‘stretched notion of reform’ 
can be interpreted as the overall development of Chinese sport in this era of 
change, and includes both “Olympic success” and “sustainable development” 
respectively representing Juguo Tizhi, and the ‘essential or fundamental 
reform’.  
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Similar to the Sport Ministers notion of ‘the refinement of Juguo Tizhi’, 
quoted in the previous passage, the authors also clothe the prioritisation of 
Juguo Tizhi in a reforming rhetoric, through stretching the connotation of the 
reform. For example, through emphasising that the reform should not be 
limited within the preparation for Beijing Games and elite sport, the authors 
indirectly frame the strengthening of Juguo Tizhi in the preparation for the 
2008 Olympics as a reforming move. This, to a degree, eases the external 
pressure and criticism of the SADs’ conservatism in relation to ‘essential 
reform’.  
On the other side of the coin, the authors also constructed their positive 
attitude to the ‘essential reform’, and its ideal relationship with Juguo Tizhi. It 
could be argued that the advocacy of expanding the focus of reform beyond 
the 2008 Olympics not only portrayed the preparation of the 2008 Games as a 
reforming move, but also directly promoted future reform of Chinese elite 
sport. Such direct promotion of reform is evidenced in statements, such as 
“utilising the Games for innovation, civil-society-based development, 
industrialisation, etc.”  
However, we would argue that though the ‘essential’ requirement of reform 
is directly indicated in both quotations above, it is Juguo Tizhi and the 
interest of the SAD that is mainly and ultimately promoted. For instance, it is 
  246 
suggested that “all kinds of domestic and international resources for sport” 
should be integrated for the development of Chinese sport, which coincides 
with the core feature of Juguo Tizhi. Additionally, though the Beijing Games 
is portrayed as a crucial causal factor in the ‘strategic postponement’ of the 
‘essential reform’ in the second quotation, the authors also suggest that it was 
“the complicatedness” of the reform per se, that actually delayed its 
implementation. This circuitous statement indirectly reduces the emphasis on 
the impact of the preparation for the Beijing Games on the postponement of 
reform, and simultaneously de-emphasise the SADs’ interests, which are 
associated with the Olympic preparation and the postponement of the reform.  
Even though there is no explicit mention of who will implement the 
advocated moves, through emphasising Olympic performance that closely 
relates to Zhuanye sport and by specifying the institutions that are involved 
with the reform, the authors indirectly identify the institutions within, and 
related to, Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi as the implementers of the reform. 
Further examples of similar construction of the role of SADs in the post-2008 
era in the first type of ‘pro-reform’ Olympic discourse might also include Liu 
Peng’s 2008 speech to high-profile sport officials. The Sport Minister 
emphasises ‘our knowledge’ of the Beijing Games as “the summit of Chinese 
elite sport development, and [its] new start point” (Liu, 2008, p.1). 
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In the second type of reform-promoting Olympic discourse, the Beijing 
Games are also recognised as a milestone and turning point in Chinese elite 
sport. In contrast to the first type, the post-2008 development is normally 
acknowledged as a reaction to the extreme pre-2008 development or emphasis 
on Juguo Tizhi. In other words, the driving force of the post-2008 reform is 
identified as the reforming trend that had been suppressed for the Beijing 
Games rather than the SADs’ political agenda. 
Similar to Li et al.’s (2003) account, Zhang (2009) also acknowledges the 
significance of the Beijing Games and its privileging position in the pre-2008 
Chinese elite sport policy. She accordingly recognises the repressive impact of 
the Beijing Games on Chinese sport reform and predicts changes in Chinese 
elite sport in the post-2008 era: 
Though the reform of the sport administration system has become the 
breakthrough point of the reform of Chinese sport at the link point between the 
two centuries, however … the key-issue of elite sport policy in the Beijing 
Olympiad remains ‘the maintenance and refinement of Juguo Tizhi’, 
[requiring the] full utilisation of the superiority of the socialist system with 
the leadership of the Party and the country’. During this period, … it is 
impossible to have radical reform on a large scale. … Nonetheless, this does 
not mean the stagnation of the reform of Chinese sport. The reform promoting 
civil-society-based-development, [the reform promoting] marketization and 
[the reform promoting] legalisation of Chinese sport is irreversible… there 
have been deep-rooted problems [in Chinese elite sport] left unsolved. The 
reforming forces have been accumulating [before the Beijing Games], all kinds 
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of reforming forces will converge in 2008, the end of the Beijing Games will 
open the curtains for another round of Chinese sport reform. 
Zhang 2009 p.47 
A supportive attitude towards Chinese elite sport reform is constructed 
throughout this statement through, for example, arguing for the inevitability 
of overall reform of Chinese elite sport and pointing out the goals of the new 
round of reform. In a manner similar to that in the previous quotation from Li 
et al. (2003), the predicted “breakthrough point” of Chinese elite sport reform 
also highlights the reform of the administration system. This perspective 
coincides with Chinese elite sport policies, as it is the leading part of the four 
aspects stated in the 1993 Policy and the only reformist phenomenon that is 
indicated in the practical section (the measures) of the 2001 Summary. 
Rationally, Zhang also complies to, if not legitimises, the GAS’s conservative 
move prior to the Beijing Games, acknowledging the impossibility of radical 
reform before 2008. Through associating the pre-2008 principle of elite sport 
policy, i.e. “the maintenance and refinement of Juguo Tizhi”, with the socialist 
character of Chinese society, Zhang legitimises the GAS’s conservative move 
against the reforming trend with “the leadership of the Party and country”. 
We would argue that this reflects the structural constraints in the Chinese 
contexts and the knowledge of the dominance of the interests that Chinese 
elite sport serves. 
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In spite of endorsing the conservative move of the GAS, Zhang also portrays 
“the end of the Beijing Games” as the ‘call to arms’ of the reformist forces that 
had (voluntarily or involuntarily) been suppressed before 2008. We would 
argue that the different moves associated with the SAD and the reforming 
force constructs the relationship between the two and their respective roles in 
Chinese elite sport reform. Through linking the “insistence and refinement of 
Juguo Tizhi” that was emphasised in the policy statement to the “stagnation” 
of Chinese sport reform, the author frames the GAS as the source of the 
delays, if not the cessation, of reform. As previously illustrated, the notion of 
reforming forces in Chinese elite sport was ‘less-emphasised’, if not 
suppressed, before the Beijing Games in policy statements. In the portrayal of 
the termination of the 2008 Olympics as the release of a ‘pressure valve’ of 
Chinese elite sport reform, there is an implication that the anonymous 
“reforming forces” would provoke the post-2008 reform of Chinese sport. 
Through isolating the SADs from explanation of the post 2008 reform, Zhang 
frames the reforming force as a development trend that is independent from 
the control of SADs. It thus reinforces the linkage between Chinese elite sport 
reform and the reforming trend of Chinese society, by which the reform is 
endorsed and empowered to challenge Juguo Tizhi. This is consistent with 
the view of interviewee General 3, who argues that: 
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The reform of Chinese sport had basically halted from 2000. Everyone 
temporarily suppressed conflicts in order to guarantee [the success of] the 
Beijing Games. It was like a pressure cooker, [or] a coiled spring, the more you 
pressure [it] the more it will bounce back. After the subsequent release of 
pressure, everyone would be able to focus on other problems… 
Emphasising the promotional effect of the 2008 Olympics on Chinese elite 
sport reform, the third type of Olympic discourse interpreted the Beijing 
Games as the driving force or accelerator of the reform. Liu Peng (2008, p.1) 
identifies the post-2008 elite sport reform as a legacy of the Beijing Games, 
stating that: 
[The 2008] Olympics will leave precious legacies in terms of … human 
resources, knowledge, spirit, and experiences. We should ruminate on the way 
in which the long-term effect could be maximised, [in order to] promote the 
all-around improvement of Chinese sport in terms of the theory of 
development [of Chinese sport], the ideas [of development of Chinese sport],  
and the system[of Chinese sport], [in order to] fulfil the new and tougher 
requirements to [Chinese] sport at a higher level from the development of 
socialist economy, [socialist] politics, [socialist] culture, and [socialist] society      
In contrast to the first two types of Olympic discourses, the 2008 Games is 
constructed not only as a turning point of Chinese elite sport reform, but also 
a significant social event influencing the knowledge of the development of 
Chinese sport. Liu recognises the development of both the “the system of”, 
and the “knowledge of” Chinese elite sport development, i.e. “the theory” 
and “the idea”, as the legacies of the 2008 Games.  
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Even though isolating the post-2008 reform from the actions of social actors, 
Liu circuitously maintains the dominant position of the SADs and the 
importance of Juguo Tizhi in the reform. Given this speech was delivered at 
the 2008 All States Sports Minister Conference, through associating “we” with 
a number of proactive genres (Fairclough 2005b; Fairclough 2003), such as 
“seriously consider”, “promote”, and “fulfil”, Liu emphasised to the sport 
officials in China the active role of SADs in interpreting and utilising the 
Olympic legacies. In addition, given the exceptional performance of Chinese 
elite athletes in the 2008 Games, the Minister of Sport’s indication of “tougher 
requirements of [Chinese] sport at a higher level” indirectly maintains the 
importance of Olympic performance for the subsequent reform. This would 
also maintain the weight of Juguo Tizhi in the post-2008 era if there were no 
better means to satisfy this “tougher requirement”.  
It could be argued that these practical features concerning the future 
performance of Chinese elite sport and the political elements, such as the 
notion of socialist development, in Liu’s speech, coincide with his role as the 
top sport politician in China. The character of Liu’s speech is different from 
Zhang’s interpretation of the impact of the Beijing Games on the reform of 
Chinese sport, in which however a number of political elements are also 
embraced: 
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At present, Chinese sport has not yet been liberated from the totalitarian 
run-by-government sport system. However, for the socialist-market-economic 
sport system of China that is in the process of transformation, hosting the 
Olympic Games is a challenge, which brings enormous shock and dynamic 
stimulation for [further] transform. It will be a long-term mission in the 
post-2008 era [for Chinese SADs] to take the sport development models of the 
Western developed capitalist countries as examples, to establish a model of 
[Chinese] elite sport reform targeting the socialist market economy, to explore 
the route of the reform of civil-society-based development, industrialisation 
and marketization of Chinese sport.  
Zhang, 2009 p.13 
Even though Zhang also promotes a view of the positive impact of the Beijing 
Olympics on the reform of Chinese sport in the post-2008 era, a challenging 
attitude to the current Chinese sport system is constructed in her 
interpretation. This attitude is not only conveyed through directly suggesting 
the Beijing Games would “bring an enormous shock” to Chinese elite sport, 
but is also constructed via the political terms associated with Juguo Tizhi and 
reform in the above quotation. For example, the author also constructs the 
“socialist-market-economy” route and direction required for Chinese sport to 
be “liberated” from a “totalitarian run-by-government” system.  
Additionally, various ‘action’ terms are associated with different political 
phenomena, for instance, “liberated” from the old system, “brings enormous 
shock and dynamic stimulation”, “to establish” and “to explore” the new 
route, etc. This not only constructs the author’s different attitude to the reform 
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and Juguo Tizhi, but also reflects the author’s knowledge or expectation of the 
provoking effect of the Beijing Games for Chinese sport reform. 
In the quotations from both authors, the Beijing Games are interpreted as an 
opportunity for China to ‘learn from outside’, which would increase its 
interaction and communication with international community. This portrayal 
of the Beijing Games illustrates a change in the Olympic discourse in the 
Chinese context. Thus even though, the political significance of the Beijing 
Games, for instance as a political showcase and an icon of national 
rejuvenation, has continued to be promoted by many (Cha 2009; Brownell 
2008; Pound 2008; Dong & Mangan 2008); the Beijing Games is recognised as 
a two-way communication rather than merely a one-way propaganda 
medium.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
Through looking at the pre-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse and its 
relationship with Chinese elite sport, we would argue that the Chinese 
interpretation of the Olympics has essentially reinforced the power of Juguo 
Tizhi and the dominance of Zhuanye sport in Chinese elite sport. Even 
though the reform of Chinese elite sport is also mentioned in the portrayal of 
the Olympics in Chinese society, its importance had been marginalised as the 
2008 Olympics became imminent.  
As one of the intrinsic characters of Chinese Olympic discourse, the political 
implication of the Olympics is accentuated not only in government 
documents, but also in those by external commentators. The extrinsic 
functions of the Olympics, such as in relation to nationalism, patriotism and 
diplomacy, are interpreted in a socialist rhetoric, reflecting the political power 
that regulates the appropriate tone of Chinese Olympic discourse.  
Olympic successes (both within and outside the stadium) are traditionally 
emphasised in Chinese Olympic discourse; and are officially identified as the 
means for realising extrinsic functions, such as endorsing the correctness and 
superiority of socialism in Chinese society and as a vehicle for interaction 
with the international community. As evidenced by its former success in elite 
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sport development, Juguo Tizhi is recognised as the key component of the 
Chinese Olympic strategy, but thus is also under great pressure to maintain 
success through such victories, especially after Beijing was awarded the 2008 
Games. Nonetheless, such pressure not only forced, but also empowered, the 
SADs to reinforce the maintaining of their dominance over national sporting 
resources and to postpone, if not to reject, the requirement for the reform on 
the grounds of avoiding any distractions in the run up to the Beijing Games.  
As the administration and operational mode of Chinese elite sport, Juguo 
Tizhi embodies the character of the regime and the country, i.e. the 
government’s control over sport resources throughout the country, and thus 
fortifies SADs’ dominant status in Chinese elite sport. In return, governments 
exert their power over Chinese elite sport discourse, legalise the role of Juguo 
Tizhi as the apparatus for accomplishing the Olympic strategy and seize 
national resources and the benefits of winning gold medals within Zhuanye 
sport system. Consistent with its ‘government-run’ character, the advocacy of 
Juguo Tizhi not only reinforced SADs’ dominance but also restrained the 
influence of other stakeholders, even though the investment of resources from 
civil society was encouraged.  
Nonetheless, this promotion of Juguo Tizhi in the pre-2008 era did not 
eliminate the reform discourse, in which reform of Juguo Tizhi is recognised 
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as the core issue in Chinese elite sport. On the contrary, the GAS embraced 
reform discourse within Chinese elite sport policy, indicating its willingness 
to cater for this political trend in Chinese society. However, the GAS had 
effectively manipulated reforming discourse and limited the influence of 
reform, especially of the ‘essential’ reforms, in Chinese elite sport. As Xiong et 
al. (2008, p.59) indicate, “inherently, the Olympic strategy has been the core of 
all the reform of Chinese elite sport”. In return, the limited growth of 
civil-society-based development of Chinese elite sport further increases the 
importance of Zhuanye sport for fulfilling the Olympic task, and secures the 
dominance of Juguo Tizhi in Chinese elite sport. As Xiong et al. (2008, p.53) 
suggest, “there was no other choice but to implement administrative methods 
in order to … achieve [satisfactory] results in the Olympic Games”. In other 
words, we would argue that Juguo Tizhi was not only directly promoted via 
the emphasis on the Olympic success, but also indirectly secured through 
deemphasising or superficially promoting the reform, thereby marginalising 
the importance of reform, at least prior to the Beijing Games.  
The former equilibrium between Juguo Tizhi and Chinese elite sport reform 
was thus broken and restructured. The grievances against the dominance of 
Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport were labelled, or perceived, as 
‘trouble-making proposals’, and consequently (voluntarily and involuntarily) 
silenced in Chinese elite sport discourse. In the practical domain, this 
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contributed to the pre-2008 brake placed on Chinese elite sport reform, 
especially in those aspects that were recognised as challenging the position of 
Juguo Tizhi. 
This turn of events was not only associated with the portrayal of, and the 
knowledge of, the importance of the Olympic Games in the Chinese context, 
but also reflected awareness of the inconsistency between the emphasis on 
Olympic performance and the advocacy, at least of certain parts, of elite sport 
reform. In other words, it is the recognition (both on the part of those 
supporting and those opposing reform) of the conflicting relationship 
between reform and Olympic success that resulted in Chinese elite sport 
reform being removed from discussion, as the 2008 Olympics became the 
dominance focus and concern of Chinese elite sport. 
On the other side of the coin, the superficial promotion of Chinese elite sport 
reform, such as advocacy of the “sustainable development” of Olympic 
performance legitimised the pre-2008 development of Juguo Tizhi and 
maintained the possibility of post-2008 reform through, for example, 
stretching the connotation of reform. The positive portraits of the post-2008 
reform by the SADs and others reflect the knowledge of the necessity of 
reform and the infeasibility of the reform in the pre-2008 era. Thus, Juguo 
Tizhi is ultimately emphasised in the pre-2008 era in the name of the 2008 
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Games, and this emphasis is consistent with the interests of SADs. Even 
though post-2008 reform was promoted, the role of the GAS was understood 
very differently by different stakeholders while the significance of the Beijing 
Games in reforming terms was widely understood.  
In summary, as a conclusion to our pre-2008 analysis, we would argue that 
the power of Chinese Olympic discourse was endorsed by the consensus of 
Chinese society in, for instance, the knowledge of the significance of the 
Beijing Games. The emphasis on Olympic performance considerably 
increased the pressure on, and the importance of, Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye 
sport to deliver satisfactorily in the 2008 Olympics. Recognised as a potential 
challenge to the dominance of Juguo Tizhi, Chinese elite sport reform was 
de-emphasised in official discourse and social consensus in this period and 
thus in practice postponed. Moreover, through manipulating and re-defining 
Chinese elite sport reform, SADs further legitimised the reinforcement of 
Juguo Tizhi and the pursuit of Olympic performance as an appropriate 
‘reforming’ move, at least in the pre-2008 era. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Chinese Olympic Discourse and Chinese Elite Sport 
Development in the Post-2008 Era 
As “a realisation of a nation’s expectation for a century”(Hu 2008c, p.1), since 
Beijing was awarded the 2008 Olympics, the significance of Beijing Games to 
the Chinese society was interpreted from a number of perspectives, such as 
nationalism, socialism, diplomatic usefulness, etc., due to its importance that 
was a powerful medium in China in the pre-2008 era. In terms of Chinese elite 
sport, as we argued in the previous chapter, the emphasis on the 2008 
Olympics, on the one hand, greatly intensified the pressure on Zhuanye sport 
and Juguo Tizhi for achieving outstanding performance. On the other hand, it 
also promoted the development of Juguo Tizhi in its ‘extreme form’. The 
advocacy of Chinese elite sport reform was silenced during this period, as the 
significance of the Olympic fever in Chinese society was felt in the dominant 
voices relating to Chinese elite sport. By contrast, the post-2008 era was 
framed as a favourable opportunity, an opportune “time”, for furthering the 
reform of Chinese elite sport, more precisely of Juguo Tizhi.    
Even though, the necessity for reform in the post-2008 era was well 
recognised, the central role of the GAS was consistently implied in portrayal 
of the reform in the post-2008 era by, for example, some stakeholders from the 
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SADs. Thanks to the accentuation of the 2008 Games and development of 
Juguo Tizhi, the dominance of the GAS and SADs in Chinese elite sport was 
reinforced with a further concentration of national sporting resources in 
Juguo Tizhi. Given such power among the SADs and the enormous vested 
interests that had been realised via the Juguo Tizhi framework, this official 
advocacy for maintaining the central role of the GAS undermined the 
feasibility, and effectiveness, of the projected post-2008 reform. Especially in 
those areas in which SADs’ power would confront challenges from 
civil-society based organisation, the superficial promotion of the reform in the 
pre-2008 era provided crucial and ‘successful’ experience for those advocating 
the maintenance of Juguo Tizhi.   
In this chapter, we start the investigation of the post-2008 development of 
Chinese elite sport with examining the Olympic discourse in Chinese society 
after the third, also the last, ‘Olympic question’59, which had been brought up 
a century ago, was finally answered. In line with the analysis in the preceding 
chapter, we move on to the relationship between Chinese Olympic discourse 
                                                 
59 The ‘three Olympic questions’ refer to the three questions brought up in an article was 
published in Tiantsing Young men. These questions, which have become the cornerstone of the 
Chinese Olympic Dream, are a) When could China be able to send a winning athlete to the 
Olympic Games? b) When could China be able to send a winning team to the Olympic Games? 
c) When could China be able to host an Olympic Game? (Xu 2008; Yi 2008) 
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and the development of Chinese elite sport. By contrast to the analysis in the 
chapter dealing with the pre-2008 period, the main part of the analysis in this 
chapter is concerned with the reform of Chinese elite sport and its 
relationship with the post-2008 portrayal of the Beijing Games and of the 
Olympics in general. This is because, firstly, given the positive connection 
between ‘post-2008 era’, which was framed as a pro-reform epoch, and 
‘Chinese elite sport reform’ that had been officially, and unofficially, 
constructed before the Beijing Games, it would be sensible to expect an 
increase in the importance of reform on the Chinese elite sport agenda after 
the 2008 Olympics. Secondly, due to the relationship between the (essential) 
reform and Juguo Tizhi, it could be argued that the development, or change, 
of Juguo Tizhi closely relates to the substantive achievement of Chinese elite 
sport reform. Thus, even though mainly focusing on the development of 
Chinese elite sport reform, i.e. the post-2008 topic of Chinese elite sport 
development that was projected prior to the Beijing Games, we would be able 
to scrutinise the trend of the development of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye Sport. 
6.1 The Chinese Discourse on the Olympics  
The successful staging of the Beijing Games changes the Chinese discourse of 
the 2008 Olympics Games from the portrait of an ‘Olympic dream’ to the 
interpretation of the experiences and implication of the expected 
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‘opportunities and challenges’ of the Beijing Games. In this post-2008 Chinese 
Olympic discourse section, we start with examining the discursive 
construction of the Beijing Games and its impact on Chinese society, 
including the account concerning the Beijing Games per se and its comparison 
with other Olympics. Then we shift our focus to the post-2008 Chinese 
Olympic discourse in general.  
6.1.1 The discursive construction of the Beijing Games  
The extrinsic function of the Olympic Games has been employed in Chinese 
Olympic discourse, constructing the significance of the Olympics to Chinese 
society. In the post-2008 era, the extrinsic functions of the Olympics are 
consistently evident as a core element of the discursive construction of the 
2008 Games and other Olympics. Interviewee General 1, for example, states 
that: 
[The Beijing Games] provided a platform, not only for elite sport but also for 
other [social sectors], to present, to communicate and to perform. It was also a 
great opportunity for Chinese elite sport, in terms of its trend of 
communicating, assimilating and integrating with international community, 
as the Olympics is a communication activity in essence. … [The 2012 
Olympic] was good as well, showing its national characters. … The UK, with 
its high-level of development, does not need to show anything via the 
Olympics. We needed to display our national spirit, and to throw away the 
title of ‘the sick man of East Asia’. Chinese people had bent down, but [we] 
now lift [ourselves] up, …it had a strong sense of [this] mission.  
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This portrayal by Interviewee General 1, of the Olympics as a “platform”, not 
only for Chinese elite sport, but also for Chinese society, is associated with a 
number of terms denoting ‘(one or two-way) communication’. Through 
employing terms, such as “to present”, ”to communicate”, ”to perform” 
and ”to show’, Interviewee General 1 constructs the role of Chinese society in 
the 2008 Games as both a participant in a “communication activity” and a 
presenter on the global platform, i.e. the Olympics. This portrayal of the 2008 
Games, as a “communication activity” is consistent with the traditional 
Chinese Olympic discourse framing the Olympics as a medium through 
which the revival of the Chinese nation could be communicated to others in 
the international community.  
The function of the 2008 Olympics, as a showcase of the PRC, is also 
normalised by Interviewee General 1 through comparing the 2008 and the 2012 
Olympics in terms of the function of presenting the host countries. He 
portrays the move of “displaying the national spirit” via the Olympics as a 
common practice among the Olympic host nations, which, however, is 
influenced by the status of the host nations. This is consistent with his account 
framing the realisation of such a function as a “mission” of the 2008 Olympics, 
rather than a “mission” of Chinese society. It is thus suggested that whether 
the host country utilises such a function is a question of whether it needs to 
do so. It could be argued that this interpretation of the role of the Olympics 
  264 
conveys an argument against the critical voices blaming the Communist 
government for politicising the 2008 Olympic Games, and constructs a 
self-recognition of China as an emerging power seeking an equal status in 
world affairs via hosting an Olympics. 
This nationalist feature is employed not only in the interpretation of the role 
and the nature of the Olympics hosted in Beijing, but also in the account 
concerning the impact, or legacy, of the 2008 Games. On the one hand, 
concurring with the Interviewee General 1’s portrait of the 2008 Olympics as a 
‘platform’, the Beijing Games is also assessed as a successful ‘show’ of China’s 
cultural, economic and political strengths by Interviewee General 3, stating:  
We not only became the No.1 in the medal table in the Beijing Games, but also 
demonstrated the vitality of the country through the Games. No matter what 
incentivizing means was employed, we surely presented our vitality.  
On the other hand, the Beijing Games was also portrayed as a 
confidence-booster for the Chinese nation and a ‘springboard’ for the take-off 
of the PRC in changing its role, and becoming increasingly active in the 
international community. It is suggested by Interviewee General 2 that 
There have been changes in the [Chinese] national mentality since the Beijing 
Games. [Chinese people] used to perceive [themselves] as a weak nation that 
was looked down upon by others, but [we now] perceive [ourselves] as a 
powerful nation. [At present, we] need to be inclusive. ‘Harmony’ was [thus] 
promoted in the Beijing Games, instead of the [type of] song that we sang in 
  265 
the [1990] Asian Games “the mountains in Asia, are like heads held high”, 
[and is] different to [the meaning] ‘I need to strive [for the country], I need to 
rise up, I need to catch up and take over others‘. The Beijing Games was a 
national and cultural symbol. It…utilised the strength of the whole of 
[Chinese] society, … because it was a symbol representing the rise of the 
Chinese nation, [we] needed this symbol to show the rise of a nation. 
In the above quotation from Interviewee General 2, the impact of the Beijing 
Games, which is recognised as “a national and cultural symbol”, is 
interpreted from the perspective of the Chinese identity and the subsequent 
related actions that China took. Besides the direct indication of the change 
from “a weak nation” to a “powerful” one, Interviewee General 2 also indirectly 
portrays this change through comparing China’s discursive self-construction 
via the 1990 Asia Games and the 2008 Olympics. It is indicated that in terms 
of its interaction with the world, the Chinese nation’s appropriate move 
conveyed in the respective themes of the two international events changed 
from “striving”, “catching-up” and “taking over” to emphasising the “need to 
be inclusive” and “promoting harmony”. We would argue that such changes 
construct a changing position in the attitude of the PRC towards its 
relationship with the international community. 
This is to say that the actions implied in relation to the Asian Games convey 
that the communist regime was eager to keep pace with the world, in a 
manner consistent with China’s status at the early stage of its economic 
reform. In other words, the relationship between China and the outside world 
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was portrayed as that of a straggler in the leading group. Through addressing 
the PRC’s need to “promote harmony” and the “need to be inclusive” in the 
Beijing Games, the PRC is portrayed as an actor in the global community not 
only equally and “harmoniously” communicating with others, but also 
accepting the difference of others. In addition, through acknowledging the 
actions of the PRC in the 2008 Games as “inclusive”, this ‘new’ attitude of 
acceptance was differentiated from the PRC’s former passive compliance to 
the global rules when it attempted to engage with the international 
community. In other words, through portraying the “change in the national 
mentality”, Interviewee General 2 advocates a more active, but inclusive, role 
for the PRC when interacting with the world via a western-oriented medium, 
i.e. the Olympics. In relation to Interviewee General 1’s portrayal of the 
different messages that the UK and China convey via the 2012 and 2008 
Olympics, we would argue that this change could be recognised as a 
reflection of the increased power and international status of China. 
Consistent with the ‘function’ of the Beijing Games as an approach 
constructing the image of the PRC, the participants in the Beijing Games are 
often portrayed as the audience or receivers of the information conveyed via 
the 2008 Olympics. The director of the Administration Centre for Swimming 
states in his work summarising the 60-year development of Chinese 
swimming that: 
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In 2008, one year before the 60-year anniversary of the PRC, Beijing hosted 
the XXIX Olympiad, [by which] the Chinese nation fulfilled its century old 
wish. From a suffering and humiliated ‘sick man of Asia’, to [a country that 
is]…capable of hosting a ‘truly exceptional’ Olympics, to the number 1 in gold 
medals, China’s tremendous change has surprised and convinced the world, 
[earning] the world’s respect. … When the fire went out, athletes from all 
countries gave thumbs up to Beijing and China, showing [their] respect and 
admiration, representing international appreciation for the magnificent 
30-year reform and the great achievement of Chinese [elite sport]. 
Li, 2009, p. 242 
In the above quotation, the Beijing Games is associated with the development 
of China, as a symbol of one stage of its development from the humiliating 
past to the glorious present. Consistent with his identity as a high profile 
sport official, Li referred to China’s peak performance in the 2008 Games as a 
symbol of the final stage of this historical development, by which China was 
able to “surprise and convince” the world. In Li’s account, there are two terms 
relating to the external world, to which China attempted to show its new 
image, namely “the world” and ”athletes from all countries”. These two terms 
are associated with words, such as “surprises”, ”convinces”, ”respects” 
and ”admires”, which, on the one hand, imply the success of the Beijing 
Games in fulfilling its expected extrinsic function of conveying a positive 
image of China to the world. On the other hand, these impacts of the Beijing 
Games also construct the identity of the world in the Beijing Games, as 
witness to the development of China.  
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In a manner similar to the politicisation of the successful bid of the Beijing 
Games, demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the success of the 2008 
Olympics is also linked to the political character of the communist regime. In 
other words, the world’s acceptance of the Beijing Games is portrayed as a 
recognition and an endorsement of “the magnificent task of the 30-year 
reform” of China and thus of the PRC regime in China. Liu Peng’s speech at 
the 2009 All States Sports Minister Conference provides a more explicit 
example of this linkage constructed between the 2008 Olympic Games and 
global recognition of the communist regime and its development. The Sport 
Minister directly states that: 
The successful Beijing Games and the outstanding results of Chinese [elite] 
sport are a true reflection of the PRC’s glorious procedure of striving [to 
become] prosperous and strong; is a showcase of the great achievement of the 
reform and opening-up of Chinese society and the modernisation of China; is a 
successful practice of a mode of sport development with a Chinese character 
that is long with the status quo of China.... 2009 is the 60-year anniversary of 
the PRC, is a new beginning for Chinese elite sport; [Chinese elite sport] 
experienced its glory in the Beijing Games, is invigorated with its study and 
implementation of ‘the scientific outlook on development’, is facing the future, 
is working around the clock, tirelessly and continuously striving to transcend 
[its former success].  
P. Liu, 2009, p. 1  
In Liu’s speech, the success of the Beijing Games per se and the outstanding 
performance of Chinese elite sport are not only associated with the former 
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achievements of the communist regime, but also linked to the future 
development of Chinese elite sport. It is worth noting the Sport Minister 
subtly constructs the 2008 Olympics’ relationship with Chinese society and 
with Chinese elite sport from different perspective.  
On the one hand, in terms of its relationship with the development of China, 
the Beijing Games is framed as a “reflection” and a ”showcase” of the 
accomplishment of the PRC since its establishment. Implying a receiver of the 
information ‘reflected’ and ‘shown’, these two terms indirectly emphasises 
the international connection, and the exogenous origin, of the Olympics in the 
Chinese context. Thus it is suggested that the success in the Beijing Games 
should be interpreted not only as positive images conveyed to the world; but 
also a proof via an international means of the appropriateness of the socialist 
route that is implied in terms, such as “PRC’s glorious procedure” and “the 
great achievement of the reform and opening-up”. 
On the other hand, the general success of the Beijing Games is also identified 
as “a successful practice of the mode of sport development with a Chinese 
character”, i.e. of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport; even though, more 
precisely, it is the term “the outstanding performance” that should be 
separately linked to the “successful practice” of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye 
sport.  
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It could be argued that this implicit account reflects a traditional but 
‘superficial’ knowledge, as D. Xiong (2002, p.10) suggests, which “regards the 
Olympic [movement] merely as a sporting competition”. Thus, in contrast to 
‘the exogenous origin of the Olympics’ stressed in the construction of the 
relationship between the Beijing Games and development of China, the Sport 
Minister identifies the Beijing Games as an original task of Zhuanye sport that 
should be accomplished along with Juguo Tizhi. In other words, “the 
successful Beijing Games” is portrayed as an endorsement of the effectiveness 
of Juguo Tizhi.  
Furthermore, via this vague statement, Liu not only associates the general 
success of the 2008 Olympics with Juguo Tizhi, but also portrays the excellent 
Olympic performance as a reflection of the achievement of the socialist 
development of China. In other words, it is suggested by Liu that the 
correctness of the socialist route is not only demonstrated via the ‘externally 
originated’ events, but also by the effectiveness of the ‘planned-economy-base’ 
Juguo Tizhi. Therefore, in order to “continuously transcend” such successes, 
reflecting the ‘correctness’ of the communist regime, the current direction and 
means of development have to be maintained after the “new beginning”.  
It could be argued that the statement combining the interpretation of the 
general success of, and the performance in, the Beijing Games reflects the 
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understanding of the Olympics in the Chinese context. It, on the one hand, 
emphasises the elite sport performance in the Olympics, while on the other 
hand, it colours the Olympic performance with political shades. Through 
associating the achievement in the Olympics with the political character of 
China, the Sport Minister also reinforces Juguo Tizhi’s linkage with the 
socialist regime. This implicit interpretation of the Olympic success indirectly 
promotes the interests of SAD in the post-2008 era through stressing the 
political significance of Olympic victories. 
Not only the Beijing Games and its impact, but also the interpretation of the 
peak performance of Chinese elite athletes is influenced by the Chinese 
political context. Interviewee Baseball 1’s acceptance of the limited publicity 
given to the best Olympic performance ever of a Chinese baseball team 
provides an interesting example of the influence of political context on 
Chinese elite sport. 
Setting aside its low ranking in the world baseball table, Chinese baseball has 
been dwarfed by Japan, South Korea and Chinese Taipei in the East Asia area, 
and had never qualified for any Olympic Games finals except those in 2008 in 
which it participated as the host nation team. Seeing themselves as “the 
weakest in the tournament” (Interviewee Baseball 10), hardly anyone expected 
the Chinese baseball team to achieve any wins in the temporary and 
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subsequently-demolished Wukesong baseball stadium. 
Following its predictable 0-10 loss to Canada and a surprising 0-0 tie with 
Korea, Chinese baseball team astonishingly achieved a historical 
breakthrough beating Chinese Taipei for the first time in its history. However, 
compared to the overwhelming number of reports and comments on this 
match on the east shore of the Taiwan Strait, media in the PRC was almost 
silent in terms of comments on this significant victory for Chinese baseball. 
Interviewee Baseball 1 gives her interpretation on this silence in the media: 
Frankly, [in terms of] that game we won in the Olympics, if we beat any other 
teams, China would have publicised it greatly. Because we beat a team that is 
different to any others, the Central [government] won’t [further] irritate them. 
If you want to argue, because it was coincidentally a sensitive period, there 
was policy from above…. It could have been a fantastic opportunity [to 
promote baseball] 
In the brief statement concerning the social effect of the peak performance of 
Chinese baseball, the influence of the political interests on Chinese elite sport 
is reflected through prioritisation of the political concerns in the promotion of 
the sport. Interviewee Baseball 1 acknowledges that it is “China”, instead of 
Chinese media, which was in charge of (not) publicising the historic 
performance of Chinese baseball. It could be argued that this account 
normalises the government’s power in setting the agenda of the Chinese 
Media and in silencing the challenges of others, which is exercised through 
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“policy from above”. Thus through controlling the acceptability of certain 
voices, the Chinese government promotes its interests by prioritising the 
political concerns in the Olympic discourse. 
It is interesting to note that Interviewee Baseball 1 ignores the name of Chinese 
Taipei and subtly replaces it with “that game”, ”a team that is different” and 
“them” in the quotation, which is the only mentioning of this 
ground-breaking performance in the interview. It is difficult for us to argue, 
merely based on her circuitous rhetoric, that “Chinese Taipei” is regulated 
and acknowledged as ‘the one who must not be named’ in Chinese baseball 
discourse. We would however argue that this account reflects the 
government’s influence not only on the content of Chinese Olympic discourse, 
i.e. the intentional silence in 2008, but also on the way of framing the Olympic 
performance. In other words, this constructed rule of Chinese elite sport 
discourse of prioritising political interests not only constrains what could or 
could not be known and thought, but also influences how it could be 
understood and addressed. 
Besides the direct discursive construction of the Beijing Games, comparisons 
between the 2008 Games and other Olympics in which the PRC has 
participated are also normally employed in the post-2008 discourse. These 
comparisons in Chinese Olympic discourse also indirectly frame the 
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characters of the Beijing Olympics. In his elaboration of the differences 
between the Beijing Games and other Olympics, Interviewee General 2 states 
that: 
We hosted the Beijing Games. It is totally different to the Athens and the 
London Games, in which we participated. Participating in an Olympics is like 
visiting another person’s home, and means merely sport competition. [Chinese] 
people would not pay as much attention as they did to the Beijing Games. The 
Beijing Games, was the games for which the country acted as the host, for the 
first time in Chinese history. We paid so much money for it, and hosted it as 
the symbol of the rise of the Chinese nation.   
Straightforwardly, Interviewee General 2 differentiates China’s role in other 
Olympic Games, as visitors to another’s home, with its identity as the host 
country in 2008. Compared to the pre-2008 practice of the whole country, i.e. 
“acted as the host” and “paid so much money”, Interviewee General 2 points 
out the lower level of attention paid by the general public to other Olympics. 
Given the importance of the Olympic task to Zhuanye sport, it could be 
argued that through acknowledging the general public’s attitude towards 
other editions of the Olympics, Interviewee General 2 indirectly suggests that 
the Zhuanye sport system is the main stakeholder involved with these “sport 
competitions”. 
We would argue such different attitudes of the Chinese society towards the 
2008 Games and other Olympics is influenced by the differences in the 
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significance of the Games, and in the identity of China in these Games, as 
comprehended by the Chinese society. However, the knowledge of the 
exceptional significance of the Beijing Olympics led the pre-2008 Chinese 
Olympic discourse to a direction that was similar to what it was for previous 
editions. This is to say that due to the historical emphasis on success in the 
Chinese context, the knowledge of, and the discourse about, the particularity 
of the Beijing Games also resulted in an accentuation of Olympic performance, 
and thus of Juguo Tizhi, before the Beijing Games.  
In spite of the similar emphasis of Olympic performance in the pre-2008 era, 
the difference in significance between the Beijing Games and other Olympics 
is reproduced more clearly in the post-2008 Olympic discourse. We would 
argue that as Interviewee General 2 differentiated between “merely sport 
competitions” and “the symbol of the rise of the Chinese nation”, the 
exceptional significance of the 2008 Games to Chinese society resulted in the 
defining character of the post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse, i.e. the 
accentuation of the extrinsic function of the Olympics and the recognition of 
the effective achievement of such functions in the Beijing Games. As 
evidenced in the prior quotations in this section, the general success of, 
instead of the peak performance in, the Beijing Games become accentuated in 
the post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse. This account, on the one hand, 
reflects the knowledge on the part of Chinese society of the most significant 
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achievement of the Beijing Games; and, on the other hand, constructs China’s 
new Olympic identity as the host of the 2008 Olympics, which enjoyed 
general success in its organisation of the Games. Thus, even though Chinese 
elite sport achieved its top Olympic performance in 2008, elite sport 
performance is less emphasised in the post-2008 discourse evaluating the 
Beijing Games, and is portrayed merely as a part of, or evidence of, a 
successful Olympics.  
Nonetheless, this is not to deny or to ignore the astonishing performance that 
Chinese athletes accomplished in the Beijing Games, which is also frequently 
mentioned in the post-2008 discourse as a distinguishing feature of the Beijing 
Games. For example, in Interviewee General 2’s account, this exceptional 
performance, which shows the “maximised effectiveness of all the means that 
could be utilised in Juguo Tizhi”, is identified as something that “had never 
happened before and will never happen again“. It could, of course, thus be 
argued that what essentially differentiates the Beijing Games and other 
Olympics, in terms of elite sport development, is the effectiveness of Juguo 
Tizhi in its preparation for the 2008 Olympics.  
However, when making this argument, we cannot help wondering about the 
underlying condition that enabled such “extreme methods and extreme 
results” for the Beijing Games (Interviewee General 2); or, from a counter 
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perspective, wondering about the conditions that constrain the 
implementation of this “extreme” Juguo Tizhi for the development of Chinese 
elite sport. 
Comparing the preparation for the Beijing Games with what Chinese elite 
sport has done for other Olympics, Interviewee General 3 states that 
[The preparation for] other Olympics… only concentrates relatively less social 
resources but mainly the resources within the Chinese elite sport system … 
the Beijing Games engaged the whole Chinese society…. This is to say that the 
support for the 2008 Games and for the elite sport system differentiates the 
Beijing Games from others, which were more like a one-man show. … If the 
2008 Games was not in Beijing, then it would be the same as other 
Olympics… in which  [though] we would still fight for gold, the influence 
would not be as significant as it is now. 
In line with our previous argument, the pursuit of gold medals with the 
resources within Zhuanye sport system is portrayed as a routine job of 
Chinese elite sport for the Olympic Games in general. It is thus indirectly 
indicated by Interviewee General 3 that the factor that differentiates Zhuanye 
sport’s preparation for the Beijing Games and other Olympics is the resources 
that were invested in the preparation for the Olympics. Given the dominance 
of Juguo Tizhi over Chinese elite sport, it could be argued that the boosted 
social support (resources) to Chinese elite sport for the preparation for the 
Beijing Games considerably increased the resources that SADs controlled and 
distributed with Juguo Tizhi. Even though an increase in the resource might 
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not necessarily lead to a growth in Olympic gold medals, financial investment 
is regarded as one of the most important elements that influence elite sport 
performance (Houlihan & Green 2008; De Bosscher & De Knop 2002). Thus, it 
could be argued that with such growth in the resources invested in Juguo 
Tizhi before the Beijing Games, it increased the possibility of a improvement 
in the elite sport performance.  
Additionally, there were also changes and development in the practices in the 
Juguo Tizhi system for the Beijing Games, such as the increase of the numbers 
of foreign coaches and the different versions of Statements of Liability for 
Undertaking the Task of the 2008 Games that had also been issued and signed 
from the top of the hierarchy (the GAS) to the bottom level (coaches of key 
training groups of national teams) of the Chinese Olympic squad.   
However, in terms of the essential changes in the pre-2008 operation of Juguo 
Tizhi, which is analysed in detail in the following section, we would like to 
quote Interviewee Diving 1’s statement assessing the actual development of the 
core mechanism of Juguo Tizhi framework for the Beijing Games. He states 
that: 
[The development of Chinese diving]… has hardly any relation with the 
Beijing Games, therefore your question [concerning the relationship between 
the 2008 Olympics and the development of Juguo Tizhi] is difficult to answer. 
As a matter of fact, I know what you want … how can I express [in the way 
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you need]. A better way is to say that the Beijing Olympics… enabled us to 
have [more] detailed preparation with more [material] support. 
In general, we would argue that knowledge of the significance of the Beijing 
Games not only led to a change in discourse concerning, and attitude towards, 
Juguo Tizhi, but also in the resource that was controlled by the stable and 
unchanged Juguo Tizhi system. These changes are recognised as the 
underlying condition that boosted the 2008 performance of Chinese elite sport 
in the post-2008 discourse.  
6.1.2 The discursive construction of the Olympics 
Consistent with the increased emphasis on the general success of the Beijing 
Games after 2008, there is also a growth of the content of post-2008 Chinese 
Olympic discourse concerning the extrinsic function of the Olympics Games 
in general. Taking the scenario of Chinese elite sport policy, we would argue 
that this trend is reflected in the change of the statement concerning the 
significance of the Olympics in the three editions of the Strategic Plan for 
Winning Olympic Glory (1994-2000, 2001-2010, 2011-2020).  
Straightforwardly, related content is noted in different ways in the three 
editions of the Olympic-targeted documents. In the first two versions of the 
Plans, brief statements concerning the implication and extrinsic function of 
the Olympics are separately addressed in different sections of the documents. 
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In contrast, the significance of the Olympics are intensively stated in the 
second part of the 2011 Summary, following the leading section summarising 
the achievements of Chinese elite sport since the first edition of the Plans.  
Content wise, there are two brief statements in the 1994 Summary relating to 
the social impact of the Olympics. The first focuses on the Olympic 
performance and its impact on “the socialist material progress, and cultural 
and ethical progress”. The second emphasises the benefit of “promoting the 
Olympic ideology and [of] advocating the Olympic spirit … for stimulating 
the opening-up of our country and its international communication”. For the 
second (2001-2011) edition of this series of document, thanks to the successful 
bid of the 2008 Games, the 2001 Summary focuses solely on the social 
influence of the Beijing Olympic, which is portrayed as:  
… another great opportunity of Chinese sport development, and will have 
significant impact on the economic and social development [of China] in the 
new century, on the establishment of an ‘all-dimensional’, multi-tiered and 
wide-ranging ‘opening-up’ of our country, as well as on enhancing its 
international status. 
GAS, 2002, p.1 
Compared to the brief statements in the 1994 Summary and the 2008-focused 
account in the 2001 Summary, the authors of the 2011 Summary not only assign 
the significance of the Olympics to different international events but also 
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associate these sporting events with various strategic practices of states. It is 
stated that: 
International sport events, represented by the Olympic Games, [could be used 
as means for] international comparison, [performance in which] is the 
benchmark and character of the progress [for becoming a] ‘Sport Power’… 
Elite sport and the Olympic strategy will remain its significant role and 
implication in the economic, social and cultural development in the following 
decade… the Olympic Games…has become an important platform for the 
international communication, competition and cooperation as well as a show 
window for the image of general strength of nations.  
GAS, 2011, p. 1 
Straightforwardly, it could be argued that the above quotation provides a 
more detailed account than the statements in the previous two versions of the 
Plans that cover the same topic. From an international perspective, more 
terms which imply state practices associated with the Olympics are employed 
in the above quotation, such as ”competition”, ”cooperation”, “international 
comparison”, etc. Domestically, the Olympic strategy associated with Chinese 
elite sport is assigned a “significant role … in the economic, social and 
cultural development” of China. We would argue that these terms implying 
different practices of States not only suggest an increased Chinese 
understanding of the extrinsic function of the Olympics; but also construct 
various relationships between the participant countries of the Olympics, or 
the different identities that China or other countries may take in the Olympic 
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Games. Furthermore, we would argue that with the inclusion of this content 
concerning the significance of the Olympics, the Plans are changed from elite 
sport performance focused elite sport policy, to a certain extent, to a 
diplomatic document in the domain of sport. 
Even though, there is such remarkable change in the knowledge of the 
Olympics in Chinese context before and after the Beijing Games, it is difficult 
to argue that the 2008 Games worked as the turning point at which the PRC 
government and SADs suddenly comprehended such insight. However, as 
shown in the Sport Minister’s different speeches that are quoted in the 
previous chapter, it could be argued that this development of knowledge 
gradually took place along with the imminent approach of the Beijing Games, 
and is reflected in the gradual change in the official account framing the 2008 
Olympics in diplomatic, socialist and other terms. After the Beijing Games, 
Liu Peng concisely stressed in the 2009 All States Sports Minister Conference 
that in economic, diplomatic, cultural and social terms: 
The development of Chinese sport and the success of the organisation of the 
Olympics fully prove the significant influence of sport, which is a new driving 
force of economic development, a platform of international communication, an 
important content of cultural development, a necessary condition of social life, 
on the full development of individuals and society 
P. Liu, 2009, p. 1 
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Interviewee General 1 positively reviews the extrinsic function of the Olympics 
and the ‘improvement’ of the understanding of such functions in the Chinese 
society. He elaborates as follows: 
As a matter of fact, … [the social and political meaning of the Olympics] is 
good. It is not only good for China as the host country, but also good for the 
Olympic Games. [Because] it shows that the Olympics could incorporate 
[social and political implications], ... there is nothing in the world that could 
incorporate as much as the Olympics does… Chinese society used to have little 
respect for sport. But one Olympics has lifted [the image of] sport, making 
[Chinese] people aware that sport could have so many functions … some of 
which the UN does have, some of which are irreplaceable.   
The above interpretation of the extrinsic function of the Olympics covers two 
aspects. Firstly, the speaker not only normalises the association between the 
Olympic Games and its social and political implications, but also positively 
acknowledges such association as “good for the host country… and for the 
Olympics.” Thus, he suggests, as the second aspect, that such a positive 
function of the Olympics changes the portrait of sport in China, or “lifts [the 
image] of sport”. In other words, this account acknowledges the significance 
of the extrinsic function to the value of sport, more precisely to the value of 
elite sport in the Chinese context. Or, we would argue that given the limited 
association between Zhuanye sport and social economy, the value, or the 
usefulness, of Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi, to a great extent, relies on its 
implication in political and social domains. This is, on the one hand, 
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consistent with the emphasis of the nationalist, socialist and other political 
elements of the Beijing Games in the pre-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse. On 
the other hand, it also, to a degree, explains the notion of elite sport 
performance, which is often stressed as the ‘political task’ of Chinese elite 
sport, in the Chinese context.  
We would thus argue that even though Chinese elite sport successfully 
finished its glorious and formidable job in 2008, its ‘political task’ of 
maintaining its performance is continuously stressed in the Chinese context. 
For example, although there is no direct mention of elite sport performance in 
the above quotation from the 2011 Summary, given the high media exposure, 
and thus public attention on the Olympic medal table, it could be argued that 
the notions of “international comparison”, “competitions” among different 
states and the “benchmark” of being a ‘sport power’ subtly constructs elite 
sport performance as the criterion of ‘comparison’ between delegations from 
different NOCs. Thus in order to maintain its role as a ‘sport power’, which 
was stressed by the then-President of China (J. Hu, 2008), it is subtly 
suggested in the policy from the GAS that elite sport performance needs to be 
maintained. In other words, Juguo Tizhi should be steadily promoted in the 
post-2008 era for China’s status in the sporting world and international 
community. 
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It could hence be argued that the increased understanding of the extrinsic 
function of the Olympics indirectly but continuously promotes the 
significance of elite sport performance, and thus of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye 
sport, in the Chinese context. However, the significance of elite sport 
performance, especially of Olympic performance is differently constructed for 
different sports. For instance, it is stated by Interviewee Diving 6 and Table 
Tennis 2 that:   
[The expectation of] the Chinese people for the [Chinese national diving] team 
is that you have to win Olympic gold medals. In order to do that …, we thus 
give up other routes [of development], such as professionalisation. … If you 
are the one who is responsible [for the sport], no one cares about 
professionalisation but all focus on [Olympic] performance. You dare not risk 
[Olympic performance for professionalisation], even if you are the political 
leader [of Chinese diving]. If [Chinese diving] failed to attain an excellent 
performance, who would dare to take the responsibility? Thus we 
don’t…promote a stance [for reform].  
Interviewee Diving 6 
The national team is mainly supported by the country, thus … the need for 
[the reform for] civil-society-based development is not so urgent. Only those 
who are starving are eager to reform, isn’t it? … What are you going to do, if 
the country stops funding? This is the original driving force for the 
reform…At present, … [Chinese table tennis] still has an important duty, 
winning Olympic glory…Thus, [professional] clubs, in other words the 
professional league is still [a] supplementary element [of the national 
team], … which has not been highly promoted.  
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Interviewee Table Tennis 2 
Both diving and table tennis are regarded as key sports for the Chinese 
Olympic strategy, each of which have won more than 20 Olympic gold 
medals for China since the 1984 Olympics. In the above quotations from 
Interviewee Diving 7 and Table Tennis 2 concerning of the limited 
civil-society-based development in diving and table tennis, i.e. the 
introduction of professionalisation, the significance of the Olympic 
performance is differently constructed by the interviewees from the two 
sports 
Through explicitly emphasising the “Olympic gold medal” as an expectation 
of “the Chinese people” that “has to” be met, and employing other terms with 
a political denotation in the Chinese context, such as ”political leader” of 
sport, ”taking responsibility”, etc., Interviewee Diving 7 maintains a ‘traditional’ 
tone portraying the Olympic performance as the political task of Chinese elite 
sport. Furthermore, he also consistently stresses the importance of Olympic 
performance from the perspective of Chinese elite sport reform, stating “no 
one cares about professionalisation but all focus on Olympic performance”. In 
other words, we would argue that this account constructs a consensus (or 
general knowledge), in Chinese diving, of the considerable difference in the 
importance between the reform and Olympic performance. Additionally, he 
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further acknowledges that the Olympic performance is so important that no 
one “dare to” risk it by promoting reform. It could be argued that such a 
constant emphasis on Olympic performance is a causal factor, if not the factor, 
resulting in the abandoning of the essential reform in Chinese diving, or, as 
he exemplifies, of “the route … [of] professionalisation”. 
In addition, the reform in elite sport also affects the discursive construction of 
the significance of Olympic performance, such as is evidenced in the above 
quotation from Interviewee Table Tennis 2. Interpreting from a financial 
perspective, Interviewee Table Tennis 2 associates the promotion of “winning 
Olympic glory” with the support from the country and portrays the 
reforming element, i.e. the professional league, as “supplementary” to the 
Olympic strategy and to the financial support from the country. In other 
words, with the existing professional league, Chinese table tennis is 
attempting to be, to a degree, self-sufficient, which is portrayed as the 
“original driving force” of the reform, even though its main source of support 
continues to be the national government. We would argue that the 
simultaneous inclusion of the Olympic strategy and professional league in the 
quotation from Interviewee Table Tennis 2, on the one hand, reflects the 
coexistence of the two sources of finance for the national squad and the 
Chinese Table Tennis Association. On the other hand, this account also 
constructs the co-existence of the ‘promotion of Chinese elite sport reform’ 
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and ‘the winning of Olympic glory’, i.e. the goal of Juguo Tizhi, in Chinese 
elite sport. The latter is however given greater emphasis. We would further 
argue that given the importance of these two key sports to the Chinese 
Olympic strategy and their reliance on government funding, the significance 
of the elite sport performance is consistently emphasised by the two 
interviewees. However, even though both indicate a positive attitude to 
Chinese elite sport reform, they nevertheless construct the relationship 
between elite sport performance and Chinese elite sport reform differently, 
especially in terms of the introduction of professionalisation. This different 
account reflects the difference in the degree of civil-society-based 
development in the respective sports, and of the dominance of Juguo Tizhi 
discourse, which emphasises elite sport performance as a key element of the 
vested interests of the Zhuanye sport system. 
By contrast to such emphasis on the significance of elite sport performance 
and Olympic glory, the significance of Olympic performance, more precisely 
of the Olympic Games per se, is differently interpreted by Interviewee Baseball 5 
from Chinese baseball. 
Sport is a game, the Olympics, ultimately, is also a game. It is a game to 
which the people assign different layers [of implication] … It is this kind of 
sport [such as baseball], about which no one cares, that either ends [as a 
Zhuanye sport] or reverts to its essence [as just a game].  
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Given the marginal position of Chinese baseball in the Olympic strategy, it 
could be argued that the advocacy of the essence of the Olympics and of sport 
in general, and the construction of the direction of Chinese Baseball reflect the 
necessity of civil-society based development of Chinese baseball. This is to say 
that the development mode of Zhuanye sport, which associates the sport with 
governmental funding, would naturally lead to an accentuation of Olympic 
performance. However, for such a sport that has rarely produced any 
Olympic achievement, continuously emphasising Olympic performance is 
meaningless for gaining recognition and attention in the Zhuanye sport 
system. 
Through deemphasising the extrinsic function of, and related significance of, 
the Olympics and of sports in general, Interviewee Baseball 4, on the one hand, 
portrays, or normalises, the limited ‘value’ of Chinese baseball as the true 
nature of all sports. On the other hand, he also deemphasises both those 
‘values’ that are exogenously imposed on sport and the ways that emphasises 
those imposed ‘values’. We would thus argue that the notion of “its true self” 
embraces a two-fold meaning, including the nature of elite sport, as “just a 
game”, and as a ‘natural’ medium of development, i.e. the civil-society-based 
mode of development. 
Based on our analysis in this section, we would make a brief conclusion 
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before starting an investigation of the influence of the Beijing Games on 
post-2008 Chinese elite sport development. Even though Chinese elite sport 
achieved its peak performance in the 2008 Olympics, the further emphasis on 
the extrinsic function of the Olympics (including both the 2008 edition and 
other Olympic Games) and of elite sport is the defining character that 
differentiates the pre- and post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse. Such 
‘improved’ knowledge of the Olympics constructs an alteration in the attitude 
of the PRC in relation to its interaction with international community, and 
reflects the increased power and international status of China. 
The increased emphasis on the extrinsic function of the Olympics and on the 
general success of the Beijing Games does not decrease, but maintains the 
importance of Juguo Tizhi in Chinese elite sport, which is consistent with the 
vested interests of the Zhuanye sport system. However, the interpretation of 
significance of the Olympics in terms of its extrinsic functions varies among 
different sports in various positions on the power hierarchy of Chinese elite 
sport. This different account, on the one hand, reflects the different roles of 
these sports in the Olympic strategy and their respective interests. On the 
other hand, it also shapes the direction, and progress, of development of the 
respective sports in the post-2008 era, which is investigated in the following 
two sections.  
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6.2 Being a ‘Sport Power’ and the post-2008 development of Juguo Tizhi  
Becoming “a Sport Power”60, which was advocated by the then-President of 
China (Hu 2008c) at the Awards Ceremony for the 2008 Olympics and the 
Paralympics, is recognised as the next mission assigned to SADs. This 
important addition to the Chinese elite sport discourse in the post-2008 era 
immediately became the main slogan for Chinese (elite) sport development. 
For example, it was employed by the Minister of Sport (P. Liu 2009b) as the 
title of his speech at the 2009 Conference of All-State Sports Ministers. In the 
latest version of the Strategic Plan for Winning Olympic Glory (GAS 2011a), i.e. 
the 2011 Plan, it is identified as the ten year goal of the development of 
Chinese sport in the section Guiding Theory and Principle. Rhetorically, in that 
section, the term of ‘sport power’ is introduced following reference to socialist 
theories and the related terminology employed by each generation of the 
Chinese top leaders, even before reference to “the needs of Chinese people in 
sport” (GAS 2011a, p.1).  
                                                 
60 The notion of a ‘Sport Power’, representing the future target of Chinese elite sport, is 
combined by Hu with the term ‘Sport Giant’ in his speech, which refers to the status of China 
after the Beijing Games. These two terms are also translated as “Strong Sporting Nation” and 
“Major Sports Nation”(Research Group of the Studies on Theory and Practice of stepping 
from a Major Sports Nation to a Strong Sporting Nation 2010).    
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Even though Hu did not provide an elaboration of the concept of ‘being a 
Sport Power’, this ”new outline and objective for the future development of 
Chinese sport” (Research Group of the Studies on Theory and Practice of 
Stepping from a Major Sports Nation to a Strong Sporting Nation 2010, p.1) is 
given great attention by, and is seriously studied and discussed in, Chinese 
elite sport. For example, not long after Hu’s speech in September 2008, the 
GAS summoned a group of the best-known Chinese sport intellectuals 
working with the China Institute of Sport Science (a directly affiliated public 
institution of the GAS; CISS, hereafter.) and produced a book in 2010, which is 
entitled ’Studies on the Theory and Practice of stepping from a Major Sports Nation 
to a Strong Sporting Nation’ (hereafter, the Research of Sport Power). Given the 
leading role of the CISS and the influence of the GAS in this research, it could 
be argued that this report could be recognised as an official interpretation of 
this crucial concept of Chinese sport in the post-2008 era. 
As is the case with D. Xiong’s (2002) specification of the intrinsic and extrinsic 
functions of sport, the research group identifies two defining criteria for a 
country to be recognised as a Sport Power. Intrinsically, it is “a country with 
fundamental strength in high level sport and core influence [in sport]61”(Bao 2010, 
                                                 
61 The fundamental strength incorporates infrastructures and facilities, the number of active 
people, quantity and quality of sport talent, the scale of the sport market and spending, etc. 
The core performance refers to the international performance of elite athletes, the number of 
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p.6). The performance in international events is an important element of the 
latter. It is identified with referencing to extrinsic purposes as follows:  
A country is a Sport Power as long as its sport development can integrate into, 
and fully promote, the development of its politics, economy, society, culture 
and its people; in other words, as long as that the positive externality of the 
sport in that country is huge and powerful.   
Bao, 2010, p. 6 
In addition, following the officially-recognised three components of Chinese 
sport, i.e. mass sport, elite sport and the sport industry, it is also specified that 
the sport of a Sport Power embraces three characteristics: a) it is 
people-oriented, b) it is beneficial to the development of the country, c) it is 
comprehensive, harmonious, and sustainable. 
From this broad, but vital, elaboration of the defining criteria and characters 
of ‘a Sport Power’, we would argue that, on the one hand, consistent with the 
character of post-2008 Chinese Olympic discourse, this official account 
emphasises the extrinsic function of Chinese sport, especially those relating to 
the development of the country, in China’s procedure of being a ‘Sport 
                                                                                                                                           
sport stars and famous clubs, the influence in IFs, and powerful sport media (Research Group 
of the Studies on Theory and Practice of stepping from a Major Sports Nation to a Strong 
Sporting Nation 2010, p.6).  
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Power’. On the other hand, the importance of elite sport, more precisely of 
Zhuanye sport, is subtly maintained, while other parts of Chinese sport, i.e. 
mass sport and the sport industry are explicitly given more accentuation in 
the statement.  
Despite the close relationship of Zhuanye sport with the concept of “core 
performance” and related elements of “general strength”, which is explicitly 
indicated in the portrayal of the defining criteria; Zhuanye sport is also subtly 
portrayed as an element with which all other components in Chinese sport 
need to cope in the statement concerning the character of a ‘Sport Power’. For 
example, it is stated that ‘the comprehensive, cohesive, and sustainable 
development of sport’ is basically manifested as “the cohesive development 
of elite sport and mass sport, of amateur sport and professional sport, and of 
the sport cause62 and sport industry” (Bao, 2010, p.6). Given the power and 
                                                 
62 ‘Sport cause’ is translated from the Chinese term “Tiyu Shiye”(体育事业). As we 
previously indicated, “Tiyu” is normally translated as ‘sport’, in spite of other meanings 
relating to physical activities. The term, “Shiye” can be translated as a) “cause and 
undertakings”, i.e. revolutionary cause; and b) “(non-private) enterprise; (non-private) facility” 
(Oxford·FLTRP English - Chinese 2010). Though “Tiyu Shiye” has been mentioned in many 
quotations in this thesis, following the first English meaning, it is normally translated as 
‘Chinese sport’ or ‘sport’. Such as ‘[we] have to scientifically plan the development of the 
sport of our country in the next decade’ (GAS 2002, p.1) and ‘…the development of sport is 
insufficient …’ (SPCSC 1993d, p.1).  
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significance of Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi in Chinese “elite sport” in 
general, which we have sought to demonstrate in this thesis, and the 
‘public-institutional’ denotation of the term “sport cause” referring to the 
government-run Zhuanye sport (as elaborated in the footnote), which is the 
key point denoted in these two terms, we would suggest that the 
development of Zhuanye sport is continuously promoted in this official 
interpretation of ‘Sport Power’. 
                                                                                                                                           
With its second meaning, ‘Shiye’ is usually combined with the Chinese word of ‘institution’, 
forming a nominal term ‘public institution’, referring to ‘the public service organizations that 
are established by the state organs or other organizations by using the state-owned assets’ 
(The State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1998, p.1). 
In the above quotation, “Tiyu Shiye” is compared with “sport industry”, which is a 
market-oriented concept that has been promoted in the Chinese elite sport reform. We would 
argue that through this comparison, the authors emphasise the ‘non-private’ and 
‘public-institutional’ feature of “Tiyu Shiye”. Given the innate planned-economy 
characteristic of Zhuanye sport, it could be argued that it is Zhuanye sport that is connoted in 
the term of ‘Tiyu Shiye’ to be compared to the sport industry. 
This comparison between the two is also evidenced in other Chinese elite sport accounts, 
such as the Sport Minister’s (Liu, 2007,p.1) speech elaborating the difference between the two 
that: 
Sport cause and sport industry are different and oppose one another… [We have to] correctly 
manage the relationship between the two, in order to achieve the coordinated development of the 
two, [and make them] facilitate each other. 
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However, this is not to say that the post-2008 Chinese elite sport discourse is 
merely a duplication of what it was in the pre-2008 era, especially with the 
increase in emphasis on promoting sport reform and the development of 
sport industry. Thus, in order to grasp the subtle development, we separately 
analyse the post-2008 development of Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi and of 
Chinese elite sport reform in the following sections. 
6.2.1 The concept of ‘Sport Power’ and the maintenance of Juguo Tizhi  
As previously argued, the concept and interpretation of “becoming a Sport 
Power” have increased the significance of ‘mass sport’ and ‘sport industry’, 
which are the two other elements of the three-fold notion of Chinese sport 
(besides elite sport). That is to say that given the power structure of Chinese 
society and the governmental nature of SADs, this ‘new’ discourse, 
“becoming a Sport Power”, because it was promoted by the top leader of the 
communist regime gained significantly in influence in Chinese sport 
discourse in the post-2008 Chinese context. This ‘privileged’ discourse, which 
frames a ‘new’ power structure of different parts of Chinese sport, 
re-constructed the understanding in Chinese society of a more appropriate, 
and more balanced, way of sport development. This ‘new knowledge’ of 
Chinese society increased the emphasis on the development of ‘mass sport’ 
and ‘sport industry’, and, in return, overshadowed the significance of elite 
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sport achievement in Chinese society. 
For example, since 2010, mass sport has replaced elite sport, as the first 
section of the Sport Minister’s speeches at the annual All States Sports 
Minister Conferences. In addition, there were two noticeable documents 
published by the State Council after the Beijing Games, which are the Guidance 
for accelerating the development of sport industry (The General Office of the State 
Council of the PRC 2010) and the new version of the Sport-for-all Fitness 
Programme63 (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2011). Even 
though the new version of the Sport-for-all Fitness Programme is a projected 
renewal of the previous edition, such a trend of increasing emphasis on the 
balanced development of Chinese sport is associated with the decrease in the 
pressure on Chinese elite sport for excellence in performance in the post-2008 
era. It is stated by Interviewee General 1 that 
After the Beijing Games…neither the GAS, nor other SADs, have ever relaxed 
[in preparing for the Olympics]. Within the [Chinese elite sport] system, it 
was claimed for “preparing for the London Games in the same way of the 
preparation for the Beijing Olympics” … [However] relatively speaking, the 
                                                 
63 The former version of the programme was published in 1995, one year after the first 
edition of the Olympic Strategy. It is indicated in the programme that it covered the period 
from 1995 to 2010. One year after the State Council announced this new edition of the 
Programme, a White Paper on the achievement of the former version of the Programme was 
published by the GAS. 
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balance [between different parts of Chinese sport] has been better since the 
Beijing Games. It was so unbalanced before the Beijing Games that Chinese 
elite sport had basically been under great pressure in the process of ‘battle 
preparation’.  Non-Olympic sports, let alone mass sport (which was so much 
less-emphasised), were inhibited as well. The balance became better after the 
Beijing Games … but is still not very satisfactory. 
Interviewee General 1 constructs two different trends within and outside  
the Chinese elite sport system in terms of the importance of elite sport 
performance after the Beijing Games in the above quotation. On the one hand, 
consistent with the requirement of ‘balanced development’ in the notion of 
‘Sport Power’, he indicates an improved balance between Olympic sports and 
other parts of Chinese sport, especially mass sport, the latter of which was 
“repressed” in the “battle preparation” for the Beijing Games. On the other 
hand, through quoting the slogan of the SADs concerning the preparation for 
the London Olympics, Interviewee General 1 explicitly portrays a consistent 
emphasis on the Olympic performance that has been maintained by the GAS 
and SADs within the Chinese elite sport system. We would argue that this 
internal attitude towards elite sport performance, on the one hand, reflects the 
vested interests of Zhuanye sport, which has been realised through providing 
satisfactory elite sport performance. On the other hand, it is also heavily 
influenced by the official interpretation of the role of elite sport performance 
for the ‘Sport Power’ nations, the competition among which is explicitly 
addressed. For instance, it is stated in the general report of the ’Research on 
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Sport Power’, and is emphasised by the Sport Minister from the perspective of 
the extrinsic function, and symbolic meaning, of sport in international 
competitions: 
At present, the competition among the major sport countries in their general 
strength in sport, which includes mass sport, elite sport and the sport 
industry, has become more and more fierce … we have to be soberly aware that 
the main force controlling international sport is still the West. Along with our 
transferring procedure from a Sport Giant to a Sport Power… we will have 
competition with them across all sports dimensions …   
Bao, 2010, p. 3 
Constructing a Sport Power…is the strategic deployment made by … the 
Secretary General … at the height of realising the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation…the world becomes multi-dimensional, globalisation is 
irreversible … the competition among powerful countries in their 
comprehensive national power has become more and more fierce…In modern 
society, sport has become an important symbol of the development and the 
civilisation of… a society, [sport] has been a crucial manifestation of the 
comprehensive national power and competitive power of a country, and has 
been an indispensable vital driving force for building the socialist modernised 
powerful country.  
P. Liu, 2010, p. 1 
In both quotations, “competition” is employed as the main term constructing 
the relationship among countries, especially those recognised as ‘Sport 
Powers’, in the era of globalisation. It is also explicitly indicated that China 
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“will have all-dimensional competition” with these Sport Powers. This notion, 
on the one hand, suggests an equal position of China with other countries, 
which is consistent with the goal of the nationalist term the “great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” that is employed in the quotation from 
Liu Peng’s speech. On the other hand, it also identifies the competitive nature 
of the interaction between China and external worlds, and the symbolic 
meaning of sport in this type of international relationship. 
It could be argued that through portraying the competing relationship 
between China and other countries in the world, sport is constructed not only 
as an “arena” of such contest, but also a means, or a symbol, of the 
competition. Even though, it is projected that there will also be general 
competition in other parts of Chinese sport, i.e. mass sport and the sport 
industry, in the first quotation; Liu Peng specifically emphasises that ”elite 
sport represented by the Olympics has strong international comparability, 
and is hence the distinctive indicator and representation of a Sport Power” 
(Liu, 2010, p.1). We would argue that due to the essential characteristic of elite 
sport, i.e. the international comparability, it could naturally and easily be 
utilised as the means for such competition. In other words, it could be argued 
that the continuous emphasis on the “competitive feature” of sport in the 
post-2008 Chinese sport discourse, especially in the notion of “becoming a 
Sport Power”, directly maintains the importance of elite sport performance 
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after the Beijing Games. On the other side of the coin, given elite sport is also 
identified as “the vital support and driving force” for other elements of 
Chinese sport in the official interpretation of “Sport Power” (Hu 2010, p.45), 
the increased emphasis on the importance of other parts of Chinese sport 
indirectly promotes the significance of elite sport in the post-2008 era. 
This maintenance of the importance of elite sport performance and thus of 
Juguo Tizhi is also evidenced in the 2011 Summary, directly or indirectly. As 
quoted in Section 1.2 of this thesis, the significance of, and the extrinsic 
function of, the Olympic Games is stated more explicitly in Section 2 of the 
2011 Summary, ‘the Opportunity for and Challenges to the sustainable development 
of Chinese elite sport’. Following the statement that is quoted in Section 1.2, it is 
stated that   
All countries and regions pay more attention to elite sport in the 21st 
century…governments’ leadership in elite sport has been reinforced… 
competition has become fiercer…Especially, the rapid development of 
professional sport has accelerated the civil-society-based development of, 
marketization of, and the professionalisation of elite sport, has changed the 
traditional system and mechanism of elite sport…; a new form of elite sport 
development that is closely associated with the Olympics and has its own 
characters is [thus] established. 
GAS, 2011, p. 1 
Straightforwardly, it could be argued that through normalising of the 
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governments’ role in elite sport, the policy makers consistently legitimate the 
SADs’ dominance in elite sport in the quoted policy statement. However, it is 
worth noting the portrayal of professional sport, which is restated after its 
absence in the 2001 edition. On the one hand, consistent with its reforming 
connotation, professional sport is identified as an accelerator of elite sport 
reform that is represented by terms in the above quotation, which relate to the 
essential reform of Chinese elite sport, such as “civil-society-based 
development”, “marketization” and “changing the traditional system and 
mechanism of elite sport”. On the other hand, and more importantly, 
professional sport is officially recognised as an element of “a new form of elite 
sport development that is closely associated with the Olympics”. This account, 
which is similar to, but more explicit than, the positive attitude towards 
professional sport in the 1994 Summary, is different from the statement of the 
2001 Summary, in which professional sport is isolated from the Olympic task. 
We would argue that this account associating this commercial phenomenon 
with Olympic performance constructs the consistency between the two and 
increases the reforming tone of the policy.  
Nonetheless, it is stated in the practical section, the [implementation] measures, 
of the 2011 strategy, that the principle for promoting professional sport is that 
“[professional sport should be] administered in an orderly fashion, [its] 
development is controllable, [it should] serve the Olympics” (GAS 2011a, p.1). 
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Though it is further analysed in the following section concerning professional 
sport, we would argue, at this stage, that terms such as 
“administrated”, ”controlled” and “serve” construct the relationship between 
professional sport and SADs. In other words, through restating professional 
sport in the 2011 Summary, the policy makers maintain, if not reinforce, the 
SADs’ control over professional sport, while obeying the concept of ‘Sport 
Power’ through indicating the ‘new’ recognition of, and attitude towards, 
professional sport. 
The influence of ‘Sport Power’ is also evidenced in other sections of the 2011 
Summary, for example, it is stated in the following section, the guiding theory 
and principle, that 
…[we should] regard becoming a Sport Power as the goal, regard fulfilling the 
people’s need in sport as the starting point … insist on the development route 
of elite sport with Chinese characteristics, consistently implement the 
Olympic strategy… regard promoting the all-around development of human 
beings… [in order to] promote the comprehensive and sustainable 
development of Chinese elite sport, and positively contribute to the 
development of a moderately prosperous society and a socialist harmonious 
society. 
The GAS, 2011b, p. 1 
Besides the direct reference to ‘Sport Power’, which is identified as the 
ultimate goal for which the Olympic strategy works (or, as the ultimate 
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outcome of winning Olympic medals), a number of sub-concepts related to 
the characteristics of ‘Sport Power’ are also employed in the above quotation, 
including “all-around development of human beings”, “the comprehensive 
and sustainable development of Chinese elite sport” and the socialist 
development of the country. Meanwhile, a protective attitude towards Juguo 
Tizhi and Olympic performance is also constructed through employing terms 
such as “insisting on” and “consistently implement” in the above quotation. 
This is consistent with our previous assertion of the continuous emphasis on 
elite sport performance and the increasing weight assigned to other parts of 
Chinese sport that is associated with the reform and civil society-based 
development of Chinese elite sport.  
In the following section on the objectives of development and main tasks in the 
2011 Summary, a co-emphasis of these two directions is also evidenced. For 
instance, “the refinement of developing mode” of Chinese elite sport is 
stressed as the leading objective and (or but) is accompanied by the 
requirement of excellent elite sport performance in international events. In the 
subsequent statement, while the maintenance of excellent performance is 
stressed as a priority task, another two additional tasks, “boosting the reform 
of elite sport system” and “exploring the development route of professional 
sport with Chinese characteristics”, closely relate to elite sport reform, and are 
newly introduced in this part of the Olympic strategy.  
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Similarly, in the following [implementation] measures section, even though two 
specific measures, i.e. Deepening Reform, Innovating the Developing Mode of Elite 
Sport and Exploring the Development Route of Professional Sport with Chinese 
Characteristics, are designated to elite sport reform; Juguo Tizhi and Olympic 
strategy is consistently emphasised in a leading article that is entitled “Aiming 
to become a Sport Power, maintaining and refining of Juguo Tizhi and continuous 
implementing of the Olympic strategy”. Additionally, another four measures (2, 3, 
4, 6), which cover respective areas of the Zhuanye sport system and Juguo 
Tizhi framework, are subsequently identified as supplementing the first. 
Furthermore, even in the reform-related parts, for example the previously 
quoted statement relating to the development of professional sport, elite sport 
performance and government control remain subtly but significantly 
addressed.  
6.2.2 The development of Juguo Tizhi discourse and of the Juguo Tizhi 
system 
Compared to the ten year review of Olympic strategy, swiftly changing 
accounts, such as the annual speech of Sport Minister, and external 
interpretation of the development of Chinese elite sport, rapidly and subtly 
reflect and restructure the knowledge concerning, and the power structure of, 
Chinese elite sport, while constructing a relatively stable post-2008 theme, i.e. 
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that of ‘becoming a Sport Power’. In considering the discursive construction 
of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye sport, there are apparent differences in Liu 
Peng’s speeches at the 2009 and 2013 All States Sports Minister Conferences, 
even though both are consistently emphasised. 
In his 2009 speech, Liu answers the questions “concerning the value, task, 
direction and mode of Chinese sport in future; and with Juguo Tizhi, 
harmonious development and government’s role in sport” through stating 
that: 
We have a clear understanding of Juguo Tizhi … [which] is an effective elite 
sport operations system. It is impossible for China to achieve its historical 
breakthrough [in 2008] without Juguo Tizhi; destabilising Juguo Tizhi… 
would lead to a collapse in elite sport performance and negatively affect mass 
sport. Thus we have to maintain and refine Juguo Tizhi, utilising its 
cohesiveness and effectiveness [in battle preparation] as well as its 
effectiveness in the integration and coordination [of interests and resource] … 
in terms of the government’s leadership over sport, it should only be reinforced 
but not be weakened…in terms of the problems of Chinese sport, we should 
neither reject [solving the problems] nor … using these problems deny the 
glorious achievement, core value and fundamental experience of Chinese sport. 
P. Liu, 2009, p. 1 
We would argue that similar to the narrative in the pre-2008 era, which was 
just one year prior to this speech, a generally protective attitude towards 
Juguo Tizhi is constructed as the main theme of the quotation. For example, in 
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his evaluation of Juguo Tizhi, Liu, on the one hand, directly, employs the 
achievement in elite sport to endorse this ‘effective operation system’. On the 
other hand, he also emphasises the necessity of maintaining the stability of 
Juguo Tizhi through projecting the potential negative impacts on mass sport if 
Juguo Tizhi were to be withdrawn, even though there is a struggle for 
resources between the two. In addition, such a protective tone in the account 
concerning Juguo Tizhi is also reflected in the indication of “the glorious 
achievement, core value and fundamental experience” of Chinese sport in 
general, all of which, nonetheless, is mainly associated with elite sport and 
thus can be, directly or indirectly, linked with Juguo Tizhi. 
However, the Sport Minister’s account also implies an attempt to retain the 
possibility of both directions of reform and Juguo Tizhi in this speech. These 
attempts to balance both tendencies are reflected in the framing of the 
statement “neither…nor”, which rejects a radical move in either direction; 
and is reflected also in Liu’s emphasis on the different features of Juguo Tizhi 
that need to be utilised for the post-2008 development of Chinese elite sport. 
This is to say that the features of “cohesiveness and effectiveness [in battle 
preparation]” construct the link between Juguo Tizhi and elite sport 
performance; while the features of “effectiveness in the integration and 
coordination [of interests and resource]”, which are normally promoted in 
reforming rhetoric, imply the inter action between Juguo Tizhi and civil 
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society. 
Contrary to the pre-2008 Chinese elite sport discourse, in which the essential 
reform was superficially addressed, this emphasis on elite sport reform has 
been increasingly accentuated along with the post-2008 development of 
Chinese elite sport. Liu Peng’s 2013 speech covering the same domain 
provides a good example of the change in weight between the account related 
to Juguo Tizhi and to elite sport reform. It is stated that: 
 [We should] maintain and refine Juguo Tizhi, reinforce its sustainability, 
openness and inclusiveness, and promote Juguo Tizhi’s integration with 
interaction with [Chinese] society and market…[we should] cultivate sport 
culture [ in Chinese society] to promote the soft power of China…  
On the basis of maintaining and refining Juguo Tizhi, [we should] 
continuously reform and innovate [Chinese sport], resolve the problems in the 
system and mechanisms [of Chinese elite sport] that make Chinese elite sport 
imbalanced, discordant and unsustainable, and [we should] endeavour to 
explore multiple ways for elite sport development and a development mode for 
professional sport, which are consistent with the status quo of China.   
P. Liu, 2013, p. 1 
The phrase, “maintain and refine Juguo Tizhi”, appears in the quotations 
from both the 2009 and 2013 speeches, and is consistently followed by the 
acknowledgement of its features that are to be utilised. However, we would 
argue that the perspective implied by the same term in these two documents 
varies from one to the other, which constructs a change in the attitude 
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towards, and power relationship between, Juguo Tizhi and elite sport reform. 
As previously argued, the indication in the 2009 speech of ‘cohesiveness and 
effectiveness in battle preparation, in the integration and coordination of 
resource’ covers both Juguo Tizhi and elite sport reform. By contrast, in the 
quotation from the 2013 speech, Liu Peng highlights the ‘sustainability, 
openness and inclusiveness’ of Juguo Tizhi and its integration and interaction 
with Chinese society and the market. Even though the notion of 
‘sustainability’ could also be interpreted from the perspective of stressing the 
sustainable development of elite sport performance, given its usual reforming 
connotation, we would argue that the three features indicated in the 
quotation from the 2013 speech imply the increasing interaction, even 
“integration”, between Juguo Tizhi (also Zhuanye sport) and civil society.  
From another aspect, i.e. that of ‘solving the “problems” of Chinese elite 
sport’, Liu constructs the appropriate moves in a different manner, which 
provides another good example of the changing attitude of the Sport Minister. 
We would argue the genres employed in the quotation from the 2013 speech, 
i.e. “reform and innovate”, “resolve” and “endeavour to explore multiple 
ways”, focus on ‘one side’ of the “neither…nor” phrase that is indicated in his 
2009 speech. This partial emphasis not only identifies the appropriate moves 
that the GAS is implementing, but also constructs a more determined attitude 
towards the reform of Juguo Tizhi 5 years after the Beijing Games. In addition, 
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such a decrease in the weight of ‘the other’ half of the “neither…nor” phrase 
is also evidenced in the general account of the whole report. In the 2009 
version, Juguo Tizhi and the Olympic Games had each been mentioned 13 
and 27 times respectively, which were reduced to three and twelve times in 
the 2013 edition. Thus, we would argue that even though the maintenance of 
Juguo Tizhi is consistently indicated in the Chinese elite sport discourse, the 
power structure in Chinese elite sport discourse had been continuously 
modified throughout the post-2008 era, for example by the top sport 
bureaucrat of China.  
However, the effect of modifications in the discursive domain, not only the 
rapidly changing account but also relatively consistent policy and political 
theme, is not immediately evident in the practices of Chinese elite sport. For 
example, it is stated by Interviewee Diving 6, a Chinese Olympian, that “so far, 
there is no [change], especially no difference in Juguo Tizhi”, even though the 
post-2008 reform was projected before the Beijing Games and is advocated in 
the interpretation of the concept of ‘Sport Power’. There are also other 
interviewees who attempted, but eventually failed, to provide more 
characteristics that differentiated the pre-2008 and the post-2008 development 
of Juguo Tizhi except the tremendous resources invested in, and pressure on, 
Juguo Tizhi before the Beijing Games. Interviewee Diving 1 states that  
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There must be impact, [which] however, cannot be easily demonstrated … 
because diving has always had fabulous performance… [The development of 
Chinese diving] has hardly any relation with the Beijing Games… I know 
what you want … [but] how can I express it [in the way you need]. [I would] 
say that the Beijing Olympics… enabled us to have [more] detailed 
preparation with more [material] support. 
During the interview, Interviewee Diving 1 repeatedly claimed that “the Beijing 
Games had significant impact” on Chinese elite sport and implied that he 
understood the researcher ‘needed’ him to address some changes in the 
Zhuanye sport system in the post-2008 era, in order to show the significance 
of the Beijing Games. However, like many other interviewees, the senior 
official in the Centre of Aquatic sport was also not able to change his focus 
from resources and pressure.  
We would argue that this stability of Zhuanye sport after the Beijing Games is 
influenced by the discourse of, and the practice of, Chinese elite sport in the 
post-2008 era. In terms of the influence of Chinese elite sport discourse, it is 
consistent with the protective tone of the discursive construction of Juguo 
Tizhi in the Chinese elite sport documents, such as in the interpretation of 
‘Sport Power’ in the annual speeches of the Sport Minister and the 2011 
Summary. For example, it is stated in a sub-report of the Research of Sport 
Power that:  
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Given the scarce resource of China and the unbalanced development among 
elite sports, maintaining Juguo Tizhi…[and] implementing Olympic 
strategies is a necessary and inevitable choice …After the Beijing Games, as 
evidenced by the general strength of elite sport, there is no doubt that China 
has become a Sport Power in elite sport…Reinforcing and maintaining this 
advantaged position in elite sport is the primary requirement of the 
implementation of the strategy of becoming a Sport Power, [which aims to] 
lead the overall development of Chinese sport with the development of elite 
sport. 
L. Hu, 2010, p. 45 
Besides associating the implementation of Juguo Tizhi with the character of 
Chinese society, a supporting narrative that is evidenced in the pre-2008 
discourse, Hu also stresses maintaining the 2008 success and links this with 
the powerful notion of ‘Sport Power’. Even though, it is well acknowledged 
that Chinese elite sport achieved its peak performance in 2008, this emphasis 
on maintaining elite sport performance is also commonly evidenced in the 
post-2008 discourse, such as “at least [it should be] maintained… [in] the 
‘leading group’ [top three]” (Interviewee General 1). It could be thus be argued 
that the author associates excellent performance with the characteristics of 
Sport Power, i.e. sustainability, and thus utilises this powerful statement to 
legitimise the maintenance of Juguo Tizhi in official discourse while other 
parts of Chinese sport are also increasingly accentuated.  
Another example for the similar utilisation of ‘Sport Power’ in ‘protecting’ 
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Juguo Tizhi is the interpretation of the “comprehensive and harmonious” 
features of ‘Sport Power’ from the perspective of the all-around development 
of Olympic sport rather than of sport in general. Examples may include the 
Research on Chinese Olympic Performance (Long 2013), and Strategic Research on 
Elite ports in Strong Sporting Nations (Hu 2010), etc.  
In practical terms, the Zhuanye sport system is interpreted as a causal factor 
that proactively restrains the potential impact of the Beijing Games on the 
development, or reform, of Juguo Tizhi. For example, Interviewee Diving 2 
states that: 
Even though all are satisfied with the peak performance [in 2008], we can’t 
eliminate the need [for excellent elite sport performance]. Moreover, it is 
impossible [for Juguo Tizhi] to be weakened rapidly; the most fundamental 
reason is that there is such a [gigantic] system … dozens of Centres, 
provincial Sport Administrations, etc. … It is impossible to [start] reform of 
the [elite] sport system from inside, [would] anyone want to have a revolution 
against himself? [Thus the reform] has to be from top to bottom, for instance, 
the State Council’s reform of institutions [in 1998]64…Therefore, as long as 
the current system exists, [it is impossible to reform from its inside], [however] 
this is not to say there was no change after the Beijing Games, everyone 
gradually gave more attention to other issues including the People’s need, 
mass sport. 
                                                 
64 The State Council’s reform of institution in 1998 resulted in the restructure of the former 
SPCSC, a department of the Central government, into the GAS, a direct affiliated institution 
of the Central government. 
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Even though the interviewee acknowledges that the maintenance of Juguo 
Tizhi could be associated with the remaining need for elite sport performance, 
the Chinese elite sport system per se is explicitly identified as an obstacle, if 
not the obstacle, against potential change. It is interesting to note two terms or 
expressions employed by him, “weaken” and having a “revolution against 
himself”, respectively portraying the potential impact of elite sport reform on, 
and the nature of elite sport reform of, Juguo Tizhi. We would argue that the 
two terms construct a conflicting relationship between Juguo Tizhi and this 
expected reform, as we argued in the previous chapter. In order to provoke 
such a move that would be perceived as challenging the dominant position of 
Juguo Tizhi, the interviewee suggests a top-down approach that references 
the reform of institutions of the State Council in 1998. We would argue that 
this statement indirectly evidences the significance of the notion of “Sport 
Power” in the post-2008 era, which was indicated by the top leader of the PRC. 
However, as we have argued, the impact of this powerful discourse is 
influenced or directed by the interpretation placed upon it, especially by the 
official interpretation, i.e. that of the GAS. 
In conclusion, it seems contradictory that we, on the one hand, argue that the 
Beijing Games significantly influenced Chinese sport, and its success in the 
2008 Olympic Games, at least partially, produced the requirement of China 
becoming a ‘Sport Power’. On the other hand, we also claim that there is 
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limited tangible change in the development of the system and the operational 
mode of Juguo Tizhi. We would argue that this reflects a stratified diffusion 
of the impact of the Beijing Games and its effects at various levels in Chinese 
society. It is stratified in the sense that the Beijing Olympics’ legacies are 
realised at different times in the discursive and operational domain, i.e. in the 
ways in which elite sport is understood (or is portrayed), and in the way in 
which elite sport is administered and operated, to “brew and ripen” in 
Chinese society. For example, while claiming the limited impact of the Beijing 
Games on Juguo Tizhi, many interviewees acknowledge changes in terms of 
the social cognition of Chinese elite sport, such as the increase of people’s 
understanding of the sport. 
In terms of the impact [of the Beijing Games on Chinese table tennis], there 
would be a positive side…I think it has increased the understanding of 
Chinese table tennis. 
Interviewee Table Tennis 1 
In terms of the further impact of the [Beijing] Olympics, in fact, I think it just 
makes more people understand it … when I was [in my] diving [career], 
people used to say it is good because I could have a good husband, or I could be 
an Olympic champion and become rich  
Interviewee Diving 7 
This change in the cognition of Chinese elite sport, more precisely Zhuanye 
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sport, is also recognised in terms of the attitude towards Zhuanye sport and 
related elements. It is stated by Interviewee General 1 and Interviewee Diving 2 
that: 
Speaking from my perspective, there have been some changes in the role of 
Chinese elite sport in Chinese society… quietly taking place since the Beijing 
Games. This is to say that there has been a great increase in the attention 
people pay to commercial and professional sport rather than to the Olympics. 
Of course, I am not saying it exceeds the Olympics fever… [But] people’s 
interest in the Olympics is decreasing … it reflects that there are some quiet 
changes in people’s selection. 
Interviewee General 1 
What is the aim of [promoting] the concept of ‘Sport Power’…that 
was…indicated in the speeches of political leaders, after the Beijing Games? … 
Actually, it is to deemphasise elite sport [in Chinese sport]… Of course, it has 
been four or five years, and is not easy to tell whether the goal is achieved… 
But, at least, the political leaders released a signal, implying that the direction 
of Chinese sport will return to mass sport, to the society … which I think is 
very important.  
Interviewee Diving 2 
The two interviewees construct a similar decrease in the importance of 
Zhuanye sport recognised by the general public and China’s political leaders. 
It is portrayed in the above quotations that these two groups exert their 
influence in relation to Zhuanye sport through different ways, i.e. the general 
public decreases its attention on Zhuanye sport and the political leaders 
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proactively “deemphasise elite sport” in Chinese society. It could be argued 
that the ways in which political leaders influence Chinese elite sport is more 
direct than the influence exerted by the general public, suggesting a close 
relationship between Chinese politics and Chinese elite sport. This is 
consistent with our previous argument concerning the political origin and 
significance of Chinese elite sport. 
However, both interviewees directly or indirectly acknowledge the limited 
impact of this changed recognition of Zhuanye sport, including the 
authoritative statement of ‘Sport Power’, on the operation of Chinese elite 
sport. This is consistent with our previous argument concerning the time gap 
between the impact of the Beijing Games on the discursive and practical 
domain. We would thus further argue that given this difference in the speed 
of reaction to the influence of the Beijing Games, the impact of the Beijing 
Games in Chinese elite sport discourse would have an additional 
(constructing or reproducing) effect on the influence of the 2008 Olympics 
over the practices of Chinese elite sport, especially its reform.    
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6.3. Reform or resistance? The post-2008 development of three sports 
Consistent with the pre-2008 projection of Chinese elite sport reform in the 
post-2008 era and the emphasis on the comprehensive development of 
Chinese sport in the concept of ‘Sport Power’, Chinese sport reform, 
especially in terms of elite sport, was increasingly accentuated after the 
Beijing Games. In a way similar to that of the reforming discourse of the 
pre-2008 era, the conflicts between the planned-economy foundation of Juguo 
Tizhi and the market economy which had been established in Chinese society 
is recognised as the main factor contributing to the problems in Chinese sport. 
This claim is made in the sub-report concerning elite sport development in the 
Research on Sport Power that:  
With the reform of the society and of the economy and the refinement of the 
Socialist Market Economy … the increasing problems, deficiency and conflicts 
of Juguo Tizhi [with Chinese society] is the outcome of the inherent conflicts 
between its reliance on planned economy and … the Socialist market economy.  
L. Hu, 2010, p.51 
Through acknowledging the conflicts between the base of Juguo Tizhi and the 
market economy, the author indirectly constructs a connection between Juguo 
Tizhi and the communist features of the regime. However, similar to the 
communist features of the reformed Chinese economy, such as the 
government’s ‘macro control’ stressed by top leaders (Hu 2007; Jiang 1997; Xi 
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2014), we would argue that these conflicts do not inevitably lead to a 
termination of Juguo Tizhi in a socialist society with a market economy. In 
other words, just as there is a coexistence of the socialist character and market 
features of the reformed Chinese economy, a balance between the 
socialist-related elements, and the market-oriented direction, of Chinese elite 
sport is an essential feature of the post-2008 development of Chinese elite 
sport. Both features are recognised as necessary to Chinese elite sport. It is 
suggested by He and Xiong (2010, pp.11, 12) that: 
Even though ‘winning glory for the country’ embraces the interests of the 
general public, [because] this kind of interest, on the one hand, depends on an 
abstract concept, i.e. ‘the country’; and on the other hand, is limited within 
[the sphere of] spiritual needs, therefore this pure national and ideological 
interest will definitely [negatively] affect the interest of various 
stakeholders…[However, because] ‘winning Olympic glory’ is a public good 
that satisfies public needs, the State has to undertake the role of the major 
stakeholder (investor), while proactively seeking support from the society. 
The authors interpret the relationship between the country and ‘various 
stakeholders’ involved in elite sport, especially Zhuanye sport, from the 
perspective of the interests and the role of the two parties. It is important to 
recognise that the interpretation is made with a precondition, that it is 
absolutely essential that Chinese elite sport should ‘win Olympic glory’, and 
this reflects an internalised knowledge of the ‘political task’ of Chinese elite 
sport. With such preconditions for Chinese elite sport, it could be argued that 
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the key to its reform is not replacing Juguo Tizhi with a reformed system, but 
achieving a balance between “the interests of general public” realised via 
Olympic success and “the interests of various stakeholders”, which is 
promoted in the reform. Even though this balance was broken in the pre-2008 
era with the significance of success in the 2008 Games, it “became better after 
the Beijing Games” (Interviewee General 1). As we generally analysed in the 
previous section, the reform related content is considerably increased in the 
2011 Summary, especially those passages concerning the essential part of 
Chinese elite sport, even though the importance of Juguo Tizhi is still 
maintained. 
For example, besides the introduction of the notion of ‘Sport Power’ and 
related concepts, such as human-oriented development in the section on 
‘guiding theory’, the most noticeable modifications of the statement of the 
2011 Summary include the reinstatement of professional sport and the 
promotion of the reform of the administration system of Chinese elite sport. 
Both topics are not only briefly mentioned in the section on general strategy, 
the guiding theory and principle, but also specifically stated in the section on the 
objectives of development and main tasks paragraphs and on [implementation] 
measure. 
As we previously argued, there is a remarkable increase in the content related 
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to the development of professional sport. It is noteworthy that the “integrated 
development between Zhuanye sport and professional sport” is explicitly 
indicated for the first time since the first edition of the Olympic strategy 
published in 1994. Even though the ‘government’s direction’ and 
‘performance enhancement’ are consistently emphasised in the statement 
related to professional sport, the introduction of the inclusive statement 
reflects a change in the government’s knowledge and attitude towards 
professional sport. 
In terms of the reform of the administration system of Chinese elite sport, 
besides the rise in the sequence of points made in the section on tasks, related 
content is designated with a specific article in the section of the objectives and 
the [implementation] measures. Especially in the section on the [implementation] 
measures, the content concerning deepening the reform, which used to be 
combined with “maintaining and refining Juguo Tizhi” in the 2001 Summary, 
has become an independent article, the fifth article, that is described as 
“deepening reform, innovating the developing mode of elite sport”. It is 
stated 
 [We should] continue the institutional innovation, deepen the reform of the 
system and mechanism of elite sport…reinforce macro control; further change 
the role [of SADs], [further] separate administration and operation, [further] 
strengthen [the function of] supervision and public service …; [in order to] 
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establish a [new] elite sport administration system that is mainly directed by 
the government and is able to fully utilise the enthusiasm of the society. 
[We should] further deepen the elite sport administration system, gradually 
establish an administration system that fits global [rules] and the requirement 
of the Socialist market economy, reinforce the development of, and the 
administration system concerning, National Sport Associations … improve 
the administrative effectiveness and ability and the level of scientific 
management of National Sport Administrations. 
(GAS 2011b, p.1) 
A number of reforming terms and concepts are included in the quoted policy 
statement, including the explicit indication of issues related to the role of 
Sport Associations in, and civil-society-based development of, Chinese elite 
sport. It could be argued that this addition of the reforming content in the 
above quotation implies a change, at least, in the discursive domain of 
Chinese elite sport. However, SADs’ control is also continuously emphasised 
through indicating, for example, the need to “reinforce macro control”, to 
provide ”a [new] elite sport administration system that is mainly directed by 
the government”; or indirectly via the portrayal of the lack of competence of 
Sport Associations. 
This maintenance of SADs’ dominance is in line with its control over the 
tempo of the post-2008 development of Chinese elite sport, i.e. the general 
increase of reforming content in Chinese elite sport discourse and the 
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maintenance of Juguo Tizhi and of the notion of ‘winning glory for the 
country’. Consistent with this general protection over Juguo Tizhi, five out of 
eight articles in the section of measures directly concern Juguo Tizhi with an 
additional one (Article 8) emphasising the importance of ideological edition 
to elite athletes. Such maintenance of Juguo Tizhi is also recognised in the 
‘non-official’ interpretation of the Chinese elite sport in the post-2008 era, 
which is identified as “an elite sport [system] that is [continuously] directed 
towards ‘winning glory for the country’” by He and Xiong (2010, p.12). They 
(He and Xiong, 2010, p.12) argue that ‘winning glory for the country’ had to 
be maintained after the Beijing Games, because   
it is the precondition and foundation for elite sport to obtain resources from 
[Chinese] society in which the reform of economic system has not been 
completed, and the development of organisations in commercial and voluntary 
sector is inadequate. 
Even though the authors associate resources from society with “elite sport” as 
a whole, given the isolation of Zhuanye sport from the market and the 
resources that stakeholders in civil society invest in professional sport, it 
could be argued that it is Zhuanye sport that relies on ‘winning glory for the 
country’ to obtain resources. In other words, this account interprets the 
importance of ‘winning glory’ for Zhuanye sport. Similar to a pre-2008 
Chinese elite sport discourse, the inadequate involvement of Chinese society 
with elite sport, which would incorporate the civil-society-development of 
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Chinese elite sport, is employed as a causal factor in this pro-Juguo Tizhi 
move. However, we would argue that both elements, i.e. the necessity and 
significance of ‘winning glory’ and the inadequate development of Chinese 
civil society in sport, in the post-2008 era are different from what was the case 
before the Beijing Games. 
In terms of discourse concerning the two elements, changes in Chinese elite 
sport discourse are not only evidenced in the increasing pro-reform account 
in official documents and social consensus, but also in the statement related to 
the decreased attention paid to Olympics. Interviewee Table Tennis 6, for 
example, states that:  
There is less attention paid [to Chinese elite sport]. Because…China became 
No.1 [in Beijing]… After 2012, we feel that there will not be more suspense 
[in the Olympics]… that’s it. 
Even though the ‘political task’ of Chinese elite sport is still stressed in official 
documents, the account by Interviewee Table Tennis 6 reflects a decrease in 
Chinese Olympic fever, which, as we previously argued, was a condition 
reducing the importance of Juguo Tizhi in Chinese elite sport. In addition, 
elite sport performance is not only insufficient to fulfil the expectation, or to 
catch the attention of Chinese society, as indicated in the above quotation; but 
also is officially recognised as inadequate to fully ‘accomplish’ its new 
‘political task’, i.e. ‘becoming a Sport Power’. Thus, as we previously analysed, 
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a change in discursive domain is evidenced in the post-2008 era.  
On the other hand, the practical implication of such general discourse change 
on the development, especially the reform, of Chinese elite sport in the 
post-2008 era, is investigated in this section through examining three ‘niche 
markets’ of Chinese elite sport reform. Even though the focus remains on 
discourses in the three sports, we would argue that the changes in the 
discourse at micro level of Chinese elite sport reflects the impact of the 
changed general discourse on power relationships in Chinese elite sport. In 
other words, the discourse in the three sports would be our weathervane at 
the top of the complex construction of Chinese elite sport. 
 
6.3.1 Baseball: a case of ‘compelled civil-society-based development’  
Chinese baseball is a marginal sport in the power hierarchy of Zhuanye sport 
system. It is governed by the baseball office of the Administration Centre for 
Handball, Hockey, Baseball and Softball, which is also known as the Chinese 
Baseball Association (hereafter, the CBA). There are only a handful provincial 
elite baseball teams competing in the Chinese Baseball League (hereafter, the 
CBL) and the National Games. The CBL was terminated in 2012 due to 
insufficient funding. There have also been serious concerns about its place in 
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the National Games, even though this non-Olympic sport will at least be 
maintained in these Games (the domestic equivalent of the Olympics) until 
201765.  
In contrast to the dim future in the Zhuanye sport system, organisations in the 
commercial and voluntary sectors66 have become increasingly active in the 
post-2008 era. For example, Major League Baseball (hereafter, the MLB) 
restarted its promotion campaign for baseball around China with the new 
CEO of its China office, who replaced his predecessor after quitting his 
former job as the senior manager of Olympic sponsorship affairs in Lenovo in 
                                                 
65 Baseball and softball were maintained in the 12th National Games in 2013, because of a) the 
possibility of returning to the Olympics (Interviewee Baseball 12); and b) it was easy for the 
host province, Liao Ning, to earn points, as the host cut the number of participants at the final 
stage from eight to six (Liao Ning eventually finished at six and earned 12 points, which was 
4-points more than it would have won if ranked eighth) (Interviewee Baseball 3).  
It is also in the schedule of the 13th National Games in 2017, as the host city, Tianjin, is 
dominant in baseball. However, Guangdong (Canton) province has eliminated the sport from 
its Provincial Games (the equivalent of the National Games at provincial level, participants in 
which are mostly youth players) since 2011, 6 years earlier than its potential final curtain call 
in the National Games. This move is interpreted as an official termination of youth 
development of Guangdong and a sceptical projection of the future of this sport in the 
Zhuanye sport system (Interviewee Baseball 3 and 12).. 
66 The CBA is not considered a voluntary sector organisation here, because it has another 
identity as the Administration Department 
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November 2008. A grass-root league was started, the national final of which 
consisted of teams qualified from group matches in a number of provinces. 
However, the increasing resources invested in, and the cumulative attention 
paid to, baseball from the commercial and voluntary sectors have limited 
relation to, and interest in, Zhuanye baseball, which was the focus of the CBA. 
In spite of the differences in their respective foci in Chinese baseball, all 
interviewees (directly or indirectly) recognise that winning the Olympic bid 
had more impact on Chinese baseball than had the Games per se. The 
interpretation of the impact was mainly from the perspective of Zhuanye 
baseball, emphasising the increased benefits and media coverage before the 
Games. Interviewee Baseball 1, for example, a senior baseball official, recalled 
that: 
Before 2001…there had not been a platform for a national team for Chinese 
baseball … Elite athletes of the [Olympic] sports in which China is dominant, 
such as table tennis, diving… have [always] been accommodated in the 
Training Bureau of the GAS. They have a dorm, dining hall, etc [in the GAS]; 
[by contrast] we didn't have a position [of a permanently established national 
team in the GAS], which was then gradually provided to us after [winning] 
the bid. 
Terms, such as “2001” and “the bid”, explicitly indicate the time at which 
changes took place. Besides the quoted material, the interviewee also 
provided more evidence to demonstrate the differences in the benefits 
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provided to Chinese baseball before and after 2001, which is attributed as an 
outcome of winning the bid. We would, however, argue that it is important to 
recognise this improvement as the outcome of the changes of the identity of 
Zhuanye baseball from a potential Olympic sport to a sport that would form 
part of the Olympic programme. This is to say that the change in the 
circumstances, in which Chinese baseball would compete, altered the 
significance of what had been a marginal sport in Chinese elite sport, and 
thus enhanced the benefits provided via Juguo Tizhi.   
This knowledge of the significance of Olympic identity to Zhuanye baseball 
provides us a stable perspective to interpret the post-2008 development of 
Chinese baseball, which has been heavily influenced by the termination of its 
place in the Olympic programme and by the subsequent decrease of the 
importance of baseball in the Zhuanye sport system. Two Interviewees within 
the Zhuanye system, Baseball 10 (a key player in the 2008 team) and Baseball 9 
(a coach at the basic level of the three-level training framework) commented 
that: 
The Olympics is significant … athletes and coaches of Olympic sports are like 
the GAS’s own flesh and blood, but we … ~.  
Interviewee Baseball 10 
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Even though I could not reach the final stage of the Olympic competition, … 
[as long as it is an Olympic sport, the GAS] would not reduce or cancel the 
sport’s funding or let it run its own course, because it is Zhuanye baseball … 
in line with the USSR approach. It is same for the whole [Zhuanye sport] 
system.   
Interviewee Baseball 9 
In a manner similar to Interviewee Baseball 1, the Chinese Olympian also makes 
a comparison the benchmark of which, however, changes from “Olympic 
sports” rather than “the [Olympic] sports in which China is dominant”. It 
could be argued that this change in the ‘standard’ indirectly reflects a change 
in the identity of Zhuanye baseball, from that of “GAS’s own flesh and blood” 
to “orphans”, after its removal from the Olympic roster. This linkage between 
Zhuanye sport and the Olympics is also evidenced in the quotation from 
Interviewee Baseball 9. His emphasis on the character of ‘Zhuanye’ sport and 
system is noteworthy. We would argue that through deemphasising the 
significance of participating in the Olympics, and stressing the identity of 
Chinese baseball as a ‘Zhuanye’ sport, the interviewee indirectly 
demonstrates his support for maintaining government funding.   
Without providing the exact amount of funding, Interviewee Baseball 1, 
nonetheless, states that the CBA would be delighted if the GAS would 
provide 25% of the amount of the annual funding provided from 2001 to 2008. 
It is also acknowledged that the annual income of the CBA at the time of 
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interview could barely cover a two-week overseas training camp for the 
national squad. Thus the CBA, which relied on the resource from Juguo Tizhi, 
was forced to shift its operational pattern to expand its source of finance. 
Interviewee Baseball 1 indicates that   
We are not in the era of Norman Bethune67, in which resources are provided 
[to you] for free…For a [sport] association, it doesn’t work if it only focuses on 
Zhuanye teams or on whether or not it could participate in the Olympics; 
especially [for baseball] … a non-Olympic sport. [We] have to find some 
option, at least for survival … The only way out is [establishing] a chain [with] 
not only Zhuanye, but also amateur baseball including [involvement from] 
civil society and the education sector … Merely focusing on one area is not 
sustainable.   
Similar to the mentioning of ‘the USSR’ in the quotation from Interviewee 
Baseball 9, another term with strong communist connotation in the PRC 
context, i.e. “Norman Bethune”, is employed in the quoted material. Through 
associating the termination with the communist era and its non-Olympic 
identity, the interviewee indirectly frames a linkage in the above quotation 
                                                 
67 Henry Norman Bethune, a Canadian physician who is best known in the PRC for his 
service to the Chinese communist military force in the second Sino-Japanese war (the Asian 
part of the WWII). He was a member of the Communist Party of Canada. After refusing the 
invitation from Chiang Kai Shek, he went to Yan’an to join Mao Zedong’s communist side. 
He died in 1939 of septicemia, which he contracted through a finger cut in an operation. Mao 
wrote a famous article In Memory of Norman Bethune (Mao 1939), in which he was portrayed 
as a devoted, kind-hearted internationalist without any thought of himself. 
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between the political features of the Zhuanye sport system, the Olympic 
identity of the sport, and the support provided via Juguo Tizhi. This 
relationship could be characterised as Olympic sport being supported by the 
socialist-based Zhuanye sport via Juguo Tizhi. 
Hence, due to the change in its Olympic identity, Chinese baseball has to 
expand its focus from Zhuanye baseball to establishing a relationship with 
civil society for its “survival”. The Interviewee also admits, “those 
civil-society-based ways [of development] were all implemented after the 
‘de-Olympic-isation’”. However, we would argue from another perspective 
that such ‘relegation’ of Chinese baseball in the power hierarchy of the 
Zhuanye sport system, to a degree, has promoted the civil-society-based 
development of this sport in the post-2008 era, for example, in terms of the 
attention paid by the CBA to this domain. This is in line with Interviewee 
Baseball 12’s comment on the relationship between the Olympics and the 
domestic development of Chinese baseball. He indicates that 
[At present], with a step backwards, everyone could, nonetheless, gain a better 
understanding of…the rule of [the development of] this sport… [which] is to 
let more people participate. In fact, … if it had been maintained in the 
Olympics, I think Chinese baseball would have found it difficult to flourish … 
I am wondering what would happen if there were no Zhuanye, or even 
national, team of baseball? I think the obstacle confronted by Chinese baseball 
[in terms of its development] is not at this [elite] level, but is how to make the 
Chinese nation… accept the sport.  
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Both Interviewee Baseball 1 and 12 argue that the promotion of the 
Olympics-focused Zhuanye sport on its own is not enough to achieve strong 
development of the sport; or, as Interviewee Baseball 12 expresses it, is not even 
necessary. We would further argue that even though they all associate the 
development of baseball with civil society rather than government, the two 
interviewees constructs different goals of such civil-society-based 
development. These divergent goals are in line with the two interviewees’ 
respective relationships with, and interests in, the Zhuanye sport system. This 
is to say that while Interviewee Baseball 12, a sports correspondent who 
subsequently started an after-school baseball club, advocates a bottom-up 
approach to development and deemphasises elite level baseball; Interviewee 
Baseball 1 employs “survival” to portray the critical situation confronting 
Chinese baseball, or more precisely confronting Zhuanye baseball, despite the 
increasing level of activity of actors from the private and voluntary sectors. 
Thus, the involvement of civil society has become gradually more important 
to the CBA in the post-2008 era. This is partly related to the CBA’s reliance on 
resources from non-state sources. However it is also well recognised that civil 
society had become a crucial source of political kudos for the CBA. This 
increasing involvement of sporting civil society not only provided more 
resource and opportunity for the CBA to ‘survive’, but also influenced the 
dominance of the department of the GAS in baseball.  
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Interpreting the CBA’s cooperation with the MLB and Score Sport (the 
organiser of the amateur league), Interviewee Baseball 1 states: 
I think [we] have to appreciate them. … Even though there are some conflicts 
in our cooperation with the MLB … we are able to communicate with each 
other, thus the cooperation has worked pretty well. After all, they are helping 
us, in spite of different goals… if we merely focus on our own, there won’t be 
any great achievement in Chinese baseball with the CBA ourselves. Thus, we 
have cooperation, communication and coordination with then, and [attempt to] 
expand the cooperation through continuous communication. 
[Score Sport] attempted to work together with us [for the amateur league] in 
2011, [a request that] we did not approve… they listed the CBA as one of the 
consultants, but this transferred all responsibility to us in the event of 
accidents... they apologised to us, and we told [them] you may finish this first, 
and we will work together later. 
We would argue that the different terms employed by the interviewee in 
relation to the interaction between the CBA and the two partners constructs 
the different relationship between the authority of Chinese baseball and the 
two organisations in sporting civil society. In terms of its interaction with the 
MLB, Interviewee Baseball repeatedly employs the term “communication”, 
which implies a more equal relationship between the two parties in the 
post-2008 era. By contrast, the interaction between the CBA and Score Sport is 
portrayed with terms implying a more hierarchical relationship, as the latter’s 
activities had to be “approved” by the CBA, and there was a need to 
“apologise” for its behaviour to the CBA, and was subsequently “told” by the 
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CBA that it may provide authorisation for appropriate practice in future. 
It could be argued that the CBA’s different attitude, on the one hand, is 
affected by the differences of the resource and capability of the other party in 
the cooperation. As the dominant power in the baseball world, the MLB has 
met all expenses for the annual overseas training camp of the baseball 
national team, which is more than the annual income of the CBA. This is 
portrayed as the CBA’s strategy of ”‘borrowing another person’s hen to lay an 
egg for us’, … since we cannot do it [ourselves] at the moment” (Interviewee 
Baseball 1). However, Score Sport is only “a small non-governmental group … 
has beautiful plans which are difficult to achieve” (Interviewee Baseball 1).  
On the other hand, the different attitude of the CBA to the two organisations 
is also a consequence of the different areas to which these two organisations 
contribute. Even though the importance of development in civil society, such 
as school and amateur baseball, has been increasingly emphasised (Interviewee 
Baseball 2 and 10), it is explicitly indicated that the CBA “has never given up 
[at least] developing the national team” and expects to regain its ‘Olympic 
identity’ (Interviewee Baseball 1 and 4). We would argue that given this 
consistent attitude of the CBA to the national team, since Score Sport focuses 
on an area that makes it “very difficult to have influence on Zhuanye baseball” 
(Interviewee Baseball 10), it has less to negotiate with, and thus less influence on 
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the CBA than the MLB, whose involvement with Zhuanye sport not only 
includes supporting the overseas training camp but also establishing two 
Development Centres (hereafter the DCs) for young baseball players.  
Thus, even though the MLB is negatively perceived at provincial or basic 
level of Zhuanye baseball, for example, the DCs are blamed for “stealing” 
young talent from other sport schools (Interviewee Baseball 9) and are 
“looked down on by everybody“ (Interviewee Baseball 3), it is ‘dialectically’ 
interpreted by Interviewee Baseball 1 that: 
However, I think we must pick up the main trends [which are positive] instead 
of the negative points made by others, which is the way to refine our 
cooperation… The CBA can’t develop the sport solely on its own …It is 
impossible for any sport to be powerful, if its development only relies on one 
group of people or on one association. 
A statement by Interviewee Baseball 4, a junior member of staff at provincial 
level, provides a clear portrait of this complex relationship between the MLB 
and Zhuanye baseball and the different attitudes towards it at different levels 
of Zhuanye baseball: 
The [MLB] is in an awkward situation… is isolated from the development of 
[Zhuanye] baseball in the country… Everyone feels that you are rich, have a 
lot of resources, which I can take away from you. [I] feel they are viewed as an 
ATM machine… few people see them as partners for development…  
This isolating stance of the MLB, on the one hand, could be seen as an 
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outcome of its sole cooperation with Zhuanye baseball at the national team 
level and of DCs’ conflicts with other sport schools. On the other hand, this 
arm’s-length relationship is also portrayed by Interviewee Baseball 5, a senior 
manager of MLB China, as a projected by-product of the strategic plan of its 
cooperation with the CBA. He elaborates on this point:  
[Gathering as many fans as possible] is the ultimate benchmark of our work in 
the promotion campaign, as [those fans] could continuously consume baseball, 
otherwise how could [we] sell the product? … Thus, I don’t care so much 
about the serious fans and Zhuanye baseball, who love and are involved with 
the sport anyway, as I do to the new fans … I have been ‘criticised’ or ‘sneered’ 
at by those from Zhuanye system, which makes me feel happy and that I am 
correct. 
According to the quotation, the neglect of Zhuanye baseball is portrayed as a 
proactive choice of the MLB China based on its marketing strategy, which is 
in line with its commercial interests. In a manner consistent with the previous 
statement of Interviewee Baseball 4 concerning the relationship between MLB 
China and Zhuanye baseball, Interviewee baseball 5 also acknowledges the 
distant, if not conflicting, relationship through portraying his reaction to the 
“criticism” and “sneering” of the Zhuanye system.  
Even though the MLB is isolated by stakeholders at the practical and 
provincial level of Zhuanye baseball, the MLB’s influence at the top level of 
the CBA and of Zhuanye baseball and its commercial interests, which are 
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mainly gained from non-government sources, are hardly affected. We would 
argue that such ‘immunity’ from the influence of the Zhuanye sport system, 
on the one hand, is an outcome of the reliance of the CBA, especially at the 
top level, on the support of the MLB, which has grown remarkably since 
baseball lost its ‘Olympic status’. The influence of this change of the CBA’s 
identity is also emphasised by Interviewee Baseball 5. 
The government [the CBA] had embraced all of the benefits, drawn money 
from the market but had not paid back to the market [before 2008]…[the CBA] 
remains [a department in the] government sometimes, and a [sport] 
association [at other times]. … It thus did care much about market… [until] 
the privileges of the CBA disappeared, …. without the Olympic [identity] … 
It was pushed towards civil society, as the current [Zhuanye] system and 
mechanisms were not able to support the baseball personnel in the government. 
This, however, gives a new opportunity for the sport.    
Active and passive voices are respectively associated with the CBA before 
and after the Beijing Games. For example, the CBA “embraced…benefits, [and 
had] drawn money” before 2008, and “was pushed towards civil society” 
after the Games. It could be argued that this different tone constructs a change 
in the CBA’s relationship with civil society, especially with the market. Even 
though the interviewee recognises that the CBA maintains its character of 
‘one group with two banners’, he also acknowledges the decline in the CBA’s 
“privilege” along with its increasing reliance on civil society due to the 
decrease in the resource it controls, which accompanied the change of its 
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identity in the Zhuanye system. This is in line with its low-profile attitude in 
the cooperation with the MLB. In addition, it is worth noting that the 
traditional hierarchical administration system of Zhuanye sport also limits the 
‘bottom-up’ influence of the negative attitude of personnel at provincial level, 
who also seek resources from the [MLB]“ATM machine” (Interviewee Baseball 
4). 
On the other hand, the ‘resistance’ of the MLB could also be regarded as an 
outcome of its knowledge of, and obedience to, the character of Chinese elite 
sport and of Chinese society. This is to say that thanks to the stability of the 
structure of Chinese elite sport, at least when the data were collected, the CBA 
still held the important position, as the Administration Department, in 
Chinese baseball. This is also recognised and highly respected by the MLB 
China. It is stated that:    
[When we started] the cooperation, what the Centre worried about … was 
whether we would take [everything from] the market and get them fired. I told 
them …  neither you nor I were able to [develop Chinese baseball] alone; I 
would help you to develop it, what I asked was only a share of it… [you have 
to let the CBA know that] it is the master [in Chinese baseball], and it is the 
government, which means it will always be the master. 
The reform should not fully reject the current system … We hence cooperate 
with the CBA if we can, and do it by ourselves if we cannot … 
Cooperation …[means a] 50/50 [investment], I could pay 100%, if you don’t 
have the money, but you also need to invest [in other ways], which is the core 
  339 
of cooperation. What does the CBA have? It represents the government, … 
[which] is its value [and the reason why we cooperate with the CBA]… Since 
[those in the Zhuanye system] cannot [develop baseball in society], I have to 
do it, and let those who make decisions see it. There are no ways of attracting 
them to cooperate other than: firstly, offering them the political kudos; 
secondly, making money for them…  
Interviewee Baseball 5 
Even though the MLB has gained considerable influence in Chinese baseball, 
the interviewee’s portrait of the ‘right way’ of obtaining this influence reflects 
MLB China’s knowledge of, and the attitude towards, the structure of Chinese 
elite sport in the post-2008 era. This is different from the approach of the 
former CEO, a Chinese-speaking American who is viewed as, “having no 
respect for local features” (Interviewee Baseball 1) and “thinking their [the 
former CEO and the MLB] ways are the best” (Interviewee Baseball 2).  
In this interpretation of the concerns of the authority in the first quotation, the 
“Centre”, rather than the CBA or the baseball office, is identified as the 
counterpart negotiating with the MLB China to gain its cooperation. We 
would argue that this account indirectly reflects the essence of the power 
structure of Zhuanye baseball, or even of Zhuanye sport. In other words, it 
identifies the more important identity of the ‘two banners’ that are used by 
the one group of people, i.e. the CBA. The interviewee further identifies the 
two aspects that the Centre valued: a) its position in the Chinese elite sport 
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system, b) the market and resources this could provide for baseball. In both 
quotations, the interviewee employs a number of terms that are in line with 
the interests of the CBA, such as “help you develop”, “forever be the master”, 
“offering political kudos”, etc., conveying the MLB’s respect and potential 
contribution to the dominance of the authority and the financial benefit the 
MLB could contribute.  
Besides its obedience to the structure of Zhuanye baseball, the autonomy of 
the MLB China is also acknowledged through suggesting its capacity, for 
example, to accomplish its goal without the CBA’s cooperation and of 
demanding the authority’s “investment in other ways” with its advantage in 
resource. However, it is worth noting that these ‘capabilities’ and the MLB 
China’s autonomy also benefited from the MLB’s understanding of the 
character of the structure of Chinese sport. For example, even the personnel 
from the Zhuanye system regarded the MLB China’s cooperation with the 
education sector for youth development as a right move that is in line with its 
commercial purpose, because “there are hardly any students in the Zhuanye 
system, …more and more parents send their kids to have fun rather than join 
the Zhuanye system (Interviewee Baseball 3). 
In summary, as a marginal activity, or a weak link, in the chain of Zhuanye 
sport, Zhuanye baseball and its authority have seen their position drift further 
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away in the hierarchy of Chinese elite sport. Even though this change took 
place after the Beijing Games, it is seldom interpreted as an outcome of the 
Games but rather seen as an outcome of the decision that the IOC made in 
2005 to exclude baseball from the programme of the Olympic Games.  
Along with its increasing resource dependence on civil society sources, the 
CBA has made concessions in its cooperation with the stakeholders from civil 
society, which has had an impact on the power structure of Chinese baseball. 
Considering the scenario of the MLB’s influence in the post-2008 era, it could 
be argued that it not only affects the practices at the lower level of Zhuanye 
baseball through its strategic deployment, but also shapes the agenda at the 
top level of the CBA in terms of dealing with potential conflicts between the 
CBA and MLB. To a certain degree, the MLB’s commercial approach is 
perceived by the Zhuanye baseball system as an appropriate direction in 
which to move that would be in line with its commercial interests. 
However, it is worth emphasising that in spite of the increasing power of the 
MLB, the CBA maintains its significant, if not dominant, role in Chinese 
baseball. This is both acknowledged by Interviewee Baseball 5, and evidenced 
in the CBA’s dominance over Score Sport which is regarded as less beneficial 
to the SAD’s ultimate goal, i.e. winning international competitions. In other 
words, it could be argued that the CBA’s acceptance of its loss of power is 
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driven by its ultimate goal, which is consistent with the theme of Zhuanye 
sport, i.e. winning glory for the country. 
Following Interviewee Baseball 5’s statement concerning the identity of the CBA 
as “the government”, we would argue that this maintained dominance of the 
CBA is closely associated with its identity as the Administration Department, 
which is rooted in the government dominated structure of Chinese elite sport. 
This is to say that even though the power of the CBA was decreasing, if Sport 
Associations remains a ‘banner’ of SADs, the civil-society-based development 
of baseball would remain under the shadow of the government-run Juguo 
Tizhi. 
6.3.2 Table tennis: a case of ‘lagging professionalisation’  
Even though table tennis is, surprisingly, not the sport in which China has 
won most medals in the Olympics68, it is recognised as the national sport and 
as one of the core symbols of Chinese elite sport. The introduction of 
professionalisation to table tennis began in 1995, when the ‘Clubs League’ 
was started. Former Zhuanye provincial teams were identified as ‘clubs’ with 
                                                 
68 Diving provides the most Olympic gold medals, 33, and the second most Olympic medals 
in total, 59 for the PRC. Table tennis ranks three in the table with 24 Olympic gold medals 
and 47 in total, following gymnastics with 29 and 68 respectively. 
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the name of respective sponsors in their title and participated in this league. 
In 1998, it was renamed as ‘Jia Ji’ league, following the naming pattern of the 
professional football and basketball league, both of which were named as ‘Jia 
A’ leagues69. In 1999, it was transformed into the Chinese Table Tennis Super 
League (hereafter, the CTTSL). However, the member clubs of the CTTSL, 
which still belonged to provincial SADs, were identified as Zhuanye teams as 
they were (Lan 2008) 
Given table tennis has been an important contributor to China’s Olympic 
success, the progress of the professionalisation of Chinese table tennis, 
especially the development of the CTTSL was “slow and cautious” 
(Interviewee Table Tennis 2). The influence of the Olympic strategy and 
Zhuanye sport system have resulted in a number of long-lasting problems in 
in the CTTSL, such as an unstable timetable (being required to make way for 
not only the Olympics but also other international events, such as World cup 
and World championships), ambiguous identity of players (clubs did not own, 
but lease players, who are staff of Zhuanye teams), scarce support from the 
Zhuanye system (the result in CTTSL bears little relation with the points in 
National Games), etc. (Sun 2014, Interviewee Table Tennis 5).  
                                                 
69 “Jia” means first in Chinese. “Jia Ji league” is the Chinese equivalent of the top league. 
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It is commonly admitted by interviewees that there had been little change in 
the general development of Chinese table tennis. However, the interpretation 
of this ‘general’ development is often actually made from the perspective of 
elite sport performance and of the development of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye 
sport. For example, Interviewee Table Tennis 4, a senior coach of the national 
squad, indicates, “there has been nothing special [in Chinese table tennis] 
after 2008 … since we have been so dominant around the world”. This 
perspective is consistent with Interviewee Table Tennis 8’s portrayal of the 
operational pattern of Chinese table tennis, in which he states: 
They only think that the mission for this four-year is finished, [so we need to] 
consider the next four years. Even though they always claim to implement 
innovation and to be open minded… I think they are basically going in the 
same direction. 
The combination of the claim of ‘innovation’ and maintenance of Juguo Tizhi 
in practice is portrayed by the interviewee as a character of the development 
of Chinese table tennis in the reforming era. Such a narrative is also explicitly 
evidenced in the top Chinese table tennis official’s report in a series of books, 
entitled 60 Years of New China's Sport, which is edited by the GAS and 
published by the People’s Press70. The director of the Centre of Table Tennis 
                                                 
70 The People’s press, initially established by the CPC in 1921 in Shanghai, is “an important 
press of political books of the Party and the country” (People’s Press 2002). Mao Zedong’s 
handwriting of the name of the press is used as the symbol of People’s press. 
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and Badminton (hereafter, the CTTB) positively states “the success in the 
Beijing Games exemplifies that significant achievement has been 
accomplished in the innovation of the sport of Chinese table tennis” (F. Liu 
2009, p.349).   
Particularly indicating “the sport of Chinese table tennis”, the top table tennis 
official frames the perspective of his report precisely on the development of 
elite performance. We would argue that this narrative, on the one hand, 
exemplifies Interviewee Table Tennis 8’s account concerning the ‘internal’ 
perspective of Chinese table tennis. On the other hand, through associating 
the exceptional performance in 2008 with the notion of “innovation”, the top 
official in Chinese table tennis subtly clothes the foundation of such 
achievement, Juguo Tizhi in a reforming rhetoric, which would maintain the 
current Zhuanye sport system in the post-2008 era. In other words, we would 
argue that the interpretation of the impact of the Beijing Games, at least those 
supporting Zhuanye sport, not only reflects the stability of Zhuanye table 
tennis after the 2008 Olympics, but also reproduces, or reinforces, the 
dominant part of Chinese table tennis, and thus further limits the promoting 
effect of the impact of Beijing Games on the reform of Chinese elite sport. 
In terms of the reforming narratives in the post-2008 era, even though, as we 
previously argued, the termination of the Beijing Games is portrayed as a 
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trigger of reform, the limited impact of the Beijing Games is also recognised. 
Two ‘reformist’ officials, Interviewee Table Tennis 1 and 2, for example, 
respectively state that: 
In terms of elite sport performance, Chinese table tennis clinched its place at 
the summit, which made us rethink how [Chinese table tennis] should be 
[further] developed…2008 is a new start for administrators like us…it is [also] 
an important signal for the comprehensive or multi-directional development 
[of the sport]… [because] firstly, it was the summit of [Chinese Olympic 
sport]; secondly, along with the reform of Chinese sport, Chinese people 
require not only elite sport achievement, but also the comprehensive 
development of Chinese table tennis.   
Interviewee Table Tennis 1 
It was publicly discussed that [since] the 2008 Olympic Games were very 
successful, [the Olympic mission was achieved] … sport departments were 
going to reform…This is the external [element], such a topic was hot for a 
while, but there was no subsequent institutional reform…. [This is because] it 
was still supported by government funding, thus had less of a requirement to 
be self-sufficient, [the reform for] civil-society-based development became less 
urgent. 
Interviewee Table Tennis 2 
In the first quotation, through associating ‘2008’ with “new start” and with 
terms that imply elite sport performance, the interviewee portrays the Beijing 
Games as a watershed dividing two eras with respective ‘themes’, i.e. the 
performance-focusing pre-2008 era, and the “comprehensive” 
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development-emphasising post-2008 era. It is worth noting that this new start 
is closely associated with the identity of “administrators”, which suggest a 
top-down trend in these changes; and is linked with terms, such as “rethink” 
and “signal”, implying that the change began at strategic rather than 
operational level.   
Essential moves in the operation of CTTSL had not taken place until another 
four-year cycle finished in 2012. This delayed diffusion of the impact of the 
Beijing Games at practice level as associated by Interviewee Table Tennis 2 with 
the continuous support provided by government. In the second quotation, the 
direction of post-2008 development of Chinese table tennis is portrayed as an 
indicator of the influence of the interaction between the external and internal 
elements of the Zhuanye system. The interviewee directly identifies the 
external pressure in the post-2008 era. However, through associating this 
pro-reform element with terms, such as “discussed”, “topic” and 
“requirement”, he indirectly suggests that this external pressure is merely in 
the discursive domain, which is in line with the first quotation concerning the 
post-2008 change in the internal discourse. In contrast, Interviewee Table Tennis 
2 indirectly portrays government support, a defining feature of Zhuanye 
sport, as an element, to a degree, being able to constrain the impact of external 
pressure at discursive level and thus maintain the dominance of Juguo Tizhi 
at operational level. We would argue that the internal element, government 
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funding, greatly influenced (supported) the power of Zhuanye system in its 
interaction with civil society. This, on the one hand, is in line with Interviewee 
Diving 2’s argument of the necessity of a top-down pressure from the central 
government for reforming the Zhuanye system; on the other hand, further 
exemplifies the stable and overwhelming influence of government in 
Zhuanye sport.   
This hierarchical dominance of Chinese elite sport in general by the central 
government is extended to the development of professional sport, and is 
portrayed as a defining feature of Chinese professional sport in the official 
interpretation of the concept of ‘Sport Power’. It is stated that: 
Chinese professional sport…is transferred from Zhuanye teams…[and] is 
‘government promoted and directed’ (or policy promoted and directed) … 
Professional sport … [orthodoxly] aims to maximise its profit… [and thus] 
conflicts with the planned-economy feature of Juguo Tizhi. These conflicts 
result in [problems in Chinese elite sport, such as]: the multiple natures of 
professional clubs, the ambiguous property rights of the clubs, [professional] 
leagues are constrained by the gold medal strategy. [To solve] this [dilemma] 
we need to maintain Juguo Tizhi, and create a new mechanism, promoting the 
healthy development of professional sports which have different interests [from 
Juguo Tizhi]. 
L. Hu, 2010, p. 53 
In the above quotation, the author normalises the government’s dominance of 
Chinese professional sport, which is “government promoted and directed” 
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professional sport. Given the nature of Juguo Tizhi, it could be argued that 
this official account subtly acknowledges the government’s overwhelming 
influence on both sides of the conflict, i.e. the socialist government’s 
promotion of Zhuanye sport, and professional sport’s pursuit of profit. Thus, 
through stressing the necessity of maintaining Juguo Tizhi, the author 
indirectly identifies professional sport as a target of moves to solve the 
dilemma of introducing professional elements into Zhuanye sport. This is 
then described as making Chinese professional sport “healthy”. On the other 
side of the coin, Juguo Tizhi, is protected in this conflict of socialist and 
market values; and its goal, winning glory for the country, has been 
maintained as a ‘healthy practice’ of professional sport. Given the 
complementarity of the goal of Juguo Tizhi and the political interests related 
to elite sport performance, it could be argued that this emphasis on ‘healthy 
practice’ is in line with the government’s interests. 
This practice, which promotes political interests, is accentuated in the 
post-2008 official discourse, such as “organising [professional] leagues, we 
have to ensure that the core aim of winning glory for the country is unaffected” 
(Liu, 2009). In the case of the CTTSL, we could argue that the emphasis on 
‘healthy’ practices reflects the knowledge of the dominance of Zhuanye table 
tennis, which is internalised by stakeholders as the only professionalised 
sport in which China is dominant. 
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The CTTSL was projected to become the equivalent of the NBA in table tennis 
by Cai Zhenhua71 in 2005 (Shi et al. 2009). After being ‘suppressed’ during 
the preparation for the Beijing Games, the CTTSL also “missed its best 
opportunity” of reform in 2009 after Chinese Table Tennis clinched its best 
performance in the 2008 Olympics (Interviewee Table Tennis 2). After another 
4-year cycle, the most significant move in the history of the CTTSL, i.e. ceding 
to clubs the ownership of table tennis players72, was finally made following 
the London Olympics (Wang 2013; Wu 2012). This move, delayed until after 
the 2012 Games, is regarded as an outcome of policy makers’ concerns 
                                                 
71 Cai Zhenhua, was a former Chinese national table tennis team player and current deputy 
Minister of Sport. Before being promoted to his current post in 2007, Cai, with 13 years 
experience of coaching the national squad, was nominated as the director of the CTTB in 2004. 
The 53-year-old, the youngest deputy Minister of Sport, was selected as the Chair of the 
Chinese Table Tennis Association, Chinese Football Association and Chinese Badminton 
Association in a 8-day time span in 2014 (17 – 24 January) (Fei 2014; Cai 2014). 
72 Before 2012, most clubs did not own but leased players from provincial Zhuanye teams for 
a two-year period, after which the athletes would return to their Zhuanye team and be 
‘auctioned’ by the Zhuanye team to CTTSL clubs. According to the new policy in 2012, all 
players in the CTTSL should sign a 4-year contract with their clubs. After the termination of 
this contract, if a player signed a contract with any team other than his/her former club, the 
former club would be paid a transfer fee by the new ‘owner’ of the athletes rather than return 
the player to his/her Zhuanye team for nothing. In addition, the new policy is only effective 
in the CTTSL, players continue to play for their Zhuanye provincial team in the National 
Game and National Championship system (Wang 2013; Wu 2012). 
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relating to the interests of the Juguo Tizhi system. Interviewee Table Tennis 1, 
for example, states that: 
Frankly, the greatest difficulty [in the reform] is to find a balance [between the 
CTTSL and Juguo Tizhi] in this ‘dual-track system’. It is very difficult; 
especially when [we] need Juguo Tizhi to sacrifice [its interests], because we 
also worry about whether the marketization is so fast that it may hinder the 
interests of Juguo Tizhi…[we] always worry about what we should do if there 
is no balance [in relation to these issues].  
Through associating the interests of Juguo Tizhi with terms, such as “sacrifice” 
and “hinder”, the interviewee indirectly portrays the hesitation in the 
development of the CTTSL as a consequence of concerns about potential harm 
to the interests of Juguo Tizhi (whether it be proactively ‘sacrificed ‘or simply 
passively ‘hindered’). This suggests that even though he argues for a 
‘balanced development’, it is the interests of Juguo Tizhi that are essentially 
emphasised. This is in line with his subsequent indication of the principle of 
developing the CTTSL, which is that “the CTTSL should never make trouble” 
for Juguo Tizhi. In other words, it could be argued that the realisation, or 
prioritisation, of the interests of Juguo Tizhi is recognised and portrayed as a 
precondition of, or a context for, the development of the CTTSL. 
In addition, it is worth noting the repeated linkage between ‘us’, ‘our’ and 
Juguo Tizhi. It could be argued that these terms not only convey the internal 
identity of the interviewee, but also the relationship between the CTTSL and 
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the Zhuanye system. More explicitly, he also acknowledges that the nature of 
the CTTSL is still an element “ complementary to the traditional competition 
system…despite the [financial] value that it shows is growing”. This 
internalised understanding of the nature of CTTSL is not only reflected in the 
general portrait of the professional league, but also reproduced at the level of 
clubs and professional players, which, we would argue, is an outcome of the 
self-construction of their identities. Interviewee Table Tennis 5, a manager of a 
CTTSL club, complains: 
[After the Beijing Games,] putting us, the provincial team, aside, I think the 
GAS and the CTTB should operate in a market-oriented way … The 
CTTSL… is exhausting [for us] … [because] we have to win gold medasl [in 
the National Games], and play in the CTTSL [at the same time].  
[Only through combining] the government’s direction, market-oriented 
operation, and civil society’s involvement, will the CTTSL be able to 
survive. … The CTTSL… cannot be successful without governments 
[working] as directors… Governments should provide the funding to run the 
clubs; however, we are striving to look for sponsorships… there has not been a 
penny from our [Administration Department of] table tennis.  
Straightforwardly, even though the interviewee urges market-oriented 
development in the post-2008 era, he also supports direction by the GAS and 
implies funding from the government for his ‘professional’ clubs. We would 
argue that this emphasis on the government’s involvement in the 
‘professional league’ is consistent with the terms that the interviewee employs 
in relation to different organisations. This is to say the continuous reference to 
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the notion “the GAS”, “CTTB” and “the government” indirectly constructs 
the nature of the dominant stakeholders’ involvement with the CTTSL as 
institutions in Zhuanye sport. Even the club that the interviewee manages is 
recognised as a “provincial team”, which has its core mission in the National 
Games. We would argue that this self-recognition of the nature of the 
‘professional club’ reflects the dependence of the ‘professional club’ on 
government resources. This also is in line with his requirement of government 
involvement and with his attitude towards gold medals in the National 
Games (in that he recognises that gold medals that “have to” be won). As we 
previously demonstrated, the performance in the National Games is well 
recognised as a benchmark for provincial sport officials. However, we would 
argue that the expected increasing direction by, and funding from, the 
government signals transformation of the CTTSL into another 
government-run Zhuanye competitive body rather than it developing into a 
market-oriented professional league. 
At the athlete’s level, the realisation of individual interests also relies heavily 
on the Zhuanye sport system. Interviewee Table Tennis 2 states that  
… all of these [professional] players have been cultivated and trained in the 
national team… If any club wants one athlete to become successful or famous, 
[then] he/she will have to join the national team, … and [have to] win glory 
[for the national team], … [by which] the market price of the athletes is 
decided ….As long as [the athletes] perform well in the national team, no 
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matter how poorly they play in the league, they [the athletes] still command 
the same price…. 
From an athlete perspective, Interviewee Table Tennis 7 (a former national team 
player) ascribes the factors differentiating importance among the Olympic 
Games, the National Games and the CTTSL, stating that: 
For athletes, the country’s interests override [others]…since you are 
cultivated by the country … otherwise you have no chance to play in the 
CTTSL… and to be paid so much. Your value in the CTTSL is shown through 
your performance in the national squad… 
The National Games of course [is more important]… after all, the Beijing 
team trained me, … CTTSL must give way to the National Games. If there is 
no role for the National Games to play, then the CTTSL will become my 
primary task, which is where my money comes from. 
Not only is the development of elite athletes associated with the Zhuanye 
system, which relates to the well-established three-tier training framework, 
but both interviewees suggest that an athletes’ value in the CTTSL is also 
influenced, if not decided by their national team performance. This is 
consistent with the interests of the Zhuanye system. In other words, it is 
indirectly acknowledged that athletes have to provide ‘healthy practices’ to 
“win glory for the national team” in order to realise their personal interests in 
the CTTSL, from which their “money comes”. 
The CTTSL is identified as a ‘cash cow’ not only for the individual need of 
Zhuanye table tennis, but also for the strategic deployment of Chinese table 
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tennis. For instance, the initial purpose of introducing professional elements 
into Chinese table tennis, which is recognised by all interviewees in this sport, 
is to stop the draining of talent to foreign countries through exploring another 
source of income for elite table tennis players. It is also acknowledged by 
Interviewee Table Tennis 2 that the interests of the national squad and of the 
CTTA are the “original driving force” of the important 2012 reform, which in 
addition also benefited other stakeholders in the CTTSL. He states that: 
The 2012 reform is… a substantive step in the professionalization of the 
CTTSL, …[which was] a fake professional league… all clubs were, in fact, 
shell companies, because they have to recruit staff [athletes] every two years... 
We could only maintain the high level of the national squad with enough 
money. What shall we do if the government cancels the funding? This is the 
original driving force of this [2012] reform.  
Even though the pre-2012 CTTSL was identified as “a fake professional 
league” for the dependence of the league, clubs and the athletes on the 
Zhuanye system, it was still recognised as a professionalised sport in China 
(Lin 2001; Bao 2009; Hu 2010). We would argue that this acceptance of the 
‘former’ CTTSL as a professional league reflects the concept of ‘professional 
sport with Chinese characteristics’ in the Chinese context, which is influenced 
by the dominance of Zhuanye sport. Even after the 2012 reform, as we 
previously argued, Interviewee Table Tennis 5’s support for government’s 
involvement in governance and financial terms reflects the continuous 
influence of such understanding. 
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In summary, even though all interviewees, especially from the perspective of 
Zhuanye sport, acknowledged that the Beijing Games had hardly any impact 
on Chinese table tennis, it would be radical to thus eliminate the influence of 
the Beijing Games from the post-2008 development, even from the 2012 
reform of the CTTSL, which was implemented 3 years after missing the “best 
opportunity” to reform (Interviewee Table Tennis 3). However, this lagged, or 
postponed, realisation of the impact of the Beijing Games is, to a degree, a 
consequence of the Zhuanye system’s absorbing of the 2008 Olympics. Or, as 
Interviewee Table Tennis 2 states, it reflects the “great resistance against the 
reform inside [the GAS]”.  
We would argue that the Zhuanye system’s capability of resisting the 
influence is an outcome of its continuous control over the resources provided 
by the government, which results in the CTTSL and other stakeholders’ 
dependence on this traditional system of Chinese elite sport. Such reliance on 
the Zhuanye system also leads to the acceptance of the dominance of Juguo 
Tizhi and of the form of ‘professional league’ that is identified as appropriate 
and ‘healthy’ in different eras. This is to say that, in practical terms, thanks to 
the consistency of the resources provided to Zhuanye table tennis, Juguo 
Tizhi has maintained, if not enhanced, its dominance in Chinese table tennis 
with the additional resource provided by the CTTSL. We would thus argue 
that the CTTSL, to a degree, reinforces the dominance of Juguo Tizhi in 
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Chinese table tennis. 
6.3.3 Diving: a case of ‘failed combination of elite sport and the HE sector’ 
As the most successful Chinese Olympic sport, diving is portrayed as “the 
pride, and the ‘dream team’, of Chinese elite sport” (Li 2009, p.231). Diving is 
thus well supported by, and ‘protected’ in, the Zhuanye system, in which the 
socialist characters and socialist narratives are dominant. For example, it is 
stated in the summary report of the 60-year development of diving under the 
PRC regime that: 
There have been great changes in Chinese aquatic sport after 60 years… the 
most fundamental [reason] is the Party and national government’s positive 
leadership and great attention [to detail]…The 60-year development of 
Chinese aquatic sport is a microcosm of the new-born socialist China… 
Concentrating all resources for highly challenging tasks…is a feature of the 
superiority of socialism …and of Juguo Tizhi. [This feature] is consistent with 
the People’s common interests, …. with the CPC’s ‘in-power’ status and its 
principle of ‘service to the people’, … with the structure of the political and 
economic system of a socialist regime …, [and] with the rule and internal 
requirement of [elite] sport development. It is clearly evident that Juguo Tizhi 
is the most steady, most reliable and most powerful guarantee of [the 
performance of] Chinese aquatic sport. 
(Li 2009, pp.229, 240, 241) 
There are more examples of strong ‘socialist’ and political discourse in this 
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report. The top leader of Chinese aquatic sport associates the development of 
his sports, including diving, swimming, etc. with the political character of the 
regime and with the corresponding elite sport administrative and operational 
framework, i.e. Juguo Tizhi. It could be argued that such portrayal of socialist 
features, in this case, of the development of diving legitimises the dominance 
of Juguo Tizhi, through which Chinese diving has historically achieved its 
excellent performances and thus realised its interests.  
We would argue that the significance of Juguo Tizhi to the Zhuanye diving 
system indirectly reflects Chinese diving’s reliance on resources derived from 
government and, it also implies the limited involvement of the 
non-government resources from civil society in Chinese diving. This not only 
results in a continuous emphasis on Olympic performance in Chinese diving 
discourse, which is argued in section 1.2 of this chapter; but also leads to a 
de-emphasis on the particularity of the Beijing Games and on its significance 
in the post-2008 development of Chinese diving. This feature of 
‘deemphasising-2008’ in the ‘pro-Juguo Tizhi’ discourse is consistent with our 
previous argument in section 3.2 concerning the limited promotional effect of 
the Beijing Games on Chinese elite sport reform. For example, it is stated by 
Interviewee Diving 1 that: 
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… the Beijing Olympics, to a certain degree, is no different from any another 
Olympics, … [it] was only one more Olympics in which we tried our best and 
had good preparation …  
A number of sports achieved great leaps forward in terms of developments in 
the Beijing Olympics…[but this was] not the case for Chinese diving… The 
influence of the Beijing Games on Chinese diving is less obvious than its 
influence on less-developed or potential sports.  
Through comparing a) the significance of different Olympic Games to 
Chinese diving and b) the impact of the Beijing Games on diving and other 
sports, the senior official in the Centre for Swimming of the GAS portrays the 
2008 Olympics as another routine job for Chinese diving, the sport which is 
the major contributor to the ‘Olympic glory of China’. We would suggest that 
through arguing for the inappropriateness of describing Chinese diving as 
having made a ‘leap-forward’ in terms of development, the interviewee 
rejects a common post-2008 reforming narrative, which argues “elite sport is 
no longer enough [for China], [after it had] reached its summit, thus what the 
next direction is” has to be considered (Interviewee General 2). In other words, 
this de-emphasis on the importance of the Beijing Games indirectly constructs 
a continuity of the Olympic task for Chinese diving along the on-going story 
of Chinese Olympic history, in which the 2008 edition “is no different from 
any another past” and future Olympics. It is thus subtly suggested that, in 
order to fulfil this task, Juguo Tizhi is, and should be, consistently 
implemented, at least for Chinese diving. 
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This is in line with our previous argument concerning the relationship 
between the Olympic task and Juguo Tizhi. That is to say that the continuity 
of the Olympic task legitimises the implementation of Juguo Tizhi, since the 
raison d'être of Juguo Tizhi is to fulfil this significant task. Interviewee Diving 5 
attributes this stability of Zhuanye diving to its consistent performance and 
the vested interests in it. The interviewee states that: 
There has been no change [in Juguo Tizhi after the 2008 Olympics]… because 
[diving] has maintained its excellent performance. [This is because] people are 
satisfied, and everyone would be worried if there were to be any change…[the 
current system] is thus maintained. For those who have realised their interests, 
they definitely would not want to share. This power could not be modified by 
any individual, but is [influenced by the] big [picture], this is not simply a 
problem for diving…furthermore, the most important thing is that people still 
value gold medals highly. 
In the above quotation, the limited impact of the Beijing Games on Juguo 
Tizhi is described as a consequence of people’s consistent attention to 
excellent performance, which reflects a typical stance in Chinese elite sport in 
terms of the relationship to the needs of the people, the Olympic task and 
Juguo Tizhi. The interviewee also employs other terms, such as “people are 
satisfied”, “everyone will be worried”, “cannot be modified by individuals”, 
to portray the resistance to change in Juguo Tizhi as a choice made by, or 
provoked by, the structure of Chinese society.   
However, on the one hand, the fact that the general public has paid declining 
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attention to elite sport is well recognised, at least by most interviewees. For 
example, it is stated that: “people [now] pay more attention to their 
well-being and to those sports in which they can participate, … however, it is 
very difficult to let everyone participate in diving, [thus its popularity has had 
a tendency to drop] (Interviewee Diving 4). On the other hand, it is also 
acknowledged in the above quotation that it is “those who have realised their 
interests” who reject sharing their benefits. We would thus argue that it is 
those who have realised their interests through implementing Juguo Tizhi, 
rather than the ‘Chinese people’ in general, who stress the importance of 
consistently excellent performance. This not only maintains the importance of 
the Olympic task and thus endorses Juguo Tizhi, but also constrains, or 
absorbs, the impact of the Beijing Games on momentum towards the reform 
of Chinese diving. 
As one, if not the only, reforming move of Chinese diving in terms of 
civil-society-based development, the attempt at ‘combining [elite] sport 
[development] and education’, especially at the top level, is a sensitive topic 
in Chinese diving after the famous conflict between the Zhuanye system and 
Tsinghua University.  
The ‘combination of [elite] sport [development] and education’ (hereafter, the 
Combination), especially with higher education, is recognised as an approach 
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that would lead to the “healthy, sustainable and rapid development” of 
Chinese elite sport (Yu & Zhang 2006, p.79). It is expected that this approach 
may combine resources from both [elite] sport and the education sector for 
elite athletes development, or even enable the education sector to develop 
elite athletes with its own resources (Yu & Zhang 2006).  
In terms of the Combination in diving, Tsinghua University, one of the top 
two universities in China, attempted to not merely cooperate with the 
Zhuanye system, but also to develop Olympic-level divers within its own 
system. In 1997, Tsinghua recruited the former deputy head coach of the 
Chinese diving national team, Yu Fen, after her contentious departure from 
the national team. A number of top-tier divers had then been ‘developed’ by 
Yu in Tsinghua, including the Olympic medallists Fu Mingxia73, Lin Yue74 
                                                 
73 Fu Mingxia had been trained by Yu in the National squad before her first retirement in 
1996. At that time, she had already won three Olympic gold medals. She went to Tsinghua in 
1996 after her retirement, and had continued her cooperation with Yu since Yu subsequently 
took the role of the head coach of the Tsinghua team in 1997. Fu won her fourth Olympic gold 
medal in 2000, and then retired permanently. She graduated from Tsinghua with a BA in 
economics in 2004. 
74 Lin Yue, was sent to the primary school of Tsinghua University by his parents after the 
Guangdong diving centre, in which he was trained, was disbanded in 2001. During the 
conflicts between Tsinghua and the national team, he left Tsinghua in 2004 and joined Beijing 
team. Lin won a gold medal in the Beijing Olympics when he was 17-year old. 
  363 
and Zhou Lvxin75. Apart from Fu Mingxia, most of these Tsinghua divers had 
started to train with Yu in the primary school of Tsinghua University and 
were under a 15-year training and education contract with Tsinghua 
University. However, when the GAS terminated its ‘dual-registration’ 
policy76 in 2001, Tsinghua divers started to leave the University team and 
joined provincial teams in the Zhuanye system. Some of them were 
subsequently selected for the National team. It is worth noting that since the 
policy change, no diver registered at Tsinghua has been selected for the 
national squad. During the data collection procedure in 2013, all divers 
training in Tsinghua, the only HEI that had a diving team at that time, were 
either amateurs, who participated as a personal hobby, or young divers from 
                                                 
75 Zhou Luxin was recruited to the primary school of Tsinghua University by Yu in 1998 
when he was 10 year old. During the conflicts between Tsinghua and the national team, Zhou 
left the Tsinghua diving team in 2005 and was subsequently selected for the national team. In 
the Beijing Olympics, he won the only silver medal for the Chinese diving national team, 
which had 7 gold, 1 silver and 3 bronze. 
76 With the ‘dual-registration’ policy, members of Tsinghua team were able to register in, and 
compete for, provincial teams in domestic events. After this policy was terminated, athletes 
had to choose between Tsinghua and a provincial team; the member of the former one was 
not able to participate in the National Games. Even though members of the Tsinghua team, 
on paper, still had a chance of being selected for the national teams, the opportunity was slim. 
Thus members of Tsinghua team started to leave the University and joined provincial teams. 
(F. Yu, 2010, Interviewee Diving 7). 
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a provincial team, who had no link with the university in educational terms. 
Given the framework of institutions in the PRC, policies relating to the 
Combination are commonly jointly published by two or more institutions. 
These policies, such as the Opinions of the GAS and the Department of Education 
in terms of Improving Nation-wide School Football (GAS & The Department of 
Education of the PRC 2013), generally focus on school sport rather than elite 
sport. In Liu Peng’s 2009 speech, the promoted cooperation between the 
Zhuanye and education systems represents a closer association at primary 
and junior school level, a relationship which becomes more distant when an 
athlete becomes more mature or the level of the athlete’s performance is 
higher. He states: 
[We should] … at county level, insert ‘youth sport schools’ at primary and 
junior middle school level into the education system; at city level, [we should] 
insert sport schools that are at primary and junior middle school level into the 
education system in the form of cooperation with [common] schools; [we 
should] improve education in sport high schools, the training which is 
operated by sport departments, while the education [in sport high schools] is 
operated by the education sector, [we should] improve the education for teams 
at provincial or higher level. 
…[we should] provide vocational training especially to those athletes who 
cannot achieve the highest level; pursue new policies for graduates from sport 
[high] schools to entre HEIs. 
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…[We should] increase vocational opportunity for retired athletes, further 
pursue a national policy of ‘exam-exemption’ to allow outstanding athletes to 
enter universities.  
P. Liu, 2009, p.1 
In the first of the quotations from the Minister’s speech, the relationship 
between Zhuanye sport and the education system clearly changes when the 
adolescent athletes reach high school age. Even the educational needs of the 
teenagers in sports high school and for those in provincial teams or national 
teams are differently addressed. Responsibility for students at sports high 
schools is explicitly assigned to the education sector, while the education for 
those in provincial or national teams is generally noted as requiring 
improvement. Liu further differentiates the education for these two groups 
through associating “graduates from sport high schools” with higher 
education while delaying the provision of education for “outstanding 
athletes”, the education for who was absent in his speech, until their 
retirement. Given most divers reach, or are close to, their prime in their late 
teens or early twenties77 (British Swim, 2010), we would argue that through 
ignoring the education for top elite athletes in their sporting prime, which for 
divers normally overlaps with university age, the Sport Minister decreases the 
                                                 
77 The average age of male Olympic diving medalist is 21 (platform) and 23 (springboard), 
and the average age of female Olympic medalist of platform is 20 (British Swim 2010). 
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possibility for HEIs to be associated with the prime performance of elite 
athlete and to meet the needs of elite athletes except in their post-athletic 
careers. 
In practice, such protective moves became the main form of the Combination 
between Chinese diving and the HE sector, which benefited “outstanding 
athletes”, especially world champions. For example, a number of diving 
world champions were sent to, and accepted by, Renmin University after the 
Beijing Olympics ended. It is admitted by the university that they are 
exceptionally recruited due to their identity as world Champions, and they do 
not need to attend the University until after retirement from the national 
squad (Xia 2008). 
As we previously argued, maintaining athletes’ elite performance is closely 
associated with the interests of the Zhuanye system that are realised through 
the Zhuanye system accomplishing its ‘political task’. In his speech in 2013, 
Liu (2013, p.1) explicitly acknowledged the influence of SAD’s interests on the 
education for elite athletes. He indicates that: 
It has been more than a year since the publication of ‘the notice’78, especially 
the education issues [which] vary considerably between different provinces… 
                                                 
78 The notice refers to the State Council’s notice of publishing the Guiding Opinion on Further 
Strengthening Elite Athletes' Education and Social Security jointly made by the GAS, the 
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The key factor for [solving] this problem is whether SADs could essentially 
open their mind … break the ‘fences’ of the [Zhuanye] system and the 
constraints [created by…vested] interests. 
In his account of the factors inhibiting the development of athletes’ education 
in general, Liu explicitly identifies interests as a factor, if not the factor, 
‘constraining’ development in this area. It is worth noting that the Sport 
Minister indirectly acknowledges that it is not a problem of merely one or two 
provinces but of “SADs”, as the self-protected “system” could, but did not, 
break “the fence” that protect its interests. This considerable influence of ‘the 
system’ is also evidenced in Interviewee Diving 6’s statement, that: 
Everyone knows about Juguo Tizhi and the exceptional performance in Beijing, 
if you change [it to a new system that] combining the education sector and 
                                                                                                                                           
Department of Education, the Treasury Department & the Department of HR and Social 
Security (2011), in which the higher education of athletes is mentioned. In terms of related 
content, the statement relating to SAD includes mention that:  
Graduates from sport schools…and national team members… are encouraged to study in HEIs. ... 
Elite athletes in services are encouraged to flexibly receive higher education through adult 
education and distance learning. 
Responsibility of the other co-authoring departments is also stated, such as the HEIs should 
establish special modules for athletes. 
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elite sport, and then performance decreases … no matter how high profile 
he/she is, he/she cannot take this responsibility. 
In line with our previous quotation from Interviewee Diving 5, who portrayed 
the stability of Juguo Tizhi as a choice that is in line with the interests of 
Chinese society, Interviewee Diving 6 also portrays the understanding of the 
relationship between Juguo Tizhi, i.e. ‘the system’, and Olympic performance 
as common knowledge i.e. known by “everyone”. In contrast, the challengers 
are associated with pronoun in singular form, such as “he”, “she” and “you” 
(in its singular form in Chinese). We would argue that this account not only 
constructs a structure-agents relationship, but also suggests an ‘appropriate’ 
move in terms of ‘the Combination’ issue for Chinese diving from a 
collectivist perspective. In addition, the interviewee also indirectly indicates 
the ‘punishment’ that any challenger would receive in the government 
dominated Zhuanye system. 
Additionally, consistent with the previous quotation from Interviewee Diving 2 
suggesting a ‘top-down’ approach for elite sport reform, the Sport Minister 
also refers to a document published by the State Council, i.e. The Notice, as the 
backdrop of his criticism. In other words, it could be argued that even though 
Liu is also a member of this protected vested-interest system, the account of 
the top sport bureaucrat in the PRC indirectly acknowledges the significant 
‘top-down’ power of the central government, which provides the resource for 
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the Zhuanye sport system. 
This reliance on the resources from the government and Zhuanye Diving’s 
dominant control over these resources is identified by Interviewee Diving 6, a 
senior academic in the sport department of Tsinghua University, as the 
factors that constrain the Combination in Chinese diving. He states that: 
As long as the [Zhuanye] sport system exists, it is nearly impossible [for the 
two systems] to develop harmoniously, because it relates to interests. 
Resources are mainly embraced within the sport system…including 
funding…There are two big dilemmas [constraining the Combination]. 
Firstly, …HEIs lack resources…athletes [thus] choose the [Zhuanye] sport 
system for performance…Secondly, even if they want to come to HEIs, they 
won’t be allowed to do so by the current [Zhuanye] system… The current 
system still survives on winning glory for the country. If this function is 
changed, what will they do [for life] ?... the country has invested a lot of 
money in the sport system?...isn’t the resource all in their [system]? Are there 
any resources for the HE sectors? No. …Tremendous resources are all in 
there… Thus the Olympics have no impact on this policy [of the 
Combination]. 
The interviewee’s elaboration of this conflict focuses on the perspective of 
resources. On the one hand, Zhuanye Diving’s monopolistic control over 
resource via Juguo Tizhi and its dominant position in sport is implied with 
terms, such as “embraced within”, ‘allowing’ athletes to choose their route, 
“tremendous resources are all in there”. This is recognised as a key factor that 
not only limited the related investment in the HE sector; but also forced 
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athletes to rely on the Zhuanye system.  
On the other hand, through employing terms, such as “survive on winning 
glory for the country”, “invested in”, the interviewee also acknowledges the 
Zhuanye Diving’s reliance on government’s support and on its ‘political task’. 
We would argue that this account constructs an orthodox Zhuanye 
relationship in the “current” Chinese diving context, in which Zhuanye sport 
earns its ‘salary’ from the government through providing satisfactory 
performance. Thus, ‘the Combination’ in diving, especially the Tsinghua 
model, is portrayed as ‘life-threatening’ to the Zhuanye Diving system and to 
its interests, as the university divers represented another route for ‘producing’ 
Olympian, or even gold medallists. Therefore, in order to maintain its ‘income 
level’, the Zhuanye diving system strived not only to maintain its level of 
performance, but also to limit the entrance of competitors providing a similar 
product.     
This competing relationship between the two systems also has influence at 
individual level. Recalling her memory of the experience in the Tsinghua 
system, Interviewee Diving 7 states: 
The university set identical goal [for all of us]…that you need to be an 
Olympic champion as well as a university student… [We then] had to 
compete with kids in the Zhuanye [system for the opportunity of participating 
the Olympics]. Thus they definitely hate you, [and ask] why you [could 
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continue] study while competing with them [for the Olympic opportunity]… 
[Thus] if [the education system] insisted on competing with the national team, 
this would have to be rejected unless the leader of the national team were 
changed. 
A strong word “hate” is employed by the interviewee to portray the 
relationship that she perceived between the HE sector and Zhuanye Diving, 
at least at individual level. The interviewee explicitly identifies this 
contending relationship as a consequence of a competition for the realisation 
of individual interests. While the Tsinghua divers could, to a degree, choose 
between education and elite sport performance in seeking to realise their 
individual interests, those in Zhuanye sport mainly rely on the latter route.  
The interviewee use the term “rejected” to portray a difference between the 
powers of the contending parties, i.e. the rejected Tsinghua model and the 
Zhuanye system (represented by “the national team”), with the former being 
effectively axed by a policy change by the GAS. However, it is interesting to 
note that the interviewee re-focuses on the individual level, portraying this 
conflict as a competition between “you” (in its singular form in Chinese) and 
the leader of the national team. On the one hand, this is in line with the 
long-lasting conflicts between Yu Fen, the head coach of the Tsinghua team 
and Zhou Jihong, the leader of the Chinese diving team, who dismissed Tian 
Liang from the national team for his involvement in commercial activities. On 
the other hand, given the harmonious relationship between the national 
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shooting team and the Tsinghua shooting team, which are respectively 
coached by the Olympic gold medallist Wang Yifu and his wife Zhang 
Qiuping, one is forced to consider to what extent conflicts at individual level 
hindered the fate of the Tsinghua diving team and the future of the 
Combination in Chinese diving? 
Through looking at the post-2008 development of three sports in terms of 
their interaction with civil society, it could be argued that there are differences 
in the speed of realising the projected and promoted change in the practical 
domain of Chinese elite sport. We would argue that such difference is 
influenced by the source of resources invested in particular sports and by 
other stakeholders’ reliance on the Zhuanye system of respective sport.    
Given the stable government-run nature of Chinese elite sport, whether 
Zhuanye or professional sport, Sport Associations maintain their dominance 
in Chinese elite sport with another significant governmental identity (that of 
the SAD). Even though their dominance is or was affected by the involvement 
of other stakeholders and is influenced by the new opinion released by the 
top leaders, hardly any changes in the operational domain are identified as a 
direct consequence of the 2008 Games, which, however, set the backdrop of 
for the development of the powerful notion of a ‘Sport Power’. 
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Chapter Seven  Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the tangible evidence of changes in the discourse 
relating to the Chinese elite sport system after the Beijing Games. We aim to 
unveil the structural factors, particularly the power and interests relationship 
within Chinese sport, that interact with (for example, enable and/or are 
reframed by) these changes in discursive domain, through employing Critical 
Discourse Analysis.  
As the conclusion of our thesis, we start this chapter with revisiting the 
theories that enlighten us of the construction of the social reality that is 
independent with social actors, and that enable us to peel off the rhetoric flesh, 
see through the skeleton of social structure, and ultimately interrogate the 
spirit of power operating and running through the whole system of Chinese 
elite sport. Then, we present the research findings through answering the 
three research questions, followed by a discussion of the limitation of this 
research and of further study that could be and need to be done in relation to 
Chinese elite sport for which a number of important policies has been 
published by the Chinese government at the very late stage of our research.  
7.1 Contribution to Theory 
Informed by Critical Realism (Bhaskar 2008; Collier 1994; Bhaskar & Hartwig 
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2010), the thesis has adopted a ‘depth realist’ ontological position while at the 
same time acknowledged the constructive effect of social agency. Critical 
Realism, on the one hand, enables us to understand the effect of the stratified 
social structure79 on social actors’ constructive activities. Accordingly, our 
research analyses the development of Chinese elite sport policy statements, 
addresses the causal factors leading to these changes, and further discuss the 
implicit references to, and reflection of, struggles of power and interests 
embedded in such changes. Examples include the changes in the discourse of 
Juguo Tizhi in the annual speeches of the Sport Minister in the post-2008 era, 
which relate to the notion of ‘Sport Power’ and the political origins of Chinese 
elite sport. On the other hand, Critical Realism also requires us to investigate 
the dialectic relationship between structure and agency, to consider the social 
structure (at least, partially) as a product constructed by social agency 
(including discourse), such as the diversely interpreted essence of Juguo Tizhi, 
which has influenced the reform of Chinese elite sport. However, such a 
constructive effect is also enabled and constrained by the structures within 
which it operates, specifically in terms of which social groups are able to 
                                                 
79 The difference between the tangible empirical level and the intangible actual and real level 
can be exemplified as the differences between policy statement (what the government says 
they do), policy narratives (what the government say how they do) and the power and 
interests relationships embraced within the policy procedure. 
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exercise power over policy discourse in Chinese society before and after the 
Beijing Games in the significantly developing political climate.  
In order to unveil the development of Chinese elite sport and its significance 
in the post-2008 era, we employ Critical Discourse Analysis with a protocol 
modified from Fairclough’s (2003, 2005, 2009) framework, since the revealing 
of the interests and power constructed with and within discourse in a given 
society is recognised as the ‘critical’ feature of this approach. To deconstruct 
the process of evolution of Chinese elite sport and of the power relationships, 
we investigate the development of Chinese elite sport, as a context, and the 
discourse of and about policy through analysing official documents, 
documentary material, academic research, and media coverage and through 
interviewing stakeholders in three sports concerning their respective 
perspectives on the development of Chinese elite sport, particularly after the 
Beijing Games.  
Even though language systems are not hermetic to each other, implementing 
CDA across linguistic borders (analysing in Chinese and reporting in English) 
results in concerns in terms of reliability and validity of the research. 
However, arguing the significance of warrantability, i.e. the soundness, 
robustness, convincingness, of the research and the explanations which it 
constitutes, we have striven to maintain the consistency of our portrayal of 
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the connotation implied in the Chinese data (as well as the ‘literal’ denotation 
of terms in that data) between the two languages. Thus, our analysis, which 
bridges the two language systems, focuses on teasing out the connotation of 
the terms and of elements of the order of discourse, which reflect, challenge 
and/or (re)produce the social structure.  
7.2 Research Findings  
We present our research findings through reviewing and answering the three 
research questions: 
1. Across the three periods in contemporary Chinese Olympic history, 1993-2001, 
2001-2008 and post 2008, to what extent have Chinese elite sport policy and 
discursive accounts of that policy changed? 
2. To what extent are the changes in Chinese elite sport regarded as a consequence 
of the experience of preparing for and staging the Beijing Olympics? 
3. In what ways are policies and their interpretation of the aftermath of the Beijing 
Games related to explanations of the socialist features of the regime? 
Within the period we consider (from 1993 to 2012), a consistent theme, i.e. the 
co-existence of the requirement of reform and of satisfactory elite sport 
performance, was maintained in the policy discourse of Chinese elite sport. 
The co-existence of these two goals, which were, to a degree, contradictory to 
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each other, resulted in a policy dilemma, and thus in conflicting policy 
discourse, on Chinese elite sport. The development and change of Chinese 
elite sport policy discourses is symbolised and significantly influenced by the 
interaction of these two types of strategic goal.  
The power of discourses in relation to the duo has varied across the period 
and has been influenced by a number of factors. However, the dominant 
group within society (promoting the reforming trend of the society while 
requiring satisfactory performance) and within Chinese elite sport 
(accentuating the significance of performance while indicating its willingness 
to reform) has maintained the power of these two types of Chinese elite sport 
discourse with their power over discourse, and thus these two types of voice 
have remained prominent in Chinese elite sport. 
The first type of Chinese elite sport discourse emphasises elite sport 
performance, which has been a consistent focus of Chinese elite sport, 
especially of Zhuanye sport. This continuous accentuation of elite sport 
performance is consistent with the understanding of the significance of ‘being 
successful’ for the ‘extrinsic function’ of sport, which is stressed in the 
Chinese context. Victories in elite sport events (especially in the Olympic 
Games) are recognised as approaches for, and a medium for manifesting the 
achievements in the process of, realising ‘extrinsic functions’, such as 
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‘restoring the Chinese nation’ or ‘reflecting the superiority of socialism’. This 
accentuation of elite sport performance is thus accepted by Chinese society 
not only as an available perspective within Chinese elite sport discourse, but 
also as an appropriate account for its consistency with the innate feature and 
connotation of elite sport in the Chinese context. 
Elite sport performance has also been proactively and constantly highlighted 
within the Zhuanye sport system. This ‘internal’ discourse is consistent with 
the ‘political task’ of Chinese elite sport, i.e. winning glory for the country 
through providing satisfactory performance, for which the Zhuanye system is 
provided with financial and other resources by the government. Hence, this 
emphasis on elite sport performance, for which Zhuanye sport is provided 
with resources, is in line with the interests of the Zhuanye system and SADs. 
Given its effectiveness in elite sport development, Juguo Tizhi is promoted in 
this type of Chinese elite sport discourse as the most appropriate perspective 
through which to view and operate elite sport (at least before the Beijing 
Games). In other words, such emphasis on elite sport performance greatly 
empowered the discourse in favour of Juguo Tizhi, which was recognised as 
the target of Chinese elite sport reform, before the Beijing Games as the 
dominant voice within Chinese elite sport. 
‘Reform’ provides the theme of the other major type of Chinese elite sport 
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discourse. It has been officially embraced within Chinese elite sport since 1986, 
following the reforming trend in Chinese society ushered in by Deng 
Xiaoping. The ‘political sensitivity’ of Chinese elite sport discourse is 
consistent with the ‘government-run’ nature of Chinese elite sport. The 
inclusion of a ‘reforming’ account, which aims to refine Juguo Tizhi, prompts 
concern about its potential negative impact on the essential task of Chinese 
elite sport, and thus on the interests of Zhuanye sport. It not only reflects the 
influence of generic political elements in Chinese society on Chinese elite 
sport, but also symbolises the government’s power over discourse in this 
domain. Such power places substantial constraints suggesting what is 
‘unthinkable’, ‘unspeakable’ or ‘unable-to-be-done’, and by contrast what can 
be done, in Chinese elite sport.  
The inclusion of reforming accounts has not only led to corresponding 
changes in Chinese elite sport discourse promoting in some contexts for 
example debates about professionalisation, but also has enabled reforming 
rhetoric in the construction of other positions (including those that are 
contrary to the reform) of the SADs. Given the power of reforming discourse 
in the opening-up era of the PRC, through being associated with reforming 
rhetoric and assigned with reforming meanings, the practices and policies, 
even those reinforcing the dominance of Juguo Tizhi, are legitimised and 
empowered with the these ‘market-oriented reforming’ narratives. In other 
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words, through utilising its power over discourse, the SADs directed the 
power of reforming discourse in favour of their interests seeking to achieve a 
balance between promoting reform and maintaining Juguo Tizhi. For instance, 
SADs, thus, on the one hand conform to the political priorities of the regime 
(opening up), while on the other realise their interests by protecting the Juguo 
Tizhi approach at a time when there was a clamour for reform. The struggle 
to maintain this balance is reflected, for example, in the dilemma expressed in 
the narrative of the 1993 Policy.  
This balance was influenced by the successful Olympic bid in 2001, and the 
relationship between the two was subsequently restructured during the 
preparation for the 2008 Games. With the imminence of the Beijing Olympics, 
performance-focused forms of discourse were increasingly evident, largely as 
a function of their well-recognised association with, and potential usefulness 
in realising, the Chinese Olympic dream. At the same time, reforming 
narratives had not only been sidelined in policy discourse and practices, but 
reform itself in elite sport was identified as a move which would have been 
inappropriate at this moment and thus promotion of reform in sport was, for 
the time being, voluntarily silenced.  
This voluntary silence, we would argue, embodies an exercise of power (at 
this specific juncture) in a manner consistent with what Lukes describes as,  
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supreme and [the] most insidious [level]… to prevent people, to what-ever 
degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of 
things…because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they 
value it as divinely ordained and beneficial. 
Lukes, 2005, p. 26  
From a Foucauldian perspective, the production of ‘truth’ is viewed as the 
necessary condition for the exercise of power (Foucault 1980e). In terms of 
this insidious exercise of power, we would argue that it is based on a truth 
constructed in the Chinese context in relation to a) the priority of the ‘political 
task’ for Chinese elite sport and the significance of elite sport performance in 
fulfilling this ‘political task’ and realising its political, economic and cultural 
functions, and b) the respective impact on elite sport performance of Juguo 
Tizhi and the reform. As Foucault (1980c, p.86) states, such dominance 
becomes “tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. 
Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms”. In terms 
of our case of Chinese elite sport, such knowledge is not only proactively 
promoted by the SADs and within the Zhuanye sport system, and utilised 
and reinforced in the portrayal of the significance of the Beijing Games, but it 
is also more importantly, historically constructed and socially accepted as ‘the 
truth’ in the Chinese context. Given the dominance of such truth, even though 
there were diverse interpretations of the successful bid and the 2008 Games, 
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only those that were consistent with this truth were defined and regulated as 
appropriate accounts, and are thus empowered in the Chinese context.  
These empowered discourses, on the one hand, reinforced ‘the truth’ well 
accepted in the Chinese context in terms of the Beijing Games. On the other 
hand, given its consistency with the interests and dominance of Zhuanye 
Sport and Juguo Tizhi, as we previously demonstrated, Zhuanye Sport and 
Juguo Tizhi were also strengthened in the production of such a ‘truth’. In 
return, the vested interest groups within the Zhuanye sport system, for 
example the SADs, utilised their power over discourse to ensure the 
implementation of the power of the ‘appropriate’ discourse in reproducing 
and reinforcing ‘this truth’. In other words, in a Foucauldian account, through 
discourse, we know the world, through the power of discourse, we change 
the world, for “we are subjected to the production of truth through power 
and we cannot exercises power except through the production of truth” 
(Foucault 1980e, p.93). 
In the post-2008 era, the concept of ‘Sport Power’ has significantly influenced 
the constructed truth of Chinese elite sport, after the Chinese President 
brought ‘Sport Power’ as a concept into public discourse. Due to the emphasis 
given to comprehensiveness in Chinese sport in the concept of ‘Sport Power’, 
elite sport performance was no longer to be regarded as the only or sufficient 
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means by which to fulfil the new political task. As a consequence, reforming 
discourses, such as those contained in accounts concerning the 
civil-society-based development of sport, and the development of the sport 
industries, became increasingly accentuated (and/or legitimated) as elements 
of the newly emerging ‘multi-dimensional’ political mission.  
We would thus argue that the power relationship between the two types of 
Chinese elite sport discourse had been significantly influenced by the 
successful bid, which resulted in a widely accepted and compliant emphasis 
on the performance-focused narrative from 2001 in the period of preparation 
for the Beijing Games. Given the significant influence of the concept of ‘Sport 
Power’, the changes in Chinese elite sport discourse in the post-2008 era can 
not be easily characterised as an immediate legacy of the Beijing Games per se, 
even though the concept of ‘Sport Power’ is, to a degree, associated with the 
success of the Beijing Games. This is consistent with statement of many 
interviewees suggesting the limited impact of the Beijing Games per se on the 
development of their sport, supporting Fan, Fan & Lu’s (2010) projection of 
the continuity of Juguo Tizhi after the Beijing Games.  
However, the interpretations of the Beijing Games and of the concept of 
‘Sport Power’ vary among different agencies. These diverse interpretations, 
on the one hand, constructed the direction of the post-2008 development of 
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Chinese elite sport through, for example, framing knowledge concerning the 
Beijing Games. For instance, the 2008 Olympics is portrayed as another 
example, as with other Olympics, of the effectiveness of Juguo Tizhi. Given 
that consistent elite sport performance is interpreted as a necessary condition 
of the realisation of the concept of ‘Sport Power’, Juguo Tizhi has been 
continuously emphasised in the immediate post-2008 era. On the other side of 
the coin, through stressing the summit performance in 2008 and the 
realisation of the Olympic dream, which set the backdrop for the introduction 
of ‘Sport Power’, the newly empowered reforming discourse accentuates the 
necessity for the development of sport to move in another direction.  
On the other hand, these different interpretations also reflect and restructure 
different agencies’ roles and identities in relation to the Zhuanye system in 
the post-2008 era. In the case studies of the three sports, the different 
discursive styles are influenced by the differing relationships of resource 
dependence between the agencies and the Zhuanye system. This relationship 
not only shapes the power of different discourses, such as the degree to which 
a challenging account is accepted by the ‘dominant’ discourse; it also 
manipulates the direction of development to be taken by each of the three 
sports. 
Given that government resource remains the main financial source for 
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Chinese elite sport, the SADs’ accounts have retained their position as the 
dominant voice in this area. For example, elite sport performance has been 
constantly stressed in the interpretation of the concept of ‘Sport Power’. 
Zhuanye Sport and Juguo Tizhi have been continuously emphasised, at least 
in the immediate aftermath of the Beijing Games. However, the effects of this 
attempt to protect Juguo Tizhi have been declining with the increasing 
accentuation placed on elite sport reform by the top leader, particularly by the 
new President Xi (who reportedly is a football fan), and the boosting 
investment from the civil-society into sport. 
In addition, those elements that are consistent with the political mainstream 
of the PRC regime, i.e. consistent with socialism with Chinese characteristics, 
have been constantly embraced in Chinese elite sport discourses. Both the 
promotion of Juguo Tizhi and Zhuanye Sport (which are highly related to the 
planned economy) and the promotion of a reforming account are associated 
with the dominant ideology. This account, which associates Chinese socialist 
ideology as an element of social structure, and the reform of Chinese elite 
sport, has legitimised and empowered the reforming discourse in the PRC 
through endorsing its political correctness. By contrast, ideologies, as 
“representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and 
maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation” (Fairclough 
2003, p.218; cited by Wodak & Meyer 2009, p.9), are also constructed and 
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reproduced by social actors via discourse. Examples include Deng Xiaoping’s 
statements, which have significantly influenced the interpretation of socialism 
in the Chinese context, as well as Jiang Zemin’s emphasis on Juguo Tizhi and 
Hu Jintao’s idea of ‘Sport Power’, both of which have brought new narratives 
and concepts to the interpretation of socialist ideology in Chinese elite sport. 
We would argue that the dominant socialist ideology frames a constant (but, 
crucially, not universally held) truth in Chinese elite sport, which is in line 
with the dominant power in the Chinese society. This constant truth facilitates 
and enables the ‘appropriate’ discourses and practices, through “function[ing] 
as … [the] infrastructure, … material, economic determinant, etc.” (Foucault 
1980d, p.118), while rejecting opposing discourses that could also be 
“supposed to count as truth” (ibid, p.118).   
As demonstrated in the Literature Review chapter changes in the political 
climate of the PRC, such as the beginning and the termination of the Cultural 
Revolution, provoked changes in the language used in Chinese society. 
Significant events in relation to Chinese sport, such as China’s return to the 
IOC in 1979, also influenced Chinese elite sport discourse. However, given the 
stability of the communist regime of the PRC and the dominance of Zhuanye 
sport system and Juguo Tizhi within Chinese elite sport, there has been a 
consistent theme of language, especially after the opening-up and reform of 
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the PRC in 1979, within Chinese elite sport discourse, i.e. the socialism with 
Chinese characteristic and the emphasis on elite sport performance.  
Following Deng Xiaoping’s (1993) statement in terms of the economic reform 
and the socialism with Chinese characteristic, it could be argued that the 
reforming theme of Chinese elite sport discourse is a consequence of such 
change in the language used in Chinese society. And, as we discussed in this 
concluding chapter, the emphasis on elite sport performance has been 
consistently promoted by the SADs and other stakeholders within the 
Zhuanye sport system and been accepted by Chinese society as another theme 
of Chinese elite sport discourse.  
We would thus argue that there has been a similarity of terms used in 
Chinese elite sport discourse throughout the period we investigate in the 
thesis. Since 1979, the reforming account has been introduced, legitimised by 
the government, and thus has become the dominant voice in the Chinese 
society. Thus, additions of new terms in the government-dominated Chinese 
elite sport discourse, such as the introduction of professionalisation and of 
‘sport power’, are rather a complement to the dual-themed Chinese elite sport 
discourse than changes or challenges to it.  
However, it is worth noting that, firstly, this is not to ignore the transgression 
at micro or practical level of Chinese elite sport, for instance the emergence of 
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Tsinghua mode and thus the increase of power of related narratives such as 
‘the Combination, which, nonetheless, were subsequently and eventually 
diminished. Secondly, related to the first point, even though there is 
consistent power over discourse and the language used in Chinese elite sport is 
rather stable than volatile, changes in the power of discourse/language have also 
been well evidenced, for instance the power of reforming discourse before or 
after the Beijing Games, and the consistency of, but the decreasing emphasis 
on, Juguo Tizhi in the post-2008 era. 
7.3 Research limitations and further research  
The first point in relation to research limitations was brought up by a Chinese 
sport official who was seeking to reject our request for interview, which he 
eventually accepted. The interviewee suggested that the selected three sports 
were not able to represent the full picture of Chinese elite sport, since 
according to the traditional typology of the Zhuanye sport system, table 
tennis and diving are the ‘sports in which China enjoys advantage’, while 
baseball belongs to the category of ‘sports in which China falls behind’. Thus, 
the interviewee suggested that a sport ‘in which China has potential to have 
advantage’, such as fencing and cycling, and another team sport, ideally one 
of the three big ball sports, needed to be included to fully represent Chinese 
elite sport. 
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This may well be the case to some degree, given that the addition of another 
type of sport could provide another perspective, and it is undeniable that the 
selection of cases in a sense provides a frame for, and enables and constrains, 
the field of analysis. It is thus worth reminding the reader of the relationship 
between the cases selected and the objects of the research. This is to say that 
given the dominance of Zhuanye sport and Juguo Tizhi, the majority of 
Chinese elite sports, especially the Olympic sports, are within the (fully) 
control of the Zhuanye system despite of the category in which it falls. In this 
thesis we have sought to unveil the mechanisms of power within, Chinese 
elite sport, and as a consequence have chosen to focus on sports in which 
dominance is differently interpreted, is maintained and is (at least, said to be) 
manifested in the relationship between different stakeholders, rather than to 
investigate a variety of sports, which, though, variously positioned in respect 
of their differing potential for winning Olympic gold medals, were 
consistently dominated by powerful groups. Furthermore, given that our 
interests lie in the relationship between the Olympics and Chinese elite sport, 
it did not make sense to select Chinese football80, since the weak association 
                                                 
80 Chinese men’s football team has been in the final stage of the Olympics 5 times, and has 
never taken any victory back to China.  
Regime Year Host City Score Opponent 
The ROC 1936 Berlin 0-2 GB 
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between the former Olympic silver-medal-winning women’s football team 
and the concept of professionalisation, and the even ‘weaker’ association 
between the qualification potential for the Olympics and the professionalised 
Chinese men’s football renders these cases less relevant to our concerns. 
Secondly, as with elite sport systems in other countries, Chinese elite sport 
has its own confidential code, and is thus, to a degree, closed in terms of not 
only documents and strategic files, but also its attitude towards studies from 
outside. Thus, some of our analysis is based on documents, only the 
summaries of which are publicly available, and on interview data, some of 
which relies solely on note taking (rather than on recording, transcription and 
                                                                                                                                           
1948 London 0-4 Turkey 
1960 Roma 
1-4 Italy 
0-5 Brazil 
2-3 GB 
The PRC 
1988 Seoul 
0-3 West Germany 
0-2 Sweden 
2008 Beijing 
0-0 Tunisia 
1-1 New Zealand 
0-2 Belgium 
0-3 Brazil 
Though, the Chinese women’s football squad has better result than the men’s side. The 
professionalisation of Chinese women’s football has been less developed than the men’s 
league. For more information in relation to the development of Chinese women’s football, 
please see (X. Li 2007; Zhou 2004; Fan & Mangan 2003)  
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subsequent analysis). Thus though we have striven to provide the best 
available analysis given available sources, the limitations of these sources 
have to be recognised. 
In addition, the State Council published a number of significant reforming 
policies in 2014 in terms of the development of the sport industries and the 
promotion of civil-society-based development of Chinese elite sport, most 
notably Several Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Development of 
Sport Industry and Promoting Consuming in Sport (The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China 2014). The GAS also made corresponding policies 
and moves, such as Several Opinions of the GAS on Promoting the Reform of the 
Mechanism of Approving Sport Events (GAS 2014) and the abandonment (and 
subsequent reinstatement and then re-abandonment) of the medal table of the 
National Games as an indicator of performance (Sun 2015; Wang 2015; Yao et 
al. 2015). These practices, on the one hand, have been interpreted as an 
outcome of the influence of President Xi’s interests in, and focus on, sport, 
and as a reflection of the change of the central government’s thinking in 
respect of the driving force for the development of China after the decrease in 
its GDP growth rate. On the other hand, these moves are also recognised as 
consequences of pressure for the reform of the GAS, which began to be 
investigated in Xi’s major anti-graft campaign in mid-2014. Thus, further 
research of the impact of these significant and critical moves in the political 
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climate of China and of the impact of Chinese bid for the 2022 Winter Games 
on the development of Chinese elite sport would provide a fitting extension 
to the current study.  
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Appendix Interview Questions 
General Questions  
1. What is the most significant impact of the Beijing Games to Chinese elite 
sport (or your sport)?  
2. How is it different with the impact of the Athens and the London Games? 
3. Has there been any change in Chinese elite sport (or your sport)? 
4. Why there has (not) been change? 
5. Whose interest is promoted in the post-2008 situation, or in the change? 
6. What do you think the ideal environment for the development of Chinese 
elite sport (or your sport)? 
7. Has there been any change in the role of Chinese elite sport (or your 
sport) in the Chinese society?  
8. Has there been any change in your role in Chinese elite sport (or your 
sport)? 
9. Would Chinese elite sport (or your sport) be the same, if the 2008 Games 
was not in Beijing? 
10. Has there been any change in media? And how? 
11. Why there has (not) been Change? How does it affect the governance of 
Chinese elite sport (or your sport) 
Sport specific Questions 
1. Table tennis 
a) What is most fundamental feature of the Chinese table tennis super 
league, comparing with other Chinese elite table tennis competition? 
b) What is the most significant obstacle of development? 
c) How are the conflicts between commercial and collective interest 
sorted? 
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d) Has there been any change in players’ self-recognition on their role? 
Why? 
2. Diving 
a) How does the Beijing Games influence the relationship between the 
elite system and education system? 
b) How does the diving system in education sector affect the elite one? 
Why has there been decline? 
c) How should these two systems be balanced?  
d) How should the individual interests and collective interests be 
balanced? 
3. Baseball 
a) How do you perceive the development of Chinese baseball after 
being de-Olympiclised? How do you think the way of development 
shall be? 
b) How do you perceive the development of baseball in mass sport, 
education sector? How does these affect the elite baseball? 
c) How do you perceive the cooperation between the Chinese baseball 
association and other organisations in private sector? How do you 
think about the effort?  
 
 
 
 
